REMAKING URBAN CITIZENSHIP

ORGANIZATIONS, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE RIGHT TO THE CITY

COMPARATIVE URBAN AND COMMUNITY RESEARCH, VOLUME 10

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Making the Case for Organizational Presence: Civic Inclusion, Access to Resources, and Formal Community Organizations

Irene Bloemraad and Shannon Gleeson

When asked about ethnic groups in his city in 2006, a San Jose city councilor had trouble mentioning more than a few organizations. When pressed further, he acknowledged,

We have the Italian groups, we have the Mexican group, the Mexican heritage group.... We have various chambers of commerce...a Hispanic chamber, we have the African American chamber...the Italian, and so forth.

Ethnic organizations, for this local politician, were vaguely known, largely confined to business groups, and mostly located on the political periphery. The politician's lack of knowledge is striking, especially given the extensive literature on past and present immigrant incorporation into the civic landscape of places such as New York, Boston, and Chicago.

This chapter is about civic invisibility and the importance of immigrant-origin community organizations. While New York, Boston, and Chicago are iconic immigrant metropolises, immigrants account for a greater proportion of the population in San Jose than in these traditional immigrant gateways. Almost two of every five people living in San Jose are foreign-born, with about 60 percent from Asia and a third from Mexico and Latin America. At over 350,000 people, immigrants in San Jose are almost as numerous as the entire population of Oakland, the third largest city in the San Francisco Bay Area, and they hail from around the world. Civic invisibility is not due to a lack of immigrant presence.

These immigrants and their supporters have not been silent inhabitants of the city. At least one hundred thousand people, mostly Mexican, marched through San Jose's streets on May 1, 2006, opposing HR 4437, a federal bill that would have made undocumented status a felony (Vital, 2010). The following year, members of the Vietnamese community engaged in a series of demonstrations and counter-demonstrations over the most appropriate name for a business district that is home to many Vietnamese American stores (Molina, 2007). Such actions can be considered a realization of the "right to the city" ideal (Purcell, 2003; Smith and Guarnizo, 2009): immigrant and low-income residents of color took to the streets to call for better living conditions and to articulate their vision of the city.

Yet protesters' actions have not transformed immigrants into equal and invited participants in local politics. As the city councilor's reaction suggests, despite their mass mobilization, immigrants and ethnic minorities remain largely invisible to the decision-makers who oversee
the city's day-to-day civic and political life. The juxtaposition between mass protest politics and immigrants' relative invisibility in ordinary politics shows, we believe, that protest is not sufficient for acquiring voice and influence. Sometimes officials are conscious of their foreign-born constituents, but they rarely register at the top of local agendas.

In this chapter we argue that civic and political visibility depends on having an organizational presence in city life. Groups that are better organized around an interest or cause, or around a shared background or common barriers to inclusion, have better odds of being seen, heard, and acknowledged.

Furthermore, not all organizations have equal access. Formal nonprofit organizations, whether working to help someone rent a hall for an event or to advocate for bilingual public services, tend to be better at opening up civic and political spaces to immigrants. Bureaucratization and formalization can present challenges to those who favor grassroots participation, but formal organizations play an important role in bringing immigrants into local decision-making. It is critical to document and understand the degree of formal organizing within immigrant communities and to evaluate the consequences of organizational inequality.

In what follows, we first review various models of urban political inclusion with a focus on immigrant incorporation. We then introduce our research site, San Jose, California. We examine the city's organizational landscape and demonstrate that immigrant empowerment is severely hindered by the limited number of formal immigrant organizations in San Jose—many fewer than what we would expect given the city's demography. We explore some of the unfavorable consequences of civic inequality by considering resource allocation, protest politics, and immigrants' civic and political presence in the eyes of local officials. We end the chapter by outlining some policy suggestions to reduce such inequality.

Theorizing Urban Citizenship and Political Inclusion

American scholarship on the political inclusion of urban minorities has long vacillated between a focus on electoral politics and an emphasis on social movement activism. Seminal work by Robert Dahl (1961) describes urban political parties' strategy of ticket balancing by running one or two "ethnic" politicians to secure the "ethnic vote" in New Haven, Connecticut. With a different purpose, but with similar attention to electoral politics, Ira Katznelson (1982) outlines the conceptual and participatory divide between New Yorkers' workplace activism around class and their ethnic orientation to local politics. Having been rooted in the experience of European-origin immigrants and their descendants in the Northeast and Midwest, the attention to electoral contests has a distinguished lineage in studies of urban politics.

This paradigm, however, became a target for criticism for failing to deal adequately with the second class citizenship and political disenfranchisement of low-income city residents and racial minorities. The civil rights movement of the 1960s and the urban protests that followed generated scholarship on social movement activism as the primary means for political outsiders to challenge elite insiders (e.g., McAdam, 1982; Piven and Cloward, 1977). Scholars differed in their evaluation of whether the formal political system could improve the lives of those excluded from power, but they agreed that civil disobedience, civil society mobilization, and contentious street-based action offered a surer path to political power than voting and electoral representation.

The debate over an electoral path to inclusion in urban politics continues to the present, although it has evolved as immigration to the United States has changed. Browning, Marshall,
Making the Case for Organizational Presence

and Tabb (1984) challenged the adequacy of protest politics to explain the political empowerment of African Americans and Latinos in San Francisco, concluding that electoral coalitions were better for advancing minority interests. Other scholars have followed suit, acknowledging that although contemporary political parties do not incorporate immigrants and ethnic minorities as fully as in earlier periods, urban politics remains a battleground for votes and winning coalitions (Jones-Correa, 1998; Mollenkopf and Sonenshein, 2009; Rogers, 2009).

Yet other observers deem the electoral lens to be inadequate (de Graauw, 2008a; Minnite, 2009; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a). Today, many immigrants do not hold US citizenship and are formally barred from voting. Cultural and linguistic divides make accessing information about electoral campaigns difficult. The diversity of today's immigrants renders the creation and mobilization of a politically-oriented collective identity—as has been achieved by African Americans—problematic. Some also contend that the transnational orientations of some contemporary immigrants mesh imperfectly with local political activism, although the bulk of available evidence appears to suggest the opposite: civic and political engagement in the sending community breeds engagement in the country of settlement (Black, 1987; Smith, 2007).

In the search for alternatives, Mark Purcell (2003) lays out an anti-capitalist "right to the city" model that highlights the declining centrality of the nation-state. As Smith and Guarnizo (2009) suggest, the right to the city model suffers from an overly simplified view of group power relations, but it provides room for migrant agency. Other scholars have advanced the notion of "cultural citizenship," drawing attention to how immigrants articulate social and political membership through their everyday practices (Coll, 2005; Flores and Benmayor, 1997; Rosaldo, 1994). These alternative membership approaches move beyond standard electoral or contentious politics models.

Before abandoning electoral or contentious politics, however, we believe scholars should bridge the divide between the two by focusing on the organizations that link individuals to the political system. These organizations can include political parties, but more frequently they involve a host of civil society organizations that can communicate information down to immigrants and up to decision makers. These community organizations can also serve as sites for the development of collective identities, formulate and articulate the interests of immigrant communities, act as advocates on immigrant issues before city government (both elected officials and salaried staff), and provide a convenient way for local media to broadcast the perspectives of the immigrant community (de Graauw, 2008a; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a). While these diverse roles also mean that organizations can co-opt or mislead, we argue that immigrants face a serious risk of civic invisibility without a rich organizational infrastructure.

The focus on organizations does not inherently privilege one political strategy or another: electoral politics and contentious mobilization are both important, as are strategies of legal claims-making, bureaucratic incorporation, and local identity construction. Indeed, community-based organizations can, and do, engage in all these different political activities. Here our focus is on the role of organizations in furthering urban inclusion generally. Our approach builds on a growing literature recognizing the importance of community and nonprofit organizations in immigrants' political integration (Bloemraad, 2006b; Chung, 2007; de Graauw, 2008a; Gleeson, 2010; Marwell, 2007; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008b; Sampson, et al., 2005; Vermeulen and Berger, 2008; Wong, 2006). This analytical lens also falls in line with recent calls for greater attention to organizations in urban sociology (McQuarrie and Marwell, 2009). Put simply, formal organizations matter; thus, evidence of organizational inequality and under-representation carries
disquieting implications for immigrants' ability to achieve voice and influence in the places they live.

**San Jose: 21st Century Immigrant Gateway**

Founded in 1777, San Jose is one of the oldest cities in California. The city was incorporated in 1850 and was home to the first and second sessions of the California state legislature in 1850 and 1851. In subsequent decades, the city grew steadily as it became the service and processing center for the region's agricultural economy. From a population of about 18,000 in 1890, the city more than doubled in size to almost 40,000 in 1920. Immigrants, many of them from Mexico and Portugal, were a significant part of this growth. Between 1900 and 1920, over 20 percent of the city's residents were foreign-born (Gibson and Lennon, 1999).

San Jose, however, does not have a continuous experience of international migration and newcomer settlement like its northern neighbor, San Francisco. Exclusionary immigration laws that barred Asian and most European migration effectively ended immigration to San Jose in the 1920s; Mexican immigration also declined. When new migration did occur, especially in the decades following World War II, it consisted of US veterans and their families as well as other Americans seeking cheap housing and economic opportunities in California. These domestic, mostly native-born, migrants fueled significant economic growth, especially through industrial and real estate development. International migrants, however, were not a significant part of this story. By 1970, only 8 percent of the city's inhabitants were born outside the United States (Gibson and Lennon, 1999).

This has all changed in the last four decades. San Jose has been transformed into the Bay Area's largest urban center and the high tech capital of Silicon Valley. Today about 900,000 city residents live sprawled across 175 square miles of land. In 2006, 39 percent of these residents were foreign-born, 58 percent from Asia and 34 percent from Latin America. Immigrants' imprint on the city's landscape is clear in neighborhoods such as the largely working-class Eastside. This area is home to many Vietnamese and Mexican residents and includes the city's new "Saigon Business District" (Molina, 2007) and the well-known Mexican cultural hub at King and Story roads. About a fifth of the city's immigrants had lived in the United States less than 6 years in 2006. Whereas some US cities such as San Francisco and New York have been continuous migrant destinations, the recent and explosive increase in San Jose's immigrant population distinguishes the city as a 21st century immigrant gateway (Singer, 2003; Singer, et al., 2008). Consequently, San Jose faces new structures and must develop new ways for dealing with its foreign-born population.

As outlined in Table 1, San Jose's immigrants are diverse in their needs and resources. San Jose's dual labor market epitomizes that of a global city (even though, strictly speaking, San Jose does not conform to Sassen's (1991; 1999) definition). One finds a wealth of professional jobs demanding high human capital, especially (but not exclusively) in the computer and biotech industries. Fully 34 percent of the foreign-born living in San Jose held a college or more advanced educational degree in 2006. Demand for high-skilled labor is accompanied by a strong demand for low or semi-skilled workers. During San Jose's tech-boom of the late 1990s, this included many electronic assembly workers. Today, the low-wage immigrant workforce is critical to many post-industrial sectors, such as construction, cleaning, restaurants, and other services. Twenty-seven percent of San Jose's immigrants have not completed high school, a much higher proportion than the 10 percent of US-born residents with a similarly modest level of
education. This "paradox of poverty in the midst of the affluence" has become a central feature of Silicon Valley's landscape (Zolinski, 2006, pp. 3-4). Additionally, the diversity of immigrants' backgrounds—including factors such as their cultural origins, religions, languages, and migration statuses—further complicates San Jose's socio-economic stratification; thus, a milieu of complex integration needs is generated for both newcomers and established immigrant populations.

**Table 1. Demographic Profile of San Jose, American Community Survey, 2005-2007 Estimates**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>898,901</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Hispanic White (only)</td>
<td>285,249</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Hispanic Asian (only)</td>
<td>274,338</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Hispanic Black (only)</td>
<td>27,761</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic or Latino (of any race)</td>
<td>281,651</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native-born</td>
<td>548,092</td>
<td>61.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-born</td>
<td>350,809</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entered the US in 2000 or later</td>
<td>74,054</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naturalized US citizen (% of foreign-born population)</td>
<td>177,498</td>
<td>50.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a US citizen (% of total city population)</td>
<td>173,311</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals who speak English less than &quot;very well&quot; (of pop. 5 yrs old+)</td>
<td>222,585</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic ancestry and national origins (foreign and native-born)*</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>246,410</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>89,371</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>64,773</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>62,652</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>50,603</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>47,955</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>44,851</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>41,045</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Indian</td>
<td>32,709</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>14,977</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Education and poverty**

Less than a high school degree (of pop. 25 yrs old+)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native-born (% of all native-born)</td>
<td>25,863</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-born (% of all foreign-born)</td>
<td>82,764</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bachelor's degree or higher (of pop. 25 yrs old+)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native-born (% of all native-born)</td>
<td>103,911</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-born (% of all foreign-born)</td>
<td>106,109</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Individuals living in poverty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native-born (% of all native-born)</td>
<td>50,704</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-born (% of all foreign-born)</td>
<td>36,375</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures are taken from sub-categories of Census tallies for "Hispanic or Latino" (for Mexican), "Race" (for Vietnamese, Chinese, Filipino, Asian Indian), and "Ancestry" (for German, Irish, English, and Portuguese).
San Jose Politics and Immigration

San Jose is a peculiar microcosm of liberal California politics. It combines progressive viewpoints on social issues with the laissez-faire gusto that has powered Silicon Valley. Given the importance of real estate and industrial development for San Jose's post-World War II expansion and the city's dependence on high-tech companies today, pro-business and pro-growth interests have long played a critical role in San Jose politics. This can be seen in the prominence of groups like the Silicon Valley Leadership Group and the many chambers of commerce. In recent years, San Jose residents have also elected mayors who explicitly promote job growth and take on the entrenched interests of unions. For instance, in his 2006 bid for office, the current mayor, Chuck Reed, promised to check the power of unions over city politics (Mayor Watch, 2006; Office of the Mayor Chuck Reed, 2009); his platform garnered campaign endorsements from the Santa Clara County Deputy Sheriffs' Association but not from any major Democratic organizations.

Nevertheless, like much of the San Francisco Bay Area, partisan politics are largely absent in this liberal, northern California city. Seventy percent of registered voters in Santa Clara County cast a ballot for Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election (Santa Clara County Registrar of Voters, 2009); only 20 percent of registered voters considered themselves "conservative" in 2009 (Jackson, 2009); and, with one exception, the entire San Jose City Council in 2009 consisted of registered Democrats, including Mayor Chuck Reed. Electoral wrangling in San Jose centers on a candidate's relative position on the Democratic spectrum rather than polarized right-left conflicts.

As a result, San Jose is a largely pro-labor and pro-immigrant city. The Justice for Janitors campaign was launched from San Jose in the early 1990s. This movement to ensure fair wages for poorly paid service workers—many of whom are immigrants—garnered strong support from local elected officials and eventually led to agreements with several major tech companies and their subcontractors (Preston, 2004; Zlopniski, 2006). In 1998, the city council approved one of the most generous living wage ordinances in the country (Reynolds and Kern, 2003); an expansion of this ordinance was approved in 2008 (South Bay Labor Council, 2008).

On immigration, most elected city officials stand in solidarity with undocumented residents. This is evidenced by Resolution No. 73677, which the San Jose city council unanimously adopted in March 2007 after Immigration and Customs Enforcement conducted raids in neighboring cities in 2006 (National Immigration Law Center, 2008). The resolution reaffirmed the San Jose Police Department's policy of non-engagement with immigration enforcement officers. More recently, the city council publicly condemned SB 1070, an Arizona law passed in 2010 that allows state and local enforcement of federal immigration law and that makes unlawful presence or aiding undocumented immigrants a misdemeanor (Rodriguez, 2010; Woolfolk, 2010). The city has also taken a number of steps to build a stronger day-to-day relationship with its immigrant residents and organizations, perhaps most notably through the San Jose's Strong Neighborhood Initiative, which was established in 2002 (City of San Jose, 2010). In contrast to the experiences of immigrants in other localities that are characterized by anti-immigrant reactions (e.g., Bump, 2005; Odem, 2008), immigrants in San Jose generally find that officials and businesses appreciate their economic and cultural contributions.

Nevertheless, San Jose's bureaucratic structure and programming reveal an urban center that has not yet established a mature infrastructure for dealing with its immigrant population. San
Jose—again unlike San Francisco—lacks any city agency that is specifically dedicated to immigrant affairs (National League of Cities, 2009). Instead, like most cities in the South Bay, San Jose relies largely on Santa Clara County to fund English as a Second Language and citizenship courses, to address hate-crime prevention, and to foster immigrant leadership (Castellanos, 2009). Relations between the San Jose Police Department and the city's immigrant population are not uniformly positive. For example, when his liberal counterparts in San Francisco and Oakland embraced the label of "sanctuary city," San Jose mayor Chuck Reed initially proclaimed that his city would follow federal and state laws since "we don't need to be a sanctuary city as other cities have done" (Normand, 2007). His comments prompted a wave of criticism, but they also hinted at the relatively weak electoral power of immigrants. As of 2006, only about half of all San Jose's foreign-born residents had acquired citizenship through naturalization, making the other half legally unable to pressure elected officials through the ballot box. Though the electoral power of immigrants appears to be growing (discussed further below), we stress that in a context where half of the immigrant population is barred from voting, immigrant organizations become vital to civic voice and political influence.

Assessing Immigrant Civil Society in San Jose

Scholarly and public interest in social capital and civic engagement has shined a spotlight on the importance of community-based organizations and voluntary associations for everything from democratic vitality to the good health of group members (Putnam, 2000). It is thus troubling that a small but growing body of evidence shows substantial under-representation of immigrants and racial minorities among US non-profit and voluntary organizations, both nationally (Bell, et al., 2006; Hung, 2007; Ostrower, 2007) and in California (De Vita, et al., 2009; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008b). If mainstream organizations were including immigrants in their membership and services, this imbalance would be less problematic. However, as our research and other studies have found, mainstream groups often actively or passively keep immigrants out (Aptekar, 2008; Jones-Correa, 2005; Ramakrishnan and Viramontes, 2006). With fewer immigrant organizations to advocate, mobilize, and provide services, existing inequalities between foreign-born and native-born residents, or between particular foreign-born groups, will be exacerbated.

Following standard practice in assessing civil society, we enumerate the number of formal nonprofit organizations in San Jose that primarily target or represent immigrant communities in order to gain a sense of the character of immigrant civil society. To do this, we assembled a database of all formally registered 501(c)3 non-profit organizations (excluding private foundations) from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). We then classified these 1,987 organizations as either "immigrant-origin" or "non-immigrant" organizations, basing our designation on identifiers and indicators found in the organization's name, group mission statements, other documents, and in-depth interviews. In a fashion similar to Cortés (1998), we considered an organization to be of immigrant-origin if it focused on the problems or aspirations of a group with similar national origins, notwithstanding whether members, clients, or leaders were first, second, or third generation.

Of the 1,987 formally registered nonprofits in San Jose, we identified 412 immigrant-origin organizations, which constitute just 20.7 percent of all nonprofit organizations in the city. This underrepresentation of immigrant-origin organizations is astonishing given that the foreign-born make up 39 percent of the population and that less than a third (32 percent) of city residents
identify as non-Hispanic white on census surveys. Consequently, our research reveals significant
inequality in the civil society landscape of San Jose.

Formal organizations represent, however, only the tip of the iceberg when assessing the
vitality of civil society. Small and informal organizations are commonly overlooked by these
methods (Smith, 1997; Toepler, 2003). Official sources typically produce a gross undercount
(Groenbjer, 2002), with registered 501c(3) organizations comprising only a portion of all
voluntary associations (Colwell, 1997). Accordingly, we also identified publicly present
community-based organizations in San Jose that are not found in these official data. To find
these organizations, we followed a method similar to Groenbjer's (2002, p. 1757)
"informant/community based approach" and relied on references from 62 interviews with leaders
of community groups, public officials, and government staff that were conducted between June
2004 and December 2006. We also identified and enumerated organizations by means of ethnic
newspapers, resource directories, and web searches.

For focus and clarity, we limited our analysis to four immigrant communities: Mexican,
Vietnamese, Indian, and Portuguese. Persons who self-identify with these backgrounds comprise
43 percent of San Jose's residents. We chose these groups due to their distinct migration
histories, their different modes of entry into the country, and the significant variation in their
socio-economic profile. Mexican and Portuguese immigrants have been settling in the area for
over a hundred years. Mexican migration continues to be significant, and today a quarter of San
Jose's residents report some Mexican ancestry. While contemporary migration from Portugal is
minimal, the legacy of both flows is still apparent. Some Mexican and Portuguese organizations
have been around for decades and have generated ties with local bureaucracies and political
structures. In contrast, Indian and Vietnamese migration only began on a large scale in the 1970s.
Today, people of Vietnamese descent constitute a tenth of the city's population, and the number
of those born in India is even more modest. Indian and Vietnamese immigrants had to establish
organizations de nouveau, rather than build on previous efforts.

These four immigrant communities also differ in their modes of entry into the country and
their legal status. All four groups have significant proportions of people who arrived legally in
the United States via family sponsorship, which is the primary means by which most immigrants
acquire permanent residency in the US. In addition, a large number of Vietnamese migrated as
refugees fleeing the communist regime or under special visas related to US involvement in
Southeast Asia. Refugee status provides migrants with public assistance and more settlement
help than that offered to other migrants. This includes help with setting up mutual assistance
organizations, which facilitates nonprofit organizing (Bloemraad, 2005; Hein, 1993). In contrast,
over half of all Mexican immigrants in the US are estimated to lack legal residency documents
(Passel, 2006); fear of public scrutiny likely presents a significant barrier to civic engagement for
this group. In comparison, the Portuguese, comprising an older and more established group, have
higher rates of legal permanent status and naturalization (60 percent of Portuguese immigrants
are naturalized), while Indians represent the largest number of legal, temporary workers in the
with high levels of education. This fact serves as an advantage for civic and political
engagement, but due to the temporary nature of some visas—such as the six-year H1-B high
skilled work visas—some Indian migrants face uncertain time horizons in the US. This
examination of a range of historical trajectories, contemporary resources, and migrant
experiences helps us to capture a wide diversity of immigrant experiences.
From our database of officially registered organizations, we then identified 173 formal nonprofit organizations that had a substantial relationship with the Mexican, Vietnamese, Indian, or Portuguese communities. These 173 organizations represent just 8.7 percent of all registered nonprofit groups in the city (out of 1,987 total), a number which is much lower than these communities' 43 percent share of the city's total resident population. Based on our interviews and field research, we subsequently identified an additional 87 publicly present organizations that are not in the official database and 3 ethnic-specific chambers of commerce. Of all the organizations identified, through both formal and informal means, only 67 percent appeared in the official database. Even when adding the uncounted organizations to those that are formally registered, we see nowhere near the number of community organizations we might expect, especially given the significant presence of Mexican- and Vietnamese-origin residents and, to a lesser extent, residents of Portuguese and Indian origin.

We draw three important lessons from this examination of nonprofit organizations in San Jose. First, immigrant origin communities are severely under-represented in the universe of formal 501(c)3 organizations in the city. As we discuss further below, this results in serious, negative consequences for everything from immigrants' ability to acquire public resources to immigrants' civic and political presence in the eyes of local decision-makers. Second, reliance on official databases of voluntary organizations—a standard practice in many studies of the nonprofit sector—underestimates the vitality of immigrant civil society. Such underestimates could reinforce perceptions of political apathy or silence (Huntington, 2004) or lead observers to misjudge the mobilization potential of immigrant communities, as occurred most dramatically in the 2006 immigrant rights protests (Voss and Bloemraad, 2011). Finally, civic inequality varies dramatically across immigrant communities, with Mexican-origin communities having a considerable disadvantage. Twenty-seven percent of San Jose residents report some Mexican background, but only three percent (60 out of 1,987) of formally registered nonprofits serve or represent this community. Adding in non-registered publicly present organizations increases the number of Mexican organizations, but the total of 87 organizations still represents only a minute fraction of what we might expect given the demography of San Jose.

The Consequences of Organizational Inequality

What are the implications of organizational inequality in San Jose? For those who adhere to a radical grassroots perspective on political inclusion, the absence of formal organizations might not matter much, or it could be seen as a benefit. In the words of one of our informants, a local community activist,

You know how we have to comply with the state rules [for nonprofit status], and they give you this little book about how you're supposed to organize the group? I say...don't they do this precisely so that you don't organize? As I see it, it's all with the purpose of keeping us from organizing people.

This activist feels that the requirement to create a formal board of directors and the funding regulations that come with being a formal organization detract from the group's central mission. Commenting on his colleagues in the advocacy world, he believes that "most organizations spend all their time looking for funding to do things." Lacking an office, he works from home and carries a laptop to meetings; most of the group's initiatives are financed from his personal earnings and with the help of his family. He questions whose perspective other organizations
represent. In an immigration reform gathering in Washington, DC, he told a leader of a major immigrant rights group:

You are here in this tall building...but we, the workers, the ones who produce and bring you this food you have on the table...we are the ones who labor, and never have you come and asked us what we want.

This activist believes that formalization of collective energies could lead to organizational sclerosis, the domination of many by a small group of elites, co-optation, bureaucratization, and other processes antithetical to a radical participatory view of social action (Incite!, 2007; Silliman, 1999; Staggenborg, 1988).

While this perspective is understandable, we believe that dismissing the importance of formal organizations is a serious mistake. Organizational inequality, as reflected in the absence of formal organizations, not only reflects underlying inequalities in resources, social situation, and political power among different groups in society, but it can also aggravate those differences. Put another way, organizations have an independent and consequential effect on immigrants' civic and political inclusion in urban centers. We consider three instances of how organizational inequality matters.

Access to Public Resources

Cities provide important resources to their residents through services, access to space and buildings, and disbursement of funding for programs or initiatives that the city does not provide directly. Communities with more publicly present organizations are better able to access these services and resources.

These dynamics are most evident in city contracting and public grant-making to nonprofit organizations. Often 501(c)3 status is necessary to receive certain kinds of funding (Bell, et al., 2006). Inequality in organizational capacity can thus lead to funding inequality for immigrant-centered services, which are sorely needed but often inadequately resourced. A needs assessment conducted in 2000 by Santa Clara County found that, compared with US-born residents, immigrants had between 2 and 4 times greater the service needs, yet they received only half as many services as the native-born (Santa Clara County Office of Human Relations, 2004).

An analysis of San Jose's disbursement of federal Community Development Block Grants found similar inequalities (de Graauw, et al., 2010). In 2005-06, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development dispersed $11,476,479 to San Jose in CDBG funds. Added to carry-over funds from prior years, the city made $13,150,009 in expenditures to city agencies, non-profit organizations, and other grantees. The amount allocated to community-based organizations was about $4.1 million, which was disbursed to 38 groups. Among the 38 organizations, only 7 groups (18 percent of grantees) were primarily oriented to immigrants. These immigrant-serving organizations received 23 percent of the total grant monies allocated to community-based organizations ($957,307 out of $4,082,095).

It is worth noting that the proportion of organizations funded, and the amount of money given to these organizations, is roughly similar to the proportion of immigrant-origin organizations among all registered non-profits in San Jose (21 percent). This suggests that the source of the funding inequality for the city's immigrants—who make up almost 39 percent of residents—lies less in the process of allocation to formal nonprofits and more in the relative lack of such immigrant-oriented nonprofits in the city. As we noted above, major segments of
immigrant civil society are not registered as nonprofit organizations, and less formalized groups, of course, are ineligible for this type of city support.

Access to other city resources is also affected by organizational capacity. Cities can provide local groups with access to sports fields, meeting space, and venues for cultural productions often at no cost or with a modest fee. Such public goods greatly facilitate residents' ability to create a thriving civil society, which includes volunteers who run baseball leagues (or, in Silicon Valley, cricket and soccer leagues) as well as those who teach children the dances and songs of their parents' homeland. Access through organizational capacity, for example, is an underlying factor in the frustration expressed by a young, second-generation Latina who heads up an Aztec dance troupe:

The city Parks and Recreation Department provided space [for rehearsal] and for years it was $50 for every three months. But a couple of years ago, it was really stressful because you have to be a nonprofit [501(c)(3)] organization, and we don't have that. We haven't—we just haven't done it. Half of it's because I don't know how the heck to do it....

Organizational inequalities consequently make it harder for immigrants to access municipal spaces and carry out the type of grassroots, community activities that many scholars of social capital and urban citizenship prize.

Since the members of immigrant community organizations often have modest resources, private donations can rarely serve to provide access to public resources. One staff person at a social service agency that works with small grassroots organizations to help them gain formal nonprofit status explained that many of the groups are located in low-income areas of the city that are affected by urban blight and where the majority of members tend to be undocumented. The social service agency provides technical assistance and funding to the grassroots groups for "capacity building." According to the staff member, funding often goes towards things as basic as 501(c)3 application fees.14

Foundations and corporations can be a major source of private sponsorship, but as a recent study of nonprofit organizations in Silicon Valley reported, ethnic organizations often lack the appropriate knowledge to put together successful grant applications (LaFrance Associates, 2006). A number of our respondents, especially in the Mexican community, recounted obstacles in accessing private grants. Organizations often need to establish legitimacy with private funders first. Among the organizations we interviewed, one grassroots immigrant rights group received early financial support and office space from a larger, established social service agency in San Jose. The established group's support and reputation, a representative explained, was critical in eventually winning backing from prominent San Jose foundations. In other cases, the existence of a dominant group crowds out funding opportunities. This was felt by one arts organization, which considers itself the only community-based Latino arts group in San Jose (its service audience is 70 percent Latino). A member of the group explained that when the organization seeks foundation funding, it often lives in the shadow of a larger Mexican performance venue that is better known to non-Latinos: "Sometimes it's hard for people to understand what we do." This problem was echoed in the study of Silicon Valley nonprofits: ethnic organizations that had asked for corporate donations recounted that businesses often "denied their organization funding because it was not considered a major institution, or because the corporation had already given to a Latino organization" (LaFrance Associates, 2006, p. 29). Private funders, perhaps much like public officials, still tend to see immigrants or minorities as a special interest warranting token support rather than as an integral part of the city.
Collective Action and Organizational Capacity

Building organizational capacity is critical to mass protest mobilization. Social movement scholars have long recognized the importance of social movement organizations, from the churches of the civil rights movement (McAdam, 1982; Morris, 1984) to local Sierra Club chapters in the environmental movement (Andrews, et al., 2010). In their review of the scholarly literature on advocacy and the political process, Andrews and Edwards (2004) conclude that organizations set agendas, provide access to decision-making arenas, help pass policies, monitor and shape policy implementation, and shift the long-term priorities and resources of political institutions.

Although often depicted as a spontaneous grassroots eruption of protest, organizations clearly facilitated the unprecedented mobilization in the spring of 2006 against HR 4437, the federal bill that would have made undocumented status a felony. In San Jose, marchers represented a diversity of immigrant communities, but the majority appeared to be first and second generation people of Mexican origin. Police estimate that on May 1, one hundred thousand people took to the street in San Jose; ethnic media reported levels closer to 330,000 (Vital, 2010). By any account, this march was the largest demonstration that San Jose has ever experienced, and it was one of the biggest in the United States (Bada, et al., 2006; Wang and Winn, 2006).

Vital's (2010, p. 32) retrospective of the San Jose march acknowledges that 71 organizations contributed to the mass mobilization, including immigrant rights organizations, unions, and faith-based groups. One labor leader we interviewed discussed the contribution of these organizations, which included the Central Labor Council, the Catholic Diocese of San Jose, a coalition of interfaith leaders, and even, in an unofficial capacity, the Santa Clara County Office of Human Relations.

In many ways, the march was a spontaneous movement, but I also think that it [happened] because of the capacity of the coalition that met to shape the march.... We shouldn't underestimate our capacity to organize an orderly march with good press coverage.

This organizational capacity included both explicit and implicit promotion of turnout, logistical planning, and even direct funding for the effort.13

The importance of organizational capacity is clear when we consider how organizations not usually at the forefront of civil disobedience and collective action played a major role in the 2006 mobilizations. In the words of one key activist, "For the first time we saw a very large participation by clergy people. They were able to produce a large number of marchers through the churches." This was true despite the common perception that churches stay out of politics. For example, the director of a prominent faith-based senior center that serves mostly Vietnamese and Chinese elders—an organization which usually remains removed from political issues—recounted,

I offered [the day off] to the whole staff or anybody who wanted to march. [...] So we didn't take exactly a political stand but when families are separated due to immigration issues we're against that because we think families need to be together.

Or, as a priest for a Catholic parish located in a largely Latino immigrant neighborhood explained,
[We had] two Lent services about social justice [and]...have been involved in promoting marches for drivers licenses for undocumented people, and the marches for a more comprehensive immigration reform.

As Heredia (2008) argues, churches and other faith-based groups can draw on a potent mix of ritual and religious language to legitimize and encourage participation.

Spanish-language media also played a critical role, although such organizations are not usually considered part of the voluntary "third sector" since they are technically for-profit businesses (Bloemraad and Trost, 2008; Ramirez, 2011). One Latino organizer explained,

I'm someone who has been doing this for a long time, and I sincerely doubt that we would have garnered so many people if it had not been for the voluntary participation of the [Spanish] radio stations. [...] [T]he English-language press almost never covers these types of events, [not] until after a million people take to the streets.

The media provided information to the public and urged residents to participate. Other groups were also pivotal behind the scenes, including student organizations at local universities and some non-Latino and even non-immigrant organizations. Thus, the view of the 2006 protests as spontaneous collective action underestimates the organizational backbone behind the marches (Voss and Bloemraad, 2011).

We acknowledge that organizational capacity does not necessarily have to come from formal organizations. As we document above, the organizational universe of publicly present Mexican groups in San Jose is extremely modest. The activist quoted above, who opposes the formalization of organizations, laid some of the groundwork for the marches through earlier activities around the issue of driver licenses for undocumented migrants. He spoke of his frustration with the minimal resources and conservative strategies of local organizations:

I started to hold [rallies] only because the organizations I knew, and the unions, didn't want to do them weekly [as I did]. I asked them, 'Why?' And they would say, 'Because it's a lot of work, we have to get a permit, and it's costly to organize. It's better to do them every 6 months.' [...And I would tell them] 'People are suffering every second, and we need to work faster to get things done.' And they didn't want to... And I never got a permit, because I didn't need one. I asked, and they told me that it wasn't necessary if I was just going to walk on the sidewalk. They [the organizations] had never held marches along the sidewalk. But, for me, this is more effective, to have a one hour march, where people can see you and witness what happened.

This activist's organizing strategies generated substantial conflict with other groups' leaders, but his efforts garnered broad-based support from residents. Thus, San Jose's massive demonstration shows that despite the existence of very few formal 501(c)3 organizations, the Mexican origin community came together for an impressive display of solidarity and political engagement due, in part, to the mobilization of groups outside the formal nonprofit universe.

Yet the collapse of large-scale protests since May 2006 hints that a modest organizational landscape makes it hard to sustain a concerted social movement for immigrant rights, as studies of other social movements have also found (Andrews, 2001; Staggenborg, 1988). The priority of churches is to tend to the spiritual needs of their members, and ethnic media need to prioritize profit to stay alive. These organizations' missions are not primarily about collective action and political change. Similarly, grassroots organizing can energize and mobilize many, but it is hard
to sustain a movement on the back of one extremely dedicated volunteer. Sustained collective action requires substantial organizational capacity.

Though immigrant-origin groups probably take the interests of the immigrant community more to heart than other groups, the coalition organizations do not need to be exclusively Mexican or Latino. In 2006, alliances between Latino and immigrant rights organizations, on the one hand, and unions and faith-based groups, on the other, provided important support for the marches in San Jose. However, labor organizations, which are very important players in local San Jose politics, have made strategic decisions to focus their activism on broad policy issues, such as health insurance, rather than the technical or bureaucratic needs of immigrant workers, especially those who are undocumented (Gleeson, 2008a). Unions also face legitimacy issues with immigrant communities. As one labor council leader explained,

The [union] leadership is still relatively white and relatively male, and its membership is not.... So that's a tension within the labor movement [that] we've been dealing with...an issue of having credibility with our membership....

This is not to say that immigrants do not figure prominently into the concerns of labor leaders, but rather that immigration is not seen as the central focus. In the words of the labor leader,

All the recent activism around [immigration] hasn't changed our work. [...] From our perspective, we want to go places where the need is the most. And we think that the future of that movement is with the poor, communities of color, and immigrants.

Despite San Jose's historic labor-friendly climate and the demographic opportunity immigrants offer to labor organizers, unions are positioned to be, at best, alliance partners rather than constant members of the vanguard for immigrant rights. The rapid collapse of sustained collective action following the marches of 2006 probably lies, at least in part, in the very small number of formal non-profit organizations run by and for Mexican or Latino immigrants.

Civic and Political (In)Visibility among City Officials

A final measure of the importance of a mature and developed organizational landscape lies in the civic and political invisibility of immigrant organizations in the eyes of San Jose city officials. According to Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2008a), civic and political presence—a function of visibility, alliances, and legitimacy—are indicators of "the degree to which immigrants are recognized as full partners in their communities" (p. 21). Visible organizations tend to be connected to other civic groups or with elected and appointed officials and are recognized by the general population, mainstream media, and government officials.

To assess political presence, we draw on our interviews with elected and non-elected officials in San Jose. Using a semi-structured interview format, we asked our respondents to list all the organizations they knew which are active within a specific issue area, such as in the arts, healthcare, or business development. Among the issue areas we asked about were "immigrant or refugee" concerns, citizenship and voting, and "ethnic and cultural" groups. We use these answers to measure the organizational presence of immigrants and immigrant-origin minorities among San Jose city officials. While we do not assess the degree to which visibility translates into real political influence, we echo Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad's (2008a) proposition that political presence is a likely precursor to actual weight in local decision-making.
Overall, officials who did not have an immigrant background themselves listed few immigrant or ethnic organizations in their enumeration of groups active in San Jose. For example, the US-born elected official quoted at the beginning of this chapter listed an impressive 67 different groups active on a wide variety of issues in San Jose and the surrounding area. Of these, only 5 were an ethnic or immigrant-oriented organization: the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, La Raza Roundtable, Mexican American Community Services Agency (MACSA), the Mexican Heritage Plaza, and the Portuguese Historical Museum. The councilor also offered a vague identification of 3 other organizations or groups of organizations, mentioning: "that Hispanic group" that worked on naturalization and immigrant voting; "immigrant groups" in general when asked about advocacy; and "the Italian American group" in relation to naturalization/voting and ethnic/cultural organizations. At best, 12 percent of organizations listed by the city councilor served immigrant-origin communities, less than the proportion of ethnic and immigrant organizations we counted among formally registered nonprofits (21 percent), and less than the proportion of the San Jose population that is of immigrant background (39 percent). Furthermore, this official, like others, tended to name ethnic organizations largely in response to our questions about which groups were active with ethnic, cultural, or refugee issues, but rarely in relation to other policy fields. This suggests a division in officials' minds between "mainstream" policy areas, in which ethnic organizations play a limited role, and "minority" policy areas, to which such groups are relegated.

In a similar manner, the three non-elected city officials who were not first or second generation immigrants mentioned few immigrant-origin organizations. Neither the official on the city's Parks and Recreation Commission nor the official on the Senior Commission named a single immigrant organization. An official at the Housing Advisory Commission mentioned five immigrant-oriented organizations out of 32 (16 percent).

Our findings do suggest that the election of officials with an immigrant background might increase immigrant organizations' visibility and political presence. A city councilor with an immigrant background mentioned many more ethnic organizations than the US-born councilor discussed above. Due to constraints on the councilor's time, our interview was shorter, eliciting a list of 25 separate groups. Twelve of these, or 48 percent, were national-origin specific or pan-ethnic organizations, ranging from a Sikh temple and a multi-ethnic service and advocacy organization, SIREN (Services, Immigrant Rights and Education Network), to various Vietnamese organizations and the International Rescue Committee, which is dedicated to refugee resettlement. Surprisingly, there was limited overlap in the specific ethnic or immigrant organizations listed by the two elected officials.

We also interviewed two immigrant-origin school board trustees elected to two different boards in San Jose. One mentioned 9 immigrant-oriented organizations out of 36 (25 percent), while another listed 30 such organizations out of 41 (73 percent). In comparison, the one non-elected official with an immigrant background who we interviewed, a staff member of the San Jose's Strong Neighborhood Initiative, mentioned only two ethnic or immigrant organizations out of 26 (8 percent).

With our limited number of cases, it is hard to draw strong conclusions, but our data suggest that electing someone of immigrant origins can increase the political presence of immigrant organizations. There might, however, be limits to using immigrant-origin elected representatives as a channel to increase the visibility of immigrant civil society. For example, of the 9 ethnic groups mentioned by a Mexican-origin school board member, 6 were Mexican organizations, which may be due to the official's background and relationship with that
community. When asked about other community organizations in the highly diverse school district the official represents, the board member referred us to a staff member who keeps track of relevant stakeholders. The official could not immediately name additional organizations representing other immigrant communities.

The data also hint that elected officials might be more aware of immigrant organizations than non-elected officials. Perhaps San Jose's elected officials are forced, by the political competition for votes, to pay more attention to such organizations than non-elected officials. If this finding holds, it is noteworthy since almost half of all immigrants living in San Jose did not hold US citizenship in 2007 and thus could not vote. The modest level of ethno-racial segregation in the city mitigates immigrants' relative lack of formal political voice in the city. San Jose has been classified as one of the five most integrated cities in the United States, with ethno-racial minorities spread throughout the city (Robinson and Grant-Thomas, 2004). No elected representative, therefore, has the luxury of ignoring immigrant voters and their allies. The electoral strength of immigrants has become more prominent in recent years: San Jose residents elected their first Vietnamese American councilmember, Madison Nguyen, in 2005, and their first Indian American councilmember, Ash Kalra, in 2008.

Nevertheless, the lack of formal citizenship among many immigrants, especially balanced against immigrants' demographic significance and need for services, worries many scholars and public commentators. Indeed, some researchers focus increasingly on bureaucratic incorporation, which highlights the relationships that non-elected public officials can forge with immigrant communities to help them access services and resources (de Graauw, 2008b; Jones-Correa, 2005; Marrow, 2009). Our research, however, might serve to temper some of the optimism around bureaucratic incorporation as a pathway to urban civic inclusion. All four non-elected officials with whom we spoke mentioned relatively few immigrant organizations, regardless of personal background. Our findings instead suggest that electoral politics might remain important in increasing the profile of immigrant civil society. This speaks to our general contention that there are likely important complementarities between electoral politics and contested political action; an understanding of increased urban political inclusion should not exclude either.26

**Beyond Elite Brokers**

Absent a rich infrastructure of publicly-present immigrant organizations, how do city officials learn about the needs of immigrant residents? In some cases, they do not learn about them. The lack (or perceived lack) of a rich organizational structure removes important communication channels linking the voices of individual residents to the ears of urban government.

In other cases, decision-makers take a "liaison" view of the city's relationship with immigrant communities, calling on other individuals and institutional actors to serve as conduits of information and services (de Graauw, et al., 2010). For example, the city councillor who opened this chapter highlighted the liaison work done by the Mexican consulate around immigrant day-labor issues:

We work very closely with the consulate here to rectify [issues]. [One] issue is jobs and sometimes people can't find jobs.... They're not here legally sometimes and they'll go stand alone...or somebody's at a large construction site and waiting to be picked up for a day job.... So the community complained about that and we try to work out some way to say, 'Here's an
appropriate place for you, in this property. '...[W]e work directly with organizations, not necessarily a small group, but the consulate...

Relations between local government and immigrants are also often compartmentalized and relegated to specific boards or commissions focused on minority affairs or human relations. In our interviews, officials often mentioned the San Jose Human Relations Commission and the Santa Clara Office of Human Relations when we asked about addressing immigrant tensions in San Jose. In other cases, decision-makers assume that immigrant-origin elected officials will serve as liaisons between government and immigrant communities. It was striking, for example, that almost all city officials with whom we spoke had a hard time naming any of the many Vietnamese organizations in San Jose—a city which is home to one of the largest Vietnamese communities in the US. Instead, they would reference the recently elected Vietnamese American councilmember, Madison Nguyen, as the key person with knowledge about the community.

This liaison approach is, at best, a stop-gap measure. It is better than nothing, but not sufficient to ensure full membership and political inclusion in civil society. What is even more problematic is that a liaison approach can serve as an excuse to put little effort into getting to know a city's immigrant residents. Relying on consulates to mediate relations between cities and immigrant communities underscores the view that immigrants are foreigners; immigrants are seen as the citizens of other countries rather than as full residents and local citizens of San Jose. Relying on the handful of immigrant-origin elected officials is also problematic, since any one person will have trouble representing a diverse community. This has certainly been the case for Madison Nguyen, San Jose's lone Vietnamese American city councilor, and the target of political attacks from a segment of San Jose's large Vietnamese community (Molina, 2008a; 2008b; Staff, 2009). Furthermore, as we noted with the example of the Mexican-origin school board member, relying on an immigrant-origin official might promote a relationship with only one specific community, thus excluding the full diversity of immigrants in a district. Creating space for a vibrant civil society would be more likely to reflect and express the diversity found in immigrant communities.

Finally, special immigrant or minority commissions can play a valuable role in furthering immigrant-friendly policies and ensuring implementation of those policies (de Graauw, 2008b). However, in the case of San Jose, few such structures exist. Santa Clara County has a more developed bureaucratic infrastructure geared to immigrant concerns, and it has done important work in this regard. The existence of these institutions and programs has, however, arguably allowed San Jose politicians to offload this work to the county, which is problematic given significant reductions in county funding and staffing. As of 2010, the Immigrant Relations and Integration Services for Santa Clara County had only one full-time staff member in the midst of a (likely worsening) fiscal crisis. Furthermore, as with all such liaison strategies, off-loading "immigrant" issues to other levels of government or special boards reinforces the failure of city decision-makers to recognize that immigrants and their children constitute a majority of city residents in places like San Jose and that immigrant communities are integral, rather than marginal, to city life. Hence, while a sustained focus on immigrant-specific issues is needed, the concerns of these communities must also be brought into the fold of everyday politics. One of the crucial mechanisms for doing so is organizational capacity.
Concluding Thoughts

Organizations play an important role in the political and civic life of cities. However, many of the organizations active in San Jose, including the vast majority of formal nonprofit groups, do not focus directly on representing or serving immigrant communities. We document significant inequality between the number of mainstream and immigrant organizations—given the city's demographics there are only half as many immigrant-origin nonprofits as we would expect—and we show significant differences in organizational capacity across immigrant communities. Here, the Mexican-origin community stands out as being at a particular disadvantage, despite its long history in San Jose and the significant proportion of city residents who are of Mexican origin. Space limitations prevent a thorough discussion of the factors driving such differences, but two stand out. First, the modest socio-economic resources of the community, which are not offset by public or private assistance aimed at fostering organizational development, limits the organizational capacity of the community. Second, the prevalence of undocumented status within the Mexican-born community stifles civic engagement and further reinforces the inequalities created by economic conditions and illegality. Thus, civic and political inequalities are not only a product of other inequalities; they are producers of an independent effect that reinforces disenfranchisement and powerlessness. More broadly, we contend that the lack of an extensive organizational structure among all immigrant communities harms the immigrant groups living in the city by limiting their access to city resources, hindering their ability to sustain collective protest, and preventing them from being recognized and included in political decision-making.

Our findings also suggest several ways to reduce inequalities. These include dedicating additional city resources to assisting low-resource immigrant communities in obtaining formal 501(c)3 status and making more funding and in-kind resources—such as technical assistance, leadership training, and facility use—available to groups beyond formally registered nonprofits. In this regard, it is striking that the Vietnamese-origin community, which also includes many low-income individuals of modest educational backgrounds, counts slightly more formally registered nonprofits than the Mexican-origin community. This is due in large part to Vietnamese immigrants' more secure legal status (almost none are undocumented) and the fact that they are predominately a refugee population that has benefitted more from public settlement assistance—which includes help with developing an organizational infrastructure—than other immigrants in the United States (Bloemraad, 2006a; Hein, 1997).

Cities such as San Jose also need to invest resources to mitigate the dwindling number of county programs dedicated to immigrant communities. Not only would this help fill growing service gaps, but it would create urban infrastructures that help establish and sustain long-term municipal relationships with immigrant communities. The successes of smaller, informal immigrant organizations suggests that collaboration and mentorship with larger established organizations—whether immigrant-specific or not—can provide important opportunities for leadership development and capacity building while also introducing new opportunities for much needed funding.

Lastly, public officials, elected and appointed, need to be educated about the fact that San Jose has become a 21st century immigrant gateway. The number and variety of foreign-born residents equals—and in some cases surpasses—the demographic diversity in cities of continuous migration like Chicago, New York, and San Francisco. Municipal leaders need to change their mindset from one that perceives immigrants as a special interest and minority issue to one that sees them as an integral part of the city's economic, social, cultural, and political life.
Such initiatives should also proceed with the understanding that immigrant communities are diverse and dynamic, like any other group, and that immigrants cannot be easily or accurately represented by a few minority elected officials, foreign consulates, or even a number of well-established immigrant groups from earlier waves of immigration. A vibrant civil society demands deep and broad engagement by all of a city's residents.

Notes

2. The American Community Survey estimates that in 2006, 39 percent of San Jose's residents were foreign-born. The comparable figures for New York, Boston, and Chicago were 36, 27 and 21 percent, respectively.
3. We focus on documenting and evaluating the consequences of organizational inequality to make the case that protest politics are not sufficient for immigrant incorporation. Space constraints prevent an analysis of why immigrants are poorly represented in the formal nonprofit sector. As Gleeson, Bloemraad, and Ramakrishnan (2006) find, this is in part due to socio-economic and linguistic barriers, and for some, it is further exacerbated by undocumented status.
5. San Jose city council consists of ten council members, each elected to represent a particular district of San Jose, and a mayor elected by all voters. The city runs on a council-manager system of government; the mayor nominates a city manager, who must be approved by city council.
6. Thus, "non-immigrant" organizations include those whose mission is not directed at any given national-origin or ethno-racial group (e.g., an Elks Lodge, a mainstream Parent-Teacher Association), while an "immigrant-origin" organization largely serves a particular group, such as the Santa Clara County Vietnamese Parent-Teacher Association.
7. Other studies, such as Hung (2007) and De Vita, Roeger, and Niedzviecki (2009), identify minority and immigrant nonprofits by examining directors and board members, while Cordero-Guzmán's (2005) study of immigrant social service providers focuses on the origins of clients. To cast as broad a net as possible, we did not limit our categorization by leadership, membership, or clientele thresholds; we focused instead on overall mission and activities. For more on the methodology, see Gleeson and Bloemraad (2010).
8. By "publicly present" we mean all organizations known by local officials, ethnic or mainstream media, or key nonprofit sector leaders and volunteers as relevant to a particular migrant community. These organizations render their community visible to mainstream society, for example, through their advocacy efforts or their cultural activities. Our search, consequently, is biased towards groups that have moved beyond an incipient stage of development and have the potential to build bridges between the immigrant community and mainstream society.
9. These data are from the Immigrant Civic Engagement Project. For more on this project and additional findings, see Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2008).
10. Chambers of Commerce hold 501(c)6 status and thus do not appear in our official database of 501(c)3 organizations. Because informants consistently mentioned these groups as publicly present organizations, we include them in our discussion but not in the undercount statistics reported below.
11. Broken down by national origin, 62 percent of all publicly present Portuguese organizations (8 formally registered out of 13 publicly present) appeared in the NCNS data; these numbers can be compared with 64 percent of Vietnamese organizations (68 out of 107), 69 percent of Mexican organizations (60 out of 87), and 70 percent of Indian organizations (37 out of 53).
12. Translated from Spanish: Tú ya sabes que hay que cumplir con las reglas del estado, que te dan un libro, que así debes de organizarte. Digo: No, es que ellos lo hacen así precisamente para que no te organicen, porque todo eso es con el fin, lo que yo veo, de que no organicen bien a la gente, tienes un tope, esto no puedes hacer.

13. The remainder went to municipal government departments and publicly run programs.

14. Not all immigrant organizations face such challenges. For example, the leader of one political advocacy organization explained, "It's not like [we're] a state or federally recognized organization. We don't have a tax I.D. code. We're not a seed corporation. We're not a limited liability corporation. The best way I can describe it is we just happen to be a very well organized group of friends, who happen to have dinner together, and we happen to have expert people." The group relies on the expertise of its members, who are mostly young Asian professionals, to organize themselves through social media. They operate entirely on member donations and matching corporate donations. Other immigrant groups are not as well-resourced.

15. Data in this section include interviews conducted from October 2005 to August 2007 for Gleeson (2008b), as well as participant observation at a symposium, "Reflections on the Marches of 2006," held in San Jose on April 25, 2009.

16. We do not mean to romanticize ethnic solidarity and acknowledge that exploitation can occur between co-ethnics (Sanders and Nee, 1987). There is also significant variation in the priorities held within immigrant communities and across generations (Gleeson, 2007; Gleeson et al., 2006). However, immigrant-origin organizations that emerge from immigrant communities identify priorities that are often missing from the agendas of mainstream groups (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008b).

17. Our interviews span the period between June 2004 and December 2006. However, our organizational reputation data are limited to interviews conducted between August 2005 and December 2006.

18. The councilor also mentioned a few organizations run by and primarily focused on African Americans. These groups are not included in our tallies of immigrant-oriented organizations; only a very small percentage of blacks in San Jose are of immigrant origin.

19. Whether US-born or of immigrant-origin, the two city councilors we interviewed both represent districts that are home to large immigrant communities. Consequently, simple electoral calculations cannot account for the difference in reported immigrant organizations between councilors with immigrant backgrounds and those without.

20. For a similar argument centered on the Mississippi civil rights movement and black electoral success see Andrews (1997).

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