Outsiders No More?

Models of Immigrant Political Incorporation

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"The Great Concern of Government"

Public Policy as Material and Symbolic Resources

IRENE BLOEMRAAD

[Toronto] is just the place that I feel [at] home ... the way the government runs things—I guess the great support, the multicultural stuff, the social assistance. We pay a lot of tax[es], that’s true. But the great concern of government, the help for the citizens themselves.

—Portuguese-born immigrant, who holds Canadian and American citizenship

Public Policy as Material and Symbolic Resources

Joe, the Portuguese-born immigrant quoted previously, underscores how government policy—from multiculturalism to social assistance—provides material support for ordinary people and sends a message of “concern” from the state to individuals. In this chapter I argue that studying how government policy distributes material and symbolic resources offers an important advance in understanding immigrants’ political integration.¹ It helps account for both cross-national differences in integration patterns

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¹ This interview quote and others presented in this chapter are drawn from Becoming a Citizen: Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States. For more on the field research and interview methodology, see Bloemraad (2006a).

² Immigrant political integration, as others in this volume have argued, can be conceived of as an individual or group-based phenomenon. Elsewhere, I distinguish between individual choice or generational succession models of political assimilation, where integration is achieved when those of immigrant origin are indistinguishable from similarly situated members of the majority in their political actions and preferences, and group-based models of political incorporation, where political integration occurs based on membership in and identification with a particular ethnic, racial, religious, or national-origin community (Bloemraad 2011). The argument here should speak to both conceptualizations. I consequently use the more general term political integration to refer to both the individual political assimilation and group-based incorporation patterns.
and within-country differences between types of immigrants. By providing support to some groups but not others, governments generate resource inequalities or help mitigate inequalities. Furthermore, by targeting some groups over others, governments generate symbolic resources and create normative boundaries around the type of people we help—the insiders—and those outside the community of care. Such differences produce variation in behavioral outcomes, such as higher levels of citizenship and greater immigrant-origin representation in elected bodies, as well as attitudinal or affective outcomes, such as feelings of trust in government or belonging to a political community.

Understanding the material and symbolic effects of policy also helps bridge a conceptual divide between North American and European approaches to immigrant political integration. The former has been more oriented to individual action; the latter primarily centers on how societies and nations structure outcomes. Focusing on individuals or ethno-racial groups, as is often done in North America, helps account for variation between people in a particular political system but does less well in explaining systematic differences between countries. Conversely, attention to macro-level institutions and legal structures, such as laws on citizenship, accounts for cross-country differences in integration but does less well in explaining variations within states. I argue that attention to the material and symbolic resources that flow from public policy provides purchase on both inter- and intracountry variation in integration outcomes.

Conceptualizing Processes of Immigrant Political Integration

To explain immigrant political integration in North America, scholars often add immigrants to existing models of political behavior, which focus on correlating individual characteristics with formal political engagement and electoral participation, or they add immigrants to models of minority politics, which focus on the dynamics of collective behavior and group identity among native-born ethno-racial communities.

From the political behavior perspective, individual skills, resources, and attitudes are central to political and civic engagement. Given that the United States and Canada accord automatic citizenship to children born on their territory, and adult naturalization is relatively easy for legal permanent residents, scholars presume that the institutional environment is quite open and the pathway to mainstream political participation is straightforward, with no need for specific immigrant models. Empirically, political behavior models simply add a variable for “foreign born” into existing models of voting, partisanship, and the like, to capture any residual influence of immigrant background. Thus, the immigration experience gets reduced to an added regression coefficient, which is presumed to lose significance as the first generation gives way to the second, native-born generation. The real “action” in the model lies in individuals’ skills, resources, and attitudes.

For scholars sensitive to the history of African American, Asian American, and Chicano second-class citizenship in the United States, new immigrants fit into models of minority politics because most newcomers to North America are of non-European origin. To the extent that native-born racial and ethnic groups were historically excluded—and were forced to fight for inclusion—it is presumed that immigrant incorporation works in a similar fashion, though here the institutional environment is structured around racial exclusion, which must be overcome through collective action.

The relevant analytical lens in either North American approach directs our attention to individual (micro-level) and group-based (meso-level) agency, within a set of institutional constraints that are taken for granted. In contrast, the European approach has traditionally focused on explaining cross-national variation in immigrants’ political integration, understood as membership or claims making, with limited focus on formal electoral participation. In Europe, many immigrants—and their children—were not seen as would-be citizens by the societies and governments that received them in the four decades following World War II, a view sometimes shared by the migrants who envisioned a return to their homeland. Given the presumption of return, it made little sense to study immigrants’ integration into electoral politics; in many cases, migrants could not vote.

When immigrants did become politically active, in demonstrations, union actions, or public claims making, scholars adopted a social movements framework, suggesting that models of contentious behavior by political outsiders were the appropriate way to view immigrant political integration. In this approach, “immigrants” become an undifferentiated category and the

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3 More recent scholarship both extends and starts to criticize these traditional models. See, for example, Ramakrishnan (2005) for the United States and Anderson and Black (2008) for Canada.

4 The lack of attention to voting or similar outcomes was further aggravated by a lack of good statistical data on the political activities of immigrant-origin individuals.

5 This research tradition largely evolved in the 1980s and 1990s. It was preceded in the 1970s by a scholarship heavily influenced by Marxism, which viewed immigrants’ struggles as part of larger class struggles. From this perspective, foreign birth, race, and ethnicity were sources of oppression in addition to class exploitation or were used by states as a form of control and false consciousness. For a review, see Bloemraad and Vermeulen (forthcoming).
presumption is that macro-level differences—in citizenship law, political party systems, and the like—provide the greatest theoretical purchase. In particular, the concept of political opportunity structure helps explain why immigrants in different European countries engage in different sorts of political acts, with different levels of participation, and articulate different types of claims. In some important ways, this analytical lens overlaps with a minority politics focus in the United States, as both draw theoretical inspiration from the US civil rights movement. However, the primary narrative in this research is the limited agency of immigrant groups: while some countries provide immigrants with a path to citizenship, others erect high barriers to formal membership. By showing how political institutions and societal differences across European states shaped outcomes, scholars concluded that the particularities of immigrants—such as relative resources or collective identities—were secondary to political opportunity structures. Immigrants become undifferentiated individuals who behave in the same way given a specific environment, much like laboratory rats running through the maze in which they find themselves.

The next generation of scholarship must build on these foundations by focusing on the interaction between macro-, meso-, and micro-levels. I believe that a particularly fruitful way to do this is to focus on public policies. Public policies provide differential material and symbolic resources to immigrants as compared to other residents, and they have variable impacts between different types of immigrants. In what follows, I elaborate on the conceptual foundations of such an approach and provide some examples of its usefulness.

Public Policy and Structured Mobilization

For conceptual clarity, it is useful to delineate three levels of analysis. At the "macro-level," there are geographically bounded political jurisdictions with some ability to make and enforce decisions for those in the territory, and potentially also for those outside the territory. While subnational jurisdictions such as states, provinces, counties, and cities can exercise political power, for immigrant political integration, nation-states are arguably the most significant entity. In most countries, national governments have the exclusive right to set the rules for entrance (immigration law) and formal membership (citizenship law).

The second level of analysis, at the "meso-level," centers on organizations, understood as collections of individuals. Attention to organized collectives—between the macro-level and individual—is critical since, in a democracy, individuals can rarely wield power and political influence on their own. Rather, they gain power and voice by aggregating resources, votes, or bodies in order to donate money, affect elections, or launch a demonstration. Organizations can also serve as civic or political schools, providing individuals with skill development, information, and motivation to engage in political or civic actions. At the most micro-level, the focus is on individuals and differences between them, such as variation in skills and resources related to language ability, education, income, and employment, as well as variation in political and social attitudes. Micro-level dynamics encompass both immigrants and native-born residents. As Karen Schönwälder (2009) points out, immigrants' political integration might be even more difficult than economic or social incorporation since not only do immigrants need certain resources or skills to engage in politics, but also nonimmigrants can facilitate or block political integration. For example, a political act like voting for election requires the approval of party gatekeepers before one can stand for office, and then requires that one secure enough support among the general population to be successful.

Figure 11.1 incorporates the three levels of analysis in a simplified form. The right-hand side of the figure portrays political integration as actions taken by ordinary immigrants and the mobilizing work done by community organizations and leaders within the immigrant community, a model that reflects key insights from North American scholarship. Outside the immigrant community, mainstream actors—such as native-born citizens, political parties, unions, churches, and other groups—can also influence and mobilize newcomers. The left-hand side of the figure reflects how a political community, through its institutions and policies, affects the mobilization activities of immigrants and nonimmigrants. This is the general thrust of European scholarship on political opportunity structures.

I take the further step of linking the two sides of the figure through two analytically distinct mechanisms. In doing so, I build on prior arguments of "structured mobilization" (Bloemraad 2006a, 2006b). A structured mobilization approach highlights distinct instrumental and interpretative pathways linking the macro-level to the meso- and micro-levels of analysis through the provision of material and symbolic resources. It is an approach that increasingly finds support in new US-based scholarship on legal status and membership.

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6 There are many excellent European studies in this tradition that demonstrate the importance of national ideologies, institutions, and policies. Three key ones that show the evolution of this research tradition are Brubaker (1992), Ireland (1994), and Koopmans et al. (2005).

7 For some examples of research on immigrant political integration and community organizations, see the contributions in the 2005 special issue of Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 3, No. 5, and Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2006).
and echoes moves in the European context to evaluate the power of discourse in affecting politics.

The first mechanism is instrumental, related to the material resources that public policies provide to immigrant and nonimmigrant actors, which in turn affect groups' and people's ability to participate and mobilize. Most obviously, such support can come in the form of monetary assistance, from social benefits provided to individuals through welfare programs to operating grants given to nonprofit immigrant service providers. In the first case, government policy affects individuals' resources—such as income—which we know, based on standard models of political science, affects people's ability or interest in political participation. In the second case, financial assistance to community organizations provides the means to offer collective help—such as language training, legal assistance, or other services—as well as resources for collective mobilization. An important implication is that countries with more developed welfare states provide, all else equal, greater resources for political participation. To the extent that immigrants can access such public policies, immigrant political integration should be greater in countries with more generous and inclusive public policies.8

8 The instrumental pathway is not limited to money but includes other types of direct support. A straightforward example is rules of access, such as electoral laws and whether there is a provision for bilingual ballots, which could affect immigrants' voting. Alternatively, material

Applications: Refugees in the United States

Compared to immigrants of similar socioeconomic backgrounds, the foreign born who are designated as refugees by the US government or who are admitted with refugee-like visas demonstrate greater political integration than nonrefugees. Levels of citizenship acquisition among refugees is higher, even controlling for standard socioeconomic variables (Bloemraad 2006a, 2006b; support can be found in a municipality's policy of providing rent-free public meeting facilities to community organizations that want to host an event, and it would also include the technical assistance provided by a nonelected public official or civil servant to an immigrant who wants to apply for citizenship or who is requesting admission to an educational institution, what some have called bureaucratic incorporation. On bureaucratic incorporation see, for example, Jones-Correa (2005), Lewis and Ramakrishnan (2007), and Marrow (2009).

9 For example, Richard Alba (2005) identifies four sorts of conceptual boundaries around which societies can draw lines of inclusion and exclusion: citizenship, race, religion, and language.

10 I take inspiration from Mettler's (2002) study of the interpretative effects of the US GI Bill on veterans of World War II. She identifies three interpretative mechanisms: (1) policy beneficiaries are more likely to feel that politics are relevant; (2) receiving policy benefits can make recipients the focus of strategic political mobilization, increasing feelings of personal and political efficacy; and (3) receiving government benefits may enhance awareness of one's rights, duties, and obligations (Mettler 2002, 352).
Bueker 2006; Fix, Passel, and Sucher 2003); the overall civic infrastructure of refugee communities, as measured by community-based organizations, is denser (Bloemraad 2005; Hein 1997); and among the small number of foreign-born representatives elected to political office, many come from refugee communities (Bloemraad 2006a; Andersen 2008).

Many observers explain refugees’ relatively high political and civic integration as a direct result of the refugee experience. Fleeing persecution and turmoil arguably reduces refugees’ interest in return migration, increases commitment to the new country, and heightens the desire to have a citizenship not associated with the hated homeland regime (e.g., Portes and Zoolo 1985). The desire to undermine the homeland regime through foreign policy and encourage further refugee admissions also leads refugee communities to engage in electoral politics (e.g., Zucker and Zucker 1989). These arguments are theoretically equivalent to models based on individual attributes and collective mobilization, the right-hand side of Figure 11.1.

Such accounts ignore the ways in which public policies in the United States have provided refugee communities with material and symbolic resources not available to other immigrants. The Office of Refugee Resettlement, a federal agency established in 1980, provides cash and technical assistance to refugees, usually through grants to community-based organizations or subnational governments. Even prior to 1980, the federal government worked with voluntary agencies to provide settlement assistance such as job training, housing assistance, and human support services to displaced Europeans following World War II, Cuban émigrés starting in the 1950s, and Southeast Asian refugees in the 1970s. In 1996, when noncitizens were excluded from many social benefits during welfare reform, refugees were exempt from most citizenship or residency requirements. These public policies have provided direct material support to individuals and to community organizations, giving refugees more public resources for political integration than the limited assistance given to the majority of family and economic migrants in the United States (Bloemraad 2006a; Moreno 1996).

Designation as an official refugee, and the material support it provides, also generates symbolic resources and affects notions of legitimacy and deservingness among refugee populations, as well as those who interact with them. Ethnographic research finds that in the health care system, Latino immigrants who are associated with official refugee status benefit not only from having medical services paid for by the government but also from medical staff seeing them as more deserving and treating them as citizens who can make demands; nonrefugees are discouraged from making claims on American institutions (Horton 2004). This dynamic has also been identified among other social service providers who work with refugee populations (Nawyn 2011). In a similar way, Hana Brown’s (2011) fieldwork among Liberian refugees, a group with very limited educational or economic resources and which could be stigmatized as a racial minority dependent on welfare benefits, documents how these individuals use their refugee status to make claims on others. In one case, a woman abused by an American man told him, “I’m a refugee. Your government brought me here…. I have the whole American government on my side. I have more power than you!” (Brown 2011, 154). This particular exchange communicates the same sense of government care and support as that articulated by Joe in the opening epigraph to this chapter. It also contrasts to that of a Portuguese American woman in Boston, who came to the United States as a family-sponsored immigrant. During an interview, she complained, “... they [the government] don’t know how it is…. You can’t say, ‘Sir, sir, send people that care about the immigrants, because they are the people who can’t speak up.’ There is nowhere to complain to, and we can’t complain” (Bloemraad 2006a, 1). Given the general laissez-faire approach to immigrant settlement in the United States (Bloemraad and de Graauw 2012; US Governmental Accountability Office 2011), with immigrants expected to pull themselves up by the bootstraps through their own efforts and the support of family and friends, nonrefugees feel abandoned by government. This feeds into feelings of political exclusion and lack of engagement.

Policy dynamics can also affect the mobilization efforts of nonimmigrant actors vis-à-vis foreign-born residents. For example, from the 1950s through to the 1990s, US refugee policy was heavily influenced by foreign policy. This made it easier for groups fleeing communism, such as Cubans and Vietnamese, to gain entry into the country via refugee status than for Salvadoran and Haitian migrants fleeing authoritarian regimes and civil conflict. Public support for refugees was also furthered by the ideological framing of these migrants as ideological allies (Hein 1993). This had implications for partisan politics. Unlike most Latino and Asian American voters in the United States, many first-generation Cuban and Vietnamese Americans support the Republican Party for its strong anticommunist foreign policy, support that the Republican Party has leveraged in running candidates from these communities for political office. The engagement and support of these foreign-born candidates and voters reinforced, at certain moments, the initial anticommunist policy that facilitated their entry. Attention to policy dynamics consequently helps us to explain intracountry variations in the political integration of immigrant individuals and communities.

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11 This is most evident in the case of Cuban Americans living in the Florida area, but it also applies to foreign-born individuals who moved to the United States soon after World War II as displaced persons and is reflected in the growing contingent of representatives of Southeast Asian origins, whether Vietnamese Americans in Louisiana, Texas, and California; Hmong Americans in Minnesota; or Cambodian Americans in Massachusetts.
Applications: US–Canada Differences in Political Integration

Cross-nationally, many observers view the United States and Canada as similar countries of immigration, with a long history of immigrant settlement, relatively open citizenship rules, and similar welfare states focused on means-tested access and limited benefits. However, empirical evidence demonstrates significantly higher immigrant political integration in Canada, as measured by citizenship acquisition, civic infrastructure, or election to national office (Bloemraad 2006a) or as indicated by measures of trust in national government (Wright and Bloemraad 2012).

I have argued that such differences can partially be explained with reference to multiculturalism and immigrant settlement policies (Bloemraad 2006a, 2006b). These provide both material and symbolic resources. The federal Canadian government, for example, gives community-based organizations and subnational governments significant public funding for language training, job assistance, and other settlement services. In the 2010–2011 fiscal year, Citizenship and Immigration Canada projected spending $1.1 billion Canadian dollars on immigrant integration, for a total population of almost 7 million foreign born (Seidle 2010, 4). In comparison, US Citizenship and Immigration Services provides almost no settlement funding beyond very modest support for naturalization activities. For 2011, this amounts to US$9 million for 22 million noncitizen immigrants living in the country (US Citizenship and Immigration Services 2011). The federal Canadian government also embraces an official policy of multiculturalism, written into national legislation and included in the country’s constitution. While multicultural curricula are readily found in US schools, there is no similar diversity policy at the federal level in the United States, especially one targeted at immigrant communities.

The greater funding in Canada eases the process of acquiring citizenship, especially for those with modest resources and human capital. Tilla, for example, immigrated to Canada with limited schooling and no knowledge of English. Reflecting on becoming a citizen years later, she recounted, "Oh, I want to vote, I want to vote… [It is] very difficult because my income is not much and my husband’s income is not very much. Manuel, he’s the one who taught us to get [citizenship] papers. He applied for a supplement from [the] government to pay him to teach us" (cited in Bloemraad 2006a, 1). The Canadian multiculturalism policy also signals that immigrants have a legitimate membership and standing within the national community. As one Vietnamese Canadian senior explained, “The Canadian government listens to the voice of the people’s will, the requests, and helps to respond. They not only respect the cultures of the different community backgrounds, but they always try to develop the culture and tradition of that community more” (cited in Bloemraad 2006a, 683). This senior, who lives in publicly subsidized housing, votes regularly even though his language skills are limited.

We can also go beyond immigrant-specific policies to consider how other policies affect immigrants’ political integration. Comparative research on US/Canada labor policy, health care policy, and social policy suggests that while the differences in the two countries’ approaches are modest, they are consequential. Jeffrey Reitz (1998) finds that the economic security of immigrants is higher in Canada, in part because of more generous social benefits and stronger labor protections, a finding echoed in Zuberi’s (2005) comparison of low-wage hotel workers, many of whom were immigrants, in Vancouver and Seattle. To the extent that socioeconomic inequalities produce inequalities in political participation—biased toward engagement by those with more economic resources and more schooling—Canadian social policies mitigate resource differentials that would impede immigrants’ political incorporation. At the same time, social policies can also carry symbolic messages about deservingness and inclusion. In my research, immigrants in Canada regularly mentioned universal health care and the “great concern of government” as factors that made them feel at home in the country. Such responses were much less likely among immigrants in the United States, a country with more limited publicly provided social benefits and a political discourse that sometimes associates welfare use with racialized minorities (Bloemraad 2006a; see also Ong 2003).

Once mobilized, immigrants—and those opposed to their political projects—can reinforce, undermine, or modify existing policies or institutional practices via feedback loops (Pierson 1993). Immigration and multiculturalism policies affect nonimmigrant actors in the Canadian political system, as does the very high level of citizenship among foreign-born residents. The transformation of the Canadian political right is a striking case in point. At its founding in 1987, the right-wing Reform Party was antagonistic to multiculturalism and suspicious of immigration. In its 1988 “Blue Book,” which outlined the nascent party’s platform, the party proclaimed, “Immigration should not be based on race or creed … [but] nor should it be explicitly designed to radically or suddenly alter the ethnic makeup of Canada, as it increasingly seems to be.” The 1991 Blue Book dropped language over the “ethnic makeup” of Canada, but it committed the party to opposing “the current concept of multiculturalism and hyphenated Canadianism” and to abolishing the program and

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12 The Canadian foreign-born population counted 6.2 million individuals in 2006. Given new arrivals since then, this group was likely about 7 million individuals in 2011, or over 20 percent of the total population.
ministry dedicated to multiculturalism. Twenty years later, key actors from the old Reform Party, now members of a new Conservative Party, gained a majority in federal Parliament in 2011. To win the election, the party actively, and successfully, sought out new Canadians, including those termed "visible minorities" in Canada, precisely the people that have changed the ethnic makeup of Canada. The Conservative government has not made any moves to eliminate multiculturalism policy or rescind the 1988 Multiculturalism Act.

Moving Forward

This chapter argues for the importance of an immigrant-centered model of political integration highly attentive to the ways in which public policy produces material and symbolic resources that can be used by individual immigrants and their organizations to facilitate political and civic engagement. Conversely, public policies can also aggravate material inequalities or provide discursive scripts for political actors to exclude immigrants. In the United States, for example, the bulk of funding for immigration goes to border control rather than to immigration and naturalization services. The latter, like border control, are housed in the Department of Homeland Security. The agency's very name may lead to feelings of exclusion among immigrants; such labels may also make native-born residents more likely to view would-be immigrants as a potential security threat and exclude them from political life. Attention to the instrumental support and interpretative consequences of public policy can help explain within- and between-country variation in immigrants' political integration.

This argument is based on a belief in the specificity of the immigrant experience, one that cannot be reduced to standard accounts of skills and resources or even existing models of minority politics. Immigrant specificity lies, in part, in the legal constructs of citizenship and residency status. Access to various political acts is often circumscribed by one's legal status; for example, voting at almost all levels of government in North America, and in most national elections in Europe, is restricted to legal citizens. But we need to go beyond a narrow, rule-bound understanding of political opportunity structures as related to immigrants. Status as a foreign-born individual, either as a matter of formal regulations or social policy, also affects access to or targeting by a gamut of public policies, from receipt of redistributive benefits and health care to language instruction or job training. A model of structured mobilization, in which policies enacted at a "macro"-level influence the political and civic engagement of individuals and groups on the ground, helps to bridge different levels of analysis, as well as differing theoretical traditions, on either side of the Atlantic Ocean.
The Political Economy of Immigrant Incorporation into the Welfare State

NOLAN MCCARTY

Immigration, especially that of the lower skilled and the less educated, has become a contentious issue in the United States and other advanced industrial democracies. These debates focus on a very broad array of issues from the impact of immigration on economic growth, low-wage labor, and cultural solidarity to national security. A particularly salient issue is the effect of immigration on the welfare state. Immigrants, especially those lacking skills and education, are likely to be net beneficiaries of public services and transfers, placing additional stress on public coffers. Additionally, immigrants may increase pretax inequality among citizens if immigrant labor supply depresses the wages of the low skilled. Further, if voters view culturally and socially distant immigrants as the beneficiaries of welfare state benefits, they may be less willing to tax themselves to pay for them. Such a response not only would affect benefits for the newcomers but also may rebound to the detriment of poor natives.

The premise of my chapter is that the effects of immigration on the welfare state are contingent on both the degree to which immigrants are incorporated into the encompassing social programs and the extent to which the immigrants are politically incorporated to mobilize against any retrenching backlash triggered by migration or increased ethnic and racial heterogeneity. When there is greater incorporation of immigrants into the programs of the welfare state, the demand for retrenchment is greater unless it is offset by greater political incorporation.

To make this argument, I develop a model of the effects of immigration on the politics of redistribution. The chapter, built on standard models of redistributive politics, departs from standard assumptions in a variety of ways. First, rather than assume that all voters maximize their own utility, I assume that voters also consider the social benefits paid to others out of some sense of social solidarity or altruism. This allows me to consider the effects of voters