Beyond Strong and Weak: Rethinking Postdictatorship Civil Societies

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What is the impact of dictatorships on postdictatorial civil societies? Bottom-up theories suggest that totalitarian dictatorships destroy civil society while authoritarian ones allow for its development. Top-down theories of civil society suggest that totalitarianism can create civil societies while authoritarianism is unlikely to. This article argues that both these perspectives suffer from a one-dimensional understanding of civil society that conflates strength and autonomy. Accordingly we distinguish these two dimensions and argue that totalitarian dictatorships tend to create organizationally strong but heteronomous civil societies, while authoritarian ones tend to create relatively autonomous but organizationally weak civil societies. We then test this conceptualization by closely examining the historical connection between dictatorship and civil society development in Italy (a posttotalitarian case) and Spain (a postauthoritarian one). Our article concludes by reflecting on the implications of our argument for democratic theory, civil society theory, and theories of regime variation.

INTRODUCTION

Much contemporary democratic theory rests on the claim that functioning democracies require a “civil society”—a network of nongovernmental organizations that allows men and women to both discuss their common in-
terests and form organizations that can pressure the state on the basis of those interests (Tocqueville [1835] 1988, p. 515; Lederer 1940, p. 72; Kornhauser 1959, p. 23; Jowitt 1992, p. 287; Hall 1994; Booth and Richard 1998, p. 793; Putnam 2000, pp. 31–47; Howard 2003, pp. 47, 122–29; Alexander 2006, pp. 31, 37; Villa 2006, p. 225). A lively debate has now developed around this thesis (Berman 1997; Armony 2004; Riley 2010). Yet recent work does not well explain where civil societies come from. According to some scholars they are both a cause and a consequence of liberal democracy (Paxton 2002). Others suggest that civil societies develop out of long-term cultural or economic factors (Putnam 1993). But surprisingly the political determinants of civil society development have been relatively neglected (for an exception, see Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas [2001]). Specifically there has been little comparative work on the impact of different sorts of dictatorial regime on the configuration of postdictatorship civil societies. That connection is the focus of this study.

A word is necessary on terminology. This study follows Juan Linz’s canonical distinction between “totalitarian” and “authoritarian” regimes. Totalitarian regimes have a strong state party with an official ideology, while authoritarian regimes lack strong state parties and more generally lack “extensive political mobilization” (Linz 1970, p. 255). While we nuance Linz’s distinction below, this is the starting point for our analysis. To render our terminology consistent we will speak of “dictatorships” to refer to all non-liberal democratic regimes, but we will distinguish types of dictatorship according to whether they are totalitarian or authoritarian. In the analysis that follows Italy (1922–43) will be our key empirical example of totalitarianism, and Spain (1939–75) will be our key empirical example of authoritarianism.

There are of course some strongly held ideas about the impact of dictatorship on civil societies. The prevailing view holds that totalitarian dictatorships tend to flatten civil societies, thus leaving a legacy of associational weakness after the emergence of democracy (Linz, Stepan, and Gunther 1995, p. 82). In contrast, authoritarian regimes leave more space for voluntary associations. Therefore, societies that experience these regimes tend

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to have stronger civil societies in their democratic periods than do societies that experienced totalitarian regimes. Theoretically this argument is rooted in a “bottom-up” theory of civil society that views its growth in cultural or economic rather than political terms.

This argument contrasts strikingly with what might be called the “top-down” view, a position that was once widely held but is now relatively neglected. Bolshevik theorists, particularly Lenin in the State and Revolution, emphasized that one of the central projects of socialist transformation should be to “smash the state” and replace it with self-administering communes (Lenin 1975, p. 338). To achieve this level of self-administration required a major effort to organize secondary associations from the central state down. Samuel Huntington, in his classic Political Order and Changing Societies, developed and generalized this point. He suggested that totalitarian regimes, and particularly Leninist regimes, were centrally concerned with building “civic polities” (Huntington 1968, pp. 339–40). Indeed Huntington (1968, p. 340) argued that communists were “the most energetic and intense students of Tocqueville’s ‘art of associating together.’” The top-down view reverses the bottom-up account. From this perspective it is precisely totalitarian regimes (communist and fascist ones) that are likely to produce the most well-articulated intermediate structures.

These two arguments have opposite implications about the connection between dictatorship and civil society. If the bottom-up view is correct, totalitarian regimes should produce relatively weak civil societies, while authoritarian regimes should produce relatively stronger ones. If, in contrast, the top-down argument is right, totalitarian regimes should produce relatively strong civil societies, while authoritarian regimes should produce relatively weak ones.

This study develops a critique of both these arguments and presents some evidence for thinking about the connection between dictatorship (in both its totalitarian and authoritarian forms) and civil society in a new way. We suggest that both bottom-up and top-down theories suffer from a one-dimensional concept of civil society as either weak or strong. Our article proposes to replace the strong/weak dichotomy with a reconstructed Gramscian concept. Gramsci, unlike both the bottom-up and top-down theories, thought of civil society as varying in two relatively autonomous dimensions: organizational (strong or weak) and relational (autonomous or heteronomous). While in some instances organizational strength might combine with autonomy, Gramsci (1971, pp. 159–60; see also Althusser 1971, p. 144) saw this as an empirical matter, not an intrinsic feature of all forms of civil society. Our article shows the fruitfulness of this approach by investigating two strategically selected cases of postdictatorship civil society development: Italy and Spain. We show that postfascist Italy (our example of a posttotalitarian regime) possessed an organizationally strong civil so-
Ciety dominated by politics, while post-Francoist Spain (our example of a postauthoritarian regime) possessed an organizationally weak civil society that was relatively autonomous from politics. We contend that these opposite configurations of civil society (strong and heteronomous in Italy, weak and autonomous in Spain) were the result of the fundamentally contrasting historical experiences (and particularly the contrasting historical sequences) of fascism and Francoism. In the conclusion we discuss the implications of our study for civil society theory, democratic theory, and work on regime variation.

CIVIL SOCIETY: FROM ONE DIMENSION TO TWO DIMENSIONS

What are the origins of civil society? As we suggested above, there are two broad theoretical approaches to this question. The dominant position in contemporary work on civil society is “bottom-up,” suggesting that civil society emerges spontaneously under liberal political conditions. An older political development perspective is “top-down,” arguing that activist regimes with mass party organizations can create civil societies. Here, we briefly explore the logic of these two positions.

The Bottom-Up Theory

Most contemporary theories of civil society understand it as a realm of organizations that allows citizens to both pressure the state and solve common problems without its intervention (Tocqueville 1988, p. 515; Shils 1991, p. 3; Booth and Richard 1998, p. 793; Putnam 2000, pp. 31-47; Villa 2006, p. 225). Civil societies develop under two conditions. First there must be either a legally defined, or de facto, space in which people can associate to pursue their common interests without the threat of repression. Within this political context bottom-up theories generally hold that voluntary organizations develop for either cultural or economic reasons. From this perspective then civil society is the result of the conjunction of a legal division between the public and the private sphere, and social processes that push citizens to self-organize. There are three main strands of this general argument, a Hegelian one, a Marxian one, and Tocquevilian one.

Hegel, in the Philosophy of Right ([1820] 1991, pp. 220, 224; see also Bobbio 1969, pp. 81-82), suggests that civil society as a sphere of private interests can emerge only when there exists a state that endows its citizens with rights (Stedman-Jones 2001, p. 122). At the same time public institutions can emerge as public only when they are recognized as such by private persons (Hegel 1991, pp. 276, 282). For Hegel, then, the private sphere of civil society and the realm of public institutions emerge as dialectical counterparts.
The Hegelian argument emphasizes that civil society depends on a legal framework that institutionalizes a split between the public and the private sphere. Habermas and his followers are the most faithful contemporary Hegelians in this sense. They suggest that civil society is best understood as a public sphere of private persons in which a consensus about political affairs forms through discussion outside the manipulative context of states and markets (see the review in Anderson [2005, pp. 113–14]; see also Gouldner 1980, p. 356; Habermas 1989, pp. 36, 117–18; Cohen and Arató 1992, p. 25; Hirst 1994, p. 24; Cohen and Rogers 1995, pp. 38–39). This argument was extremely influential on the antipolitical movements of dissidents in Eastern and Southern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. For these intellectuals the establishment of a legally protected private sphere became, somewhat paradoxically, a political project (Konrád 1984, pp. 91–98).

The Marxian account of civil society is genetically related to the Hegelian one; indeed, like the Hegelians Marxists focus on the emergence of an institutional division between the public and private sphere. However, Marxists go beyond Hegelians because rather than stipulating the separation they specify a mechanism producing the split between the two institutional realms: the emergence of private property (Marx 1994, p. 18; Femia 2001, pp. 135–39). Although in Marx’s own work civil society is usually seen as an outcome of the French Revolution, presented as the origin of capitalist private property, more recent Marxist work civil society is usually traced back further. For example, Ellen Meiksins Wood (1990, pp. 69–70), following Anderson (1988, pp. 128, 139) and Szücs (1988, pp. 298–304), argues that civil society is the historical product of a combination of the tradition of Roman private law and Germanic feudal contract. All these Marxist arguments suggest that the emergence of civil society is connected to the development of a sphere of economic production and exchange that emerges outside the framework of political authority and is connected to the development of private property.

The Tocquevillian strand of work on civil society differs in two ways from its Hegelian and Marxist counterparts. It is more specifically focused on rights of free association than on civil and political rights in general, and it is more concerned with the cultural disposition to associate. For Tocqueville it is not rights in general that explain civil society but the right of free association. Where the right to association is well established men and women tend to combine to pursue their common interests, especially where a cultural disposition to associate exists (Tocqueville 1988, pp. 520–24; Jacobitti 1991, p. 590; Wolin 2001, pp. 212–15; Gannett 2003, p. 4).

There are many debates between the Tocquevillian, Hegelian, and Marxist exponents of civil society theory (for a useful overview, see Khilnani [2001]). To simplify somewhat, Hegelians and Marxists accuse Tocquevillians of ignoring the special structural characteristics of civil society in
their enthusiasm for the absolute number of organizations, while Tocquevil-llians accuse Hegelians and Marxists of not developing empirically useful concepts (Howard 2003, pp. 48–50). However, the two arguments are quite similar in the emphasis they place on establishing a minimal legal framework within which civil society emerges. Therefore a considerable body of work on civil society actually combines these traditions (Arato 1981, p. 23; Barber 1996, p. 279; Pérez-Díaz 2003, p. 110). From the perspective of this study, the key point is that for all three traditions civil society is best understood as the result of a well-established separation between a public and private sphere that allows civil society to develop spontaneously “from below” (Howard 2003, p. 47).

The bottom-up theory suggests that civil societies develop through cultural or economic processes that unfold outside the ambit of political organizations such as states and parties. Bureaucracies cannot create civil societies from above. This position implies that totalitarian regimes should generally produce weak civil societies after the reemergence of democracy because they, by definition, infringe on the separation between private and public life. In contrast, authoritarian dictatorships should allow for the development of strong civil societies if other conditions such as economic development or cultural dispositions are in place.

The Top-Down Theory of Civil Society

Sharply opposed to this bottom-up theory of civil society is a top-down approach that argues that civil societies can be created “from above” through specific political projects (Mouritsen 2003, p. 656). There are at least three major political and intellectual strands advocating the top-down approach: Leninism or Bolshevism, fascism, and theories of political development.

A central goal of Bolshevism was to establish a society without a coercive state. Leninism thus shared with many contemporary exponents of civil society the political ideal of a self-organizing social sphere (Tamás 1994, pp. 216–17). In The State and Revolution Lenin (1975, p. 344) draws on the example of the Paris Commune to argue that the Bolsheviks should use state power paradoxically to “smash the state” and create a new civil society based on associations outside the formal parliamentary sphere (Sakwa 1989, p. 227). To achieve this project, Lenin and his followers encouraged the construction of organizations such as agricultural cooperatives, youth groups, and unions (Arendt 1966, p. 318; Lenin 1975, p. 707; Bukharin 1982, p. 238). Bolshevism, from this perspective, was to a large extent a political project that aimed to create a civil society from above.

The Bolsheviks were not the only political force to express this idea. It was also common to fascist theorizing and particularly in the work of the
Italian jurist Sergio Panunzio. Panunzio argued that fascism was an attempt to synthesize state and civil society in a new higher unity that would transcend the antistatism of early syndicalism and the antisyndicalism of the liberal state (Panunzio 1939, pp. 36–37). Panunzio called this synthesis “corporatism,” a phenomenon that he interpreted as the reestablishment of Hegel’s civil society under modern conditions (Panunzio 1939, p. 21; 1987, p. 151). Ugo Spirito, another major corporatist theorist, held that fascism was a project of creating associations for a variety of groups. In this way, argued Spirito, government would be dispersed throughout this organizational fabric, thereby undermining the distinction between “rulers” and “ruled” (Spirito 1933, p. 41; Manoïlesco 1936, p. 15; Gregor 2005, pp. 118, 134). There is, of course, an important difference between Leninist and fascist thinking about civil society. Whereas the former aimed at establishing a society without a state, the latter aimed at creating what Michael Mann (1992, pp. 9–11) would call an “infrastructurally strong” state. Yet the construction of a civil society, defined by Panunzio (1939, pp. 22–23) as a “structure of various associations” was as central to the fascist political project as it was to the Leninist one.

This point, which sounds paradoxical in the context of contemporary scholarship, used to be rather widely acknowledged. For example, Samuel P. Huntington synthesized and generalized these arguments, as well as casting them in a neutral analytic language palatable to American social science, in his classic Political Order and Changing Societies. In this book Huntington argued that single parties, especially Leninist ones, were uniquely successful at creating “civic polities” with “stable patterns of institutional authority” (Huntington 1968, p. 82). For Huntington the key to their success was that they expanded both political participation and social organization. These parties “maintain contact with the masses through a system of transmission belts: unions, cooperatives, youth groups, soviets” (Huntington 1968, p. 341). Indeed for Huntington (1968, p. 340) communists “are the most energetic and intense contemporary students of Tocqueville’s ‘art of associating together.’” The political development perspective had a long subsequent life. For example, Daniel Chirot’s (1978, p. 493) analysis of communist Romania as a society in which “corporate groups are specifically organized and legitimized” bears a strong resemblance to Huntington’s claims. Gino Germani, in his classic study Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism, suggested a similar conclusion in slightly different language. He argued that totalitarianism was characterized by an intrinsically contradictory “planned socialization and resocialization” aimed at “the transformation of the population into ideologically ‘militant,’ active participants” (Germani 1978, p. 9). Indeed for these scholars of political development the true heirs of Tocqueville were Lenin, Stalin, and Mussolini—not contemporary liberals.
The top-down theory of civil society, to summarize, suggests that totalitarian dictatorships can actively construct civil society from above. The implication of this argument is quite clearly the opposite of that of the bottom-up theory. Fascist or communist regimes should be expected to leave a legacy of organization building favoring the development of civil society in the postdictatorial period. In contrast, authoritarian regimes should have less impact on the development of civil society.

Toward a Two-Dimensional Perspective: From Tocqueville and Hegel to Gramsci

Despite their sharp differences, the bottom-up and top-down theories of civil society discussed above share a similar one-dimensional concept of civil society as either “strong” or “weak.” While the bottom-up school sees strength as a consequence of an appropriate legal framework, the top-down school sees strength as an outcome of a conscious political/organizational project. Yet “strength” is an ambiguous concept. Therefore, it is important to make some distinctions. It is useful to begin by noting that much recent empirical work on civil society has been critical of the attempt to sharply distinguish it from the political sphere (Koshar 1986; Berman 1997; Ertman 1998, p. 499; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001; Encarnación 2003; Riley 2005). This growing body of research implies that the tidy legal distinctions of the bottom-up school are messy in empirical reality, but the theoretical import of this empirically based critique has yet to be adequately formulated. In this section we begin to do this by reconstructing Gramsci’s political theory and showing how the Sardinian implicitly distinguished between the organizational and relational dimensions of civil society in a way that puts the entire discussion in a new perspective. Gramsci’s *Prison Notebooks* are fragmentary, complex, and internally contradictory (Anderson 1976–77). However, they contain the beginnings of a concept of civil society that can form the basis of a two-dimensional model to replace the one-dimensional (strong-weak) model prevalent in most contemporary work. To lay the conceptual groundwork for this concept requires a theoretical break with some of the basic assumptions of both the bottom-up and top-down schools.

Gramsci, like Marx, Tocqueville, and Hegel, argues that the organizational development of civil society is important. Voluntary associations, argues Gramsci, exploded in late 19th- and early 20th-century Europe, radically altering the politics of advanced societies (Gramsci 1971, pp. 147–48, 243). However, in contrast to bottom-up theories (Keane 1988, p. 2; Kumar 1993, p. 282) Gramsci does not define civil society as being autonomous from politics (Pizzorno 1968, pp. 156–57). Instead, he sees the political position of civil society (particularly its connection to parties) as variable.
This is evident from his famous remarks on revolutionary tactics in Eastern and Western Europe. There (Gramsci 1971, p. 238) he writes: “In Russia the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and when the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed.” There is an important asymmetry in this passage. In the phrase about Russia, civil society is defined as “primordial and gelatinous”—that is, organizationally weak. Surprisingly, however, Gramsci does not contrast this to “strong” civil societies in the West, but rather to a situation in which “there was a proper relation between State and civil society.” That is, he suggests that civil society in Western Europe was autonomous from the state. Thus, Gramsci’s text implies two distinctions: an organizational one between strong and weak civil societies, and a relational one between autonomous and heteronomous civil societies. From the Gramscian perspective, then, civil societies should be thought of in two dimensions: a dimension of organizational strength and a dimension of political autonomy or heteronomy. Gramsci’s discussion remains, however, elusive in the text and requires some further elaboration.

The strength of civil society is a familiar conception. It refers to the number of voluntary organizations, including “mutual aid societies, cooperatives, and mass-based political parties” (Putnam 1993, p. 148), that exist in a given area for a given population; and it refers to the number of people who participate in such organizations (Putnam 2000, pp. 31–79). Strong civil societies are ones with many organizations and many people participating in them.

Civil society’s autonomy, in contrast, refers to a set of qualitative relationships between the state and nonstate organizations, and among nonstate organizations themselves. In our view, civil societies can be autonomous or heteronomous in two senses. They can either be externally autonomous—in the sense that they are autonomous from the state, or they can be internally autonomous in the sense that civil society organizations operate independently from one another. From this perspective a civil society is autonomous when cooperatives, mutual aid societies, political parties, and other forms of voluntary organization are able to act independently of one another and independently of the state. A civil society is heteronomous either when the state dominates the sphere of voluntary organizations or when a particular organization or organizations within civil society, usually a political party or parties, rises to a position of supremacy and is able to shape the agenda of other voluntary associations.

Gramsci expresses skepticism about the use of the legal distinction between the political realm and civil society as a way of analyzing actually
existing configurations of civil societies and politics. As he writes of liberal and syndicalist ideas of free trade, “they are based on a distinction between political society and civil society, which is made into and presented as an organic one, whereas in fact it is merely methodological” (Gramsci 1971, pp. 159–60). In short, Gramsci suggests that the distinction between civil society and politics should be treated as a “methodological,” meaning empirical, matter rather than an “organic,” meaning definitional, one (see Althusser [1971, p. 144] for an acute reading of this point).

The important analytic point is that for Gramsci the organizational development of civil society and its relationship to other spheres of social life vary. In some instances parties encompass and politicize associations, which nevertheless remain organizationally intact. In others, the associational sphere is relatively autonomous from politics, but this does not imply that civil society in such instances is always organizationally strong (Gramsci 1971, pp. 155–56, 265). Unlike the bottom-up view of civil society discussed above which holds autonomy to be an “organic” defining feature of it, since bottom-up theorists define civil society as a legal sphere, Gramsci sees the relationship between civil society and politics as a “methodological” empirical matter. But unlike the top-down view that shows a lack of interest in the autonomy of civil society, Gramsci preserves a concern with its importance. Indeed for him the connection between the political sphere and the sphere of associations is one of the main distinguishing features of different types of civil society (Gramsci 1971, p. 160).

Some recent literature on civil society hints at aspects of this approach. For example, Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva (2008, pp. 918–19) distinguish between the “self-organization” and the “mode of engagement” of civil society and further call for a “relational” approach to civil society (Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva 2011, p. 28). This work also distinguishes civil society organizations (CSOs) in terms of their autonomy from the state (Baiocchi et al. 2011, p. 34). Our approach, however, differs from theirs in two basic ways. First, these authors address themselves mostly to the important problem of the democratic consequences of civil society, but they do not provide much of a model for explaining the origins of civil society. Second, these authors, like the literature reviewed above, fail to clearly distinguish autonomy from strength. They write that “while some CSOs engage the state as clients . . . others are sufficiently strong and self-determining that they choose not to engage the state and retain their autonomy” (Baiocchi et al. 2008, p. 919). Further, in their 2011 book Bootstrapping Democracy the authors (Baiocchi et al. 2011, p. 34) state that CSOs are “autonomous when they have the capacity for self-organizing and self-determination [i.e., when they are strong].” For these scholars the idea of a strong het-
eronomous civil society or a weak autonomous one is a contradiction in terms. This is because autonomy, for them, is a function of strength, and strength is defined by autonomy. In contrast, the neo-Gramscian approach that we develop treats these as independent axes of variation and constitutes an entirely different approach to civil society.

Closely related to this analytic rethinking is a new explanatory agenda. For Gramsci not only provides a more sophisticated typology of civil society than either the bottom-up or top-down schools. He also suggests that civil society can develop in two fundamental ways: as an autonomous growth from below or in a hothouse fashion from above. In his note on “Statolatry” he hints that a period of dictatorship is likely to accompany the transition to new forms of state when a social group has not “had a long independent period of cultural and moral development” (Gramsci 1971, p. 268). During this dictatorial period a group emerges with “the will to construct within the husk of political society a complex and well-articulated civil society, in which the individual can govern himself without his self-government thereby entering into conflict with political society—but rather becoming its normal continuation, its organic complement” (Gramsci 1971, p. 268). Gramsci has in mind here both fascist Italy and the Soviet Union. The first he interprets as a transitional regime from a peripheral capitalist to a developed capitalist society. The second he interprets as a transitional regime from a peripheral socialist to a developed socialist society. In both cases, suggests Gramsci, political elites create a strong and heteronomous civil society (appropriate to either capitalism or socialism) during a phase of dictatorship.

Gramsci’s analysis, in sum, provides a useful corrective to both the bottom-up and top-down views. First, he breaks with the idea that civil society is by definition a sphere of social life autonomous from politics. Instead, for him the associational sphere constitutes an organizational terrain that may be autonomous from states and parties, but need not be. This suggests that analysts should treat the legal status of civil society as a variable, not a constant. However, and this distinguishes Gramsci’s argument from the top-down perspective, the autonomy or heteronomy of civil society is important. Gramsci distinguished “Eastern” civil societies from “Western” civil societies not only in terms of their organizational strength but also in terms of their relationship to the state-party sphere.

What are the empirical implications of the Gramscian argument? Unlike the two positions discussed above, this position suggests hypotheses about organizational strength as well as about organizational autonomy. From Gramsci’s perspective totalitarian regimes are likely to produce strong but heteronomous postdictatorial civil societies, while authoritarian regimes are likely to produce weak but autonomous civil societies.
How can we investigate empirically the three positions outlined above? The research strategy in this article draws on the Hungarian philosopher Imre Lakatos’s theory of scientific progress. Lakatos described scientific growth as a process of the identification and subsequent theoretical incorporation of anomalies (Lakatos 1970, p. 130; see also Burawoy 1990, p. 777; Emigh 2009; Riley 2010). In a brilliant inversion of Karl Popper’s (1968) theory of falsificationism, Lakatos argued that theories were born falsified and then progressively “unfalsified” themselves through the development of subsequent belts of theory compatible with a set of core postulates. As Burawoy (1990, p. 777) puts the point, “According to Lakatos science grows not through the refutation of conjectures but through the refutations of refutations of core theories.” These subsequent belts of theory incorporate anomalous evidence, turning that evidence into “verifications” of its expanded form. This article attempts to build civil society theory in precisely this Lakatosian manner. The cases we focus on (Italy and Spain) are anomalies for bottom-up theories of civil society; further, they display features about which top-down theories of civil society make no predictions. The Gramscian theory of civil society has two advantages over existing accounts: first, it can explain the anomalies generated by bottom-up theory. Second it can predict new facts invisible from the perspective of the top-down theory. To understand why, we briefly adumbrate the logic of our comparative analysis.

The bottom-up theory predicts that totalitarian regimes should produce civil societies that are organizationally weaker than those produced by authoritarian regimes. We present evidence that the opposite outcome occurred in Italy and Spain. Italy, whose fascist regime became progressively more totalitarian as it lasted, produced an organizationally stronger civil society than Spain, whose regime was authoritarian, not totalitarian, after 1945. From the perspective of the bottom-up theory’s claim about the connection between totalitarianism and civil society, both are anomalous cases. We will argue that the theory can account for neither the (relative) strength of Italian civil society nor the (relative) weakness of Spanish civil society.

The top-down theory of civil society, in contrast to the bottom-up one, predicts that totalitarian regimes should produce civil societies that are more organizationally dense than authoritarian regimes. In our view the Spanish and Italian evidence broadly confirms this position, and yet the top-down perspective misses a very important feature of civil society: its autonomy or heteronomy. Top-down theories make no predictions about this dimension of variation. Our formulation of the Gramscian argument
does, however. For we predict that civil society in Spain’s democracy was relatively autonomous from parties and the state, while Italy’s civil society remained subordinated to them. One of the major tasks of our account, then, will be to present evidence of the greater autonomy of civil society in democratic Spain relative to democratic Italy.

The Gramscian approach to civil society, in sum, allows us to expand existing work in precisely a Lakatosian manner. First it makes sense of the Spanish and Italian anomalies. The strength of Italian civil society combined with the weakness of Spanish civil society is troubling for bottom-up theory, but the Gramscian alternative predicts this outcome. Second, unlike the top-down theory, the Gramscian theory makes a prediction about autonomy. Therefore, it has greater empirical content than the top-down theory that is insensitive to this range of variation. The Gramscian theory, at least as we have constructed it, is thus a Lakatosian expansion of existing accounts both in the sense that it incorporates an anomaly (from the perspective of the bottom-up theory) and predicts new facts (from the perspective of the top-down theory; Lakatos 1971, p. 115). Such is the general strategy of theoretical development that this study pursues.

Our article tries to do something else as well: to incorporate sequences of events deeply into our account of the connection between dictatorship and civil society (Haydu 1998; Sewell 2005). This demands more than demonstrating the existence of different types of civil society in Italy and Spain. Our analysis moves beyond this to show the precise historical mechanism that linked dictatorship to civil society in these cases. To understand the general strategy of analysis, it is important to emphasize the role of sequencing in our argument. Although it is useful for terminological purposes to present “totalitarianism,” “authoritarianism,” and “democracy” as regime types, one main aim of this article is to show how the historical linkages across these types molded the civil societies of Italy and Spain. So, although we use the distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in exactly the same sense as Juan Linz (2003, pp. 29–40), we also point out that the real difference between the Italian and Spanish dictatorships can only be grasped sequentially (Abbott 1995, 2001). The Italian dictatorship was cut off in its development by defeat in war, whereas the Spanish dictatorship, which initially strongly resembled the Italian one, survived. As a result, the timing of democratization with respect to the history of dictatorship differed in the two cases. In Italy democracy was temporally contiguous to the totalitarian regime, whereas in Spain democracy was temporally separated from totalitarianism by an authoritarian caesura. The “cases” of Italy and Spain are in fact sequences of historical events.

We would also like to emphasize in general terms how we think about the linkages across dictatorships and democracies. One part of our analysis stresses that authoritarianism and totalitarianism in Italy and Spain left
organizational models that were then picked up by new political actors in the democratic period and spread through processes of imitation and competition (della Porta 1995, pp. 110–11; Tarrow 2011, pp. 39–41, 127). In short, they were “historical legacies” in the sense that this idea is commonly used in political sociology and political science. But we also suggest a second mechanism. To understand this mechanism requires a break with some assumptions.

Political sociologists often describe regime outcomes using a set of ontologically positive characteristics. For example, much comparative political science has been devoted to elaborating definitions of democracy as characterized by competitive elections, civil liberties, and universal suffrage (see the review in Mahoney [2003a, pp. 158–59]). Much of this work is important and useful, but we believe that it limits to some extent the empirical examination of the historical connections between democracies and dictatorships. For democracies that emerge out of dictatorships are always characterized by a set of ontologically negative as well as positive characteristics. They are connected to the past not only through imitation but also through rejection.

Thus, we argue that the emergence of the strongly politicized and highly organized civil society of postfascist Italy was a result of the temporal contiguity of totalitarianism and mass democracy in this case. But this was not only because fascism left legacies in a positive sense. Just as important was the fact that in the concrete historical circumstances of postwar Italy, mass democracy could emerge only as a negation of fascism: as “antifascism.” Spanish democracy, in contrast, did not emerge as “antifascism” because much of the fascist character of the regime had disappeared by the 1970s, as we show below. Instead Spain’s democracy emerged as anti-Francoism, a very different sort of political project. In sum, we suggest that the two democracies emerged as determinant negations (Kojève 1991, pp. 4–5; Hegel 1975, p. 135; Sartre 1984, p. 42; Collier 2005, pp. 335–36) of two very different sorts of dictatorship. This negative character defined the specificity of each form of democracy as a historical project (Sartre 1967, p. 91). As “antifascism,” Italian democracy preserved many of fascism’s political structures. In particular, Italian democracy reproduced and pluralized the very mass party form that the fascists had built precisely because key political elites in the Italian First Republic sought to eradicate fascism. This negative orientation to the preceding totalitarian regime on the part of decisive historical actors is, paradoxically, one of the central mechanisms linking the fascist regime to a civil society that was both strong and heteronomous after 1945. In contrast, in Spain, although the dictatorship initially had an incipiently totalitarian structure, its survival into the postwar period pushed it onto a very different developmental path: one in which the party played a diminished (although still important) role. Spain’s transition to
democracy, in contrast to Italy’s, was thus separated from its totalitarian experience by an authoritarian caesura lasting roughly three decades. Democracy in Spain as a consequence emerged not as a negation of fascism, but as a negation of Francoism. As such the democratic project in Spain was much more focused exclusively on a transformation of the political elite, since the Francoist regime itself was relatively uninterested in mass mobilization.

STRONG CIVIL SOCIETY IN ITALY, WEAK CIVIL SOCIETY IN SPAIN

We begin our empirical discussion by briefly documenting the two main outcomes that we subsequently explain through our historical comparative analysis: a strong but heteronomous civil society in postfascist Italy and a weak but autonomous one in post-Francoist Spain. We focus first on organizational strength and, in the following section, on autonomy. To establish differences in the organizational strength of civil society we review several sorts of evidence: evidence on the percentage of the population enrolled in a political party, evidence on the percentage of the population voting in democratic elections, evidence on membership in cooperative organizations, evidence on the number of general strikes and the number of riots involving more than 100 people, evidence on membership in voluntary organizations, evidence on petition signing, and finally evidence on union density. These types of evidence capture the two aspects of “strength” commonly used in literature on civil society: organization and participation or “civic engagement.” To anticipate briefly, the evidence suggests that postdictatorship civil society in Italy is considerably stronger than in Spain. Table 1 summarizes the information.

Formal Political Participation: Parties and Voting

Parties are key intermediate organizations standing between centralized states and their citizens (de Leon 2014, pp. 1–2). Although neo-Tocquevillians tend to be somewhat ambivalent about them, they are clearly part of civil society (Putnam 1993, p. 149). Evidence on party membership is therefore highly relevant to assessing the strength of this sphere. Our evidence shows that party membership in postdictatorial Italy and Spain differed sharply. As table 1 shows, over the period from 1945 to 2000 (1977–2000 in the case of Spain) 10% on average of the Italian population belonged to a political party. The figure in Spain in contrast was 2%.

This difference is historically recent, however. Prior to their respective dictatorships, both Italy and Spain experienced brief windows of mass democracy: Italy in the period from 1918 to 1922 and Spain during the Second Republic from 1933 to 1936. During the predictorship period about
3% of the Italian population belonged to an organized political party, compared with roughly 8% of the Spanish population in the Second Republic. In short, the relative positions of Spain and Italy changed in their dictatorial periods. Evidence on party membership under the dictatorships is suggestive of why this was so. Under the fascist regime about 14% of the population belonged to the party Partito Nazionale Fascista (National Fas-
against only about 10% of Spaniards who belonged to the Falange Española Tradicionalista de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista (Spanish Phalanx of the Assemblies of the National Syndicalist Offensive; FET-JONS). As we show in our historical analysis below, this is indicative of two very differently organized dictatorial regimes.

Voting, as Putnam emphasizes, is a major indicator of civic engagement. As he writes of the United States, “Voters are more likely to be interested in politics, to give to charity, to volunteer, to serve on juries, to attend community school board meetings, to participate in public demonstrations, and to cooperate with their fellow citizens on community affairs” (Putnam 2000, p. 35). On this dimension postdictatorship Italy and Spain differ sharply. Between 1945 and 2004, 90% of Italian eligible voters voted. The figures for Spain, which begin with the first democratic elections in 1977, show that only 74% of eligible Spaniards on average voted. Until 2000 the turnouts to the Spanish elections, which peaked in 1982 at approximately 83%, have always been lower than the minimum turnout in Italy, which dipped in 1996 to 87% (IDEA 2004).

Voting patterns followed the same historical shift that we documented above in party membership. During the Second Republic about 70% of eligible voters voted in Spain, compared with only 58% in the democratic elections of the 1913–21 period in Italy. Again the evidence is consistent with the view that the dictatorial period had different consequences for levels of voting in Italy and Spain.

There are, however, some obvious institutional differences that might be invoked to explain the differences in national level participation. Two of these factors are particularly important: the overall electoral system and the specific legal environment for voting. We begin with the first. Between 1947 and 1991 the Italian electoral system was a very pure case of proportional representation. It had only 32 electoral districts, which favors smaller parties. Further, it allocated seats according the “largest remainders” method. This method of allocation divides the number of votes by the total number of seats in the chamber, creating a “quota” for each seat. For example, if there are 5 seats to allocate, and a total of 100,000 votes, then the quota is 100,000/5 or 20,000. Each party then receives one seat for every 20,000 votes it wins (Gallagher 1991, pp. 37–38). Unallocated remaining seats were assigned to parties with the largest unused share of the quota. This highly proportional system encouraged high voter turnout (Gallagher 1991, p. 46; D’Alimonte 2005, pp. 254–55).

The Spanish electoral decree of 1977 and law of 1985 also established proportional representation, but the legislation, under pressure from the center right, instituted correctives to reduce the level of party fragmentation (Gunther 1989, p. 838). Parliamentary seats in Spain are allocated with the D’Hondt system according to the formula \( V_i/(S_i + 1) \) where \( V \) is
the total number of votes and \( S \) is the number of seats received so far (Gallagher 1991, pp. 34–35). The party with the highest ratio of votes to seats awarded receives the next seat. Consider three parties, A, B, and C, in a parliament with three seats and 100,000 votes. Imagine that party A won 60,000 votes, party B 28,000 votes, and party C 12,000 votes. In the first division, party A gets the first seat because 60,000/1 is the highest proportion of votes to seats. Party A also gets the second seat because 60,000/2 is 30,000, and this is still higher than the 28,000 votes won by party B. In the third division, however, party B gets the seat because 28,000/1 is greater than 60,000/3. It turns out that in this system party C gets no seats. The method, then, is characterized by a “relatively severe treatment of tiny parties” (Gallagher 1991, p. 34). Other features operate in the same direction in Spain. Spanish law established small electoral districts (one for each of the 50 provinces), a minimum representation for each province, and the discarding of remainder votes. Together these electoral laws benefit large nationwide and regional parties, while penalizing small nationwide parties (Gunther, Sani, and Shabad 1986, pp. 43–53; Hopkin 2005, p. 379). Thus, even if the level of nonproportionality in Spain has declined since the elections of 1977 (Hopkin 2005, p. 382), its postdictatorial electoral system can be best classified in the middle ground between proportional and majoritarian regimes, which likely depresses political participation compared to systems like the Italian one (Montero 1994, pp. 72–78; Linz and Montero 1999, pp. 101–4).

Further, the electoral structure is not the only difference between the two countries. There are also a series of important differences in the voting laws. Most obviously, article 48 of the Italian constitution stipulates voting as a “civic duty” (La Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana). Although this constitutional provision is not backed by specific legislation stipulating penalties, a 1947 law stipulated that the words “did not vote” would be stamped on a person’s identification papers if they failed to vote (Galli and Prandi 1970, p. 28). Further, during at least the 1948 elections, which were held in an atmosphere of high Cold War tension, the electoral law stipulated that a list of those who failed to vote should be posted at communal government offices for 30 days (Grosso 2007, p. 973). On the other hand, Pombeni (1995, p. 115) suggests that this is not a “true obligatory vote,” since no specific penalties were associated with not voting. Still, having the words “did not vote” on one’s identity papers may have had negative consequences, especially for state employees.

A number of other factors worked in the same direction. In Italy voters were automatically registered on the voting rolls at the age of 21 and after the 1974 election at the age of 18, while elections in Italy were initially a public holiday often lasting for more than one day. Further in the early postdictatorship period a series of voluntary organizations, such as the
Christian democratic “Civic Committees” and the Red Cross, provided free transport to the polls (Galli and Prandi 1970, p. 30; Farnetti 1985, p. 51).

In Spain this configuration of factors differs. First, voting is voluntary and nonvoters do not suffer any administrative sanction or any formal or informal reprobation. Since the first postdictatorship elections, individuals registered in the local census are automatically registered as voters at the age of 18 (which very slightly lessens the total voting turnout because young people are less prone to vote than older ones; Justel [1995, p. 218]). And only one of the first four national legislative elections (1986) was celebrated on a holiday, while they all strictly lasted one day. Further, political parties and civil society organizations probably did not provide transport to the polls. Neither historical nor contemporary journalistic accounts mention mobilizations of this sort during either the 1982, or the 1986, election days (Preston 1986). So Spain seems to have lacked some of the organizational and broader institutional features that explain higher voting turnout in Italy.

Do these factors account for all the differences in political participation between Italy and Spain? We think there is some reason to doubt this. Elections to the European Parliament constitute a partial test of this argument. This is because the Italian and Spanish electoral systems for the European elections have an equivalent level of proportionality. Both systems lack a minimum threshold. Moreover, although in Italy the allocation of seats is based on a slightly more proportional system (the Hare system instead of the D'Hondt system used in Spain), Spain uses district size, which produces higher proportionality (the whole country instead of five regions as used in Italy; Duff 2010, pp. 32–33). Despite this similarity, however, the evidence shows that Italians have participated much more than Spaniards in the European elections. The average turnout in the six European elections held until 2000 in Italy (approximately 79%) has been 18 points larger than the average turnout in the five European elections held so far in Spain (approximately 61%). Moreover, as was the case with the national elections to the chambers of deputies, the maximum turnout in Spain (69% in 1987) was lower than the minimum turnout in Italy (70% in 1999; European Parliament 2010).

This evidence is still ambiguous. For it might be the case that indirectly institutional factors are at play in the European elections. Perhaps one of the reasons that Italians vote at high rates for the European Parliament is because they are simply used to voting because of the institutional factors that operate at the national level. However, even if we accept the idea that institutional factors account for all the difference in voting behavior between the two cases, the question still arises, “where did these institutions come from?” In other words, why did Italy have an obligatory vote,
a system of pure proportional representation, and public holidays for voting whereas Spain did not? These questions can only be fully answered in the course of the analysis below. Here we would simply suggest that the use of political institutions to promote participation is a point of continuity with the fascist regime. According to the men who designed the institutions of the Italian Republic, the new state should be based on a highly mobilized politically active population organized into mass parties ( Fioravanti 2001, p. 814). This concern for mass mobilization, which was then institutionalized in a system of proportional representation and the obligatory vote, was quite paradoxically linked to the fascist past. In short, the institutional factors that drive high voter turnouts in Italy are themselves an outcome of the fascist experience, particularly the strength of mass party organizations, as we show in detail below.

Cooperatives

Membership in cooperatives is another important indicator of the strength of civil society, because they are usually seen as organizations that depend particularly on trust and “social capital.” Indeed evidence on the Italian cooperative movement was central to Putnam’s (1993, pp. 139–41) classic analysis of Italian politics. What does this evidence suggest?

Immediately following the war the Italian cooperative movement exploded. In 1943 there were 12,000 registered cooperatives with more than 3 million members (Fornasari and Zamagni 1997, p. 145). These figures expanded rapidly over the following decade (Fornasari and Zamagni 1997, p. 162). Cooperatives undertook various activities. Consumer cooperatives provided their members with relatively inexpensive goods (Degl’Innocenti 1981, p. 65). Credit cooperatives were established for small business and personal loans (Fornasari and Zamagni 1997, pp. 148–49). Agrarian cooperatives undertook various tasks, such as increasing the bargaining power of agricultural workers who had to rent land and helping with marketing agricultural products (Fornasari and Zamagni 1997, pp. 164–65). Producer cooperatives exploded (from 3,200 to 6,500) in the period between 1943 and 1947, in part to repair wartime damage (Degl’Innocenti 1981, pp. 67–68).

Spain also has a long and vigorous tradition of cooperatives (Garrido 1996, 2007; Riley 2010, pp. 74–79). Indeed perhaps the best known cooperative internationally is Mondragón Corporación Cooperativa founded in 1956 by a priest in the rural Basque town of Mondragón (Wright 2010, p. 4). The Mondragón group is active in the manufacturing, banking, insurance, and retail sectors and counted in 2010 more than 83,000 workers, 83% of whom are cooperative members (Menzani and Zamagni 2010, pp. 41–42; Mondragón Corporación Cooperativa 2012).
However, despite the notoriety of the Spanish cooperative movement, the number of cooperatives per capita has been consistently higher in Italy than in Spain. Comparable evidence is available for the years 1999–2007. In that period there were on average 12 cooperatives per 1,000 people in Italy and only 6 active cooperatives per 1,000 people in Spain, as table 1 shows (Vella 2010, p. 104; World Bank 2010; INE 2012).

Italy not only has a denser cooperative network than Spain, it also has more medium and large size organizations. In the 2004 ranking of the Global 300 Initiative, which collects information regarding the 300 largest cooperatives worldwide, Italy has 19 organizations, whereas Spain has only eight (International Cooperative Alliance 2012). Further, Italian cooperatives employ more people than Spanish cooperatives. Based on reports of the “social economy” in the European Union, in 2002 and 2009 Italian cooperatives absorbed on average a little over 4% of the employed labor force. For the same years, Spanish cooperatives absorbed on average a little over 3% of the employed labor force (Monzón and Chaves 2005, 2012). Thus, Italy has more co-ops per capita as well as more organizations among the largest co-ops in the world, and the Italian cooperative system generates more employment than the Spanish one.

Making historical comparisons about cooperatives is somewhat more difficult. This is because for the predictorship period there do not exist parallel sources of information that define cooperatives in the same way. Further, the political environment of the cooperative movement changed dramatically over time. Thus while it is almost certainly true that the cooperative movement was weaker in Spain than in Italy prior to the Spanish Second Republic (Riley 2005), cooperative development appears to have been quite dramatic in Spain during the 1930s. To reduce the ambiguities in definition and to focus the evidence on comparable periods we compare the number of agrarian cooperatives in Spain in 1933 with the number of agrarian cooperatives in Italy in 1921. Table 1 shows that in 1933 Spain had a greater number of cooperatives per 1,000 people than Italy in 1921.

Voluntary Organizations and Unions

The evidence on membership in voluntary organizations is drawn from the World Values Survey, which from the early 1980s has asked a variety of questions about organizational membership and voluntarism. One of these questions asks if the respondent belongs to one of the listed organizations. We calculated the percentage of respondents who indicated that they belong to some voluntary organization and averaged these percentages across all waves of the survey. This information indicates that from 1981 to 1999 membership in voluntary organizations was on average five
points higher in Italy than in Spain. These results are in line with what other scholars of civil society have found about Spain using this evidence (Inglehart 1997, pp. 188–90; Encarnación 2003, p. 178).

Table 1 also reports evidence on union density obtained by Visser (2006). Union density is the percentage of persons who are union members out of all persons who are potential union members. The figures in table 1 show that on average 38% of potential union members in Italy were actual union members over the period from 1970 to 2003. In contrast, only 16% of potential union members were actual union members in Spain over the same period. This evidence suggests that Italians were much more likely to join this crucial form of voluntary organization than Spaniards. Unfortunately, for neither one of these indicators do we have good evidence on the pre-dicatorship period.

General Strikes, Riots, Petitions

Table 1 also reports evidence on a series of more informal social movement types of political participation. The evidence shows that Spain had a greater number of general strikes (two) in its pre-dicatorship period with respect to Italy, which had only one. Further, pre-dicatoral Spain had seven riots involving more than 100 people while pre-dicatorial Italy had only three such events. In the post-dicatorship period both Italy and Spain endured one general strike, while Italy had three large riots and Spain one.

The World Values Survey also collects evidence on the percentage of people who report signing a petition. For the period from 1981 to 1999 this figure was 47% for Italy and 25% for Spain. To conclude, then, the evidence suggests that less formal modes of political participation than voting were more common in post-dicatorship Italy than in Spain and that these differences were relatively recent.

Conclusion

Taken together, the evidence presented in this section suggests one basic conclusion. In the current democratic period, civil society is organizationally stronger in Italy than in Spain. Italians are more likely than Spaniards to join voluntary associations, there are more cooperatives per capita in Italy than in Spain, higher percentages of Italians than Spaniards are members of unions, and Italians join parties and vote in greater numbers than their Spanish counterparts. Further, Italians are more likely to petition their government than Spaniards, and Italy has experienced more general strikes and riots in its post-dictatorial democracy than Spain. This conclusion resonates with the important work of Giuseppe Lapalombara.
(1964, p. 172; 1987, p. 251) on Italian political culture, which emphasizes both the high level of political engagement in Italy and the dense network of secondary associations in the country.

Further, this difference in the strength of civil society between the two cases appears to be a historically recent phenomenon. In the predictatorial period 8% of Spaniards were members of a political party compared with 3% of Italians. There were three Spanish agrarian cooperatives per 1,000 people compared to one Italian agrarian cooperative per 1,000 people. Seventy percent of Spanish voters voted in the predictatorial elections, compared to 58% of Italians. As we have already suggested, there were also more general strikes and riots in predictatorial Spain than in Italy. This evidence, in sum, provides a warrant for one central empirical puzzle that this study seeks to answer: did something occur during the fascist and Francoist periods to create these differences in the strength of civil society?

Before we can turn more directly to this issue, however, we must address an equally important difference. For as we show in the next section, despite its organizational strength, Italian civil society of the postdictatorial period was distinctly subordinate to politics. It lacked autonomy. In contrast, even though Spanish civil society was organizationally weaker than its Italian counterpart, it was clearly more autonomous.

HETERONOMOUS CIVIL SOCIETY IN ITALY,
AUTONOMOUS CIVIL SOCIETY IN SPAIN

The sorts of evidence that can be used to show this autonomy or heteronomy are intrinsically more ambiguous than the organizational and membership data we presented above. This section focuses specifically on the degree to which political parties have dominated Italian and Spanish civil society in their postdictatorial periods. A careful review of the secondary literature strongly suggests that in Italy political parties influenced other types of voluntary associations to a much greater degree than was true of Spain. Unions and cooperatives, veterans’ organizations, women’s groups, and leisure time organizations have been strongly linked to political parties in Italy (Perlmutter 1991, p. 157). In contrast, in Spain political parties never exercised this degree of control over civil society, which was much more autonomous from the political sphere.

Italy

Both of Italy’s main parties in the first few decades after fascism, the Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party; PCI) and the Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democracy; DC), had a particularly intimate relationship to nonparty voluntary associations such as leisure time

The most developed party organizationally was the PCI (Almagisti 2007, p. 175). One of its main activities was selling the membership card or tessera, a document that gave its holder a strong sense of political belonging. As Martinelli (1995, p. 177) writes of the PCI, “issuing party cards [tesseramento] constituted the back-bone of the party.” The PCI thus was not simply an electoral machine but was also engaged in a broader project of constructing a political community (Galli and Prandi 1970, p. 91; Scoppola 1997, pp. 163–68).

The party also had many affiliated collective actors such as industrial labor unions, agricultural unions, cooperatives, women’s groups, and veterans’ organizations. In addition, it established a set of organizations concerned with recreation and culture (Galli and Prandi 1970, pp. 195–226). The relationship between the PCI and the Italian labor movement was particularly close in the early years of the First Republic. Under the Pact of Rome the labor leadership of the three main parties aimed at establishing the Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (Italian Labor General Confederation; CGIL) as a nonpartisan organization in which political influence would be shared. The struggle between the PCI and the DC for the control of the CGIL could not, however, be contained within this organization, and in 1948, only four years after the Pact of Rome, the Catholic union (the Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori (Italian Confederation of Workers’ Unions; CISL) representatives left the CGIL (Istituto Carlo Cattaneo 1969, p. 40). After the split, the CGIL became the union apparatus of the PCI and, to a lesser extent, the Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party; PSI). The membership of the CGIL’s executive board shows its close link to the PCI. According to an exhaustive study carried out by the Istituto Carlo Cattaneo, PCI leaders made up roughly half of the CGIL’s executive from 1947 to 1960. Perhaps more significantly the CGIL’s general secretary was a very high profile communist leader, Giuseppe di Vittorio, from 1945 until his death in 1957, when the position went to another PCI leader, Agostino Novella (Istituto Carlo Cattaneo 1969, p. 61).

The PCI had a similar relationship to the cooperative movement. Between 1951 and 1962 the number of cooperatives more than doubled from 14,331 to 35,013 (Istituto Carlo Cattaneo 1969, p. 128). Part of the cooperative movement was closely linked to the PCI through the Lega Nazionale delle Cooperative (National League of Cooperatives, or Lega). Politically,
consumer cooperation was the most important type of cooperative activity. The retail shops run by these cooperatives constituted, in 1959, according to an article in the PCI’s daily L’Unità, “the largest, most capillary, most diffused, sales chain in Italy” (quoted in Istituto Carlo Cattaneo 1969, pp. 99–100). According to the authors of the Cattaneo report, these organizations, more than retail outlets, were places where political ideas and conversations could take place and were very effective during elections. The PCI also politicized leisure. The most important organization for doing this was the Casa del Popolo (people’s house). These institutions became the center of communal life in many areas of central Italy. The people’s houses showed films, held debates, promoted sporting events, and organized games for children (Ginsborg 1989, p. 262).

The party also established two important collateral organizations: the partisan organization Associazione Nazionale Partigiani Italiani (National Association of Italian Partisans; ANPI) and the women’s organization the Unione Donne Italiane (Italian Women’s Union; UDI). The ANPI organized a program through which recruits and war veterans were sent to spend the winter months with communist families in Tuscany and Emilia Romagna (Martinelli 1995, p. 180). The UDI was even more active, establishing social assistance, reading groups, sewing circles, and singing groups. While linked to the PCI, the UDI was not explicitly engaged in political activities, seeking instead to weave political education into the fabric of everyday life. This organization had 3,500 local circles and more than a million members in 1954 (Ginsborg 1989, p. 264; Ventrone 1996, pp. 124–27).

The second main mass party in Italy was the DC. This party’s relationship to the state was entirely different from the PCI, for it was the party of government and ruled Italy virtually without interruption until it was swept away in the corruption scandals of the early 1990s (Ginsborg 1989, pp. 204–5). Before documenting how the DC penetrated voluntary organizations, it is important to emphasize two very distinctive features of it. First, as a confessional party, the DC was profoundly shaped by the Catholic Church, which could rely on parish organizations and the powerful Catholic press to mobilize its followers (Scoppola 1980, p. 105; Almagisti 2007, p. 169). Second, the DC was not as unified an organization as the PCI. Instead it was a loose aggregation of different currents. After the party’s relative electoral defeat of 1953, Amintore Fanfani shifted it toward an organizational strategy similar to the PCI (Ginsborg 1989, p. 225). In addition, a number of peripheral organizations served the party, such as Azione Cattolica (Catholic Action; AC), which in 1954 had a membership of 2,655,078. Confraternities and lay orders also aided the DC. A confederation of cooperative societies, the Confederazione Cooperative Italiane (Confederation of Italian Cooperatives; CCI) further supported the party, especially in the Emilia Romagna. The Church also provided “a vast
number of educational and recreational activities” through the Pontificia Opera di Assistenza (Papal Assistance Organization; POA). In short, the DC penetrated Italian civil society as thoroughly as the PCI (Ginsborg 1989, p. 228). The quantitative evidence on the growth of all of these organizations is impressive. The main union confederation of the DC, the CISL, grew, according to its official statistics, from 1,221,523 members in 1949 to 2,425,262 members by 1961. Indeed, unlike the CGIL, the CISL’s figures showed its tendency to expand over the period (Istituto Carlo Cattaneo 1969, p. 41). The figures for the cooperative league, the CCI, are equally impressive. This organization grew from 1 million members in 1945 to 2,184,000 members by 1962. Indeed its total membership was higher than the Lega’s after 1956 (Istituto Carlo Cattaneo 1969, p. 90).

The general point, then, is inescapable. When civil society reemerged in postwar Italy it was profoundly politicized. Civil society in Italy was penetrated and subordinated to two massive political organizations: the PCI and the DC. As Ted Perlmutter (1991, p. 157) correctly summarized the situation in the early 1990s, “parties pervade all aspects of political, economic, and social life in Italy.” Postdictatorial civil society in Italy was undoubtedly deeply heteronomous. Parties subordinated other voluntary organizations to themselves.

Spain

In contrast to the Italian case, the main political forces during the two main subperiods of Spanish democracy focused mostly on elections (Cebrián 1981, pp. 65–66) and expended less effort than their European counterparts on the expansion of membership. As political scientists put it, they embraced the model of the “catchall” rather than “mass” party (Pérez-Díaz 1993, p. 61; Gunther and Diamond 2003, p. 186). Pérez-Díaz (2003, p. 130) effectively encapsulates the point, writing that “Spanish voters tend to support parties without becoming militants of them.” Indeed, the major political parties aggregated different interests, only attempted to mobilize their electorates before the elections, and constructed presidentialist bureaucracies around charismatic leaders.

We first consider the centrist Unión de Centro Democrático (Center-Democratic Union; UCD). During the period from 1976 to 1982 the UCD grew in preparation for elections from a cell of cabinet members to an electoral organization with local cells in almost every municipality. The leaders of the UCD, Aldolfo Suárez Gonzalez and Rafael Arias Salgado, closely controlled this expansion to prevent a strengthening of the Christian democratic and liberal factions of the party. Moreover, Suárez refused to establish formal alliances with any type of voluntary organization, most conspicuously the Church, despite the fact that the Christian democratic
faction of the party lobbied actively for it (Gunther, Montero, and Botella 2004, p. 373). Suárez pursued this strategy to give his executive more autonomy. He felt, further, that in this way the UCD would not transmit a sectarian image that could potentially alienate social groups and create additional hurdles to the party’s reform projects (Hopkin 1999, p. 109).

We next consider the Partido Comunista de España (Spanish Communist Party; PCE), perhaps the political force with the greatest chance of becoming a mass party after the end of the regime. However, this party, like the UCD, also abandoned the attempt to co-opt voluntary organizations to stabilize its social support. As Verge (2007, p. 107) notes, “the PCE decided not to create adjacent organizations or movements” although it sought to increase the social involvement of its members. The leaders of the PCE, Santiago Carrillo and Julio Anguita González made this decision as part of a broader strategy of political moderation to fight against the antisystem and illiberal image of the party that the Francoists disseminated (Gunther et al. 1986, p. 151). In this regard, the critical tie between the PCE and the Comisiones Obreras (Worker’s Commissions; CCOO), the leading Spanish trade union. After 1976 the PCE dominated this organization, controlling 21 out of 27 seats in its national executive committee. PCE leaders, however, refused to use this position as a springboard to establish a formal alliance with the trade union (in sharp contrast to the behavior of the PCI in the postwar period). For this would have undermined their party’s moderate image. The leadership also feared that it would alienate the support of noncommunist workers for CCOO representatives in shop-floor union elections (Gunther et al. 1986, pp. 151, 207).

The Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Party; PSOE) displayed a similar reluctance to become a mass party. Between 1974 and 1977 the leadership of the PSOE had an intense debate about the party’s organization. The old guard of exiled and domestic opponents to Francoism lobbied for the mass-party strategy, while the new generation of members led by Felipe González, elected general secretary in 1974, sought to establish a more electoral organization. The results of the first democratic election of 1977 solidified González’s position, as the PSOE gained a decisive victory. The moderation of the Spanish electorate, perhaps partially a result of Spain’s relatively depoliticized intermediate structure, rewarded a centrist electoral organization—a catchall rather than mass-party model (Pérez-Díaz 1993). In 1982 the PSOE won the elections by a landslide, persuading González further of the need to pursue policies that appeal to multiple constituencies (Gillespie 1989). In fact, the PSOE’s internal regulations only allowed the “collective affiliation” of formal organizations from 1984. Years later, in the late 1980s the PSOE tried to strengthen its ties to civil society by creating a feminist, an ecologist, and
a pacifist voluntary association. However, after their constitution, two of three of these associations became autonomous from the party (Verge 2007, p. 104).

Furthermore, González’s ideological moderation disappointed the unions and worsened the relationship between the PSOE and the Unión General de Trabajadores (General Workers’ Union; UGT; Gunther et al. 2004, pp. 363–64). From its constitution in 1888, the UGT had been closely tied to the PSOE. Historically, new members of the PSOE also had to join UGT, while many members of the UGT national executive committee were PSOE members. However, the relationship between these organizations grew strained over the second half of the 1980s because the economic boom did not translate into an expansion of social protection (Paramio 1992, p. 533). Indeed the executive presented a neoliberal employment reform project to which the UGT and CCOO responded with a general strike (December 1988). In reaction, the PSOE eliminated new members’ obligation to join UGT (Verge 2007, p. 106). Thus, in the democratic period the PSOE never sought nor obtained the unwavering support of the union.

The evidence presented in the last two sections thus shows that post-fascist Italy had an organizationally stronger civil society than Spain, but that post-Francoist Spain clearly had a more autonomous civil society than Italy. Existing literature has not fully recognized these particular configurations of civil society because it conflates autonomy and strength. The problem is most evident in the neo-Tocquevillian literature’s contradictory classification of Italian civil society. This literature “codes” the Italian case as either strong (with regional differences) or nonexistent because party dominated (Perlmutter 1991, p. 157; Putnam 1993, pp. 148–51). The evidence shows in fact that Italian civil society is both strong and party dominated, in contrast to the Spanish case, which has a relatively weak but autonomous civil society.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
Before launching into our own account it is worth assessing how the main alternatives developed in the theoretical section of this article might account for the differences in civil society we have documented above. The main objection to the line of analysis developed in this article would be the view that differences in civil society between Spain and Italy in the post-dictatorship period reflected differences in levels of economic development, patterns of civic culture, or specific political institutional differences that were independent of the experience of the midcentury dictatorships. We can divide this general argument that there was a basic continuity into a bottom-up and top-down version.
The Bottom-Up View

The bottom-up view, as we suggested above, usually explains civil society as the result of economic or cultural factors. One important issue, then, is to consider whether the strength of civil society might be a function of the level of economic development. Literature on comparative rates of long-term economic development in Spain and Italy is contentious. One position argues that the two countries began to diverge sharply around the turn of the last century (Molinas and Prados de la Escosura 1989). A second, more recent, view argues that Italy and Spain had similar patterns of growth up until at least 1930, with a divergence after World War II (Tortella 2000, pp. 8, 13, 18, 229–30).

Despite this contention, there are a few agreed upon points that strongly suggest the comparability of these two cases. Italy and Spain suffered from a very similar basic economic problem until at least the late 1940s. Each country was saddled with a highly unproductive agrarian economy that held domestic demand down and meant that industrialization was possible only in relatively restricted regional pockets and only with substantial state intervention. Approximately 60% of the Italian population worked in agriculture in 1911, a figure that had declined to the still high 50% by 1936 (Zamagni 1993, p. 32). In Spain 66% of the population was working in agriculture in 1910, a figure that had dropped to approximately 46% by 1930 (Tortella 2000, p. 266). All parties to the debate would agree that Italy and Spain were at best semiperipheral capitalist societies in the early part of the 20th century.

The debate mostly focuses on Italian economic history. One classic interpretation of Italian long economic development focuses on the so-called Giolittian boom from 1896 to 1914 during which Italy supposedly experienced industrialization while Spain did not (for a particularly clear statement, see Milward and Saul [1977, pp. 253–64]). In Alexander Gerschenkron’s classical interpretation, the boom was made possible by the importation of German banking techniques in 1896 but was limited by the Italian state’s tariff policies. For Rosario Romeo (1959, pp. 17–51), who was keen to defend the political record of the first postunification governments, the period of the 1880s had established an original accumulation of industrial stock that was put to good use after 1896 (for a useful summary, see Gerschenkron [1968, pp. 98–124], and Fenoaltea [2011, pp. 10–14, 19–21]). Both of these interpretations suggest a qualitative break in Italian economic history in the late 19th century, which would appear not to have a counterpart in Spain.

A couple of things are worth noting about this position. First, even those scholars who see this period as decisively important recognize that the expansion was extremely brief and highly regionally concentrated. The
industrial boom lasted for about exactly a decade, from 1896 to 1906. Further, to the extent that the Giolittian boom was a qualitative transformation of the Italian economy, it was restricted to the north of the country. Milward and Saul (1977, p. 233), for example, suggest that the south had crop yields below the Balkans and Russia in the mid-1920s. However, the real challenge to this interpretation comes from more recent work that is quite skeptical of the Giolittian boom as a whole. Fenoaltea (2011, p. 27) and Baffigì (2013, pp. 165–71) interpret the Giolittian boom as a cyclical upturn in a longer process of gradual growth. Tortella (2000, pp. 229–30) argues that much of the ground that Italy gained over Spain during this period was lost in the later 1920s.

This new literature is supported by substantial quantitative evidence showing little dramatic divergence in per capita income prior to the 1950s (Tortella 2000, p. 230). Up until the 1930s the Spanish population probably had a slightly higher income per capita than Italy. Indeed the Italian fascist regime was probably a serious drag on economic growth because it reinforced a low wage economy (Zamagni 1984, p. 195; 1993, pp. 308–10). Mussolini’s economic policy produced first heavy inflation and afterward deflation, which undermined savings, investment, and individual consumption (Zamagni 1993, pp. 243–44). For agricultural workers there was a constant reduction in real income from 1919 to 1934 (Zamagni 1979–80, p. 29). In contrast, Spain benefited from its neutral status in World War I with an expansion of its agricultural and manufacturing exports, which carried over to the post–World War I period (Tortella 2000, p. 232). During this period Spanish agriculture increased its productivity more than Italian agriculture (Federico 2005, p. 240). In two decades more than 1 million Spaniards moved to urban areas and took service sector employments. These factors, combined with the decision to keep the peseta away from the gold standard, facilitated in the 1920s and early 1930s a faster rate of economic modernization in Spain than in Italy (Aldcroft 2003, p. 54; Tortella and Núñez 2011, p. 313).

Still, it is important to acknowledge that in the first three decades of the 20th century the economic and social structures of Italy and Spain differed in important ways. Italy had a more developed education system and higher literacy rates than Spain (Tortella and Núñez 2011, p. 315). There are also indications that the Italian economy was more industrialized. While in Spain the manufacturing sector was dominated by first-generation industries (e.g., clothing, iron), in Italy this sector was dominated by more efficient second-generation industries (e.g., electricity, transport materials; Carreras 1992, p. 202). In fact, the Italian manufacturing sector absorbed a larger percentage of the labor force and produced a larger output both before and after World War I (Buyst and Franaszek 2010, p. 210).
For decades economic historians have debated about how these dynamics translated into the gross domestic product in both countries. Many estimates of prosperity are available (Prados de la Escosura 1992, 2003; Bardini, Carreras, and Lains 1995). One useful recent series is the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita expressed in international dollars from the Maddison Project. Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2013) have made this data publicly available. Using this evidence we have constructed a line graph tracking GDP per capita for the two countries (see fig. 1). The similarity in evolution is remarkable. Even if in the Giolittian era Italy underwent a faster economic expansion than Spain, this difference withered with the onset of World War I. Between 1914 and 1935 Spanish GDP growth caught up to the Italian. As a result, in 1935, before the collapse of both economies due to the Civil War (Spain) and World War II (Italy), their GDP per capita differed by only 3 percentage points. The evidence also clearly shows the destructive effects of war on both economies. But in general the most remarkable feature is the similarity in overall development between the two countries over the entire period from 1900 to 1944.

This discussion, to summarize, suggests that there is very little evidence of a dramatic difference in the macroeconomies of these two countries in the early 20th century that could explain the striking difference in their

![GDP per capita in Italy compared with Spain in international dollars, 1900–1944](image)

FIG. 1.—GDP per capita in Italy compared with Spain in international dollars, 1900–1944
civil societies in the postdictatorship period. This is especially so since, as we have shown above, much of the distinctiveness of Italian civil society, such as high party membership, high voter turnout, a large number of cooperatives, and high union membership was evident immediately after the war when Italy’s GDP per capita was lower than Spain’s. Although Italy was probably slightly more industrialized than Spain, war was economically destructive in both countries. In more general terms, as the recent historiography shows, both were part of a broader model growth model that Gabriel Tortella (2000, p. 6) terms “EuroLatin.”

What of the cultural explanation? In our description of the outcomes we have already implicitly dealt with this alternative. There we showed that prior to their dictatorships a higher percentage of Spaniards than Italians belonged to political parties, a higher percentage of Spaniards voted, and Spain had a greater number of agrarian cooperatives per 1,000 people. Of course there were differences, especially since, as Riley has shown, social elites in Spain maintained a greater degree of control over the formation of voluntary associations, particularly in the key agrarian sector, compared with their Italian counterparts (Riley 2010, p. 79). None of this, however, suggests that Italy had a clearly higher level of civil society organization in the predictatorial period, especially after the period of the Second Republic in Spain.

Top-Down Explanations

What of top-down explanations of civil society development? The key issue here is whether there were important political differences prior to Francoism and fascism that might have shaped civil society development over the long term. The most obvious political difference between the two countries is that while Spanish 20th-century history has been punctuated by a series of military interventions (first with the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera and then with Franco’s regime) the military has never been a significant autonomous actor in Italian politics. But apart from this contrast the similarities are striking. In the late 19th century both countries established corrupt liberal regimes based on restricted suffrage and patronage politics. Prior to Francoism and fascism both countries experienced a period of significant political opening—in Italy during the period from 1918 to 1922 and in Spain in the Second Republic 1931–36. Of the two political experiences, the Spanish one involved much greater popular mobilization. Spain’s democratization did away with the monarchy, seriously challenged the power of the landed elite at the national level, and opened the door wide to regional autonomy. Democratization at the end of the Giolittian period achieved none of this (Pecharromán 1989; Corner 2002, pp. 278–87).
To summarize, these brief reflections suggest that the different forms of civil society in the two cases were historically constructed during the dictatorial period. Prior to fascism and Francoism Spanish civil society was arguably stronger than its Italian counterpart, and given the relative weakness of political parties in both cases they were probably equally autonomous. This suggests the question, “what was it about fascism and Francoism respectively that produced a strong and heteronomous civil society in Italy, and a weak but autonomous one in Spain in the postdictatorship period?” It is to that question that we now turn.

DICTATORSHIP, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN ITALY AND SPAIN

In both Italy and Spain civil societies emerged from experiences of mid-20th-century dictatorship. These experiences molded civil society in different ways. In Italy the fascist regime (or more precisely specific political actors within it) sought to incorporate civil society. This undermined the autonomy of voluntary associations, but it also created many new organizations. In Spain, in contrast, Francoism (or more precisely specific actors within the Francoist regime) sought to exclude all organizations associated with the Second Republic (1931–36). The regime, however, constructed relatively few new organizations. Its union and party structure in particular remained weak. Although this exclusionary project weakened civil society organizationally, it left open some space for autonomous social organization at least after the late 1950s.

Italian Fascism: The Incorporationist Project (1922–42)

The Italian fascist regime incorporated civil society by pursuing two closely connected policies. First it outlawed all political parties except the fascist one and established political control over virtually every possible interest group from doctors to industrialists (Rosenstock-Franck 1934, pp. 51–54). Second, it established organizations of the most varied type, including most importantly the official party and the union organizations (Pombeni 1984, p. 478). Italian fascism thus combined negative and punitive policies toward organizations that it viewed as oppositional with an extremely ambitious attempt to build new organizations. Regime ideologues interpreted these new institutions as an attempt to undermine what Giuseppe Bottai (1928, p. 89) called the “abstraction” of liberal citizenship. Italian citizens were now to be organically linked to the state through regime institutions. We focus on two points in this analysis. First we briefly discuss the qualitative nature of fascist organizations, arguing that they are best understood

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as a form of “compulsory voluntarism” in Victoria de Grazia’s (1981, p. 69) suggestive phrase. Second we briefly trace the expansion of these organizations over the course of the regime, focusing on the party, the unions, and the cooperative movement.

The party, the syndicates, and the professional organizations under fascism shared some features of the sorts of organizations usually referred to as civil society. First, these fascist organizations were formally voluntary (unlike their Spanish counterparts; Babiano 1998, p. 35). As a result, they devoted a great deal of effort to recruiting and retaining dues-paying members. The organizational history of the PNF has yet to be written. However, party records show that the main task of the provincial federations was to issue party cards and collect dues. The cards were generally held in a schedario, or file, in the federation office (PNF, direttorio nazionale, servizi vari, serie ii, busta 807). Membership had to be renewed annually by paying dues that varied both across federations and across broad membership categories. For example, in Milan in 1936 the budget distinguished among four categories of membership for fascists living in the city and two categories for fascists living in the rural areas outside the city (PNF, direttorio nazionale, servizi vari serie i, busta 832). Of course joining such organizations was not the same as adhering to a voluntary organization in a liberal democracy since political membership became a fundamental condition for having a normal daily life. For example, party membership mattered crucially in finding a job for a very broad range of occupations. But purchasing the card may also have been a political act of adhesion to the regime. As the Fascist jurist Sergio Panunzio (1987, p. 208) theorized, the party “is a great school of national political education . . . the institution that prepares and offers suitable men to posts in the state and public institutions, without exclusions or distinctions of social rank.” Being a member of the PNF was to be a joiner in Tocquevillian language. Indeed, as deGrazia (1981, p. 41) shows in the case of the afterwork organizations (dopolavoro), members (soci), after 1926, were described as joiners (aderenti).

The size and geographical reach of the PNF was without precedent in Italian history. As Emilio Gentile, the major historian of the party, puts the point, “it is necessary to start from the observation that the organizational network of the party, which extended over the entire national territory with increasing capillarity, constituted an entirely new phenomenon in the history of Italian society” (Gentile 1995, p. 104; see also Togliatti 1976, pp. 29–30; Gentile 1989, p. 398). Membership expanded rapidly in the years from 1931 to 1936. By the end of the regime (1942) there were almost 5 million male members in the PNF.

This growth was not restricted to the party. The total number of workers enrolled in unions also exploded under fascism. In 1922, after the
violent suppression of the socialist organizations, a little over 1% of Italians were enrolled in a union. By 1938 that figure had risen to almost 18% of the entire population (Gentile 2000). Of course these were now fascist unions, and yet, as we argued above, people had to actively join them. Just as in the case of the party, members had to get the union card. Whatever else the fascists did they managed to get workers to join unions in historically unprecedented numbers (de Castro 1940, p. 297).

It is worth considering a little bit more what the precise character of these organizations was. As was also true of the PNF, being a fascist union member was very useful for getting a job. As Leo Valiani (1959, p. 50) writes: “For all salaried professions, the fascist unions had a monopoly on hiring. The employers had to turn to them to hire employees. The ‘Labor Charter’ established that precedence in hiring had to be given to members of the fascist party and then to the members of the unions in order of their seniority of enrollment.” Two remarks are relevant here. First, union control over hiring is not distinctive to fascism. Second, despite the fact that there were powerful economic and political reasons for joining a fascist union, according to the official statistics 67% of the industrial working class was enrolled in the fascist union federation in 1936 and 72% in 1937 (Confederazione Nazionale Fascista dei Lavoratori dell’industria 1938, pp. 28–30). In short, around 30% of workers were not unionized, indicating that workers had to actively join the fascist unions.

As the party expanded it began to subordinate wider areas of social life to political control. This happened in two ways: through the incorporation of previously existing organizations into the party and through the construction of new para-party organizations. Both processes are well exemplified by the history of the cooperative movement under fascism.

Consumer, producer, and labor cooperatives were a distinctive feature of northern Italy. Although many of these organizations suffered violence at the hands of the fascists in the early 1920s, a large cooperative movement continued to exist even after the fascist seizure of power, and cooperatives grew under the regime. Fornasari and Zamagni (1997, pp. 128–29) suggest that the number of cooperative societies increased 44% from 1927 to 1938. Insertion into the fascist regime accompanied this expansion. In December 1926 a royal decree established the Ente nazionale fascista della cooperazione (National Fascist Cooperative Organization; Fornasari and Zamagni 1997, p. 123). This was the culmination of a process that occurred throughout the 1920s in which fascist leadership replaced socialist leadership in the cooperative movement but maintained the organization (Degl’Innocenti 1981, p. 51). In Sardinia the federal secretary Paolo Pili “constituted the ‘Federation of social milk cooperatives of Sardinia’” (Lupo 2000, p. 197). In Sicily the Fascist Party incorporated several organizations that had led land occupations in the early 1920s and had been loosely as-
associated with social Catholicism or veterans (Lupo 2000, p. 199). In Calabria fascism was the first political organization, apart from a few mutual aid societies, to have sections for women (Cappelli 1985, p. 544). Further, the fascist organizations extended into small villages of the south where neither the socialist nor the Catholic organizations had been able to reach prior to the March on Rome in 1922 (Cappelli 1985, p. 543).

Perhaps Palmiro Togliatti, the general secretary of the PCI from 1927 to 1963, not one prone to exaggerate the mass basis of fascism puts it best when he (2010, p. 101) writes:

Bear in mind that the only club that could be found before in the cities, villages and rural areas of the South was the gentlemen’s club. Today there is a local [fascist] Dopolavoro [Opera nazionale dopolavoro (OND), or after-work organization] in almost every town. These organizations can be defined as compulsory, but the worker does find in them a place where he can pass the evening, where he can stay warm when the weather is cold, where he can play cards, where he can drink a glass of wine if he has money, etc. These organizations are very important as mass organizations, for they represent a tie created by fascism to keep the masses bound to itself.

Under Italian fascism, male membership in both party organizations and more broadly in mass organizations constantly. It actually peaked in 1943 at 34% of the male population. This development was particularly important in southern Italy and the islands that had lacked any modern political organizations before fascism’s advent.

More surprisingly, this organizational network encouraged participation in state institutions in two quite new ways. First, the Fascist Party itself was a mechanism of social mobility for the petit bourgeois elements and sometimes even workers who largely staffed the party and unions (Galli 1974, pp. 251, 258–59). Second, fascist organizations encouraged forms of political participation. For example, the Casa del Fascio (fascist house) constituted an alternative form of political participation for the urban and rural middle classes, who were excluded from the old noble circles of the prefascist period (Galli 1974, p. 255).

The fascist regime also had a complex impact on women’s political participation. The early fascist movement supported women’s political rights (both their right to vote and their right to hold office), as its June 1919 party program made clear (De Grazia 1992, p. 30). In 1925 Mussolini granted women the right to vote in local “administrative” elections, although this right soon became meaningless because in September 1926 the key local leadership positions such as mayor and podestà (local political leader) became central state appointees (Noether 1982, p. 71). Although fascist sexism strengthened in the later 1920s, most scholars suggest that women in fascist Italy were brought into political life, as had not occurred in the liberal period (Noether 1982, p. 72). Fascist leaders enrolled women
in fascist mass organizations in huge numbers. For example, enrollment in women’s youth organizations, and the organizations of “rural housewives” increased from just a few thousand in the 1920s to several million by 1942 (Amoroso 1989, p. 314; De Grazia 1992, pp. 176, 248, 265). As in the case of the male core structure, the 1930s was the key period of expansion. The number of members increased between 1931 and 1937 from under 2 million to around 6 million.

The above discussion implies two basic conclusions. First, Italian fascism thoroughly subordinated civil society to political control. By the late 1920s there was no meaningful right to free association. Indeed the elimination of civil society’s autonomy was a central policy goal of the fascist regime. Second, Italian fascism massively strengthened civil society as a set of organizations. The PNF, the fascist unions, and the cooperatives were not state organizations. Men and women had to actively join them. Their memberships and structures expanded dramatically during the regime. Indeed, these two outcomes were linked: for fascists eliminated civil society’s autonomy precisely by creating a massive set of intermediate organizations. As De Felice ([1981] 1996, p. 63) puts the point, this model of totalitarianism “led to an extreme politicization of society.” As Gino Germani (1978, p. 258) noted, the regime was a contradictory amalgam of hierarchical subordination and mobilization from above. What was the impact of this fascist treatment on the type of civil society that emerged in the postfascist period? To answer this question we need to examine more closely the transition from fascism to democracy in the 1940s.

A Failed Alternative: A Spanish Road for Postfascist Italy

The transition from fascism to democracy in Italy was far from smooth. It required not only the defeat of fascism militarily, an inevitability after Stalingrad and El-Alamein, but also the defeat of the possibility of non-fascist authoritarianism. By 1943 the war had split the Italian peninsula into two. The Fascist Grand Council deposed Mussolini on June 25, 1943, but the Germans subsequently liberated and installed him as the nominal leader of the Nazi puppet state called La Repubblica di Salò. In the south in contrast, an authoritarian monarchical regime (Il Regno del Sud) had emerged run by marshal Pietro Badoglio.

One of the most important possibilities at the end of the war was an extension of the Badoglio regime to the rest of the peninsula. Churchill and the British diplomatic corps would have been quite satisfied with such an outcome (Barbagallo 1994, p. 27). Further, most of the Church hierarchy in the period immediately after the collapse of fascism and a large part of the Catholic leadership were pushing for the establishment of a Catholic state in this area, based partially on the Catholic youth organizations and
modeled on the Franco or Salazar dictatorships (Scoppola 1977, p. 47; Galli 1978, pp. 40–41; Barbagallo 1994, p. 20). This project was not entirely foreign even to Alcide De Gasperi, who would emerge as the most important Christian Democrat in the postwar period. During his stint in the Vatican library in the 1930s he had written a column on international affairs that included laudatory comments about various figures on the Catholic extreme right, including Franco (Galli 1978, p. 25). In sum, the possibility still existed in 1943 of a “Spanish path” for Italy (Pasquino 1986, p. 50).

According to Pietro Scoppola, the decisive element in removing this possibility was Catholic participation in the growing resistance movement in 1944 and 1945. As he (Scoppola 1977 p. 132) puts the point: “As a whole I believe that it can be said that the resistance contributed in a decisive way to the collapse of the hypothesis of a catholic succession to Fascism on the basis of an authoritarian continuity; it swept off the Italian political horizon any temptation or illusion of regimes of a Francoist type; it made clear even to the leadership of the Church that the Catholics needed to insert themselves in an active manner into democratic life.” Whatever the precise reason for the shift, the elimination of the possibility of an authoritarian, but nonfascist, caesura had enormous consequences for Italian democracy, because it meant that the democratic forces in Italy had to grapple directly with the fascist political legacy.

Democracy as Antifascism (1943–48)

The political leadership of the postfascist parties that emerged in the 1940s saw an intimate link between antifascism and democracy. The struggle against both the Mussolini regime and the German invasion forged a broad antifascist front linking disparate political forces (Eley 2002, p. 288). Paradoxically, it was precisely this antagonism to the preceding dictatorship that linked Italian democracy to the fascist period. In the thinking of men such as the communist leader Palmiro Togliatti and the Christian democrat Alcide De Gasperi mass parties with collateral organizations similar to those of the PNF were the only guarantee for democracy. In this they recognized the break between prefascist Italian liberalism and postfascist Italian democracy. The Fascist Party with its mass organizations formed the implicit and at times explicit model for democratic political organizations. The main party leaders therefore both engaged directly in building such organizations among their followers, and they shaped the constitutional order, particularly by insisting on strict proportional representation, to favor this organizational form (Scoppola 1980, pp. 59, 62–63; 1997, pp. 102–3; LaPalombara 1987, pp. 274–75; Piretti 1995, pp. 329–31; Ventrone 1996, pp. 27–28; Agosti 2003, p. 308; Borzaga 2004, p. 52; Ventresca 2004, pp. 41, 48).
The postfascist parties were connected to fascism in three ways: through organizational models, through how the leadership understood the role of parties in relationship to the population, and through the position that parties came to occupy in the broader constitutional ideas that animated the Italian Republic.

**Organizational models.**—The PCI was perhaps the first party to show a deep appreciation for fascist mass organizations. This is particularly clear in Palmiro Togliatti’s analysis of the *dopolavoro* organizations. Togliatti emphasized that no parties in Italy, including the prefascist socialist and communist parties, had developed centralized and ramified leisure time organization such as the fascists had. The *dopolavoro* were therefore filling an important organizational void (Vacca 2004, p. xcviii; Togliatti 2010, p. 101). After the collapse of the regime the party attempted to reproduce the model of politicized leisure time organizations that had emerged under the PNF (Ventrone 2008, p. 120).

The fascist organizational experience also left a profound influence on the world of political Catholicism, although in a slightly different form than for the PCI. The most obvious impact that the regime had on the Catholics was in the realm of youth organization. The construction of fascist mass organizations in the 1930s stimulated a vigorous response from the Church. Membership in the Catholic youth organizations Azione Cattolica (Catholic Action; AC) increased from just over 2 million to almost 3 million between 1938 and 1941 (Ventrone 2008, p. 47). By 1943, when Italy was divided between the rump fascist regime in the north, and the allied friendly government led by Marshall Badoglio in the south, the leadership of the AC declared its willingness to seize control of the OND together with a variety of other mass organizations of the regime (Ventrone 2008, p. 53). Thus the organizational legacy of the regime affected the DC as well (Ventrone 2008, p. 59).

Although previous research has found that practically no minister in the First Republic had previously held a leadership position in major fascist organizations (Adolfini 2009, p. 301), there is some evidence of biographical links. For example, many of the PCI’s most important intellectuals (including the current president of the Italian Republic, Giorgio Napolitano) began their careers in the Gruppi Universitari Fascisti (Group of University Fascists; GUF). These were often “left fascists” (Parlato 2000) whose initial political project was to return the regime to its putatively progressive origins (Galli 1974, p. 261). It is certainly likely that the PNF shaped their ideas of political organization.

This biographical connection probably also holds at lower levels as well. Although research in this area is still just beginning, there is evidence to suggest that there was substantial continuity between the fascist and postfascist communist union leadership. The basis for this continuity was
laid during “entrist” period in the 1930s when the exiled PCI directed its operatives to penetrate the fascist unions. At the 1936 meeting of the political office two important PCI leaders argued that the party’s policy should include the demand for a return to the leftist program of early fascism (Neglie 1996, p. 31). This new policy course coincided with a number of important achievements by the fascist syndicates, including unemployment insurance, family and medical leave, and the establishment of family wages (Neglie 1996, p. 80). A large group of relatively highly skilled and energetic operatives were important for achieving these gains. According to a report from the president of the industrial workers union, Giuseppe Landi, by 1943 there were over 200,000 union activists who occupied key posts in the local fascist syndicates, as well as about 10,000 more paid union staff (Neglie 1996, p. 203). It is very likely that many of these people went on to work in the union movement after fascism as well (Neglie 1996, pp. 230–31). Moreover, there was substantial continuity in the top ministerial bureaucracy, prefectures, and armed forces (Pasquino 1986, p. 56).

Conceptions of the party.—A second connection between the fascist and postfascist parties concerns how their leaderships understood the purpose of parties. The leaderships of the PCI, the DC, and the PSI saw their organizations as more than vehicles for electioneering. These parties were also supposed to educate their followers. Thus their purpose was as much to create new political identities, as it was to represent preexisting interests. For Togliatti one of the principal tasks of the postfascist PCI was to reeducate the population after 20 years of dictatorship (Agosti 1997, p. 240). For the socialist Lelio Basso (1966 p. 15), the role of parties was to “elevate” the “democratic consciousness of party members” and their degree of “democratic maturity.” For the leaders of the DC, such as Alcide De Gasperi, the party was not a fraction or interest group, but a school providing a political education to its followers (Bruno 1997, pp. 221–22).

Fascist political doctrine strikingly foreshadowed precisely this idea of the party. For Sergio Panunzio, for example, the PNF was an “ideal and pedagogical element” (1939, p. 69), the “seminarium reipublicae,” which gave fascism a popular basis reminiscent of the ancient Greek city-states (Panunzio 1939, pp. 59–61). Further, the PNF aimed at party followers in precisely the same way as the PCI and the DC in particular proposed to do: by enrolling them in a wide variety of organizations tailored to their specific circumstances (Panunzio 1939, p. 60).

Conceptions of political legitimacy: From the party state to the state of parties.—At a broader level the fascist conception of political legitimacy deeply influenced how postfascist political elites understood their new democracy. For the leaders of the PCI, the fascist period was characterized by the construction of a mass bourgeois party for the first time in Italian history (Togliatti 2010, p. 39). By constructing this organization the re-
gime had superseded the liberal state form and created a new type of relationship between political authority and Italian society. For example, Togliatti held, drawing on the writings of the fascist jurist Alfredo Rocco, that Italian fascism had definitively superseded the liberal state form by establishing an organized but “popular” state (Vacca 2004, p. xcix). Post-fascist Italian democracy from the communist point of view had to take the fascist experience as a point of departure. The new democracy that would emerge in the postwar period should be a party democracy.

For the Christian Democratic jurist Constantino Mortati, political parties assumed a new role in the modern state. In classical liberal Italian constitutional doctrine parties were treated like any other voluntary organization. They were legal as organizations that citizens could engage in, but they did not have any particular constitutional role since sovereignty rested with the nation and was made effective in parliament (Fioravanti 1997, p. 195). However, given the complexity of modern societies, a general will that existed either in society or in the state could no longer be taken for granted. In this context parties were not simply channels for representation but “total parts,” meaning institutions in society possessing the purpose of creating political unity out of social and economic diversity (Mortati 1998, pp. 70–74; see also the summary in Bruno [1997, pp. 224–27]). Mortati took this description of the party as a “total part” from Panunzio’s *Teoria generale dello stato fascista* (General theory of the fascist state), who used the term to describe the PNF in the 1930s (Panunzio 1939, p. 455). Indeed for Mortati the party was “the subject from which emanates the fundamental constitution” (Mortati 1998, p. 74). This argument was lifted almost directly from Panunzio, who claimed that the PNF was the constitutive institution of the fascist state (Panunzio 1939, pp. 448–49).

For Lelio Basso, a socialist intellectual and important influence on the Italian constitution, political parties had replaced parliament as the key institution for constructing popular sovereignty (Basso 1966, pp. 19–20). Similar arguments appeared in the work of other socialist intellectuals (Trufelli 2003, p. 281).

The fascist period thus decisively influenced the thinking of key Italian political elites’ conceptions of the party in three ways: in terms of organization, purpose, and constitutional position. This does not mean that Basso, De Gasperi, or Togliatti were sympathetic to fascism; they clearly were not. But it does indicate that they had to address problems that were imposed by the 20-year dictatorship. If fascism had organized the population, the democratic parties would have to do so as well, precisely in order to combat the possibility of a return to fascism. If fascism had educated or diseducated the population, then the democratic parties would need their own pedagogical project. If fascism had created a new structure of legitimacy based on the party, then no direct return to a parliamentary
The liberal model was possible. The legacy of fascism was thus primarily structured negatively as a series of attempts to counter these specific features of the regime.

*The constituent.*—The ideas described above mattered, because this conception of democracy as party democracy was incorporated in the Italian constitution. There was nothing, however, inevitable about this outcome. Italy might have consolidated as a form of liberal monarchy, although it is debatable whether it could have lasted as a democratic state in this form. A sharp and politically transversal critique of the party form emerged especially between the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945 (Trufelli 2003, pp. 119–38). On the left, the Actionists such as Adolfo Omodeo insisted that parties with their rigid organizational forms and ideological fanaticism were a basic threat to democracy. On the right more conservative liberals attached to the monarchy saw parties as a threat to the key place of parliament in the liberal constitutional monarchy (Trufelli 2003, pp. 124–25). At a more plebeian level the Uomo Qualunque (Everyman) movement rejected parties, as it did politics in general (Trufelli 2003, p. 269).

Arrayed against these various forces stood the three great organizations that had emerged out of the collapse of fascism: the DC, the PCI, and the PSI. Apart from serious ideological differences (especially between the DC and the two parties of the left), all three of these groups shared a concept of politics as mass politics, as we have shown above (Trufelli 2003, p. 289). Their decisive victory in the elections of June 1946, itself a reflection of the significant organization that these forces had already achieved, was thus a watershed in Italian political history (Trufelli 2003, p. 268). For the dominance of the three mass parties in the constituent assembly permanently marginalized all the political groupings still linked organizationally to a model of politics as individual notable politics with weak parties (Scoppola 1980, pp. 59–60; Pasquino 1986, p. 63; Barbagallo 1994, p. 114).

The influence of the mass parties is most obvious in two articles of the constitution: 48 and 49. The first of these articles, which we discussed briefly above, established the obligatory vote, and the second secured constitutional recognition for political parties. Taken together, they firmly established “the centrality of parties in the new democratic system” (Barbagallo 1994, p. 116). Thus, it was the parties, through their domination of the constituent assembly, that created a set of party-friendly political institutions; it was not the institutions that created the parties.

Italian democracy emerged then as an antifascism. The three main political forces that dominated the postwar Republic sought to actively eradicate the fascist influence by creating an alternative mass party political culture. But precisely this antifascist program solidified some striking continuities in the basic political structure of the two periods. The democratic
successors to the fascist political elite shared a number of political ideas with their immediate predecessors. They embraced the model of mass party organizations. They held that one of the key roles of a political party consists in providing a political education to its followers. Finally they rejected what they saw as an outdated liberal model of democracy in which parliament was the center of political sovereignty (Fioravanti 1997, p. 200). Part of the reason for this is that some of the key intellectual influences on the Italian constitution came from men who themselves were strongly influenced by the experience of fascism. The fascist experience, mediated through its influence on the men who were responsible for establishing the Italian constitution, had thus changed the rules of the political game. It established the foundations of a new way of doing politics in which political parties with millions of members would form close links with non-party organizations (Galli 1974, p. 251; Almagisti 2007, pp. 165–66). As we have already documented above, this particular transition produced a civil society that was both highly organized and distinctly subordinated to political parties.

Spain: High Dictatorship (1936–45)

In Spain, until 1945, the Francoist regime was of the same basic type as the Italian fascist regime. It attempted with some success to establish mass organizations and explicitly followed the fascist model. But the collapse of the Axis powers left Spain isolated. Regime elites, therefore, established a quite different model of state civil society relations in the decades between the late 1940s and the 1970s.

The Francoist state that emerged during the Spanish Civil War (1936–39) and in its immediate aftermath was in some respects a particularly harsh dictatorship. From 1936 all free political parties and unions were outlawed, while group interest representation was only allowed through the single party—FET-JONS—and union—Organización Sindical Española (Spanish Union Organization; OSE). Individual freedoms such as traveling were strictly limited. In addition, Francoism was initially much more repressive than Italian fascism (and German National Socialism); and indeed arguably the most repressive dictatorship in Europe prior to World War II (Casanova 2002, pp. 13–14). In the 10 years after the end of the civil war in 1939 the regime executed no less than 50,000 people (Casanova 2002, p. 8). It imprisoned at least 271,139 people in 1939, and terror was a standard instrument of rule well into the 1950s (Preston 1986, p. 4). Even the Schutzstaffel (SS) leader Heinrich Himmler (not a man generally known for humanitarianism), in a 1940 visit to Spain, expressed his concern over the scale of postwar state terror and recommended a program to incorporate workers (Ruiz 2005, p. 172). By 1945 the state still held 35,000 political
prisoners (Pérez-Díaz 2002, p. 258). One of the conditions for this extreme level of terror was that Franco’s state developed out of a civil war that divided the population between victors and vanquished, a split institutionalized by the Law on Political Responsibilities of 1939. This document declared that anyone who had “contributed to the subversion of all sorts of which Spain had been a victim” since October 1934 or who had “opposed or continued to oppose the national movement with concrete acts or serious passivity” was “juridically” and “physically” responsible (quoted in Casanova [2002, p. 21]). This potentially criminalized a large segment of the population, although its application depended heavily on local political authorities. The local leaders of the FET-JONS and the parish priest had enormous influence over the hundreds of thousands of trials that established a separation between the victors and the defeated (Casanova 2002, p. 23).

The regime also developed mass organizations very much in line with the German and Italian models. For example, membership in the FET-JONS grew from 245,000 members in 1937 to 890,000 members in 1941 (Bardavío 1969, pp. 177-78). The Francoists also constructed a regime union organization, the OSE, that in some respects was more ambitious than its Italian counterpart. The OSE was a “vertical” producers’ syndicate imposing compulsory membership on both workers and owners (Sánchez López and Nicolás Marín 1993, pp. 4-5, 34; Babiano 1998, p. 24). It also tried to gain control of overall economic policy (Thomàs 2001, p. 195). To incorporate women, the party created a special branch, Sección Feminina (Female Section; SF), which also imposed a form of conscription for all single, young women. Through a tightly knit network of training courses, SF advocated female subordination, idealized rural life, and praised large families as the ultimate contribution of women to the country’s well-being (Rodríguez Jiménez 2000, pp. 395, 401).

There was a substantial cooperative movement before the Civil War, which the Francoist elite reorganized. Using the OSE, the Francoists purged and reconstituted the old organizations and forced them to reregister their members and join the sindicato vertical (vertical union). This forced the closure of many cooperatives (Martínez Soto, Muñoz, and Martínez Rodríguez 2008, p. 10), including the remaining Catholic agrarian confederations (Thomàs 2001, p. 199).

However, in some respects even in this early period, Francoism remained relatively uninterested in incorporating the population into a totalitarian political project. Explicit opposition from competing “families” within the regime, in particular the military and supporters of the monarchy, restrained the extent of “fascistization” (Payne 1987, p. 274; Thomàs 2001). As a result, for example, large sectors of the employed population, particularly professional and public sector workers, remained outside the OSE. Thus, “in 1949, only 48.4 percent of the workers were affiliated to
the Organización Sindical, and union leaders underlined in several reports the difficulties in building the Sindicato” (Soto Carmona 2003, p. 12). The OSE was never as dynamic as its Italian counterpart.

To sum up, then, although there were some important differences between early Francoism and Italian fascism, there is evidence to suggest that the Francoist regime was attempting to incorporate Spanish civil society in precisely the way that the Italian regime did during the 1930s. However, this development was cut short by the outcome of World War II, which opened a period in Spain’s dictatorial history that has no counterpart in Italy.

The Second Period of Francoism (1945–75)

Unlike Italian fascism, Francoism survived into the postwar period. The existence of this second period of dictatorship had very important consequences for the development of Spain’s civil society. By the late 1950s civil society could emerge in Spain in a relatively depoliticized context.

By 1942 with the increasingly likely victory of the liberal democracies and the Soviet Union, the international environment had changed radically. Francoism now seemed a historical anachronism “in a Europe that had made the struggle against fascism the leitmotiv of its war effort and its victory over it a reason for collective pride” (Molinero and Ysás 2008, p. 1). In response, the regime rebuilt itself ideologically and organizationally. From 1941 Franco chose moderate and docile Falangists for ministerial positions and the FET-JONS general secretariat (like José Girón and José Luis Arrese). This prevented dissension within the cabinet (Payne 1987, p. 302). While the Nazi-leaning Serrano Súñer held the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 1942, in 1945 the post was given to Alberto Martín Artajo, a leading figure in the conservative Catholic think tank called the Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas (National Association of Catholic Propagandists; ACNP; Rodríguez Jiménez 2000, p. 468). Franco’s efforts to “defascistize” the regime also affected symbols and organizations. Franco changed the name of the party to El Movimiento (1942), banned references to the German and Italian regimes (1942), and prohibited the Nazi salute (1945). Further, the party budget was slashed 76% and made up less than 0.5% of the state budget in 1946 (Payne 1987, pp. 332, 365; 1999, p. 410). Franco reorganized his cabinet in July 1945, eliminating the FET-JONS from the inner sanctum of political power and shifting control of censorship and propaganda to the Ministry of Education, an agency led by José Ibáñez Martín, a man with strong ties to the Church (Moliner and Ysás 2008, p. 11).

At the same time Franco produced the Fuero de los Españoles (Charter of Spaniards), a quasi-constitutional document establishing free-
dom of expression, freedom of association, limited freedom of religion, and freedom of movement (Molinero and Ysàs 2008, p. 13). Although this was mostly a marketing exercise designed for foreign consumption, it indicated that the regime’s elites wanted to distance themselves from the fascist model.

Perhaps the clearest expression of this change of attitude came from Franco’s son-in-law, Ramón Serrano Suñer, who had previously been a major exponent of aligning the regime closely with the Axis powers. In a long letter to Franco produced in September 1945 Serrano Súñer (2005, p. 234) wrote: “We did what was in the interests of Spain during the period of German domination in Europe. . . . If the axis had triumphed Spain would have had a role in the world thanks to our presence in power. However for this same reason we must not now allow Spain to be persecuted. We provided a service and we must consummate it. Then as now our desire was saving Spain even if we perish.” The Franco regime’s turn away from the fascist model in the late 1940s was thus a response to changed circumstances, not a development determined exclusively by a distinctively Francoist ideology. The regime turned away from the fascist model in response to military fears and pressing needs. First, Franco sought to avoid a military invasion by the Allies or external attempts to remove him from office. Second, facing pervasive shortages of goods, Francoism was eager to attract new foreign investment and increased transfers of fuel and primary goods. The United States promised in exchange for the establishment of military bases on Spanish soil (Payne 1987, p. 432).

To provide some conceptual justification for the ideological turn, Franco, in an important speech in May 1946, drew a distinction between the interwar fascist regimes that were imperialist and anti-Catholic and the Spanish regime that represented a higher synthesis of the demands for social justice from the left and order from the right (Molinero and Ysàs 2008, pp. 16–17). Franco also insisted on the importance of the regime’s various forms of corporatist representation. The traditionalist dimension of the regime was also strengthened by active promotion of Catholic festivities and traditions all across the country.

These changes affected the FET-JONS. Even after the end of the war, the party continued to be a crucial pillar of the regime. It provided administrative cadres, a platform for adulatory social mobilization, and a lightning rod for critiques of the regime’s failures (Payne 1987, p. 365). Therefore Franco never wanted to fully disband it. However, especially after 1956 when José Luis Arrese (FET-JONS’s secretary general) unsuccessfully proposed major legal reform giving the Movimiento’s Council veto power over all cabinet appointments, the Falangists’ power declined (Rodríguez Jiménez 2000, pp. 399–401).
Moreover, from the early 1950s a group of reformers began to emerge within the FET-JONS loosely allied with the conservative liberal Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez, minister of education in the early fifties. This new guard aimed at modernizing the Spanish university system and encouraging the return of Spanish intellectuals (Molinero and Ysàs 2008, pp. 19, 21).

Roughly coeval with these political shifts was a fundamental change in economic policy beginning in the mid-1950s. In the early Francoist period (1939–55) the state pursued an autarkic project closely modeled on Italian fascism. The Bank of Spain loaned money cheaply to Spanish industry through the Instituto Nacional de Industria (the National Institute for Industry; INI). As a model of industrial development this turned out to be an astounding failure because the INI was badly managed and often used its state funds for speculative purposes rather than building manufacturing capacity. Furthermore, internal demand was weak because wages were kept low (Maravall 1978, pp. 20–21; Preston 1986, p. 6).

Thus, this autarkic model began to fray by the early 1950s. As the Cold War became more severe Spain’s isolation from the rest of Europe lessened, leading to foreign investment (which increased from $40 million in 1960 to $697 million in 1970) and tourism (Powell 2001, p. 25). Wages also rose as factory owners struck bargains with their workers outside the bureaucratic framework of the vertical syndicates. The result, however, was inflation (Maravall 1978, p. 23). This, in combination with the failure of the import substitution policy, which was clearest in the large balance of payment crisis, convinced Francoist elites of the need for economic reform. Thus in 1957 Franco transformed the balance of forces within the regime, establishing a cabinet dominated by a group of technocrats from the Catholic organization Opus Dei (Preston 1986, p. 7). These new leaders initiated the liberalization and internationalization of the Spanish economy following the French dirigiste model of export-oriented growth. The state provided tax breaks and cheap money to key industries that could produce Spanish goods competitive on foreign markets (Payne 1987, pp. 472–73) and sharply reduced trade barriers. In the later 1950s Spain joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the International Labour Organization (ILO), and began to negotiate to become a member of the European Economic Community (EEC; Maravall 1978, p. 24; Preston 1986, p. 8; Payne 1987, p. 468). The economic results of the change in policy were dramatic. From 1961 to 1975 the mean GDP rose at an annual average of around 7% (World Bank 2012), radically improving the standard of living and consumption pattern of Spaniards.

These events had two major sets of consequences: one for the Francoist elites and a second for the development of civil society. The rise of the technocrats in the later 1950s had an important effect on the position of
the FET-JONS. Institutionally the state party’s position strengthened in some respects in the later fifties. The Consejo Nacional (National Council) of the FET-JONS was partially revitalized in 1956 under the leadership of José Luis Arrese and became the key consultative organ of the regime (Molinero and Ysás 2008, p. 67). Its position was formalized in 1968 with the approval of the Ley Orgánica del Estado (State Organic Law; LOE), the constitution of the Francoist state (Molinero and Ysás 2008, p. 114). Yet the FET-JONS now faced intense competition from the technocrats who wished to link the regime’s legitimacy to economic growth and encourage political apathy in line with what they understood to be the common model of high-income countries (Molinero and Ysás 2008, p. 60). In response, the party shifted toward a populist strategy aimed at mobilizing and incorporating workers and other excluded groups (Molinero and Ysás 2008, p. 61). Yet as we show below, this strategy failed. Before explaining why it is necessary briefly to sketch out the consequences of Spain’s rapid economic growth for Spanish civil society.

The reforms particularly affected labor relations. As part of the policy turn in 1957, the regime attempted to get inflation under control in a 1959 stabilization plan that devalued the peseta, froze wages, and established a very tight fiscal policy. In part to compensate for these economic sacrifices, the regime liberalized industrial relations. The government allowed restricted collective bargaining between employers and workers (1958) and legalized syndical elections (1963) to elect factory councils or Consejos de Empresa (Workers’ Councils). Wages were now set by workers and capitalists striking bargains rather than by the Ministry of Labor (Balfour 1989, p. 36; Fishman 1990, pp. 90–91). The new legal framework, together with increased international competition, contributed to a reemergence of working-class mobilization beginning in the early 1960s and peaking first in 1970 and then again in 1976 (Maravall 1978, pp. 30–33; Balfour 1989, pp. 62–63, 142–47; Powell 2001, p. 52; Maluquer and Loch 2005, p. 1243).

The early and mid-1960s were also a period of organizational rebirth and consolidation for labor (Maravall 1978, pp. 72, 83). The key organization quickly became the CCOO (Powell 2001, p. 52). The CCOO movement developed out of democratic elections to the lower level posts of the OSE. Initially CCOO was only loosely linked to the clandestine political parties (Maravall 1978, p. 72). Communists, however, did become more dominant in the organization after a wave of repression in the late 1960s (Balfour 1989, p. 157; Fishman 1990, pp. 96–97; Powell 2001, p. 52).

The FET-JONS, in line with the populist turn sketched above, sought to take advantage of this mobilization. The OSE hoped to use the newly legal elections for shop floor representatives of the FET-JONS, but they failed (Balfour 1989, pp. 83–84). Hated by workers, feared by the tech-
nocrats, and looked upon with disdain by international organizations such as the ILO, the Falangist unionists were unable to establish a popular following (Fishman 1990, pp. 117–21; Molinero and Ysàs 2008, pp. 95–107). The result was that much working-class mobilization occurred outside and against the framework of the OSE organization, not within it.

However, despite the impressive reemergence of working-class mobilization under late Francoism, the regime profoundly shaped the forms of working-class struggle in two ways. First, the OSE organization fragmented workers’ struggles because collective bargaining was geographically and industrially divided. Although workers might be able decisively to shape local level agreements, they tended to have less influence at the provincial level (Balfour 1989, pp. 65–66, 111). Thus the very success of the working-class movement created problems for subsequent unified action.

Further industrial relations in late Francoist Spain were highly legally regulated. Even after the reemergence of collective working-class action, many workers had to rely on contracts established through the ministry of labor and enforced by labor magistrates. Over a quarter of all salaried workers were covered by collective agreements between 1958 and 1974 (Maluquer and Lloch 2005, pp. 1216, 1230). These institutions enforced an implicit paternalistic deal that traded away organizing rights for job security. In the democratic period this would leave a legacy of preferring individual legally mediated solutions to direct action (Balfour 1989, pp. 198–200, 248).

The rise of voluntary organizations extended beyond the arena of labor relations (Linz 1983, p. 394; Pérez-Díaz 1993, p. 60). Until the early 1960s political and nonpolitical associations beyond Catholic organizations with religious goals or those under the control of the single party were outlawed, and even Catholic and Falangist ones required approval from the Ministerio de Gobernación (Ministry of Interior; Linz 1971, pp. 313–14). But in 1964 the regime lifted the ban on nonpolitical associations, sparking a wave of associational development. On average, between 1968 and 1975 881 associations and five federations joined annually the Register of Associations established by the Ministry of Interior (Ministerio del Interior 1999, pp. 23, 61). But these organizations were probably only the tip of the iceberg of Spanish associationism. According to a survey conducted in 1973 (two years before Franco’s death) for Cáritas Española (Spanish Caritas), 37% of Spaniards declared being members of voluntary associations, with only 4% being members of a Francoist political organization such as FET-JONS, SF, or Frente de Juventudes (Youth Front; Gómez-Reino et al. 1975, p. 1292).

The waves of rural migration of the 1950s and 1960s that reshaped Spanish metropolitan areas were the basis of a movimiento ciudadano
citizen’s movement) that emerged in neighborhood associations all across the country, which, simultaneously, were at the basis of the associational reemergence of the 1960s and 1970s (Castells 1983, pp. 217–24). Despite being generally led by radical political activists, the goals of these organizations embodied relatively modest demands for improved public services, which did not keep pace with urbanization. Underground political party organizations were important in providing leadership and strategy to the neighborhood movement; however, they “were shaken in their rather instrumental view of social movements, and were forced to entertain the idea of participatory democracy in city halls and planning agencies” (Castells 1983, p. 216). These organizations were given legal recognition in 1964 and grew substantially in Barcelona and Madrid into the 1970s (Balfour 1989, pp. 194–95; Pérez Ledesma 2006, p. 133).

Indications of organizational rebirth were also evident in the Catholic Church and its affiliated organizations. Militant Catholicism was central to early Francoism, and one result of the Nationalist victory was the re-Catholicization of Spain after the secularization of the Second Republic (Casanova 1994, p. 81). By the early 1960s, however, a “slow but progressive distancing” of the Church from the regime had set in (Casanova 1994, p. 81). Enthusiasm for Francoism was cooling, especially among the younger clergy. According to one survey, almost a quarter of all Spanish priests in 1970 identified themselves as socialists, a percentage that rose to 47% among those under 30. Further clergy were exiting the Church in large numbers. One hundred and sixty-seven priests left their positions in 1963, a number that had grown to 3,700 by 1970 (Preston 1986, p. 15; Powell 2001, pp. 70–71). During the sixties the Church also became involved in the labor movement through organizations such as the Hermandad Obrera de Acción Católica (Workers’ Association of Catholic Action; HOAC) and the Juventudes Obreras Católicas (Group of Young Catholic Workers; JOC; Pérez-Díaz 1993, pp. 156–58; Casanova 1994, p. 82; Powell 2001, p. 71).

The final indication of the rebirth of Spanish associationism was regional mobilization, especially in Catalonia and the Basque country. In Catalonia Francoism was particularly hated because the regime repressed legitimate national aspirations. To protect their national identity, Catalans organized a nominally apolitical web of cultural associations and institutions of “great extent and dynamism” (Powell 2001, p. 80). The cultural organization El Ómnium Cultural (Cultural Patrimony), the Benedictine monastery of Montserrat, and the Catalan Socialist Party, the Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (Catalan Unified Socialist Party; PSUC) all struggled to protect Catalan language and culture (Powell 2001, pp. 80–82). Distinctive regional nationalist mobilization in Catalonia was not the
province of a particular political group. Rather the defense of Catalan culture was a common goal that brought together Catholics, socialists, and sectors of the middle class (Guibernau 2004, p. 65).

We would not want to exaggerate the extent to which an autonomous civil society existed in Spain under late Francoism. It was not until 1977 that the annual creation of associations surpassed the 2,000 mark (Ministerio del Interior 1999, p. 2333). During the 1960s the largest organizations were still dependent on a governmental lottery or foreign-aid distribution concession to fund their everyday activities (Pérez-Díaz and López Novo 2003, pp. 97–108). And for a long time organizations such as the colegios profesionales (professional associations) and the cámaras de comercio (chambers of commerce) that could have potentially become arenas of contestation or autonomous activity were subordinated to state control through the appointment of top officials (Linz 1983, p. 388). Furthermore, the specter of violence continued. In 1963 Franco authorized the execution of a Communist activist Julián Grimau, and the even more barbaric execution by strangulation of two anarchists, Francisco Granados Gata and Joaquín Delgado Martínez (Preston 1986, p. 10). Indeed, immediately prior to the transition that regime hardened significantly. In the summer of 1975 the government declared martial law, reiterated the notorious Law on Political Responsibilities of 1939, and carried out a number of death sentences (Molinero and Ysas 2008, p. 223). There was, therefore, no linear development toward liberalization. Instead, softening on some issues was normally balanced by increasing doses of state terror against those defined as “subversives.” Nevertheless, there is little doubt that broadly speaking in the relatively more relaxed environment of the 1960s and 1970s some voluntary organizations were developing.

The political context of late Francoism, however, was sharply different from that which characterized the Italian transition to democracy. Despite the emergence of organizations outside the regime, much of the population itself remained politically apathetic if the survey evidence is to be believed. Surveys of the 1960s and 1970s in Spain showed that only 15% of the population was interested in politics (Powell 2001, p. 42). Further, even though there was an intense wave of labor mobilization from the early seventies, it was overwhelmingly focused on bread-and-butter union issues, rather than broader political goals. As one of the most sensitive scholars of the Spanish labor movement under Franco puts the point, “The enforced silence of the vanquished, the distortions of history propagated by the new order, and the triumphant images of material progress broadcasted by the State-controlled mass media had combined to create a largely apolitical society” (Balfour 1989, p. 222). Even seemingly radical tactics, such as mass strikes, were used to attain modest, largely economic, objectives.
The continuing weakness of any organized political opposition to the regime was also important. The PCE was the regime’s most determined political opponent. Yet it never posed a serious threat to the stability of the Francoist state. Its political strategy amounted to calling for a massive general strike that would bring down the Francoist regime and lead to a constituent assembly (Powell 2001, p. 59), something that never happened. The PSOE’s approach was similar and similarly unworkable. In addition to these two parties of the left, there also existed several democratic Catholic organizations, none of which was able to mount any serious challenge to the Franco regime. This absence of a serious political opposition was an important element in the construction of Spain’s democracy (Powell 2001, pp. 66–67). For political parties in Spain remained extremely weak.

What was the upshot of these developments? Spanish voluntary associations, to summarize the above section, reemerged from the mid-1950s. However, they did so in a political context marked by the relative weakness of political parties. This was true both of the official Francoist party, which stagnated organizationally throughout the period, and the opposition parties, which remained restricted cliques. We suggest that it was precisely this absence of strong political organizations that explains the relative autonomy of civil society from politics in Spain. Voluntary associations, even those that might seem the most radical, such as the labor unions, were much less politically oriented than their Italian counterparts. What was the consequence of this for the development of civil society in democratic Spain?

Democracy as “Pacted Transition”

The rise of democracy in Spain has produced a large literature. For the purposes of our argument the key issue is that the basic political framework for Spain’s postdictatorial democracy was established by reformist actors within the Francoist regime: not by mass political parties that defined themselves in opposition to that regime as occurred in Italy. Despite vigorous pressure from below by labor organizations, women’s organizations, and nationalist organizations (Threlfall 2008, pp. 940–42), Spanish democracy was institutionally more continuous with Francoism than Italian democracy was with Italian fascism. Precisely because it occurred in this elite driven way, the Spanish transition to democracy preserved the autonomy of civil society. The process of competitive mass party formation that occurred in Italy in the 1940s and 1950s never developed in Spain.

By the late 1960s Franco faced a painful dilemma. His personal arbitrary authority was evidently incompatible with an orderly succession. As
labor militancy and regional nationalist agitation, especially in the Basque countries, increased, Franco’s greatest fear was that his regime would become a mere “parenthetical dictatorship” like that of Primo de Rivera in the 1920s. In order to address this problem he named a royal successor. This delicate operation was brought to a successful completion in July 1969 when he officially named Juan Carlos de Borbón y Borbón as the next head of the state. From the point of view of Francoist constitutionality, this was not restoration of the Bourbon dynasty that had ended in 1931 but a new institution drawing its legitimacy directly from the nationalist uprising of 1936. At the same time Franco began to withdraw from the day-to-day operations of government, transferring considerable de facto power to Admiral Carrero Blanco (Preston 1986, pp. 21–22; Payne 1987, p. 555; Powell 2001, pp. 108–9).

The issue of succession, however, opened a deep split within the Francoist coalition and the Falangists, who aimed at expanding political participation within the framework of the regime. With the succession now resolved, Carrero Blanco turned sharply against the Falangists, staffing his government exclusively with Opus Dei men (Molinero and Ysás 2008, p. 125). The narrowness of this cabinet exacerbated fragmentation within the Francoist coalition by excluding the party in particular from access to power (Molinero and Ysás 2008, p. 142). Further, the technocrats proved themselves incapable of dealing effectively with the mounting social and political tensions of the late 1960s, as the badly mishandled Burgos trial of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Country and Liberty; ETA) separatists and terrorists in 1970 showed. Carrero Blanco wanted to use the trial to demonstrate the government’s strength. But the plan to try the accused in a military court with the clear threat of execution set off a wave of popular antiregime mobilization and more seriously elicited a pastoral letter from the Catholic hierarchy requesting that the trial be moved to a civilian venue (Molinero and Ysás 2008, pp. 141–42).

These missteps pointed to a deeper structural problem in the Francoist regime: its inability to institutionalize either monarchic or democratic legitimacy. In the meeting of the Consejo Nacional del Movimiento (National Movement Council; CNM) immediately after the trial the Falangists confronted these issues openly. A report of the permanent commission of this body placed its hopes in the establishment of associations that could allow some “popular participation” but would avoid the evils of political pluralism (Molinero and Ysás 2008, pp. 157–58).

After Carrero Blanco’s assassination by ETA, these internal conflicts were sharpened during the Arias Navarro years from 1974 to 1976. Like his predecessor, Arias Navarro was an ardent Francoist. He began his political career as a prosecutor, provincial governor, and policeman during the civil war and was thus acceptable to the Francoist bunker. But some-
what surprisingly he carried out a reformist program. Perhaps most important, Arias Navarro included many members of the Tácito group of Catholic reformers at the undersecretarial level within the ministry. The most dramatic indication of the new direction came from a speech that he delivered on February 12, 1974, outlining a program of liberalization that included increasing the number of elected representatives within the Cortes. This attempt to open the regime failed for much the same reasons as the Carrero Blanco government had. Arias Navarro was incapable of opening the regime sufficiently to satisfy the growing demands of the liberals while the timid attempts at reform that he did make provoked the ultras. After Franco’s death in 1975, Juan Carlos appointed Adolfo Suárez González to replace him. The transition to democracy now began in earnest (Preston 1986, pp. 28–29, 52–57, 62).

Suárez combined impeccable Falangist credentials and good links to the military with openness to reform. He began his career as secretary to Fernando Herrero Teeter, a prominent Opus Deísta. He formed close relations with the ministry of the interior General Camilla Alonso Vega and had been the civil governor of Segovia in 1968. From this position he was able to get himself nominated director general of the Spanish state television network. From here Suárez assiduously promoted the image of Juan Carlos—thereby tightening his links to the monarchy (Preston 1986, pp. 70–71). His masterstroke was to use the institutions of the Francoist dictatorship to dismantle the regime itself. The key moment in this process occurred in November 1976 when both the CNM and the Francoist Cortes approved the Political Reform Law, allowing for democratic elections by overwhelming majorities. Following passage of the law on political reform, Suárez González decreed an electoral law (March 1977), dismantled the state-sanctioned unions (April 1977) and the Movimiento (April 1977), legalized the Communist Party (April 1977), and granted pardons to political prisoners (October 1977). Only after these reforms had been conducted from above did he begin to establish contacts with the opposition, presenting it with a set of accomplished facts (Carr and Fusi 1981, pp. 221–22; Maravall and Santamaría 1986, p. 82; Preston 1986, p. 101; Gunther 1992, pp. 47–53).

What was the position of the opposition parties in relation to these reforms? As we have already suggested, from the late 1960s the Francoist regime faced a serious wave of labor unrest that was at least partially responsible for opening up the regime. The two main leftist parties, the PSOE and the PCE, sought to use this popular unrest to bring about a ruptura democrática (democratic break) with the preexisting regime. Indeed this remained a formal demand by both parties until late 1976. However, one of Suárez’s great accomplishments was to block such an outcome. For by rapidly opening the regime up from within, he made it extremely
difficult for the PSOE and PCE to pursue a more radical agenda. Already by early 1976 both major leftist parties had in practice abandoned the goal of a democratic break. After approval of the law on political reform through a referendum that the PSOE and the PCE formally boycotted, Suárez established a negotiating committee including representatives from all the main political forces from a position of strength. This became the framework for a series of pacts with the opposition that laid the foundations for a *ruptura pactada* (or negotiated break). Suárez was willing to meet many of the concrete demands of the opposition, but he firmly rejected the establishment of a provisional government, or a constitutional Cortes. As a result the transition occurred within the framework of Francoist constitutional legality (Carr and Fusi 1981, pp. 222–23; Gunther 1992, p. 50).

Elections occurred for the first time in Spain only after many of the basic institutional questions, particularly that of the monarchy, had been settled. To compete in the electoral campaign Suárez established an ideologically empty centrist party called the UCD containing reformist Francoist technocrats and elements of the Catholic left (Preston 1986, p. 113). The lynchpin of this organization was Suárez himself. The party’s leadership was made up of men “committed to little except their own careers” (Preston 1986, p. 113). Gunther et al. (1986, p. 143) cite a UCD party leader who declared in 1981 that “Adolfo [Suárez], basically does not know what a real and modern political party is and never thought about constructing a party of that kind. The model he had in mind was, in fact, the Movimiento Nacional, since there is no other model that he followed. It’s not just that he rejected the support from the social infrastructure of people who are moved by religious aspirations, but he rejected the support of . . . the teachers’ associations, . . . movements of small agricultural proprietors . . . , small business movement, . . . and independent trade unions.” In sum, Suárez’s adoption of the “catchall” party model was partially a consequence of his own experience in the Movimiento. To the right stood a more clearly Francoist formation, the Alianza Popular (Poplar Alliance; AP) led by Manuel Fraga. To the left stood the PSOE and the PCE. The parties that performed best in this context (UCD with a little over 34% of the vote, and the PSOE with a little over 29% in 1977) were centrist electoral organizations united around strong charismatic figures, Suárez in the case of the UCD and Felipe González in the case of the PSOE. Parties farther to the right (AP) and left (PCE) were marginalized. The transition to democracy then revealed a political landscape dominated by a centrist electorate, relatively independent from organized parties (Montero 1994, pp. 62–63).

Let us briefly summarize our discussion of the Spanish case. In Spain civil society had much greater autonomy from politics than Italy. There were two main and interconnected reasons for this. First, although the Francoist uprising and regime was much more destructive of the organi-
zational texture of civil society than Italian fascism, it was less ambitious in its attempt to shape the political identities of the Spanish population. Its regime organizations had much lower memberships than their Italian counterparts and then stagnated, rather than grew, over time. Further, instead of an immediate transition from totalitarianism to democracy, in Spain a liberal opening after the mid- to late 1950s allowed for the re-emergence of civil society, prior to the emergence of democratic parties. Both of these factors, in combination with intense economic development in the 1950s and 1960s, created a civil society relatively autonomous from political parties. When democratic parties were again active in Spain, they did not transform this situation. Instead, they reproduced the basic relationship that had been established under the Francoist regime, constituting themselves as political organizations without tight links to nonpolitical voluntary organizations.

CONCLUSIONS

Our study asked: what is the impact of totalitarian versus authoritarian dictatorship on the development of postdictatorial civil societies? We showed that civil society was organizationally strong and heteronomous in postfascist Italy, and organizationally weak but autonomous in post-Franco Spain; we further argued that these two forms of civil society were linked to two different sorts of dictatorship. Italian fascism as a totalitarian regime, we argued, tended paradoxically to strengthen organizationally Italian civil society but also to undermine its autonomy. Francoism, as an authoritarian regime, in contrast, tended to weaken Spanish civil society organizationally but left its autonomy relatively intact. We further showed how these characteristics of civil society under the dictatorial period were transmitted to the democratic period precisely through the efforts of political actors to eliminate the structures of the preceding regime. Italian democracy arose as antifascist, while Spanish democracy arose as anti-Francoist. The main political elites of the Italian Republic sought to establish alternative antifascist forms of political organization (mass parties) that paradoxically resembled the fascist model. In contrast, the main political elites of democratizing Spain aimed to reform the political institutions of the state but felt little need to mobilize the population as such against late Francoism because this authoritarian regime itself had engaged in little mass mobilizing. These different processes produced the very different sorts of civil societies that our analysis documents. What was the main evidence for our conclusions?

We began our analysis by establishing the phenomenon: strong and heteronomous civil society in Italy and weak and autonomous civil society in Spain. In this opening section of the article we presented evidence under
two headings. For the concept of strength, to recall, we showed several types of evidence (on voluntarism, union membership, cooperative membership, voting, and party membership) indicating that Italian civil society in the post–World War II period was organizationally stronger than Spanish civil society. Under the concept of autonomy we documented the relations that parties and nonparty voluntary organizations had to one another in the two cases. Thus, we showed that despite its greater organizational strength, Italian civil society, in the period after World War II, was less autonomous from politics than its Spanish counterpart. We presented two main pieces of evidence to show this. First, in postwar Italy, political parties locked distinct sectors of the electorate into political subcultures that remained strong until the early 1990s. Second, political parties completely dominated the union and cooperative movement. In Spain the electorate was more autonomous from political parties, and voluntary organizations were more independent from them. In sum, Spanish civil society was clearly more autonomous from politics than Italian civil society.

We then briefly dealt with the possibility that two established alternative explanations might explain these differences. We showed that the macroeconomic evolution of the two countries was extremely similar over the first half of the 20th century, that the two cases had similar levels of associationism in their predictatorial periods, and that, if anything, Spain had greater experience with political democracy than Italy prior to its long experience of dictatorship. This, we argued, provides us with a warrant for investigating the hypothesis that differences in the dictatorial periods were key in constructing differences in the structure of civil society in the postdictatorial period in both cases.

The following section then turned to a sketch of the contrasting policies of fascism and Francoism toward civil society. Italian fascism sought to undermine the autonomy of civil society but also to increase the organizational strength of voluntary organizations. Both the Fascist Party and the fascist unions were voluntary organizations, although obviously not autonomous voluntary organizations. In the postfascist period this model of party-associational linkage was pluralized and reproduced by the major postfascist parties, particularly the PCI and the DC, precisely because they wanted to eradicate fascism. Francoism, in Spain, pursued a very different strategy toward civil society. The Spanish dictatorship began initially as a particularly harsh form of fascist regime. It was very repressive and dismantled the non-Catholic civil society that had developed during the Second Republic. However, Francoism differed from Italian fascism mostly because it survived the end of World War II. After 1945 it transformed itself into an authoritarian but nonfascist regime that allowed for the development of an autonomous civil society. In particular, it allowed a large
degree of social activism, in part, through the organizational network of the Catholic Church. The existence of this phase, we argue, is the crucial historical difference between Italian fascism and Francoism. With the return to democratic politics in the 1970s in Spain political parties did not develop strong links to nonparty voluntary associations, and they lacked a domestic point of reference for the systematic subordination of civil society organizations to political parties. What does this analysis imply? We would suggest that it demonstrates the empirical plausibility of the Gramscian model. For we have shown the existence of two sorts of civil society (organizationally strong but heteronomous and organizationally weak but autonomous) that are either disallowed or not considered by current civil society theory but are clear theoretical possibilities from the Gramscian perspective developed here.

This analysis has three important sets of implications for future research: one set of implications concerns theories of democracy, a second set concerns theories of civil society, and a third concerns methods of comparative historical sociology. One of the main contributions of this analysis is simply to rethink the legacy of dictatorial regimes for democratic outcomes. A large literature focuses on this issue. But somewhat surprisingly, the assumption of the vast majority of this work is that such legacies are exclusively negative for democracy (Di Palma 1982; Stepan and Linz 1995, pp. 81–83). Indeed the literature on regime legacies mirrors the one-dimensional approach to civil society presented above, because most scholars suggest that dictatorial regimes always weaken civil society. By shifting from the one-dimensional to the two-dimensional model, this article suggests that the relationship is much more complicated. Italian fascism strengthened civil society organizationally, as we have shown, while undermining its autonomy. Francoism, in contrast, preserved the autonomy of civil society, while in its early period attacking its organizational strength. The legacies of these dictatorships cannot be fully understood without considering both of these dimensions. Italian fascism issued in a very strong civil society in the postfascist period. This created a very specific type of democracy, one which was highly mobilized but which did not have an effective system of party alternation. Francoism produced a much weaker civil society but also a more autonomous one. This generated a less mobilized democracy but also a more functional liberal politics than in Italy. Whether, and to what extent, these legacies were “negative” or “positive” is a value-related question, not one that can be answered exclusively by positive social science. One thing these do suggest, however, is that the conceptual apparatus of political sociology needs to be disengaged from the moral evaluations of regime types. This would allow political sociology to investigate more fully the connections between regime types, rather than arranging them in contrasting conceptual boxes. As Bar-
rington Moore, Jr., suggested many years ago, it is perhaps better to con-
ceive of dictatorship and democracy as “successive historical stages” rather
than “alternatives” (Moore 1993, pp. 413–14). Historically oriented polit-
ic sociology would be well served by establishing the concrete connec-
tions between dictatorships and democracies rather than treating them as
distinct “regime types.”

Our argument is based empirically on the intensive study of two highly
specific right wing dictatorial regimes. It is important therefore for us to
at least suggest how extendable our model might be to other contexts,
especially to Eastern Europe and Russia. Marc Howard (2003) shows that
civil society in both postcommunist Germany and post-Soviet Russia is
extremely weak in comparison to the West. He attributes this weakness
to the legacy of communism. On the face of it, this would seem to be a
rather serious challenge to the argument developed above. For these were
totalitarian regimes and would thus seem typologically closer to the Italian
than the Spanish case. Viewed historically rather than typologically, how-
ever, the Eastern European cases are not so anomalous. The key point is
that the evolution of the Eastern European regimes was much more simi-
lar to Francoism than to fascism. Like the Spanish regime, most Eastern
Europe states experienced two main phases of dictatorship: a totalitarian
phase lasting into the early 1950s, and a posttotalitarian phase lasting af-
ter 1956. The proximate cause of this turn was the twentieth party Con-
gress of the CPSU and Krushchev’s “secret speech” denouncing Stalin, an
event that set off a wave of unrest in Poland and Hungary that, while not
leading to full democratization, blocked any return to the high Stalinism of
the late 1940s and early 1950s. Increasingly, with the partial exception of
Romania and Czechoslovakia, reformist technocrats, rather than parties,
dominated the economies and societies of Eastern Europe in a pattern
similar to that of the Opus Dei technocrats in Spain. Pressures from inter-
national competition imposed some liberalization of the economy after the
mid-1950s as well (Fejtő 1971, pp. 47, 73, 131; Linz et al. 1995, pp. 81–83).
The basic phases of the development of the people’s democracies in East-
ern Europe are thus strikingly similar to what occurred in Spain.

How then should scholars explain the finding that civil society is ex-
traordinarily weak in Eastern Europe? This study cannot answer this
question. But we think it is useful to acknowledge that there are two plau-
sible arguments. One suggests that the levels of atomization are the result
of the experience of communism. This, again, is the overwhelmingly dom-
inant argument in political sociology. A second view, for which we would
argue, suggests that the weakness of civil society in Eastern Europe should
be understood as a consequence of gradual liberalization after 1956, not
a consequence of communism per se. On this second view the argument
would be that it is not totalitarianism as such, but posttotalitarianism
that produced a weak civil society across the region. Put in counterfactual terms, we would suggest that if the unrest of 1956 had produced full democratization, the civil societies that would have emerged would have more closely resembled postwar Italy in their high levels of organization and politicization than they would have post-Francoist Spain, precisely because of the contiguity of the totalitarian and democratic phases. A principal aim of our future research will be to investigate the plausibility of this interpretation.

Our article also has a broader set of theoretical implications for research on civil society. If we are right that organizational autonomy and strength are independent axes of variation, then types of civil society need to be located in a two-dimensional space. In much discussion about civil society scholars suggest that civil society is “strong” or “weak” without being clear about how this relates to autonomy. The problem with this way of thinking is that the same factors that produce organizational strength do not necessarily produce autonomy and vice versa. Indeed, as we have shown for the case of Italy, fascism promoted the development of civil society organizationally but deeply undermined its autonomy. In contrast, Francoism attacked civil society’s organizations but did not significantly undermine its autonomy. Such a perspective should also force a rethinking of the paradigmatic cases of the United States and Russia as well. It is commonplace in civil society literature to identify the United States as a nation of joiners (Almond and Verba 1963; Skocpol and Fiorina 1999). But what may be really important about this case is the degree to which its civil society is both strong and autonomous from politics. Indeed, viewed from this perspective, the coexistence of a strong and autonomous civil society may be one of the central puzzles of American civil society. Russia, in most work on civil society, forms the opposite of the American case. In both popular and scholarly understanding Russia possesses a weak civil society (Howard 2003, pp. 73–78). But what may be most distinctive about Russia is the combination of weakness with heteronomy.

Future work on civil society, in any case, needs to discuss these two dimensions together. One avenue of research that seems particularly important in light of the cases analyzed here is that organizational strength and autonomy may be inversely related. It is worth reflecting on the fact that political participation in the much-maligned First Republic in Italy was so high for so long. Italian democracy shows very high levels of civic engagement, as LaPalombara correctly notes. To some extent this is clearly a result of the fact that political parties have dominated Italian voluntary organizations. Indeed the very things that produce a high level of civic engagement in Italy may also create problems in other respects. Intense activism and partisanship may undermine the search for interparty consensus that facilitates institutional stability. One obvious example is the
quality of discourse about public affairs. Many commentators have suggested that the quality of public debate is less destructive in Spain than in Italy. There is also broad agreement that Spanish democratic institutions function better than Italian ones (Salvati 2003, p. 14). Italy, for example, only very recently has established an adequate system of party alternation, and it is not obvious that this is a stable achievement. Although we have not fully assessed this point here, this may suggest that there is a potential trade-off between the strength of civil society and its autonomy. This rather bleak conclusion needs to be explored.

Our article also makes two methodological contributions. First we demonstrate the usefulness of anomalous or negative cases in the theory development. As such our piece is an addition to the growing body of literature that suggests the decisive theoretical importance of negative case analysis (Emigh 1997, 2009; Riley 2005, 2010). Our close examination of the development of Italian and Spanish civil society has allowed us to formulate a more general theory of civil society than those currently on offer by distinguishing organizational autonomy and strength. This reformulation potentially opens a new avenue of research focused on understanding how these two dimensions have developed and how they relate to one another.

Second, we have established a new way of thinking about historical sequences that should be useful for other comparative historical sociologists. As we noted, one of the problems that plagues much of the literature on the legacies of dictatorship is its underlying conception of causality. Dictatorial regimes are often understood to have left a “legacy” insofar as they directly shape institutions or attitudes. This is the result of a broader tendency in comparative historical analysis to think about connections among phenomena in an ontologically positive way. For example, Mahoney (2003b, p. 363) defines process tracing as the attempt to “link explanatory variables with the outcome variable.” Sewell (2005, pp. 218–19) similarly seeks to build a historical sociology based on the analysis of fully realized and significant happenings, which he calls events. These sorts of mechanisms are important, and indeed our evidence has suggested that they are partially responsible for the differences documented in this article. We think, however, that dictatorship can leave legacies in another way. Rather than positively producing institutions, dictatorial regimes can transmit their effects to postdictatorship democracies through the mechanism of determinant negation. Democracy, in both Spain and Italy, emerged as a negation of a previously existing dictatorship. In both instances the movement for democracy was profoundly shaped by what it was against: fascism and Francoism, respectively. The legacy of dictatorship was transmitted, paradoxically, in and through the attempt to eradicate it. In Italy this resulted in the paradoxical pluralization of the mass party form, which
was precisely an attempt to construct an “antifascist” democracy. In Spain, this resulted in a relatively demobilized democracy that emerged out of a strikingly demobilized authoritarian regime. While we would certainly not claim that this specific negative mechanism operates in all cases, it may be a very common type of historical linkage. To the extent that it is a common mechanism, it means that researchers should take seriously the possibility that the concrete connections linking different phases of any historical process are as much a process of “negation” as they are of production or causality in a Humean sense.

At the broadest level, then, our study seeks to transcend not only one-dimensional theories of civil society but also the one-dimensional social ontology that still characterizes a large swathe of comparative historical sociology. Scholars influenced by critical realism have pointed out the importance of negativity in social reality (Collier 2005, pp. 335–36; Norrie 2010, p. 13). These writers suggest that many phenomena that scholars might be interested in, such as the absence of a working-class party in the United States or the absence of water in a drought, are real in quite the same sense as positively existing objects such as the U.S. presidency or water in a lake. We have extended this idea to point out that one important type of historical linkage is between phases linked through projects of negation (Bhaskar 1994, p. 84). Thus we have suggested that Italian democracy and Spanish democracy were antifascist and anti-Francoist, respectively. Their links with the preceding period were strong, but negative rather than positive. This kind of linkage would be missed if one sought the legacy of fascism or Francoism in the existence of fascist or Francoist attitudes or political parties (Barnes 1972, pp. 46–47). This basic idea suggests that comparative historical sociologists should be as attentive to the study of absences, and the study of human activities aimed at negation, as they are to the analysis of events and projects aimed the positive construction of new states of affairs.

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