INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW

"Utter Failure" or Unity out of Diversity? Debating and Evaluating Policies of Multiculturalism[1]

Irene Bloemraad
University of California Berkeley

Matthew Wright
American University

Across immigrant-receiving democracies, "multiculturalism" has come under assault by political decision-makers and commentators. The academic debate, while less fiery, is also heated. We start by outlining the multiple meanings of "multiculturalism": a term for demographic diversity; a political philosophy of equality or justice; a set of policies to recognize and accommodate ethno-racial and religious diversity; or a public discourse recognizing and valorizing pluralism. We then review the existing empirical literature and offer some new statistical analyses to assess what we know about the harm or benefits of multicultural policies, focusing on sociopolitical outcomes. We conclude that multicultural policies appear to have some modest positive effects on sociopolitical integration for first-generation immigrants and likely little direct effect, positive or negative, on those in the second generation. On the question of majority backlash, the limited scholarship is mixed; we speculate that multiculturalism works best in places where both minorities and majority residents see it as part of a common national project. We end by considering the conditions under which this happens and whether there are distinctions between "Anglo-settler" and other countries.

[1]We thank the editors of this special issue as well as Sara Wallace Goodman for excellent suggestions on an earlier draft, and we express our appreciation to Karin Borevi and Will Kymlicka for helpful advice in preparing this article.

DOI: 10.1111/imre.12135

INTRODUCTION

"Multiculturalism" has come under withering assault since the turn of the century (Brubaker, 2001; Joppke, 2004; Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010). When German Chancellor Angela Merkel proclaimed in 2010 that a multicultural approach had "utterly failed," she merely stated in stronger terms the conclusion of a 2008 Council of Europe report.[2] After surveying 47 member states, the report declared that "what had until recently been a preferred policy approach, conveyed in shorthand as 'multiculturalism', has been found inadequate" (Council of Europe, 2008:9). In Canada, the first country to adopt "official" multiculturalism as federal policy in 1971, the 2014 Quebec election was fought in part over whether the provincial government should adopt a "secular charter" that would ban provincial employees – from bureaucrats to state-paid daycare providers – from wearing "religious symbols" at work.[3] If we understand multiculturalism as promoting the twin goals of recognition and accommodation of cultural diversity, then political discourse and public policy now appear firmly centered on "interculturalism," the preferred term of the Council of Europe and in Quebec, or on civic integration, national citizenship, and "muscular liberalism," in the words of British Prime Minister David Cameron.

Why these concerns? Those who champion multiculturalism contend that when discourse and policy valorize and accommodate cultural specificity, members of minority communities will feel increased connection to and engagement in the polity and society where they live. But others claim that multiculturalism promotes cultural isolation and "parallel lives," which impede immigrant integration. Some also fear it undermines a sense of common national identity necessary for a robust welfare state, while others worry that multiculturalism permits the advancement of illiberal, "non-Western" values that can lead to women's oppression, homophobia, or homegrown terrorism.

In what follows, we first review the multiple meanings of "multiculturalism". We then review empirical research to assess the effects of multicultural policies: Is there evidence that immigrants are less attached to and engaged in places with multicultural accommodations? Are there indicators of backlash

[2]In German, "Der Ansatz für Multikulti ist gescheitert, absolut gescheitert!" *See* "Merkel: Multi-Kulti ist absolut gescheitert" *de Bild*, October 17, 2010.

[3]The governing *Parti Québécois* promoted the secular charter, but lost the election to the Liberal party, which vowed to abandon the initiative.

among majority populations that could generate problems for social cohesion? We also offer some new analyses of whether multicultural policies affect first- and second-generation immigrants' sociopolitical integration. We primarily consider national political discourse and public policy, leaving for others a review of multiculturalism in education, inter-personal relations, and organizations. We also circumscribe our analysis to traditional Anglo-settler countries and Western Europe, although some East Asian nations have adopted a language of multiculturalism in recent years (Chung, 2010).

We find that the empirical evidence is decidedly messy, but with some modest positive effects of multicultural policies on immigrants' sociopolitical integration, and no discernable effects, positive or negative, among the second generation. Given limited data and identification constraints, conclusions about multiculturalism's impact on socioeconomic outcomes are impossible to draw. We end by taking a step back and ask, given the lack of strong or consistent negative findings, why multiculturalism has been rejected in some places, but it persists in others. We hazard that multiculturalism has become a legitimate way to express concern about ethno-racial and, especially in Europe, religious diversity, irrespective of actual policies, especially where political actors on the right and left jointly expressed concerns. We also speculate that countries where multiculturalism persists, and perhaps succeeds more, are places where recognition of and support for diversity have become part of national identity for many in both minority and majority populations.

CONCEPTUAL CONFUSIONS: MULTICULTURALISM, ASSIMILATION, INTERCULTURALISM, AND INTEGRATION

Academics delight in enumerating the definitions of multiculturalism as much as studying its effects. We group uses of the term into four categories: multiculturalism as a demographic fact about a population; as a political philosophy of equality or justice; as a set of policies to recognize and accommodate ethno-racial and religious diversity; or as a public discourse recognizing and valorizing diversity.

Demographic "Multiculturalism"

For some people, "multiculturalism" is a descriptive term for demographic pluralism. Pluralism can stem from the coexistence of longstanding minority groups, such as ethno-linguistic communities in Canada and

Switzerland or ethno-religious communities in India and Malaysia, or from majority–minority relations with aboriginal or indigenous groups, like in Australia and Mexico. Most contemporary debate about multiculturalism refers, however, to ethnic, racial, and religious diversity generated by immigrants and their descendants. In a subset of these nations, demographic multiculturalism also reflects diversity generated by involuntary migration, notably through slavery, or the migration of former colonial subjects. We focus on immigrant-generated diversity as it has animated the strongest calls to abandon multiculturalism in favor of integration and assimilation. This "retreat" is not in evidence for indigenous or subnational minorities, groups that often reject inclusion within a framework of multiculturalism since they argue for self-determination and sovereignty rights.

Permanent migration has amplified heterogeneity in Western nations and in many other countries. A voluminous literature asks whether more demographic diversity undermines social capital, social cohesion, or support for a redistributive welfare state (*see* reviews by Harell and Stolle, 2010 and van der Meer and Tolsma, 2014). Most academics, in evidentiary work, specify that they are measuring the proportion of a population that is foreign-born, or "non-Western," or a religious minority, rather than "multiculturalism". But when research is translated into political debates, the two can quickly become synonymous. In such cases, critiques of multiculturalism often cloak concerns over ethno-racial and religious heterogeneity or the level and composition of migrant flows.

Such a conflation is problematic. Heterogeneity might engender reactions of group threat in the majority population, or a "hunkering down" among majority and minority residents who retreat from collective projects and social ties (Putnam, 2007). But the empirical validity of such claims is distinct from the question of whether public recognition and accommodation of minorities ameliorate or exacerbate the consequences of demographic pluralism.[4]

Multiculturalism as Political Philosophy

Multiculturalism also refers to a set of normative claims in political philosophy. Under classical Western liberalism, all humans are freely choos-

[4]For an opposing view, *see* Koopmans (2013), who argues that the size and composition of the immigrant-origin population, especially the proportion of Muslims, is important to take into account when analyzing multiculturalism.

ing agents who deserve identical, individual protections and who must be treated the same. Governments should be blind to particularities of ethnicity, religion, or national origin. They should not, for example, provide public funding for cultural minority groups since cultural practices are a private concern (Barry, 2002). Banning headscarves in public schools, as in France, can be defended as ensuring gender equality.[5]

Multicultural theorists critique classical liberalism from a normative concern for justice and equality rooted in outcome rather than similarity of treatment (Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995, 2001; Young, 2000; Parekh, 2006; Modood, 2013). Philosophical orientations can be grounded in modified liberalism, communitarianism, post-colonial thought, or certain variants of feminism. They share a common claim that cultural neutrality in public institutions is impossible despite laws guaranteeing certain rights and freedoms. To assert neutrality as equality ignores differences in social position and power. For example, even if a country does not declare an official language, the public school system will be run in just one or a few languages. Minorities who do not speak that language are placed in an inherently more difficult situation than the majority. Some philosophers add that the presumption of individualism is also problematic: Humans are born into particular social and cultural communities that provide meaning and identity (Taylor, 1994; Parekh, 2006).

Whether oriented to group-based claims or modified liberalism, multicultural theorists agree that to enhance justice and social equality, governments and majority citizens must recognize cultural minorities, valorize them, and accommodate their needs. For example, if a legislature mandates store closings one day a week to give workers a day of rest, businesspeople of different religious faiths should be able to choose the day they close rather than having a Sunday closing – rooted in Christianity – imposed upon them.

This philosophical work has not been confined to a dusty ivory tower. Charles Taylor served as co-chair of the Quebec government's Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences in 2007, while Bhikhu Parekh headed the Runnymede Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain from 1998 to 2000.

[5]As Thomas argues, supporters of the headscarf ban in France "exalted [the law] as a realization of individuality... [and] with emancipation of the individual as a rational agent from groups seeking control of their members" (2006:239). Liberalism can also be interpreted as protecting individuals' religious freedom, including their right to wear religious markers, which is the dominant argument in the U.S.

Both commissions produced highly publicized, and contentious, reports. Usually, empirical social science does not engage with normative political philosophy; social scientists focus on theories that explain the social world, not claims about what ought to be. Yet given real-world consequences, more social scientists should subject the multicultural claims and counter-claims of theorists and political actors to empirical assessment.

Multiculturalism as Public Policy

A third meaning focuses on actual policies that recognize and accommodate pluralism. Attention usually centers on government policy, but researchers can also study institutions, such as schools and businesses. For example, a business might provide a prayer room for employees or modify uniforms to accommodate those who wear a turban or headscarf.

Interest in cataloging and measuring multicultural policies grew rapidly in the last decade (Helbling and Vink, 2013). Ruud Koopmans and colleagues identify policies across 10 West European countries at four points in time (1980, 1990, 2002 and 2008) to assess "differential rights based on group membership," distinguishing "cultural monism" from "cultural pluralism" approaches (2005:51, 73; 2012).[6] Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka have constructed a Multiculturalism Policy index (MCP index) that measures eight types of policies across 21 Western nations at three time points (1980, 2000, and 2010) as indicators of "some level of public recognition and support for minorities to express their distinct identities and practices" (2013:582).[7] For countries included in both indices, values are highly correlated.[8]

[6]This database, the Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI), now also covers the four main Anglo-settler countries. It can be accessed at <http://www.wzb.eu/en/research/migration-and-diversity/migration-and-integration/projects/citizenship-rights-for-immigrants>. Last accessed May 29, 2014.

[7]The countries were evaluated for an official affirmation of multiculturalism; multiculturalism in the school curriculum; inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in public media and licensing; exemptions from dress codes in public laws; acceptance of dual citizenship; funding of ethnic organizations to support cultural activities; funding of bilingual and mother-tongue instruction; and affirmative action for immigrant groups. Detailed information on measure, individual indicators, and aggregate scores across time and countries is available at <http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/immigrant.html>. Last accessed May 8, 2014.

[8]Koopmans, Michalowkski, and Waibel report a Pearson correlation of 0.81 (2012:1,219). For a discussion of differences between the indices, *see* Koopmans (2013).

These indices indicate that, despite Chancellor Merkel's reproach of multiculturalism's failure in her country, Germany is not and has not been a country of strong multicultural policies. According to the MCP index, as shown in Figure I, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland are among the least multicultural countries, although Germany has adopted more multicultural policies over time. Australia, Canada, and Sweden rank as having adopted the broadest range of multicultural policies.

Surprisingly, given political rhetoric and academic claims of a multicultural "retreat," there is strong evidence of an *expansion* in multicultural policies. Measures of cultural pluralism calculated by Koopmans and colleagues show a steady increase from 1980 to 2002, with statis from 2002 to 2008, whether we consider cultural rights in education or other cultural and religious rights (2012:1 223). Trends captured by the MCP index from 2000 to 2010 confirm a pattern of stability (9 countries) or expansion (12 countries) (*see* Figure I; also Banting and Kymlicka, 2013; Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010). Only three nations – Denmark, Italy, and the Netherlands – show evidence of a retreat from multiculturalism. Among the three, only the Dutch case is dramatic; Denmark and Italy had few multicultural policies to begin with. The drop in the Netherlands, 3.5 points on an 8-point scale, is less than the biggest jump, an

Figure I. Multiculturalism Policies, by Country, 2000 and 2010*



*Countries ordered by change in MCP score over 2000–2010 from largest decrease (left) to largest increase (right), and then by 2010 MCP score. *Data source*: Banting and Kymlicka (2013).

increase of 4.5 points in Finland. Analysis of policy clearly reveals the resilience of multiculturalism or even its expansion.[9] Although the Dutch case has become a touchstone for a narrative of backlash, it does not represent the general trend.

The creation of policy indices has helped move normative political debates into empirical social science. The exercise of identifying concrete policies forces analysts to convert somewhat fuzzy notions of "recognition" or "accommodation" into real-world applications. Researchers can then evaluate claims about the consequences of countries adopting "more" or "less" multiculturalism.

Attempts at measurement are not, however, without criticism. Some find the quantification, standardization, and aggregation of policy items deeply problematic. Analyzing two multicultural indices, Duyvendak *et al.* (2013) conclude that, while the individual indicators are adequate, the conclusion that the Netherlands was a country of multiculturalism is wrong due to insufficient attention to context or history (*see also* Duyvendak, Pels, and Rijkschroeff, 2009). A different critique is leveled by some engaged in ethnographic research. State-centered policy indices might have little to do with the complexity of working out diversity, accommodation, and conflict in day-to-day interactions, what some call "everyday multiculturalism" (Wise and Velayutham, 2009; Voyer, 2013).

Multiculturalism as Public Discourse

How do we reconcile evidence that policy is inching toward greater accommodation of pluralism in many countries but political rhetoric criticizes multiculturalism? This paradox gets at a fourth understanding of multiculturalism: A public discourse adopted by governments or institutions to signal recognition and valorization of diversity. Such a "thin" multiculturalism finds reflection in symbolic acts or pluralism language without necessarily being tied to laws or institutional support. By this definition, when the German Chancellor complained about multiculturalism, her objection was to the general idea of tolerance and celebration of pluralism.

[9]The ICRI shows decline in four countries (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) and expansion in six (Belgium, Canada, France, New Zealand, Sweden, and the U.S.) (Koopmans, 2013:153). The difference with MCP lies in ICRI's coding for civic integration requirements, which we treat separately.

Indeed, early multiculturalism was arguably as much about changing symbolic hierarchies and instituting a new public discourse of minority equality as about advancing laws and policies. As such, it was a reaction to the predominant orientation of the time, assimilation, understood as the erasure of difference such that minorities would become indistinguishable from the majority.[10] Assimilation could be coercive, as with "Americanization" campaigns, or the passive valorization of the majority culture to which other groups should aspire, as with Anglo-conformity. Early differentialist claims in the U.S. came from the 1960s civil rights movement, Black power, and related demands by U.S.-born Asian Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans. In Canada, multiculturalism, as announced in the House of Commons in 1971, challenged the traditional English–French duality, claiming "there is no official culture, nor does any ethnic group take precedence over any other". In Sweden, in part to reject a prewar focus on the "purity" of the Swedish population, the immigrant and minority policy of 1975 initiated a special "freedom of culture objective" to help immigrants and their children retain their language and culture (Borevi, 2013b:149). Multiculturalism as public discourse began well before philosophical theories of multiculturalism were elaborated.

As public discourse, multiculturalism has been broadly successful in advancing narratives of pluralism. While some U.S.-based scholars seek to rehabilitate "assimilation" as an academic term, stripping it of a normative preference for majority culture and emphasizing the analytical concept of increased similarity across generations (Brubaker, 2001; Alba and Nee, 2003), few politicians are reclaiming "assimilation," given its association with old beliefs in cultural superiority. The favored alternatives are instead interculturalism or (civic) integration.

As a public discourse, interculturalism differs from multiculturalism in three respects. First, interculturalism emphasizes dialogue "on the basis of mutual understanding and respect," rather than the perceived separation of communities under multiculturalism (Council of Europe, 2008:10). Second, the receiving society makes stronger claims of minorities, such as mandated adoption of gender equality norms, LGBT rights, and the majority language, based on "seniority or history" since "interculturalism concerns itself with the interests of the majority culture, whose

[10]In some European countries, the attitude was more one of segregation of post-World War II temporary labor migrants than assimilation since it was presumed the migrants would return home.

desire to perpetuate and maintain itself is perfectly legitimate, as much as it does with the interests of minorities and immigrants" (Bouchard, 2011:451, 438). Finally, and in contrast to assimilation, interculturalism is promoted as supporting diversity and equal dignity for all groups. Understood this way, some observers argue that multiculturalism and interculturalism are not analytically distinct (Meer and Modood, 2012), and it is not always clear how interculturalism differs from "integration".

Indeed, the notion of integration into a common core appears ascendant among political leaders, especially in Europe. The substance of the core is in dispute, but Christian Joppke (2010) argues that prior cross-national distinctions between diverse "models" of inclusion and citizenship have given way to a shared approach valorizing a common language, civic tests for naturalization, and a perhaps neoliberal move from group-based rights to individual responsibility. Empirically, Sara Wallace Goodman (2010, 2012a) shows that civic integration policies can take a variety of forms, some more coercive than others. The meaning of policies can also vary by national context; a policy similar, on paper, in the United Kingdom and Germany might be understood and experienced quite differently by immigrants in the two countries (Goodman, 2012b). Rhetorically, civic integration is juxtaposed to multiculturalism, as in David Cameron's promotion of a muscular liberalism. Various scholars dispute the dichotomy, arguing that historically, early adopters of multiculturalism articulated these policies as part and parcel of an integration strategy (Bloemraad, 2006; Koleth, 2010; Borevi, 2013b; Duyvendak *et al.*, 2013).

It does seem to be the case that political actors are crafting a stronger zero-sum dichotomy between multiculturalism and civic integration, one that goes beyond rhetoric. Figure II plots scores on the Multiculturalism Policy Index and Goodman's Civic Integration Policy index (CIVIX) for 14 countries in 2000 and 2010 (Goodman, 2010, 2012b). In 2000, the association between the two indices was negative but statistically insignificant, bolstering the conclusion that the indices measured different dimensions of incorporation policy (Helbling, 2013). By 2010, however, we find a strong, negative correlation between the two policy domains after some countries shifted to more demanding civic integration policies with limited expansion in multiculturalism policies. The turn away from a public discourse of multiculturalism, although not linked to dramatic change in multiculturalism policies, has been accompanied by a rise in "harder" policies of civic integration.

Figure II. Multiculturalism Policies and Civic Incorporation Policies, by Country, 2000 and 2010



Data sources: MCP index from Banting and Kymlicka (2013), CIVIX from Goodman (2012b). Only countries scored on both measures are included.

Why should social scientists care about debates over definitions of multiculturalism, assimilation, interculturalism, and integration? Conceptual clarity matters in translating normative philosophy or political rhetoric into empirical analysis: Precision in terms helps identify evidence-based measures. It also matters for those who wish to translate research into the public sphere. Even if scholars in the U.S. understand that academic debate over "straight-line" or "segmented" assimilation is not about Anglo-conformity, the term "assimilation" plays poorly outside academic journals. Definitional debates are also significant as an object of academic study, illuminating how public discourse involves political acts. For social scientists, this is an invitation to examine multicultural discourse and policy as independent variables that may affect minority communities and members of the majority and as dependent, or outcome, variables, studying the forces that lead a country or institution to adopt one diversity approach over another. We next consider multiculturalism as a possible cause of integration and then as an outcome to be explained.

MULTICULTURALISM AS CAUSE: FACILITATING OR UNDERMINING INTEGRATION AND COHESION?

The political actors who initially promoted multiculturalism and the philosophers who elaborated arguments in support almost uniformly viewed it as a mechanism for minority incorporation. The Canadian Prime Minister's 1971 speech emphasized "full participation" in Canadian society and the goal of "national unity". In Australia, a multicultural society was part of a model of immigrant settlement around equal opportunity and a "voluntary bond" of unity (Koleth, 2010). In Sweden and the Netherlands, multicultural policies were tied to eliminating socioeconomic inequality (Duyvendak, Pels, and Rijkschroeff, 2009; Borevi, 2013b; Entzinger, 2013). Political philosophers theorize that recognition, including promoting hyphenated or nested identities, generates connection to and engagement with the polity (Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995; Parekh, 2006). According to this reasoning, failing to adopt multiculturalism could alienate minorities from the nation's political life.

Have these multicultural hopes been realized? Critics worry that excessive emphasis on diversity reifies differences, undermines collective identity, and hinders common political projects, whether recruitment to the military or the ability to raise taxes for redistributive spending (Gitlin, 1995; Miller, 1995; Scheffer, 2000; Goodhart, 2004a,b; Huntington, 2004). Others claim that multiculturalism promotes "parallel lives" in which minorities live in self-segregated communities.[11] This may even, some suggest, encourage violence and terrorism, especially among young Muslim men insufficiently integrated into mainstream society. Examples include the murder of Theo van Gogh by a young Moroccan-Dutch man in 2004 or the 2005 London bombings, orchestrated by three Britons of Pakistani heritage and a Jamaica-born convert to Islam.[12] Less provocatively, some academics worry that multiculturalism impedes majority-language learning and weakens social ties with those outside the ethnic enclave, hurting socioeconomic integration (Koopmans, 2010).

[11]The concept of parallel lives was, in the United Kingdom, articulated in the 2001 Cantor report, (Community Cohesion Review Team, 2001). In Germany, similar concerns were expressed starting in the 1990s as *Parallelgesellschaften* (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010:8).

[12]Violence can also be perpetuated by men from the majority society, as in the 2011 anti-multiculturalism rampage of right-wing extremist Anders Behring Breivik in Norway.

Empirical research on the consequences of multiculturalism has been limited. This is in part due to data constraints. Until recently, few surveys collected large immigrant-origin samples, and administrative data with information on ethno-racial origins are rare or restricted. Empirical evaluation is also hindered by identification problems, notably the challenge of disentangling the effects of multiculturalism from those of welfare policy, citizenship regimes, immigration policy, or other possible contextual predictors, especially when, at best, researchers compare a dozen or so countries. Here, we review the limited empirical evidence done to date (*see also* Koopmans, 2013).

In addition, we offer some original analyses of survey data from Europe and North America. We examine whether the presence or absence of multicultural policies at the national level affects the sociopolitical integration of first- and second-generation immigrants.[13] The European data cover 16 countries that participated in multiple waves of the European Social Survey from 2000 to 2012. The data file includes between about 7,300 to 10,800 second-generation respondents and about 8,700 to 13,900 first-generation respondents, depending on the question. We also use newly available over-time variation on the MCP index to increase our analytical leverage at the contextual level to 32 country-year cases.

We build on the modeling strategy outlined in Wright and Bloemraad's (2012) investigation of first-generation sociopolitical integration, but we extend the approach to the second generation. We compare measures in two ways: a comparison of absolute levels of expressed sociopolitical integration across policy domains and a comparison of relative gaps between immigrant-origin generations and the host country's majority population within each policy grouping. To do this, we first classify each country-year in our dataset as either "high" in MCP, that is, as greater than the sample-wide median of 2.5 multicultural policies, or "low" in MCP, that is, less than or equal to 2.5 (*see* Figure I). We then estimate multivariate models within each classification that control for individual characteristics likely to correlate with sociopolitical indicators: immigrant generation (1st, 2nd, or "non-immigrant"), citizenship status (citizen or non-citizen), length of

[13]The first generation is defined by foreign birth, and the second generation are native-born individuals with at least one foreign-born parent. We use the term "majority" residents to refer to Europeans born in the country to native-born parents; in the U.S., this group is often referred to as the "3rd+ generation". In the figures, we use the term "non-immigrant" for the native-born reference group, even though the second generation are also non-immigrant. Where possible, we control for respondents' ethno-racial minority status across all generations.

residence in country, self-described membership in an ethnic minority group, years of education, gender, and age. By including such controls, we aim to better isolate the possible effect of multicultural policy context. For ease of comparison, we use the model estimates to generate predicted scores on our outcome variables for a hypothetical immigrant designed to be as comparable as possible across countries and generation and who represents someone likely to face higher barriers to integration.

We undertake a parallel U.S.–Canada analysis of first- and second-generation residents compared to third- and later-generation native-born. We use a pooled dataset that brings together the 2006 *Social Capital Benchmark* survey (for the U.S.) and two Canadian surveys (the *Equality, Security, Community Survey* of 2000–2003 and the *Ethnic Diversity Survey* of 2002). The U.S. and Canada have longer immigration histories than most European countries and thus larger second-generation populations, which puts our analysis of second-generation integration on somewhat stronger footing. Also, as Figure I shows, Canada is substantially more "multicultural" than any other country in the analysis, save Sweden. Given concerns that multiculturalism undermines solidarity, common identity, and sociopolitical integration, these negative repercussions should be most evident in Canada.

We underscore that since these surveys were fielded with the general population in mind, they suffer from coverage problems for the most hard-to-reach migrant populations. The ESS offers the important advantage, compared to most other comparative European datasets, of allowing us to identify the second generation, but less than 10% are non-White minorities; over a quarter of first-generation ESS respondents are non-White minorities. Much of the immigrant-origin population in the ESS is thus socioculturally close to the majority population. Results can be, at best, suggestive, pending better cross-national data.[14]

Immigrant Identification: Multicultural Help or Hindrance?

Does multiculturalism hinder minorities' identification with the host society, undermining a common national identity? Asked how important their ethnicity and "the nation" were to their sense of who they are, respon-

[14]Further discussion of our statistical approach and the surveys, including variable coding, can be found in Appendix A. Descriptive statistics on analyzed ESS variables are in Appendix S1. Statistical models used to generate all figures are provided in Appendices S2 and S3.

dents in more multicultural Canada indicate a higher salience of ethnicity than in the U.S., among both immigrant and native-born Canadians (Wright and Bloemraad, 2012:84–85). Stronger ethnic identity does not, however, come at the cost of identification with Canada. Among non-White immigrants, national identification is higher in absolute terms than among those in the U.S. and equal across the two countries after including socioeconomic controls. Distinguishing between second-generation and other native-born respondents, Figure III shows, perhaps surprisingly, a lower mean ethnic identification among the second generation in Canada than among those in the U.S., but continued higher national identification, although the difference with U.S. respondents is not statistically significant. Thus, in both Canada and the U.S., the importance of ethnicity decreases from the first to second generation, but the drop-off is bigger in Canada. Conversely, the second generation in both countries report more identification with the nation than the foreign-born first generation, with a smaller increase in Canada given already very high national attachment among immigrants (*see also* Berry, 2013:672). The results hint that

Figure III. **National versus Ethnic Identity Salience, by Immigrant Generation in the U.S. and Canada**



Notes: Dependent variable is scored from 0 = "not at all important" to 1 = "very important." "Non-Immigrant," "2nd Gen Immigrant," and "1st Gen Immigrant" represent mean score by country. "Hypothetical Imm." shows estimated intercept in OLS model pooling 1st- and 2nd-generation immigrants and the following predictors: 2nd Gen immigrant dummy (0 = 1st Gen Immigrant), minority status in country (0 = Yes), citizenship status (0 = No), length of residence ($0 \leq 10$ years), education ($0 \leq$ HS), income (0 = lowest quintile), age ($0 \leq 29$), female (0 = male). 95% confidence intervals shown around each point estimate. Analyses are weighted. *Data sources*: U.S. Social Capital Benchmark (Putnam, 2006), Merged ECS (Kesselman and Johnston 2000/2003).

any main effect of multiculturalism – as measured by attachment to both ethnic and national identity – is stronger in the first generation. Since Canada is one of the most multicultural countries among Western democracies based on policy indices, these findings challenge the idea of an automatic zero-sum relationship between attachment to minority and majority identities.

Some scholars go further and argue that far from being zero-sum, hyphenated or nested identities produce social psychological benefits. Berry's review (2005) concludes that individuals with identities that integrate a heritage culture and attachment to a national society exhibit greater tolerance and self-assessed well-being than those with a unitary attachment, irrespective of whether the unitary attachment is to the majority society (only) or minority community (only). Nguyen and Benet-Martínez (2013) come to a similar conclusion based on a meta-analysis of 52 psychology studies. Bicultural individuals show better psychological adjustment, as measured by higher life satisfaction and self-esteem, and lower alienation, anxiety, depression, and loneliness. Berry (2005) argues that a positive dual identity is easier to achieve in multicultural countries.

Another common indicator of social cohesion is generalized trust. Analyzing a standard 3-item trust index, we find that both first- and second-generation respondents in the European dataset are slightly less trusting of "most people" than majority residents. The absolute level of trust is slightly higher among second-generation respondents in low multicultural contexts, but there is no statistical significance in the size of the gap across multicultural policy contexts (*see* Figure IV); absolute trust levels among first-generation respondents are virtually the same across policy contexts. We find a slightly larger gap with majority residents in more multicultural contexts, but this might reflect less about immigrants than the majority population, which is more trusting in more multicultural contexts. A similar comparison of generalized trust among residents in North America reveals statistically significant higher levels of trust in the first generation in Canada, but insignificant cross-national differences in the second, though trust among both second generation and majority populations stands higher in Canada.[15] Those with immigrant parents appear to be integrating to the majority level of trust, regardless of multicultural policies; multicultural policies might also be raising all residents' trust in Canada, regardless of immigrant background.

[15]Results not shown, but available upon request.

Figure IV. Generalized Trust, by Immigrant Generation in Europe, ESS 2000–2012



Notes: Dependent variable is 3-item additive index scored from 0 (least trusting) to 10 (most trusting). Each row displays a predicted score (with 95% confidence intervals) estimated via OLS regression pooling 2nd and 1st generation immigrants across countries and years but *within* pooled groupings of "low" and "high" multiculturalism policies. "Low" includes country-years where MCP score is <2.5, and "high" includes country-years where MCP score is ≥2.5. The OLS regression model controls for generation (0 = 1st or 2nd depending on panel), citizenship status (0 = citizen), length of residence in country (0 = 20+ years), education (0 = 9–12 years), gender (0 = male), age (0 = 18–29 for 2nd Generation, 40–49 for 1st Generation), and ethnic minority status (0 = Yes). Standard errors are clustered by country.

Perceived discrimination can be considered a converse of common national identity or trust, that is, evidence of exclusion or lack of equal membership. Wright and Bloemraad (2012:83), using ESS data up to 2008, find evidence that foreign-born residents in contexts with more multicultural policies report less discrimination, a result that is robust to individual-level controls, but not conclusive given large confidence intervals. Distinguishing between first- and second-generation respondents in the expanded 2000–2012 ESS dataset, we find that a hypothetical minority male first-generation immigrant with modest education is roughly 3 percentage points more likely to perceive discrimination in more multicultural countries than in less multicultural ones, a difference that disappears in the second generation.[16] Perhaps, this is evidence of backlash in multicultural countries since 2008, although differences across policy contexts are slight and not statistically significant, rendering strong conclusions impossible.

[16] *See* Figure SI.

Immigrant Political and Civic Incorporation: Engagement or Isolation?

Beyond identity or feelings of exclusion, does recognizing and supporting pluralism undermine civic cohesion or common citizenship? If we take the question literally, to mean immigrants' acquisition of legal citizenship status, we find a strong, significantly positive relationship with multicultural policies. Estimates by Liebig and Von Haaren (2010:27–28) indicate that 89% of working age (15–64) immigrants living in Canada for at least 10 years had adopted Canadian citizenship by 2007, a larger share than among any other country studied. The top three countries in naturalization, Canada, Sweden (82%), and Australia (81%), are also the three countries with the highest MCP scores. Conversely, countries with low MCP scores such as Switzerland (35%) and Germany (37%) have among the lowest levels of citizenship acquisition. Indeed, the relationship between citizenship level and MCP in 2010, at the country level, is 0.70 ($p < 0.01$), an extremely strong correlation. This might also reflect more inclusive citizenship laws among countries that embrace multiculturalism, although naturalization is a voluntary process. A low level of citizenship is normatively problematic for Western states given that democratic legitimacy is, in part, grounded on the political membership of residents. Despite some provisions for non-citizen voting at the local level, almost all countries also require citizenship for participation in national elections. Immigrants might be motivated to naturalize for instrumental reasons, such as gaining access to certain social benefits or facilitating international travel, but higher naturalization can also reflect feelings of belonging and civic inclusion. Citizenship data thus challenge worries that multicultural policies encourage civic isolation.

Considering other political behaviors, data on claims-making suggest that immigrant-origin minorities living in more multicultural countries are more likely to engage in non-violent political activities than those in more monocultural societies and that activism is directed more at the country of residence rather than the homeland (Koopmans *et al.*, 2005:128, 137).[17] Using an alternative measure of political participation that summarizes six political activities, ranging from contacting a public

[17]Scholars have vigorously debated whether transnational practices, such as visits home, sending money or engaging in homeland politics, represent a failure of integration. Space constraints prevent a discussion, but see, for example, the special issue on "Interactions between Integration and Transnationalism" (*Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 2013).

official to signing a petition, Wright and Bloemraad (2012:87) find no statistically significant relationship, whether positive or negative, between multicultural policy context and political behaviors, a finding we re-confirmed in the updated ESS dataset.[18]

Turning to trust in and attachment to political institutions – of importance given worries that immigrants bring illiberal, undemocratic values that they are unlikely to shed in a context of multiculturalism – we find no evidence of this. Figure V echoes previous results showing that across European countries, the apparent effect of multiculturalism is statistically zero among first-generation immigrants, whether we examine the absolute level of attachment or gaps with the majority population. Second-generation respondents express slightly less political trust in more multicultural countries, but the difference fails to reach statistical significance.

Data from Canada and the U.S. provide additional evidence across generations. Earlier analyses of the first generation found substantially higher political trust in Canada than the U.S., a distinction that strength-

Figure V. Political Trust, by Immigrant Generation in Europe, ESS 2000–2012



Notes: Dependent variable is 3-item additive index scored from 0 (least trusting) to 10 (most trusting). Each row displays a predicted score (with 95% confidence intervals) estimated via OLS regression pooling 2nd and 1st generation immigrants across countries and years but *within* pooled groupings of "low" and "high" multiculturalism policies. "Low" includes country-years where MCP score is <2.5, and "High" includes country-years where MCP score is ≥2.5. The OLS regression model controls for generation (0 = 1st or 2nd depending on panel), citizenship status (0 = citizen), length of residence in country (0 = 20+ years), education (0 = 9–12 years), gender (0 = male), age (0 = 18–29 for 2nd Generation, 40–49 for 1st Generation), and ethnic minority status (0 = Yes). Standard errors are clustered by country.

[18]Results not shown, but available upon request.

ens with socioeconomic controls (Wright and Bloemraad, 2012:85). New analyses (*see* Figure VI) re-confirm high political trust among the first generation in Canada, but also, in line with the ESS findings, a decline in 2nd-generation trust that brings attitudes much closer to the Canadian 3rd+ generation. Concomitantly, the significant first-generation difference with the U.S. disappears in the second generation.

Overall, if we consider identification, attachment, or political integration, there is no evidence of a negative effect from multicultural policies and some limited evidence for a positive effect, but only in the first generation. When it comes to the second generation, the pattern is largely one of integration to the majority's level of trust or engagement, irrespective of multiculturalism; this pattern also holds for the first generation on some indicators. An open question is whether multicultural policies are raising all residents' trust and attachment, irrespective of immigrant origins. Alternatively, countries with higher trust might have been more likely to adopt pluralism policies in the first place. For many of these analyses, however, we encounter large confidence intervals, so caution is

Figure VI. **Trust in National Government, by Immigrant Generation in the U.S. and Canada**



Notes: Dependent variable is scored from 0 = "Almost never" to 1 = "Just about always." "Non-Immigrant," "2nd Gen Immigrant," and "1st Gen Immigrant" represent mean score by country. "Hypothetical Imm." shows estimated intercept in OLS model pooling 1st and 2nd generation immigrants and including the following predictors: 2nd Gen immigrant dummy (0 = 1st Gen Immigrant), minority status in country (0 = Yes), citizenship status (0 = No), length of residence ($0 \leq 10$ years), education ($0 \leq$ HS), income (0 = lowest quintile), age ($0 \leq 29$), female (0 = male). 95% confidence intervals shown around each point estimate. Analyses are weighted. *Data sources*: U.S. Social Capital Benchmark (2006), Merged ECS (2000/2003).

needed. It is unclear whether insignificant results reflect the absence of substantive findings or the reality of weak comparative data on immigrant-origin generations.

Immigrant Socioeconomic Integration: What is the role of culture?

Multicultural theorists have largely been concerned with identity and sociopolitical incorporation. Yet a key worry for policy-makers and academics is whether immigrants and the second generation are integrating into the labor market and finding good jobs or, conversely, facing poor educational outcomes or over-representation in the criminal justice system. Some researchers speculate that state policies to encourage cultural retention and accommodate diversity make immigrants less likely to learn the majority language and more likely to remain in co-ethnic neighborhoods, especially in countries with generous welfare states, thereby hurting intergroup social contact and immigrants' job prospects (Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2010; Koopmans, 2010). According to this view, immigrants need state policies that tie residence rights and citizenship to economic contribution or the disciplining force of a weak welfare state to foster socioeconomic integration (Koopmans, 2010).

Other research suggests quite different patterns. In a meta-analysis of 51 studies, Nguyen and Benet-Martínez (2013) find that biculturalism is positively correlated with a range of behavioral outcomes, such as academic achievement, career success, and reduced delinquency. Recent efforts to collect and standardize socioeconomic indicators of first- and second-generation integration across multiple Western democracies show higher foreign- and native-born unemployment gaps, in relative and absolute terms, and larger income gaps in countries with fewer pluralism policies, such as France and Germany, as compared to the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, or Canada (Alba and Foner, 2014),[19] while educational attainment, income security, occupational prestige, and residential diversity for the second generation appear higher in "inclusionary" cities – Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Stockholm – than in less inclusionary ones in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland (Bean *et al.*, 2012).

[19]The U.S., which holds a middle position on MCP policies, evidences a low unemployment but high income gap.

How do we understand such contradictory evidence? We underscore again the difficulty of compiling comparative metrics for immigrant-origin populations. Seemingly opposing findings might stem from different outcome measures, differential compositions of migrant populations, different reference groups, or distinct time periods. Also, the posited causal chain linking multiculturalism to socioeconomic integration is arguably longer and more complex than for sociopolitical outcomes. This makes it hard to separate out the possible effect of multiculturalism from the multitude of other factors that influence educational and economic success, residential segregation, crime, and the like, such as the organization of the educational system, provision of social benefits, immigration selection policy, and employment protections, to name a few. Ultimately, we have too few country cases and too many potential policy variables to overcome problems of causal inference.

Taking a step back, we find somewhat distinct orientations to the question of whether immigrant culture is "good" or "bad" for integration on either side of the Atlantic. Those in North America appear more likely to underscore positive elements of immigrant culture: hard work, family orientation, cultural creativity, and (more in the U.S.) religious faith. In Europe, especially regarding Islam, migrants' cultural and religious backgrounds raise unease over perceived illiberal values, gender oppression, and homophobia. These orientations might be echoed in academic work. In the U.S., scholars of segmented assimilation argue that "selective acculturation" – essentially, biculturalism – helps the children of immigrants do well in school, get along with parents, and stay out of trouble by avoiding "downward" assimilation to a minority, urban American culture (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001). Scholars with a "straight-line" view of integration also highlight how cultural hybridity – combining the best of American and heritage culture – correlates with socioeconomic success (Kasinitz *et al.*, 2008). It is rarer to read European accounts of how migrant culture insulates children from "bad" majority values or the benefits of hybridity for economic mobility. Perhaps, reflecting a larger Muslim population in Europe and global violence advanced in the name of Islam, there is more academic concern over the line between "reasonable" and "controversial" religious claims (*e.g.,* Koopmans, 2013). The distinct resonance of immigrant cultures may influence academics to see multiculturalism more favorably in Anglo-settler countries and less so in Europe.

MULTICULTURALISM AND MAJORITY RESIDENTS: BACKLASH OR NEW COLLECTIVE IDENTITY?

What about members of the majority group? Do multicultural policies increase their sense of political cohesion with immigrant-origin minorities? The assumption of proponents is that they do, by broadening notions of national identity to include ethno-cultural minorities. A shift in national identity could be important since, on balance, those who conceive of national identity as based on common political principles rather than ascriptive traits tend to express more tolerance for members of out-groups (Weldon, 2006; Wright, 2011b). This could help with social solidarity and majority–minority interactions in everyday life (Plaut, Thomas, and Goren, 2009).

Or does multiculturalism produce backlash, undermining collective solidarity and feeding far-right parties? Social identity theory in psychology (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1981) argues for an innate human tendency to value group memberships and to produce us/them distinctions on even the slimmest bases. If multicultural discourse and policies underscore group distinctions, inter-group relations might suffer. Perhaps, multiculturalism facilitates immigrants' civic attachment and sense of inclusion, but generates "ethnic" nationalism among the majority, undermining social cohesion. If such a trade-off exists, it would raise difficult normative questions on how to balance immigrant inclusion (or, in the language of philosophers, justice) against majority desires for a common culture.

The distinction between meanings of multiculturalism is important here. Some backlash might stem from frustration over accommodating diversity in public policy and institutions. But backlash may also stem from demographic diversity. Increasingly negative attitudes toward immigrants, especially in Western Europe (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010), could encourage politicians to make statements opposing multiculturalism, even in countries with few pluralism policies. The research question then shifts to whether multicultural policies ameliorate or exacerbate majority group members' possible negative reactions to demographic diversity.

Few empirical studies evaluate this question. Studying national identity across 18 democracies, Wright (2011a) finds that more open citizenship regimes and high levels of social spending correlate with more

immigrant-inclusive definitions of the national community, but he also finds that citizens in more multicultural nations have moved to more ascriptive – and exclusionary – conceptions of national identity, evidence consistent with backlash narratives. Among those strongly opposed to immigration in 16 European countries, anti-immigrant attitudes become more strongly tied, over time, to distrust of parliament, politicians, the judicial system, and police in places with more multicultural policies (Citrin, Levy, and Wright, 2014). The authors speculate that this link could facilitate the rise of far-right parties. At the same time, Citrin, Levy, and Wright (2014) find no evidence that multicultural policies have a net effect on political trust, suggesting a countervailing dynamic among those with moderate attitudes. This result is consistent with a study of 19 Western nations that finds more extensive multicultural policies (and more economic equality) mitigate or reverse the erosion of aggregate trust or civic and political participation among the majority population given demographic change (Kesler and Bloemraad, 2010; *see also* Crepaz, 2006; Weldon, 2006).

Some observers worry that multiculturalism might affect redistribution policies. By spotlighting difference, diversity policies may undermine social cohesion, which is posited as necessary for public support of taxation and the provision of public resources to those in need, a hypothesis called the "progressives' dilemma" (Miller, 1995; Barry, 2002; Goodhart, 2004a,b). Generous welfare states in Scandinavia, it is argued, were founded on homogeneous populations; the diversity of the U.S., in contrast, plays into a weak welfare state. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) find evidence of a negative relationship between ethno-racial diversity and redistribution. Less clear is whether multicultural policies aggravate or ameliorate this relationship. Banting *et al.* (2006) find, on average, no greater erosion of the welfare state in places with stronger multiculturalism policies, whether one measures social spending, redistribution through taxes and transfers, levels of child poverty, or income inequality. Again, distinguishing demographic from political multiculturalism is critical.

So, do countries with more robust multicultural policies experience backlash or greater social cohesion? Current empirical research is too thin to draw strong conclusions. Political discourse and surveys provide evidence of backlash among some people, yet when policy is separated from demographic multiculturalism, it is hard to find evidence of greater declines in trust and participation among the general public in countries

with more multicultural policies. Dissatisfaction with diversity has generated coercive civic integration policies targeting immigrants, but this appears to have occurred more in countries with weak multicultural policies. Multiculturalism does not appear to have affected welfare policies and, as we noted earlier, *more* countries had adopted recognition and accommodation policies in 2010 than in 2000. Hardening of attitudes might be happening, but it is perhaps occurring mostly among people or in countries that were more ambivalent about immigration and diversity to start with, or there is a time dimension such that early adopters overcome backlash problems facing other countries.

MULTICULTURALISM AS OUTCOME: ADOPTION, REJECTION, PERSISTENCE

These hypotheses lead to broader questions: Why were multicultural policies adopted in some countries but not others? What accounts for the persistence or fall of multiculturalism as political discourse or policy framework? Surprisingly, we have little comparative research on this question. Just as political scientists, sociologists, and historians debate the forces driving variation and change in immigration or citizenship policy, we need theories of diversity policy. To help foster research on the topic, in this final section, we offer some preliminary analyses of whether existing policy frameworks can be applied to multiculturalism.

Sketched broadly, explanations of immigration policy, citizenship laws, or immigrant rights locate the source of change either inside or outside the state, that is, in domestic politics or international pressures. Viewed as domestic politics, key actors may be the voting public, organized interests such as businesses and unions (Freeman, 1995; Zolberg, 2006), political parties (Howard, 2009), or elite decision-makers, elected or in state bureaucracies (Messina, 2007; Triadafilopoulos, 2012). While interests and power often hold priority in these accounts, some scholars emphasize that actors' behaviors and goals are influenced by institutions, including the judiciary (Tichenor, 2002; Joppke, 2010) or cultural tropes of nationhood (Brubaker, 1992). Researchers who locate policy change at the international level highlight how foreign policy drives refugee policy, how international pressures forced the reversal of racist entry restrictions, or how human rights norms and supranational institutions make it hard to deny right to non-citizens (Soysal, 1994; Zolberg, 2006; Triadafilopoulos, 2012). Different subsets of

these frameworks offer analytical tools to help understand the adoption, rejection, or persistence of multiculturalism.

Adoption

There is no strong evidence that multiculturalism arose from a strong policy preference by majority voters or extensive lobbying by immigrant-origin groups.[20] Rather, among early adopters of multiculturalism – Canada (1971), Australia (1973), and Sweden (1975) – discourse and policy were often elite-driven in the domestic sphere, by politicians, civil servants, academics, and key civil society actors, including leaders from some (often European-origin) ethnic communities.[21] Usually promoted by center-left or social democratic political actors, multiculturalism was favored as an integration strategy that explicitly negated prior assimilation or racial purity orientations.[22] Once initiated, subsequent policy evolution included immigrant-origin communities, with greater attention to anti-racism initiatives as migration shifted to non-European countries. Each story of adoption also has important country-specific elements, related to indigenous populations, fears of separatism, and development of the welfare state.

The spread of multiculturalism requires future research. Multicultural policy indices show real policy change from 1980 to 2010. Diffusion mechanisms likely include international networks of academics and elite policy-makers (including those embedded in regional institutions such as the European Union), as well as changing legitimacy norms (*e.g.,* linking multiculturalism with a modern approach to minority relations). The role of courts in advancing cultural or group rights, through the domestic court system or within the European Union, is disputed (*e.g.,* Joppke, 2010; Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel, 2012). Transnational social

[20]The story in the U.S. is somewhat different. Multiculturalism there was spurred by long-standing native-born minorities' mobilization, in partnership with policy development by elites.

[21]On Canada, *see* Triadafilopoulos (2012) and Winter (2011), on Australia, *see* Lopez (2000) and Koleth (2010), and on Sweden, *see* Borevi (2013a,b).

[22]Borevi (2013a) notes, however, that initial support for diversity policies in Sweden in the 1960s came from the Conservatives, with subsequent support by the governing Social Democrats. In Canada, substantial expansion of multiculturalism in the 1980s was undertaken by the right-of-center Conservatives. Such cross-party support might further explain the persistence and strength of multiculturalism in these countries.

movements and norm diffusion through school systems might also be at play, though many accounts of multiculturalism's spread in the 1980s and early 1990s privilege elite-driven change rather than bottom-up mobilization.[23] Promotion by early adopters might have encouraged the practice elsewhere, especially as politicians in countries like Canada held up multiculturalism in the international arena as a success story to be emulated (Kymlicka, 2004).

Rejection

One account for the retreat from multiculturalism is the claim that the policies have not worked.[24] But given the inconclusive empirical evidence reviewed above, we must look further to understand the political rejection of multicultural discourse.

Domestic electoral politics appears the most likely alternative account. Some observers argue that voters punished elites for forcing multiculturalism on them and paying insufficient attention to ordinary citizens' desire for a core culture and national values. In the Netherlands, it is argued, retreat from multiculturalism has been caught up in a general populist backlash, especially among those who feel left behind by globalization (Buruma, 2006; Entzinger, 2014). Populism also goes hand-in-hand with mobilization by far-right and right-center parties that have attacked immigrants and multiculturalism, with little distinction between the two. Alternatively, rejection of multiculturalism might be a new type of elite-led policy change: Far-right political leaders have arguably politicized multiculturalism for political gain over other issues of public concern, such as economic globalization (Helbling, Reeskens, and Stolle, 2013).

Those on the political left also worry about multiculturalism, especially the progressives' dilemma (Scheffer, 2000; Goodhart, 2004a,b) and fear that identity politics deflect attention from progressive causes (Gitlin,

[23]On the Netherlands, *see* Duyvendak, Pels, and Rijkschroeff (2009) and Entzinger (2014).

[24]Some minorities elaborate a policy-failure argument with a different tenor. Multiculturalism is criticized as too focused on symbolic culture – ethnic foods and dance – rather than attacking deeply racist practices and institutions. Celebrating differences becomes, in this perspective, a "divide-and-conquer" strategy to keep minority communities isolated and unable to mobilize against socioeconomic inequalities and a persistent colonial mindset.

1995). Others focus on how multiculturalism might sabotage equality norms (Barry, 2002). Muslim immigrants are most often targeted as bringing illiberal values into host nations, especially over gender equality, which can spur feminists to mobilize against multiculturalism (Thomas, 2006). Multicultural discourse and policies stand little chance when condemned by parties of the right and activists on the left. Unlike with immigration or citizenship policies, we find few academic accounts of courts or international institutions protecting multiculturalism policies from domestic political backlash.

Persistence and Plural National Identities

Much less discussed within the narrative of "retreat" is the persistence of multiculturalism in a dozen countries (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010; Banting and Kymlicka, 2013). How do we explain this?

One answer might be, again, domestic politics, but influenced by new immigrant-origin voters. High levels of immigrant citizenship in countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and Canada likely make it difficult to reverse course on multiculturalism. In Canada, the populist Reform Party, which in the late 1980s advocated eliminating multiculturalism and restricting non-European migration, is now part of the governing Conservative party; it won office in part by reaching out to visible minority voters and embracing multiculturalism (Bloemraad, 2012). If multiculturalism facilitates immigrants' political integration, it may generate a constituency for persistence, perhaps even in Europe (Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel, 2012). Immigrant-centered multiculturalism might also have more staying power in Anglo-settler countries, given recognition of the legitimate claims of indigenous populations and, in the U.S., of longstanding minority groups, especially African Americans. Although indigenous populations usually reject multiculturalism, the presence of such longstanding, native-born communities makes it harder for political actors to return to monocultural language.

We further hypothesize that multiculturalism persists, and might be more successful, in some countries because it has become part of national identity, including for a substantial group of majority citizens. This seems to be the case among early adopters. In Canada, reaction to rising Québécois nationalism, combined with desires to forge an identity distinct from the U.S. and the United Kingdom, raised multiculturalism to a core

part of Canadian identity (Bloemraad, 2006; Winter, 2011). Among the general public, 56% now believe that multiculturalism is "very important" to Canadian identity (compared to just 47% for hockey), while those who express the most patriotism are also most likely to support immigration and multiculturalism (Bloemraad, 2012; Citrin, Johnston, and Wright, 2012; Berry, 2013). In Sweden, multiculturalism elicits debate, especially with the rise of the right-wing Sweden Democrats, but all other political parties support a self-understanding of Sweden as a culturally diverse society (Borevi, 2013a). Open and humanitarian nationhood is juxtaposed to a much older, and discredited, notion of Swedish racial "purity" and the perceived exclusionary stance of Sweden's neighbors, notably Denmark. In places where multicultural orientations have been successfully folded into new national narratives of peoplehood, this might produce benefits for those of minority and majority backgrounds, especially in the face of continued migration and attendant challenges of demographic multiculturalism.

TAKING STOCK AND MOVING FORWARD

Multiculturalism can refer to demographic diversity, normative philosophies, policies that recognize and support pluralism, or public discourse that does the same. Social scientists need to subject the claims and counter-claims of multiculturalism's purported benefits or problems to empirical evaluation. An incipient scholarship has emerged, but much needs to be done. In particular, scholars face the challenge of separating out the effects of multicultural policies from the many other factors that influence identities, civic and political engagement, and socioeconomic incorporation, such as immigration policy, welfare state arrangements, and the like. We have focused on cross-national comparisons, treating the category of "immigrants" in a largely undifferentiated way, but multiculturalism's effects might differ across immigrant groups, proving beneficial for some and harmful for others. Among the majority population, researchers must identify whether and how public discourse and policies that accommodate diversity exacerbate or mitigate possible feelings of threat given continued migration.

These challenges are intensified by a paucity of empirical data. At the national level, scholars have developed indices of multicultural policies that facilitate cross-national comparisons. However, comparative data on the "dependent variable" – whether trust in government or educational

attainment – have been harder to standardize, especially so we can take into account immigrant generation, ethno-racial origins, religious minority status, and (for analyses of the second generation) parental human capital. Comparative datasets are slowly coming online, especially in Europe; a future challenge is to integrate data across continents.

Based on our own analyses and reading of published research, multiculturalism likely facilitates immigrants' sociopolitical integration and contributes to their sense of civic inclusion in a modest way. There is no sign of a significant effect, positive or negative, among the second generation; we do find evidence for convergence with the third and later generations. Evidence for socioeconomic integration, in the first or second generation, is inconclusive. Indeed, it is debatable how much multiculturalism affects outcomes such as jobs, poverty, and criminal activity net of other factors. Antidiscrimination policies' employment protections may be of greater importance. One area where an effect might be plausible is in schools, given their role in sociocultural incorporation as well as economic mobility, but scholars face the challenge of separating out the influence of multiculturalism net of school system differences. The psychological and sociological literature in North America appears to come to a stronger conclusion on the positive effect of biculturalism or hybridity, something presumably easier to achieve in places that embrace multiculturalism.

More research is also needed on cross-national differences in the adoption, rejection, or persistence of multiculturalism over time. We speculate that pluralism policies and discourse are most successful where multiculturalism is cast as something relevant to all residents, minority and majority, and where it feeds into re-imaginings of national identity. If so, then perhaps multiculturalism "works" better in countries of historic migration rather than in European countries with arguably more enshrined stories of nationhood. A study of immigrant youth concluded that young people's national and ethnic identities were positively correlated in "settler societies" (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the US), but negatively associated in some European countries (*e.g.,* France, Germany, Norway, Portugal) (as reported in Berry, 2013:672). Meta-analysis on biculturalism and psychological or social adjustment finds stronger positive effects in the U.S. than elsewhere (Nguyen and Benet-Martínez, 2013). Others speculate that the higher concentration of less educated Muslims in Europe, combined with demands for religious accommodation, produces distinct politics and consequences for multiculturalism in Europe compared to Anglo-settler countries (Koopmans, 2013).

Does that mean multiculturalism – or some variant – is doomed in Europe? It is worth underscoring that while the term "multiculturalism" has become poisoned in some places, policies of recognition and accommodation have expanded. Perhaps new terms are needed, in the same way that academics might study "assimilation" in scholarship but use "integration" in the public sphere. The two most prominent European anomalies on multiculturalism also deserve further study. Sweden was an early adopter and Swedish politicians and the public seem to be staying the course. Why? This question is especially interesting in relation to Sweden's Scandinavian neighbors, with similar historically homogeneous populations and generous contemporary welfare states.

The Netherlands, in contrast, has become the poster child of backlash. The facts of the Dutch case are, however, in dispute. Some argue that Dutch multiculturalism failed to integrate minorities, producing ethnic ghettos and welfare dependence (Scheffer, 2000; Koopmans, 2010). Others suggest a populist revolt, felt more sharply after the murder of Theo van Gogh (Buruma, 2006). Yet others question whether the Netherlands was ever multicultural; instead, it is argued that the Dutch uphold a peculiar "monoculturalism" around tolerance for homosexuality, gender equality, and a narrow conception of Dutchness that does not allow for difference (Duyvendak, Pels, and Rijkschroeff, 2009). Still others, writing from a critical race perspective, argue that Dutch multiculturalism was never about inclusion, but rather about ethnic distancing and continuation of colonial mentalities (Vasta, 2007), orientations that translate into racialized ideas of order, time, cleanliness, and Christian superiority in public school classrooms (Weiner, 2014). Yet racialized discourse and practice are found in many countries. Why was it harder for multiculturalism to "stick" as a Dutch collective story of nationhood, especially given historical narratives of religious tolerance and free thought from the time of Spinoza (Maas, 2013)?

It is important for scholars to avoid post hoc arguments that claim Anglo-settler countries "naturally" are better able to adopt and adapt to diversity policies than European (or other) countries. Canada, a country with high multiculturalism, low public opposition to immigration, and positive outcomes on immigrant integration, was not a bastion of racial tolerance in the mid-20th century. Immigration laws kept non-Whites out, and into the 1960s, the collective story of nationhood was one of English Protestants and French Catholics engaged in political bargains. The introduction of multiculturalism was, from all evidence, not something that the Prime Minister supported with zeal. But, critically, the

collective identity it provided became a powerful narrative to change the symbolic (and actual) ethnic hierarchy in the country (Breton, 1988).[25] Anglophones also seized on it to distinguish the country from the U.S. and challenge Quebec nationalists (Winter, 2011).[26] Given that the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand were no better in embracing ethno-racial or religious diversity at the end of World War II, the recasting of national identities to embrace diversity, a process that came with struggle and produced conflict, needs much more study. If multiculturalism plays some small part in facilitating sociopolitical integration, then it might help channel political struggle and conflict into productive rather than dangerous directions.

APPENDIX A
DATA AND METHODS

DATA

Our European analysis includes 16 countries and draws on six waves of the European Social Survey (2002–2012).[27] We supplement this analysis with three surveys of residents living in the U.S. and Canada. Three criteria guided our selection of surveys: a large enough immigrant-origin sample to ensure sufficient precision in estimation; attitudinal outcome measures that are both relevant and comparable across countries; and the ability to employ the same suite of individual-level controls across surveys. On the American side, we focus our attention on the *Social Capital Benchmark* survey (Putnam, 2006), fielded in 2006, which includes 2,741 respondents (373 first generation and 222 second generation). On the Canadian side, we employ a dataset merging both waves of the *Equality, Security, Community Survey* (Kesselman and Johnston, 2000, 2003), which yields a total sample of nearly 11,000 individuals, a foreign-born sample of roughly 2,490, and a second-generation sample of 2,069 people.

[25]For a discussion that also considers alternative arguments relating Canadian "success" to economic selection in immigration policy and a low proportion of clandestine migration, *see* Bloemraad (2012).

[26]The emphasis on the symbolic benefits of multiculturalism for national identity among the Anglophone population helps explain the opposition to and debate over multiculturalism in French-speaking Quebec.

[27]For further details on survey methodology, see: <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>.

Finally, we employ the Canadian *Ethnic Diversity Survey*, fielded in 2002 (roughly 40,000 total respondents, 10,686 foreign-born, and 15,317 second generation). Descriptive statistics are listed in Appendix S1.

ANALYTICAL STRATEGY

Our interest lies not with individual-level predictors of sociopolitical attitudes, which has been studied extensively, but with the effect of policy context on first- and second-generation individuals' attitudes once individual-level predictors have been controlled. Given that our survey respondents are nested by country, and countries vary in the sociodemographic profile of their immigrant populations, this suggests that a multi-level regression analysis might be appropriate. For our purposes, however, that approach is problematic. First, our investigation is based on a limited selection of countries, which does not ensure that the asymptotic properties of the typical maximum-likelihood estimator will "kick in" at the context level. Second, our selection of countries is not random, which makes traditional interpretations of *t*- and *p*-statistics associated with country-level effects problematic.

Accordingly, we estimate policy effects using a variation on the two-step visualization technique used in Wright and Bloemraad (2012). We compare the intercept values produced when outcomes are regressed on the predictors in a baseline individual-level model pooled within clusters of "high" or "low" multicultural countries. Given the way the individual-level predictors are coded, this amounts to estimating, for each policy category, predicted outcomes for a hypothetical first- or second-generation respondent. This respondent, for the immigrant first generation, is a man who is a "visible minority," has been living in the country for 20 or more years, is a citizen of 40–49 years of age, and has 9–12 years of formal education. The hypothetical second-generation respondent, who we have kept similar in sociodemographic characteristics, is also a minority male citizen with 9–12 years of formal education, but who is between 18 and 29 years of age in order to have comparable "exposure" to multiculturalism. Whenever we refer to a hypothetical immigrant in the text, it is to these estimates. Our estimator in these equations depends upon the nature of the dependent variable: Dichotomous measures employ logistic regression, whereas all other measures are estimated using OLS.

An important conceptual and methodological challenge in immigrant integration research is establishing a reference point. Different

analytical strategies speak to distinct theoretical interests. We consequently employ two comparisons. The first directly compares predicted values for our hypothetical first- or second-generation respondent across high and low multicultural categories. This comparison offers important parsimony: On the whole, do those of immigrant-origin do better in some policy contexts than others? This analysis is useful not only for its simplicity, but also because the outcome measures we assess can be seen as "goods" in and of themselves: Normatively, higher levels of social and political trust and lower levels of perceived discrimination are presumably good for immigrant-origin residents, as well as native populations and the receiving polity.

At the same time, the concept of "integration" connotes movement toward some attitude or behavior consonant with the mainstream position in the host country. Immigrants in France, for example, may evince lower social trust compared to immigrants in other countries precisely because they are integrating into a mainstream population that tends to be distrusting. While theoretically it is not self-evident that the policy effects we analyze should be predicated on natives – especially given that multiculturalism is generally thought to shape native as well as immigrant attitudes – most analyses of immigrant incorporation emphasize gaps between immigrant and mainstream populations. Our second analytical strategy consequently compares country-level gaps between our hypothetical first- or second-generation respondent and the mean value for all respondents of the third or later generation. Natives' mean scores on the outcomes thus become "anchor points" to discern how much those of immigrant origins differ from the native-born majority, and this is done with respect to the mainstream population within their country (as opposed to all countries of a specific policy regime). The idea here is that we are trying to hold constant what some might call "national political culture". Detailed regression results for all figures are in Appendix S2.

CODING NOTES

ESS 6-Wave Cumulative

All variables listed below are referenced to original measures in downloaded ESS data. For more detailed wordings, see documentation available at <http://ess.nsd.uib.no/downloadwizard/#>.

Outcomes. Generalized Trust: Additive index of three 11-point "Rosenberg" items (originally "ppltrst," "pplfair," and "pplhlp"). Index is scored from 0 = least trusting to 1 = most trusting.

Perceived Discrimination: Whether respondent perceives him/herself as part of a minority that has been discriminated against the country on the basis of either "color or race," "nationality," "religion," "language," or "ethnic group". (From raw variables "dscrrce," "dscrntn," "dscrrlg," "dscrlng," and "dscretn," respectively). The measure employed is coded 1 if the response any of these way "yes" and 0 if the response to all of them was "no".

Political Trust: Additive index of two 11-point trust measures, trust in the country's parliament (originally "trstprl") and trust in politicians (originally "trstplt"). The index is re-scored from 0 = "no trust at all" to 1 = "complete trust".

Political Participation: Summarizes respondent participation in six different kinds of political activity – contacting a party/official, working in a political party/action group, working in another political organization, wearing/displaying a campaign badge/sticker, signing a petition, taking part in a lawful demonstration – in the past 12 months. (Original variables were "contplt," "wrkprty," "wrkorg," "badge," "sgnptit," and "pbldmn," respectively). The index is scored from 0 = "no" and 1 = "yes".

Predictors. Citizenship Status: R holds [country] citizenship (from raw measure "ctzcntr"), recoded 0 = "no" and 1 = "yes".

Length of Residence: How long R has lived in country (from raw 5-category measure "livecntr"), re-scored from 0 = "within the last year" to 1 = "more than 20 years ago".

Minority Status: R identifies self as belonging to a minority ethnic group in country (from raw measure "blgetmg"), recoded 0 = "no" and 1 = "yes".

Gender: (from raw measure "gndr"), recoded 0 = "male" and 1 = "female".

Age: (from raw measure "age"), recoded into five-category measure such that 0 = "18–29," 0.25 = "30–39," 0.50 = "40–49," 0.75 = "50–64," and 1 = "65+".

Education: (from raw measure "eduyrs"), simply years of formal education completed.

Single-Country Surveys

Predictors. Every effort was made to ensure that the individual-level predictors employed were identical in substance and coding to those used in the ESS analysis (above).

Within-Country Merging/Compatibility. Prior to analysis, the two waves of the Canadian ECS survey. Not all variables used were available in both surveys. Items fielded in both were asked identically in each wave.

Cross-National Compatibility. Generally speaking, we limited variable selection to strictly comparable in the cross-country comparison. Exceptions are as follows:

Differences in Coding of Predictors: The EDS survey's only measure of Length of Residence in Canada is two categories, post-1991 (e.g. within the last 10 years) and pre-1991 (more than 10 years ago.) As a result, in cross-country comparisons, we created a comparable dichotomous measure in the SCB dataset and used it as a regressor rather than the five-category version.

Differences in Text or Substance of Questions: The wording of the Trust National Government item varies as follows: In the SCB, it is "How much of the time do you think you can trust the NATIONAL government to do what is right?" whereas in the ECS, it is "How much do you trust the government in Ottawa to do what is right?" Response options are identical. On Ethnic and National Identity, the SCB wordings are "When you think about yourself, how important is [your ethnic or racial background / being American] to your sense of who you are?" In the ECS, respondents were asked "Is [your ethnic origin/being Canadian] very important to you, somewhat important, not very important, or not important at all?" Response options are identical.

REFERENCES

Alba, R., and N. Foner
2014 "Comparing Immigrant Integration in North America and Western Europe: How Much Do the Grand Narratives Tell Us?" *International Migration Review* 48 (S1):263–291.

———, and V. Nee
2003 *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Alesina, A., and E. L. Glaeser
2004 *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Banting, K., and W. Kymlicka
2013 "Is There Really a Retreat From Multiculturalism Policies? New Evidence From the Multiculturalism Policy Index." *Comparative European Politics* 11(5):577–598.

———, R. Johnston, W. Kymlicka and S. Soroka
2006 "Do Multiculturalism Policies Erode the Welfare State?" In *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies*. Ed. K. Banting, and W. Kymlicka. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Pp. 49–91.

Barry, B.
2002 *Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bean, F. D. *et al.*
2012 "The Dimensions and Degree of Second-Generation Incorporation in US and European Cities: A Comparative Study of Inclusion and Exclusion." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 53(3):181–209.

Berry, J. W.
2005 "Acculturation: Living Successfully in two Cultures." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 29(6):697–712.

———
2013 "Research on Multiculturalism in Canada." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 37(6):663–675.

Bloemraad, I.
2006 *Becoming a Citizen: Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States and Canada*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

———
2012 "Understanding "Canadian Exceptionalism" in Immigration and Pluralism Policy." In *Rethinking National Identity in the Age of Migration*. Ed. B. Stiftung, and Migration Policy Institute. Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung. Pp. 145–170.

Borevi, K.
2013a "The Political Dynamics of Multiculturalism in Sweden." In *Challenging Multiculturalism: European Models of Diversity*. Ed. R. Taras. Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press. Pp. 136–160.

———
2013b "Understanding Swedish Multiculturalism." In *Debating Multiculturalism in the Nordic Welfare States*, Ed. P. Kivisto, and Ö. Wahlbeck. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Pp. 140–169.

Bouchard, G.
2011 "What is Interculturalism?" *McGill Law Journal* 56(2):435–468.

Breton, R.
1988 "From Ethnic to Civic Nationalism: English Canada and Quebec." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 11(1):85–102.
Brubaker, R.
1992 *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
———
2001 "The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and Its Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24 (4):267–309.
Buruma, I.
2006 *Murder in Amsterdam: The Death of Theo van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance*. New York: Penguin Press.
Ceobanu, A. M., and X. Escandell
2010 "Comparative Analyses of Public Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Immigration Using Multinational Survey Data: A Review of Theories and Research." *Annual Review of Sociology* 36:309–328.
Chung, E. A.
2010 "Korea and Japan's Multicultural Models for Immigrant Incorporation." *Korea Observer* 41(4):649–676.
Citrin, J., R. Johnston, and M. Wright
2012 "Do 'Patriotism' and 'Multiculturalism' Collide? Competing Perspectives From the U.S. and Canada." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 45(3):531–552.
———, M. Levy, and M. Wright
2014 "Multicultural Policy and Political Support in European Democracies,." *Comparative Political Studies* 47(11):1531–1557.
Community Cohesion Review Team
2001 *Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team*. London: Home Office.
Council of Europe
2008 *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue: Living Together as Equals in Dignity*. Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe. <http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/Source/Pub_White_Paper/White%20Paper_final_revised_en.pdf>. Accessed on April 8, 2014.
Crepaz, M.
2006 "If you are my Brother, I may Give you a Dime!' Public Opinion on Multiculturalism, Trust, and the Welfare State." In *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies*. Ed. K. Banting, and W. Kymlicka. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Pp. 92–117.
Duyvendak, J. W., T. Pels, and R. Rijkschroeff
2009 "A Multicultural Paradise? The Cultural Factor in Dutch Integration Policy." In *Bringing Outsiders In: Transatlantic Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation*. Ed. J. L. Hochschild, and J. H. Mollenkopf. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Pp. 129–139.
———, R. van Reekum, F. El-Hajjari, and C. Bertossi
2013 "Mysterious Multiculturalism: The Risks of Using Model-Based Indices for Making Meaningful Comparisons." *Comparative European Politics* 11(5):599–620.
Entzinger, H.
2013 "The Growing Gap Between Facts and Discourse on Immigrant Integration in the Netherlands." *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, DOI: 10.1080/1070289X.2013.828616.

Ersanilli, E., and R. Koopmans
2010 "Rewarding Integration? Citizenship Regulations and the Socio-Cultural Integration of Immigrants in the Netherlands, France and Germany." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36(5):773–791.
Freeman, G.
1995 "Modes of Immigration Policies in Liberal Democratic States." *International Migration Review* 29(4):881–902.
Gitlin, T.
1995 *The Twilight of Common Dreams: Why America is Wracked by Culture Wars*. New York: Metropolitan Books.
Goodhart, D.
2004a "Too Diverse?" *Prospect Magazine*, February:95.
———
2004b "Diversity Divide." *Prospect Magazine* April:97.
Goodman, S. W.
2010 "Integration Requirements for Integration's Sake? Identifying, Categorizing and Comparing Civic Integration Policies." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36 (5):753–772.
———
2012a "Fortifying Citizenship: Policy Strategies for Civic Integration in Western Europe." *World Politics* 64(4):659–698.
———
2012b "Measurement and Interpretation Issues in Civic Integration Studies: A Rejoinder." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 38(1):173–186.
Harell, A., and D. Stolle
2010 "Diversity and Democratic Politics: An Introduction." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 43(2):235–256.
Helbling, M.
2013 "Validating Integration and Citizenship Policy Indices." *Comparative European Politics* 11(5):555–576.
———, T. Reeskens, and D. Stolle
2013 (advance on-line publication) "Political Mobilisation, Ethnic Diversity and Social Cohesion: The Conditional Effect of Political Parties." *Political Studies* doi: 10.1111/1467-9248.12087.
———, and M. P. Vink
2013 "The Use and Misuse of Policy Indices in the Domain of Citizenship and Integration." *Comparative European Politics* 11(5):551–554.
Howard, M. M.
2009 *The Politics of Citizenship in Europe*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Huntington, S. P.
2004 *Who are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.
Joppke, C.
2004 "The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy." *British Journal of Sociology* 55(2):237–257.
———
2010 *Citizenship and Immigration*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Kasinitz, P., J. H. Mollenkopf, M. C. Waters and J. Holdaway
2008 *Inheriting the City: The Children of Immigrants Come of Age*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Kesler, C., and I. Bloemraad
2010 "Does Immigration Erode Social Capital? The Conditional Effects of Immigration-Generated Diversity on Trust, Membership, and Participation Across 19 Countries, 1981–2000." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 43(2):319–347.
Kesselman, John R., and Richard Johnston
2000 *"Equality, Community*. Democracy Survey." Waves I: Institute for Social Research, York University.
Kesselman, John R., and Richard Johnston
2003 *"Equality*, Community Democracy Survey." Waves II: Institute for Social Research, York University.
Koleth, E.
2010 "*Multiculturalism: A Review of Australian Policy Statements and Recent Debates in Australia and Overseas*." Research Paper 6, 2010–11. Commonwealth of Australia: Social Policy Section, Parliamentary Library. <http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1011/11rp06#_ftn32>. Accessed on May 8, 2014.
Koopmans, R.
2010 "Trade-Offs Between Equality and Difference: Immigrant Integration, Multiculturalism and the Welfare State in Cross-National Perspective." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36(1):1–26.
———
2013 "Multiculturalism and Immigration: A Contested Field in Cross-National Comparison." *Annual Review of Sociology* 39:147–169.
———, I. Michalowski, and S. Waibel
2012 "Citizenship Rights for Immigrants: National Political Processes and Cross-National Convergence in Western Europe, 1980–2008." *American Journal of Sociology* 117 (4):1202–1245.
———, P. Statham, M. Giugni and F. Passy
2005 *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Kymlicka, W.
1995 *Multicultural Citizenship*. New York: Oxford University Press.
———
2001 *Politics in the Vernacular*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———
2004 "Marketing Canadian Pluralism in the International Arena." *International Journal* 59(4):829–852.
Liebig, T., and F. Von Haaren
2010 "Citizenship and the Socio-Economic Integration of Immigrants and Their Children: An Overview Across EU and OECD Countries." In *Naturalisation: A Passport for the Better Integration of Immigrants?*, Report of conference proceedings. OECD Publishing. doi: 10.1787/9789264099104-en.
Lopez, M.
2000 *The Origins of Multiculturalism in Australian Politics*. Melbourne, Australia: Melbourne University Press.
Maas, W.
2013 "Immigrant Integration, Gender, and Citizenship in the Dutch Republic." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 1(4):390–401.

Meer, N., and T. Modood
2012 "How Does Interculturalism Contrast With Multiculturalism?" *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 33(2):175–196.
van der Meer, T., and J. Tolsma
2014 "Ethnic Diversity and Its Supposed Detrimental Effects on Social Cohesion." *Annual Review of Sociology* 40:459–478.
Messina, A. A.
2007 *The Logics and Politics of Post-WWII Migration to Western Europe*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Miller, D.
1995 *On Nationality*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Modood, T.
2013 *Multiculturalism*, 2nd ed. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
Nguyen, A.-M. T. D., and V. Benet-Martínez
2013 "Biculturalism and Adjustment: A Meta-Analysis." *Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology* 44(1):122–159.
Parekh, B. C.
2006 *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*. New York: Palgrave.
Plaut, V. C., K. M. Thomas, and M. J. Goren
2009 "Is Multiculturalism or Color Blindness Better for Minorities?" *Psychological Science* 20(4):444–446.
Portes, A., and R. G. Rumbaut
2001 *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
———, and M. Zhou
1993 "The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 530:74–96.
Putnam, R. D.
2006 "Social Capital Benchmark Survey." Roper Center for Public Opinion Archives, University of Connecticut .
Putnam, R. D.
2007 "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30(2):137–174.
Scheffer, P.
2000 "Het multiculturele drama." *NRC Handelsblad*, 29 January 2000: http://retro.nrc.nl/W2/Lab/Multicultureel/scheffer.html.
Soysal, Y. N.
1994 *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Tajfel, H.
1981 *Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
———, and J. C. Turner
1979 "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict." In *Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Ed. W. G. Austin, and S. Worchel. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. Pp. 33–47.
Taylor, C.
1994 "The Politics of Recognition." In *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition*. Ed. A. Gutmann. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Pp. 25–73.

Thomas, E.
2006 "Keeping Identity at a Distance: Explaining France's New Legal Restrictions on the Islamic Headscarf." *Racial and Ethnic Studies* 29(2):237–259.
Tichenor, D. J.
2002 *Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Thomas, Elaine
2006 Keeping Identity at a Distance: Explaining France's New Legal Restrictions on the Islamic Headscarf. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 29(2):237–259.
Triadafilopoulos, T.
2012 *Becoming Multicultural. Immigration and the Politics of Membership in Canada and Germany*. Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press.
Vasta, E.
2007 "From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy: Multiculturalism and the Shift to Assimilationism in the Netherlands." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30(5):713–740.
Vertovec, S., and S. Wessendorf
2010 "Introduction: Assessing the Backlash Against Multiculturalism in Europe." In *The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices*. Eds. S. Vertovec and S. Wessendorf. New York: Routledge. Pp. 1–31.
Voyer, A. M.
2013 *Strangers and Neighbors: Multiculturalism, Conflict, and Community in America*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Weiner, M. F.
2014 "Whitening a Diverse Dutch Classroom: White Cultural Discourses in an Amsterdam Primary School." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2014.894200
Weldon, S. A.
2006 "The Institutional Context of Tolerance for Ethnic Minorities: A Comparative, Multilevel Analysis of Western Europe." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (2):331–349.
Winter, E.
2011 *Us, Them, and Others: Pluralism and National Identities in Diverse Societies*. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.
Wise, A., and S. Velayuthamed.
2009 *Everyday Multiculturalism*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Wright, M.
2011a "Policy Regimes and Normative Conceptions of Nationalism in Mass Public Opinion." *Comparative Political Studies* 44:5.
———
2011b "Diversity and the Imagined Community: Immigrant Diversity and Conceptions of National Identity." *Political Psychology* 32(5):837–862.
———, and I. Bloemraad
2012 "Is There a Trade-off Between Multiculturalism and Socio-Political Integration? Policy Regimes and Immigrant Incorporation in Comparative Perspective." *Perspectives on Politics* 10(1):77–95.
Young, I. M.
2000 *Inclusion and Democracy*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Zolberg, A.
2006 *A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's web site:

Figure SI. Perceived Discrimination, by Immigrant Generation in Europe, ESS 2000–2012

Appendix SI. Descriptive Statistics of European Social Survey dataset

Appendix S2. Regressions Where Absolute Levels (e.g. Raw Individual Response) is the Dependent Variable

Appendix S3. Regressions Where Gap With 3rd Generation is the Dependent Variablet