

# PROOF COVER SHEET

---

Author(s): Alina Polyakova

Article Title: Is European integration causing Europe to become more nationalist? Evidence from the 2007–9 financial crisis\*

Article No: RJPP1080286

Enclosures: 1) Query sheet  
2) Article proofs

---

Dear Author,

**1. Please check these proofs carefully.** It is the responsibility of the corresponding author to check these and approve or amend them. A second proof is not normally provided. Taylor & Francis cannot be held responsible for uncorrected errors, even if introduced during the production process. Once your corrections have been added to the article, it will be considered ready for publication.

Please limit changes at this stage to the correction of errors. You should not make trivial changes, improve prose style, add new material, or delete existing material at this stage. You may be charged if your corrections are excessive (we would not expect corrections to exceed 30 changes).

For detailed guidance on how to check your proofs, please paste this address into a new browser window: <http://journalauthors.tandf.co.uk/production/checkingproofs.asp>

Your PDF proof file has been enabled so that you can comment on the proof directly using Adobe Acrobat. If you wish to do this, please save the file to your hard disk first. For further information on marking corrections using Acrobat, please paste this address into a new browser window: <http://journalauthors.tandf.co.uk/production/acrobat.asp>

---

**2. Please review the table of contributors below and confirm that the first and last names are structured correctly and that the authors are listed in the correct order of contribution.** This check is to ensure that your name will appear correctly online and when the article is indexed.

Sequence	Prefix	Given name(s)	Surname	Suffix
1		Alina	Polyakova	
2		Neil	Fligstein	

Queries are marked in the margins of the proofs, and you can also click the hyperlinks below. Content changes made during copy-editing are shown as tracked changes. Inserted text is in **red font** and revisions have a red indicator **▲**. Changes can also be viewed using the list comments function. To correct the proofs, you should insert or delete text following the instructions below, but **do not add comments to the existing tracked changes**.

## AUTHOR QUERIES

### General points:

1. **Permissions:** You have warranted that you have secured the necessary written permission from the appropriate copyright owner for the reproduction of any text, illustration, or other material in your article. Please see <http://journalauthors.tandf.co.uk/permissions/usingThirdPartyMaterial.asp>.
2. **Third-party content:** If there is third-party content in your article, please check that the rightsholder details for re-use are shown correctly.
3. **Affiliation:** The corresponding author is responsible for ensuring that address and email details are correct for all the co-authors. Affiliations given in the article should be the affiliation at the time the research was conducted. Please see <http://journalauthors.tandf.co.uk/preparation/writing.asp>.
4. **Funding:** Was your research for this article funded by a funding agency? If so, please insert ‘This work was supported by <insert the name of the funding agency in full>’, followed by the grant number in square brackets ‘[grant number xxxx]’.
5. **Supplemental data and underlying research materials:** Do you wish to include the location of the underlying research materials (e.g. data, samples or models) for your article? If so, please insert this sentence before the reference section: ‘The underlying research materials for this article can be accessed at <full link>/ description of location [author to complete]’. If your article includes supplemental data, the link will also be provided in this paragraph. See <<http://journalauthors.tandf.co.uk/preparation/multimedia.asp>> for further explanation of supplemental data and underlying research materials.
6. The **CrossRef database** ([www.crossref.org/](http://www.crossref.org/)) has been used to validate the references. Changes resulting from mismatches are tracked in **red font**.

QUERY NO.	QUERY DETAILS
<a href="#">AQ1</a>	Please clarify the significance of the asterisk in the article title.
<a href="#">AQ2</a>	Please provide the page extent of this quotation (‘new nationalism’).
<a href="#">AQ3</a>	Please confirm the date in this citation (Gellner 1981), as it differs from the date given in the list of references and other citations. Please amend whichever is/are incorrect.
<a href="#">AQ4</a>	Please provide reference details for this citation (Eurobarometer surveys).
<a href="#">AQ5</a>	Please clarify, as M3–M6 is four models, not three as stated.
<a href="#">AQ6</a>	Please expand this acronym (PPP) here on its first use.
<a href="#">AQ7</a>	Throughout the article you have referred to Great Britain rather than the United Kingdom (i.e., England, Wales and Scotland, but not Northern Ireland). Is this correct, or would the UK be more appropriate?
<a href="#">AQ8</a>	Please provide the full postal and email address for Neil Fligstein.

QUERY NO.	QUERY DETAILS
AQ9	Please provide the page extent of this reference (Citrin, J. and Sides, J. 2004).
AQ10	Please provide the city of publication for this reference (Ertürk, I., Froud, J., Johal, S., Law, J., Leaver, A., Moran, M. and Williams, K. 2012).
AQ11	Please provide the volume and/or issue number for this reference (Fligstein, N. and Habinek, J. 2014).
AQ12	This reference (Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. 2005) appears to be uncited. Please either cite it in the article or remove it from the list of references.
AQ13	This reference (Kohli, M. 2000) appears to be uncited. Please either cite it in the article or remove it from the list of references.
AQ14	Please provide the page extent of this reference (Kufer, A. 2009).
AQ15	Please provide the city of publication for this reference (Pew Research Center 2013).
AQ16	This reference (Risse, T. 2003) appears to be uncited. Please either cite it in the article or remove it from the list of references.
AQ17	Please provide the volume and/or issue number for this reference (Werts, H., Scheepers, P. and Lubbers, M. 2012).

## How to make corrections to your proofs using Adobe Acrobat/Reader

Taylor & Francis offers you a choice of options to help you make corrections to your proofs. Your PDF proof file has been enabled so that you can edit the proof directly using Adobe Acrobat/Reader. This is the simplest and best way for you to ensure that your corrections will be incorporated. If you wish to do this, please follow these instructions:

1. Save the file to your hard disk.
2. Check which version of Adobe Acrobat/Reader you have on your computer. You can do this by clicking on the “Help” tab, and then “About”.

If Adobe Reader is not installed, you can get the latest version free from <http://get.adobe.com/reader/>.

3. If you have Adobe Acrobat/Reader 10 or a later version, click on the “Comment” link at the right-hand side to view the Comments pane.
4. You can then select any text and mark it up for deletion or replacement, or insert new text as needed. Please note that these will clearly be displayed in the Comments pane and secondary annotation is not needed to draw attention to your corrections. If you need to include new sections of text, it is also possible to add a comment to the proofs. To do this, use the Sticky Note tool in the task bar. Please also see our FAQs here: <http://journalauthors.tandf.co.uk/production/index.asp>.

5. Make sure that you save the file when you close the document before uploading it to CATS using the “Upload File” button on the online correction form. If you have more than one file, please zip them together and then upload the zip file.

If you prefer, you can make your corrections using the CATS online correction form.

### Troubleshooting

**Acrobat help:** <http://helpx.adobe.com/acrobat.html>

**Reader help:** <http://helpx.adobe.com/reader.html>

Please note that full user guides for earlier versions of these programs are available from the Adobe Help pages by clicking on the link “Previous versions” under the “Help and tutorials” heading from the relevant link above. Commenting functionality is available from Adobe Reader 8.0 onwards and from Adobe Acrobat 7.0 onwards.

**Firefox users:** Firefox’s inbuilt PDF Viewer is set to the default; please see the following for instructions on how to use this and download the PDF to your hard drive: [http://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/view-pdf-files-firefox-without-downloading-them#w\\_using-a-pdf-reader-plugin](http://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/view-pdf-files-firefox-without-downloading-them#w_using-a-pdf-reader-plugin)

# Is European integration causing Europe to become more nationalist? Evidence from the 2007–9 financial crisis\*

AQ1



Alina Polyakova and Neil Fligstein

**ABSTRACT** The European Union's (EU) political and economic integration project has grown dramatically since its inception in 1952. While the ultimate goal of the EU is unclear, one of its aspirations has been to attempt to create European citizens. The idea is that over time, citizens would look towards Europe as their main national identity. While the political and economic integration projects are quite far along, the national identity project has lagged far behind. The number of people who have primarily a European identity is quite small and has not increased much in the past 20 years. There is a far larger number of citizens for whom their national identity is paramount, but a European identity also exists. Since 2005, this group has grown smaller and the number of citizens with only a national identity has grown larger. This article argues that the EU integration project has pushed citizens to value their national identities more and to look to their national governments to protect them. We examine the evidence for this in the context of the 2007–9 financial crisis. We show that in countries most seriously hit by the crisis, national identities have increased dramatically and citizens with some European identity have decreased.

**KEY WORDS** European Union; financial crisis; identity; nationalism

Since its inception in 1952, the original European Community of six member states has expanded its institutional scope and geographic reach tremendously. Today, the European Union (EU) includes 28 member states united by supranational political institutions and economic agreements. No less than 13 centralized EU organizations govern policy, law and financial decision-making, across six levels of economic incorporation ranging from 'strong' (eurozone) to 'weak' (free trade association agreements). This institutional complexity has produced an economically integrated Europe. But Europe, and by extension the EU, aims to be more than a supranational bureaucracy and economic association.

One of the ultimate goals of the EU envisioned by its founders (Monnet 1978) was to create a cultural community of Europeans united by a shared

sense of belonging, a 'new nationalism' in Haas's (1958) terms. We see evidence for this when the EU establishes a 'national' anthem (Beethoven's 'Ode to Joy'), a flag, citizenship and a passport, a 'capital' (Brussels), and attempts to establish a constitution. These symbols of belonging are usually associated with nation states, not economic associations. An appeal to a common European cultural heritage is enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon, which references the 'cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe' and a common history (Council of European Union 2008: 18, quoted in Risse 2010: 1). In addition to the economic project, the EU is at least partly a political project of identity construction (for a more elaborated argument, see Shore [2000]).

But while the economic project has been incredibly successful, it has not resulted in more of a sense of 'Europeanness'. In fact, we propose that further economic integration may be the cause of a decline in Europeans' sense of belonging to the EU project. This can be directly traced to the failure of the elite-driven political project to find supranational solutions that have created a sense of shared fate for Europe's citizens to problems caused by economic integration.

One way to see whether this argument is true is to examine how the financial crisis of 2007–9 has affected Europeans' sense of belonging. The financial crisis was an international crisis that began with massive bank failure across Europe, followed by a steep recession in almost all EU member states (Ertürk *et al.* 2012). The crisis and ensuing eurozone recession was a test for how EU institutions and national governments would respond to systemic economic shocks. In the crisis, the EU was not able to collectively formulate solutions that took into account the suffering of citizens in the worst hit countries. Moreover, citizens in the more privileged countries came to view the problems of those citizens as of their own making. This pushed the citizens of all countries to look to the nation and not Europe for solutions and decreased a sense of European solidarity. We show that in countries that were the hardest hit by the crisis, a sense of being a European declined substantially.

European identity is at the core of the European political project. As Hooghe and Marks aptly put it, 'identity is decisive for multi-level governance in general, and for regional integration in particular' because 'governance is an expression of community' (2008: 2, emphasis in the original). Without this identification, this political governance lacks legitimacy. If, in moments of crisis, Europeans fall back to their national identities as a result of a failure to produce political solutions for all Europeans at the EU level, this produces political conflicts within and across member states.

We proceed by first providing a theoretical backdrop to thinking about how national identities are formed. Then we consider what is known about European identity. This identity is relatively shallow or non-existent for most citizens. This means that in general most citizens view their national governments as their main avenue of both political grievance and protection. During an economic downturn, it is unlikely that such citizens will think that a distant European community is likely to come to their rescue, particularly when citizens in

other countries also will be skeptical of this outcome. They are more likely to believe that their national government will. Such crises heighten the sense that citizens belong to a nation, and have a state that works to protect them.

95 We provide evidence that shows how a sense of being European dropped significantly in many European countries during the period 2005–10 and that this is quite related to the economic downturn in each society. While their economies are tightly linked by the EU and, for those using the euro, the European Central Bank, these arrangements do not allow for easy political co-operation in fiscal policy during recessions. In such situations, the leaders of the member state governments will be under pressure from their electorates to undertake actions to protect the national interest. This means that Europeans are not in it together, but rather will need their national governments to protect them. So, for example, the German government has faced criticism that it has not done enough to help its neighbors. But it is clear that 105 Germans citizens are not feeling European and do not view their fortunes as tied to those of citizens in other countries. In this way, the democratically elected German government is not behaving in a ‘heartless’ fashion, but instead is responding to the wishes of its citizens.

## 110 NATIONAL IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY

National identity has been of central concern to social scientists interested in the construction of modern categories of belonging (Anderson 1983; Breuilly 1985; Brubaker 1996, 2004; Calhoun 1993; Deutsch 1953). Gellner understood nationalism as a sort of ‘cultural pool in which individuals who are part of a national group can, like fish, swim comfortably’ (1981: 765). Language and culture defined nation-states for Gellner, a point which led him to emphasize nationalism as ‘a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent’ (Gellner 1983: 1).

120 In different times and places, the basis of an appeal to a common culture can include language, religion, race, ethnicity, or a common formative experience (for example, in the United States [US], immigration). Any of these common cultures can form the basis for a national identity and historical and political factors influence which identity actually forms the basis for nationalism in a particular society (Breuilly 1985). Deutsch (1953: 101) argued that the historical ‘trick’ in building a nation-state is to find a horizontal kind of solidarity that appeals to a wide group of people of differing social strata and offers a sense of solidarity that justifies producing a state to protect the ‘nation’. A nation-state comes into existence when such a national story is created through communication and exchange across social strata and groups.

130 Most of the empirical literature (Green 2007; Kufer 2009; Risse 2010) shows that people who identify as European view themselves as in favor of peace, tolerance, democracy and cultural diversity, and are in general agreement with Enlightenment values. The story they share emphasizes that being a European involves the acceptance of those values. There exists ample evidence that those 135

who identify as Europeans come from the highest socioeconomic groups in society (Fligstein 2008; Gabel 1998). These include the owners of businesses, managers, professionals and other white-collar workers. They are involved in various aspects of business and government, travel frequently in Europe, and sometimes live in other European countries for a period of time (Favell 2008; Fligstein 2008; Risse 2010). They engage in long-term social relationships with their counterparts who either work for their firm, or are their suppliers, customers or, in the case of people who work for governments, their colleagues in other governments. They speak second languages for work. Since 1986, they have created Europe-wide businesses and professional associations in which people gather regularly to discuss matters of mutual interest (Fligstein 2008). Young people who travel across borders for schooling, tourism and jobs (often for a few years after college) are also likely to be more European (Sigalas 2010).

If these are the people who are most likely to interact in European-wide economic, social and political arenas, then it follows that their opposites lack either the opportunity or the interest to interact with their counterparts across Europe. Most importantly, blue-collar and service workers are less likely than managers, professionals and other white collar workers to have their work dependent upon international trade or which takes them to other countries. Older people will be less adventurous than younger people and less likely to know other languages. People who hold conservative political views that value the 'nation' as the most important category will be less inclined to travel or to know people who are 'not like' them.

Scholars interested in questions of European identity have concluded that the construction of a 'European' identity has only happened in a partial way (Citrin and Sides 2004; Deflem and Pampel 1996; Gabel 1998). Eurobarometer surveys (2005, 2010) that ask individuals to self-identify with their nation and/or Europe show that the bulk of the population in Europe falls into two categories: citizens with only a national identity (46 per cent in 2010); and citizens with a national mostly but also a European identity (41 per cent in 2010). It is this latter group that Risse (2010) describes as European 'lite' and Fligstein (2008) as 'situational' Europeans. These are people who in some circumstances might think of themselves as Europeans. In contrast to this group, the number of Europeans who self-identify as European only has remained low (3 per cent in 2010), as has the number of those who see themselves primarily as European but also with a national identity (7 per cent in 2010). These figures display the ambiguity of European identity. For the vast majority of the population, the national narrative still dominates (87 per cent). But 51 per cent have some kind of European identity.

#### WHY DOES IDENTITY MATTER FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION?

Given the distribution of European identities, it is not surprising that there is currently very little political will on the part of the citizens of Europe towards



185 more political integration (Eurobarometer 2010). There are simply not enough  
people with strong European identities to push forward a European-wide pol-  
itical integration project. While there is a majority in most countries who some-  
times think of themselves as European, this is clearly a shallow and situational  
identity (Fligstein 2008). Depending on the political issue, citizens can easily be  
suspicious of other European countries and citizens and support their national  
government as the locus of relevant politics. Public opinion polls have repeated-  
ly shown that citizens have opposed EU involvement in social redistribution  
programs for fear of interference with national social models (Eichenberg and  
Dalton 2003; Hix 2008). In response, democratically elected governments  
190 across Europe have pursued European integration projects when their citizens  
have favored them, but they have steadfastly opposed supranational regulation  
of national labor markets, labor relations and all policies tied up with welfare  
states, like pensions and health care.

195 National political parties have tried to adopt different political positions over  
time to try to attract voters. The middle- and upper-middle-class voters who  
have benefited from the EU have generally voted for parties with a pro-EU  
stance. This has produced a pro-EU platform in center-left and center-right pol-  
itical parties in most of Europe (Fligstein 2008). Until recently, only extreme  
right and extreme left parties have tried to take an anti-EU position in order  
200 to garner votes (Mudde 2007).

Most politics in Europe remains resolutely national. Fligstein (2008: ch. 7)  
concludes that most political discussion within European countries remains  
focused on national politics and most political activities organized by national  
groups are focused on national governments. There is substantial evidence  
205 that European political stories are part of the national discourse (Koopmans  
2004; Trenz 2004). But since the majority of people who live in Europe have  
predominantly a national identity, it should not be surprising that many Euro-  
pean political issues end up being framed to national as opposed to European  
wide interests. This means that as issues confronting Europeans are discussed  
210 within national media, they are more likely to be filtered through national  
debates and self-images as European ones.

## 215 EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL IDENTITIES IN TIME OF CRISIS

The financial crisis that began in 2007 offers an opportunity to see how such an  
extreme economic event affects people's sense of their identities. What began as  
a banking crisis quickly morphed into a recession, and turned into a long  
running sovereign debt crisis that put the future of the euro in doubt (Ertürk  
220 *et al.* 2012). The financial crisis started in the main banks in most European  
countries and spread quickly to all the countries in Europe (Fligstein and  
Habinek 2014). The economies of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania nearly col-  
lapsed as Western European banks pulled out and made credit nearly impos-  
sible to obtain. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central  
225 Bank (ECB) pushed national governments to respond to the economic

downturn across Europe by slashing government spending on public programs, thereby exposing already vulnerable populations, greater economic pains and worsening the effects of the crisis. As governments' ability to borrow money came under fire, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Great Britain all experienced severe retrenchments. Greece's debt crisis has been most severe.

The decisions by the EU and the European Central Bank showed citizens that enforcing austerity policies in the face of economic downturn was more important to European political authorities than the well-being of citizens in any given country. This undermined any potential sense of Europeans being in the crisis altogether. One might expect that in countries where the crisis was more severe, citizens would see this European-imposed austerity solution as evidence that they were not Europeans. Not surprisingly the Pew Research Center (2013) has shown that citizens across Europe who have a favorable opinion of the EU declined from 60 to 45 per cent between 2005 and 2013.

Citizens in the countries hardest hit by the crisis, such as Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy, have seen social movements arise to attempt to influence national governments (Werts *et al.* 2012). Flesher Fominaya and Cox (2013) show that much of this protest reflected citizens trying to get their national governments to protect them from policies of austerity. Polavieja (2013) presents evidence that citizen dissatisfaction with their governments and democracy was deepest in the countries with the highest unemployment and the deepest recessions. In prosperous European economies, such as Germany, Austria and some of the Nordic countries, public and political discourse surrounding the financial bailout of indebted EU countries took shape along national lines. It emphasized that the citizens of these countries should not be held responsible for bailing out the citizens of countries whose problems were of their own creation (Galpin 2012).

How did this affect citizens' attachments to Europe? Eurobarometer surveys in 2005 and 2010 reveal that people who hold exclusively national identities surpassed the number of 'situational' Europeans for the first time since 1999.<sup>1</sup> Table 1 shows that those holding exclusive nationalist identities in the EU increased from 41 per cent in 2005 to 46 per cent in 2010, while those holding national and European identities decreased from 48 per cent in 2005 to 41 per cent in 2010. The percentage of citizens who identified mainly with Europe remained stable. Thirteen countries witnessed increases in citizens reporting only having a national identity of more than 5 per cent. The increase is particularly stark in some of the newer member states: Czechs (+21.2 per cent); Slovenians (+19.8 per cent); and Romanians (+17.2 per cent). The Irish (10.8 per cent), the Italians (+10.3 per cent) and the French (+9.9 per cent) experienced a surge in nationalism as well. The British stand out amongst the least European, with 72 per cent of the British identifying with their nation in 2010, up from 65 per cent in 2005.

The descriptive data is certainly consistent with the idea that the financial crisis produced a downturn in a sense of identifying with Europe. It is useful to try to directly model the data to see if the severity of the crisis was a cause

Table 1 Change in national and European identities in the EU, 2005 – 2010

	Nationality only (%)			Nationality/European (%)			European/Nationality (%)			European (%)		
	2005	2010	Change	2005	2010	Change	2005	2010	Change	2005	2010	Change
	Czech Republic	37.8	59	21.2**	49.1	36.1	-13**	10.6	3.3	-7.3**	2.5	1.1
Slovenia	36.2	56	19.8**	58	37.3	-20.7**	5.1	3.8	-1.3	0.7	3	2.3**
Romania	39.8	57	17.2**	55.3	20.8	-34.5**	3.4	15.3	11.9**	1.5	7.1	5.6**
Malta	27.9	39	11.1**	68.6	54.6	-14**	3.4	4	0.6	0.1	2.5	2.4**
Ireland	49.1	60	10.9**	42.4	34.6	-7.8**	5.6	4.1	-1.5	3	1.6	-1.4**
Italy	37.7	48	10.3**	54.2	43	-11.2**	6.4	7.9	1.5	1.7	1.6	-0.1
France	33.1	43	9.9**	54.8	44.3	-10.5**	8.2	9.2	1	3.9	3.3	-0.6
Bulgaria	44.9	54	9.1**	45.2	38.2	-7**	7.7	5.3	-2.4**	2.2	2.5	0.3
Cyprus	32.1	41	8.9**	58.1	45.6	-12.5**	7.8	7.1	-0.7	2.1	6.4	4.3**
Latvia	45.2	54	8.8**	50.9	34	-16.9**	2.7	8.8	6.1**	1.1	2.8	1.7**
Lithuania	54.6	62	7.4**	40.4	32.6	-7.8**	4	3.6	-0.4	1	1.6	0.6
United Kingdom	65	72	7**	31.6	24.5	-7.1**	1.9	2.2	0.3	1.4	1.7	0.3
Sweden	43.8	49	5.2**	50.6	44.7	-5.9**	4.8	5.1	0.3	0.8	1.2	0.4
Poland	40.4	45	4.6	53.7	48.2	-5.5**	5.3	6.6	1.3	0.7	0.7	0
Greece	46.8	51	4.2**	46.2	42.5	-3.7	6.6	4.6	-2	0.5	1.5	1**
Austria	45.9	50	4.1	45.8	43.4	-2.4	6.6	5.6	-1	1.7	1.4	-0.3
Denmark	39.7	43	3.3	49.8	52	2.2	8.2	4.1	-4.1**	2.3	1.1	-1.2**
Slovakia	38.7	42	3.3	52	45.8	-6.2**	7.2	9.7	2.5**	2.1	2.7	0.6
Germany	35.8	39	3.2	50	48.2	-1.8	11.5	8.2	-3.3**	2.7	4.5	1.8**
Netherlands	34	37	3	57.6	53.4	-4.2	7.2	7.9	0.7	1.2	2.2	1
Portugal	44	44	0	52.1	47.8	-4.3	2.7	6.4	3.7**	1.2	1.8	0.6
Belgium	35.2	35	-0.2	50.1	48.6	-1.5	10.1	10.2	0.1	4.6	6.7	2.1**

(Continued)

Table 1 Continued

	Nationality only (%)			Nationality/European (%)			European/Nationality (%)			European (%)		
	2005	2010	Change	2005	2010	Change	2005	2010	Change	2005	2010	Change
Finland	48.8	48	-0.8	48.3	44.9	-3.4	2.6	6.2	3.6**	0.3	0.9	0.6
Estonia	51.1	50	-1.1	44	44.1	0.1	4.4	3.8	-0.6	0.6	2	1.4**
Spain	38.4	36	-2.4	51.4	51.7	0.3	5	6.7	1.7	5.2	5.6	0.4
Hungary	51.3	48	-3.3	44.6	46.8	2.2	3.8	4.8	1	0.4	0.6	0.2
Luxembourg	27.2	23	-4.2	51	48	-3	12.8	12.5	-0.3	9	16.8	7.8**

Note: \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , difference is significant using a two-tailed t-test.

Source: Eurobarometer (2005, 2010).

360

355

350

345

340

335

330

325

320

of this change of identification. Citizens in countries who were the most affected by the downturn will see the EU as part of the cause of their economic problems and citizens from other countries as not being sympathetic to their plight. As a result, they will turn away from seeing themselves as Europeans and towards a more nationalist view of themselves. Their experience will lead them to think that only their national governments might protect them from the effects of such a dramatic economic downturn.

## DATA AND METHODS

The ideal strategy to discover whether the financial crisis actually affected individuals' identities would be to have panel data where we could follow the same respondents over time. Unfortunately, no such data exist. This causes us to have to pursue a less convincing strategy, but one that treats what happened as a quasi-experimental design. Campbell and Stanley (1963: 25–6) argue that one way to assess the effect of an intervention that occurs in the social world is to randomly choose two groups of respondents. One of the groups does not experience the intervention and so we know the level of a particular outcome for that group and can produce a multivariate model of the process that would explain that level. One can then compare this group (which acts like a control) to another group which experiences the intervention, and we can see whether the intervention changes the outcome and helps to explain that change.

We operationalize this tactic by using two waves of the Eurobarometer surveys: Eurobarometer 64.2 (October 2005) and Eurobarometer 73.4 (May 2010). Both of these surveys asked randomly chosen respondents in all 28 EU member states to identify with their nationality, nationality and Europe, Europe and nationality, or Europe only.<sup>2</sup> We treat the 2005 survey as our control group where we assess the level of European identity in the survey and produce a multivariate model of the determinants of that identity. We treat the 2010 survey as the group that received the 'intervention' of the financial crisis. We can then compare the levels of European identities across the surveys and examine the determinants of those identities.

This tactic is not ideal to establish the causal adequacy of our explanation. We do not know, for example, whether there are other factors that might have shifted attitudes towards European identity between 2005 and 2010. Panel data would certainly be superior to establishing more solidly a causal link between the financial crisis and changes in individual-level identities more carefully. But by comparing changes in the average level of European identity across surveys, we can get important leverage on this question anyway. The Eurobarometer surveys provide us random samples of a representative survey of all EU member states at two points in time. By comparing these representative samples with the financial crisis as an intervention, we assess how the economic changes that occurred before the 2010 survey might have had an impact on changes in identity after the financial crisis. As the models will show, the

individual determinants of identity remain almost the same between 2005 and 2010, which means that change in identity is associated with broader contextual factors.<sup>3</sup>

410

### Dependent variable

Our primary aim is to examine how the financial crisis affected individuals' propensity to see themselves as Europeans. We divide respondents into two categories: those who subscribe to a European identity, either primarily or secondarily, versus those who do not. Two Eurobarometer categories, 'European only' and 'European first, national second', remain consistent and small over time (see Table 1). For this reason, we combine these two categories with those respondents who see themselves as 'national first, European second'. Most of the change in self-identity occurs between the European 'lite' and exclusive nationalists, which are also the two largest response categories.

*Identity* is coded as 1 = nationality only and 0 = national/European, European/national, and European only.

We acknowledge that with four possible response categories, the dependent variable could also be viewed as an ordered rather than a binary variable, and that the '0' category includes an array of identifications.<sup>4</sup> Our main interest, however, is to examine how the financial crisis affected the propensity for individuals to subscribe to a European identity at all, or more precisely, to switch from an exclusive national identity to a European one (primarily or secondarily).

### Independent variables

Individual factors, such as education, age and occupation, have been shown to have strong effects on how likely someone is to identify with Europe (Citrin and Sides 2004; Green 2007; Risse 2010). Based on previous studies' findings, we include the following individual-level variables:

*Age* is coded in years, and we limit our sample to adults aged 18–80.

*Gender* is a binary variable: 1 = female; 0 = male.

*Education* is a categorical variable based on when the respondent finished full-time education in three categories: less than secondary; secondary; and post-secondary.

*Occupation* is a categorical variable recoded by group from the Eurobarometer's 18 possible answers into six categories: not in labor force; blue collar and service; managers; professionals; other white collar; owners.

In addition to demographic characteristics, we include three attitudinal variables: trust in EU institutions; trust in the national government; and political orientation. Trust in EU institutions is a major aspect of support for EU integration.<sup>5</sup> By the same logic, trust in national government institutions is a

450

measure of trust in one's nation. We expect that individuals who tend to trust EU institutions are also more likely to identify as European (negative effect on the dependent variable). In contrast, we expect that individuals who tend to trust their national governments will see themselves as national as opposed to Europe. Lastly, we would expect individuals who hold more right political views – associated with traditionalism and conservatism – are more likely to identify with their nation only (Risse 2010). The three attitudinal independent variables are:

*Trust in EU* is coded as a binary variable based on the Eurobarometer question that reads, 'I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it.' Response category, 'EU': 1 = tend to trust; 0 = tend not to trust.

*Trust in national government* is coded similarly as above but with the response category 'national government'.

*Political placement* is respondents' self-placement on a left-right political scale, where 1 = left, 10 = right.

To take into account contextual effects, we add country-level variables in three of the models (M3–M6 in Table 5) to control for economic factors, EU institutional entrenchment and the political environment. We operationalize economic health as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, unemployment rate, and national debt to GDP ratio.

*GDP per capita* is reported annually by World Bank's (2013) Development Indicators in constant 2005 USD, PPP adjusted.

*Unemployment rate* is measured as percentage of unemployed labor force and reported annually in the International Monetary Fund's (IMF 2013) World Economic Outlook database.

*Gross debt* is measured as per cent of GDP and also reported by the IMF (2013).

We add measures for how long a country has been an EU member state and whether or not the country is a member of the eurozone. We expect that individuals in countries that have been long-time members or in the eurozone may identify with Europe more. We operationalize EU entrenchment with two country-level indicators:

*Eurozone*: 1 = eurozone member state; 0 = not a eurozone member state.

*Years in EU* is the number of years a country has been an EU member state.

The most important independent variables for our purposes capture the effect of the financial crisis. We expect that the financial crisis led Europeans to identify more with their nations. We use three indicators to capture the crisis effect: change in GDP; change in unemployment; and change in national debt during the crisis period (2007–9 for GDP and unemployment, and 2007–10 for debt). As we discuss in the following section, we also calculate a parallel

model with the change variables for 2005 (Model 5 in Table 5). To check that the effect of the crisis variables is not a statistical artifact of the model, we include change variables prior to the 2005 period (2002<sub>-4</sub> for GDP and unemployment and 2002<sub>-5</sub> for debt).

500 *Change in GDP* is coded as the change in GDP per capita, in percentages. Because most countries' GDP fell in 2009 as compared to 2007, the percent change was mostly negative for those years.<sup>6</sup> In contrast, in the early 2000s European economies were expanding and change in GDP was mostly positive. We expect that a larger negative change in GDP – a drop in GDP – will lead individuals to see themselves as more national. For the 2005 control model (Model 5 in Table 5), change in GDP is included for 2002<sub>-4</sub> following the same formula.

505 *Change in unemployment* is coded as the change in unemployment rate.<sup>7</sup> We expect that as change in unemployment increases, individuals will see themselves as more national. For the 2005 control model, change in unemployment is included for 2002<sub>-4</sub> following the same formula.

510 *Change in national debt* is coded the same as change in unemployment, as the difference in debt ratios (ratio of national debt to gross GDP). In 2010, we code change in debt from 2010 to 2007 rather than 2009 to 2007, as is the case with *change in GDP* and *change in unemployment*. We make this adjustment because the debt crisis set in after the initial financial crisis, with debt still increasing well into 2010. Our aim in all the crisis variables is to capture, as accurately as possible, the full effect of the crisis. The sovereign debt crisis is perhaps the most important aspect of the European crisis. To capture its effect, we must extend the coding into 2010. To reflect this adjustment in the 2005 control model, change in debt is included for 2002<sub>-5</sub>. As with unemployment, we expect that increases in debt will be positively related to the dependent variable.

525 Because the dependent variable is a binary categorical variable (*identity* = 1 if national only, 0 if not), a logistic regression is the most appropriate regression model (Long and Freese 2006). We calculate both individual level (M1<sub>-</sub>M2) and multi-level models (M3<sub>-</sub>M6) for 2005 and 2010.<sup>8</sup> There is one potential difficulty in doing this. Because there may be unmodeled variables in the regression, logistic regressions are more apt than regression models to uncover differences where none exist, or alternatively can hide differences that do exist because of different levels of sources of heterogeneity that are not explicitly modeled. There is no obvious econometric solution to this problem, but we acknowledge that this could affect our estimates (see Mood [2010] for a discussion of this problem).

535 Calculating the individual-level determinants of identity in 2005 (M1) and 2010 (M2), allows us to examine whether changes in individual characteristics are driving changes in identification. The individual level fixed effects models (M1 and M2) include country dummies to control for cross-national variation. 540 These are then excluded in the multilevel models. For the multilevel models, we



545 first calculate 2005 (M3) and 2010 (M4) results with country level controls to  
examine changes in effects between 2005 and 2010. We then calculate both  
2005 (M5) and 2010 (M6) models with the change variables. While our  
main interest is the 2010 crisis model (M6), we calculate an additional 2005  
550 control model (M5) that includes the country-level change variables. We do  
this in order to check whether the effects in 2005 and 2010 are different,  
which would rule out the possibility that the 2010 effects are owing to the  
crisis and not just an artifact of the statistical model. In the early 2000s, most  
European countries were experiencing either economic growth or stability. If  
555 our results in 2005 (M5) and 2010 (M6) are the same, then we cannot  
exclude the possibility that the 2010 effects could be reproduced at any time  
period and are thus not specific to the economic crisis. However, as our  
results in Table 5 show, this is not the case.<sup>9</sup>

## 555 RESULTS

It is useful to look at some descriptive statistics on the effects of the financial  
crisis on EU member states. Table 2 shows the percentage change in GDP  
560 per capita from 2007 to 2009 for EU member states. The EU experienced a  
general economic decline, with GDP dropping by 4.6 per cent during the  
worst point of the crisis (2007–9). By 2009, the majority of countries began  
to recover. The Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania were hardest hit  
by the economic crisis between 2005 and 2010, experiencing drops in GDP  
565 per capita of 20.7, 17.3 and 11.3 per cent respectively, between 2007 and  
2009 alone (Eurostat 2013). We note that the Greek economy declined 3.8  
per cent from 2007 to 2009 but experienced its worst decline between 2010  
and 2011 (7.8 per cent). France, Germany and Italy, the European core  
countries, saw GDP drops of 4.3, 3.7, and 7.9 respectively. In sum, the financial  
570 crisis produced a largest contraction across Europe in the two years between  
2007 and 2009, but to varying degrees across countries.

Table 3 shows the change in unemployment rates from 2007 to 2009.  
Between 2007 and 2009, unemployment increased drastically across all of  
Europe and then declined by 2010 (Eurostat 2013). The Baltic states again  
575 had the highest increases in unemployment during the crisis, which is not sur-  
prising given the correspondingly large drops in GDP. Spain and Ireland were  
not far behind, however, with increases in unemployment of 9.1 and 7.3 per-  
centage points respectively in just two years. In Greece, unemployment increased  
marginally from 2007 to 2009 (1.09 per cent), but then continued to increase  
580 dramatically after 2009. From 2009 to 2011, unemployment increased by 8.2  
percentage points from 9.5 to 17.7 per cent. While practically all the EU  
countries stabilized by 2010, the Greek economy continued on a downward  
spiral.

The financial crisis was particularly damaging to EU economies because it  
585 evolved into a sovereign debt crisis. To capture this, we look at change in a coun-  
try's national debt, measured as a proportion of GDP. Because the debt crisis

Table 2 Change in GDP per capita during the crisis

Country	Change in GDP per capita 2007-2009(%)
590 Poland	6.75%
Bulgaria	1.35%
Romania	0.43%
Malta	0.38%
Slovakia	0.14%
Cyprus	-0.14%
595 Netherlands	-2.68%
Portugal	-3.14%
Czech	-3.18%
Austria	-3.22%
Belgium	-3.41%
600 Germany	-3.67%
Greece	-4.17%
France	-4.28%
<b>Spain</b>	<b>-5.06%</b>
<b>Hungary</b>	<b>-5.65%</b>
<b>Slovenia</b>	<b>-5.71%</b>
605 <b>Great Britain</b>	<b>-6.69%</b>
<b>Sweden</b>	<b>-7.14%</b>
<b>Denmark</b>	<b>-7.61%</b>
<b>Italy</b>	<b>-7.86%</b>
<b>Luxembourg</b>	<b>-8.00%</b>
610 <b>Finland</b>	<b>-8.95%</b>
<b>Lithuania</b>	<b>-11.30%</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	<b>-11.82%</b>
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>-17.32%</b>
<b>Latvia</b>	<b>-20.70%</b>

615 **Bold** countries are below the mean

Source: World Bank (2013; reported in constant 2005 US dolalrs, PPP<sub>t</sub> adjusted, annual).

AQ6  
▲

620 followed the initial financial crisis, most European countries experienced the most severe debt increases between 2007 and 2010 rather than 2007 and 2009. To capture the delayed effect, we examine each country's changes in debt as a percentage of GDP from 2007 to 2010. These data are in Table 4. Ireland increased its share of debt by 67.2 per cent in just three years, followed by Greece (37.1 per cent), Latvia (32.1 per cent), Great Britain (31.3 per cent), Portugal (25.1 per cent), Spain (25 per cent) and Lithuania (21.2 per cent). In 625 2010, Greek debt was 144.6 per cent of the country's GDP, Portugal's was at 93.3 per cent, and Ireland's 92.2 per cent.

630 Our multivariate results appear in Table 5. The models are consistent with previous findings: women, older people and blue-collar workers are more

Table 3 Change in unemployment rates during the crisis

Country	Change in unemployment rate (2007-2009)
635 <b>Latvia</b>	<b>10.85</b>
<b>Spain</b>	<b>9.73</b>
<b>Lithuania</b>	<b>9.41</b>
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>9.11</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	<b>7.27</b>
Hungary	2.38
640 Denmark	2.26
Sweden	2.18
Great Britain	2.05
Italy	1.70
Portugal	1.48
645 Cyprus	1.45
Luxembourg	1.40
Finland	1.38
Czech	1.34
France	1.13
Greece	1.09
650 Slovenia	1.03
Slovakia	1.03
Malta	0.45
Romania	0.45
Austria	0.40
655 Netherlands	0.15
Bulgaria	-0.06
Belgium	-0.72
Germany	-1.04
Poland	-1.44

660 **Bold** countries are above the mean

Source: International Monetary Fund (2013; measured as percentage of unemployed labor force and reported annually).

665 likely to be nationalist than men, younger people and white-collar professionals. Political placement on a left-right scale does not have a statistically significant effect on one's identity as exclusively national or European in either 2005 or 2010. The negative coefficient on *trust in EU* is highly significant in both models. Individuals who tend to trust EU institutions are less likely to be exclusively nationalist. The most interesting finding from Models 1 and 2 is that the individual determinants of identity remained stable between 2005 and 2010. This finding shows that individuals' characteristics and attitudes are not driving changes in identity but rather that the main difference in identity 670 from 2005 to 2010 are likely the result of macro-level changes.

675 Model 3 (2005) and Model 4 (2010) add country-level controls to the individual level results. The current levels of the economic variables (GDP,

Table 4 Change in debt during the crisis

Country	Change in Gross Debt as Percent of GDP (2007-2010)
680 <b>Ireland</b>	<b>67.19</b>
<b>Greece</b>	<b>37.10</b>
<b>Latvia</b>	<b>32.09</b>
<b>Great Britain</b>	<b>31.26</b>
<b>Portugal</b>	<b>25.05</b>
<b>Spain</b>	<b>25.02</b>
685 <b>Lithuania</b>	<b>21.18</b>
Romania	18.48
France	18.09
Netherlands	17.57
Germany	17.04
690 Italy	15.52
Slovenia	15.51
Hungary	14.36
Finland	13.49
Luxembourg	12.38
Austria	11.62
695 Belgium	11.55
Slovakia	11.45
Poland	9.86
Czech	9.60
Denmark	8.84
700 Malta	6.90
Spain	3.00
Cyprus	2.66
Sweden	-0.91
Bulgaria	-3.62

705 **Bold** countries are above the mean

*Source:* International Monetary Fund (2013; measured as percentage of gross domestic product in national currencies, annually).

unemployment and debt) do not have a statistically significant effect on identity. We find some support that eurozone membership increases the likelihood of identifying as European in 2010. The coefficient on *Eurozone* is significant in 2010 but not 2005. Between 2005 and 2010, the euro was adopted in four additional countries in our sample: Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia, and Slovakia, for a total of 17 eurozone members in 2010. The negative coefficient indicates that individuals in eurozone member states are slightly more likely to identify as European than those outside the eurozone. This provides some support for the hypothesis that interaction with EU institutions, including the euro currency, increases the likelihood of identifying as European.

720 Model 6 is the 'Crisis Model' of interest. To rule out the possibility that our results in this model are a statistical artifact of the model, we calculate a similar

765

760

755

750

745

740

735

730

725

Table 5 Logistic regressions on national identity

	M1 2005	M2 2010	M3 2005	M4 2010	M5 2005	M6 2010
Gender (female = 1)	0.21*** (0.034)	0.25*** (0.033)	0.21*** (0.034)	0.25*** (0.033)	0.21*** (0.034)	0.25*** (0.033)
Age (years)	0.0062*** (0.0012)	0.0091*** (0.0011)	0.0063*** (0.0012)	0.0092*** (0.0011)	0.0063*** (0.0012)	0.0093*** (0.0011)
Education (ref. below secondary)	.	.	.	.	.	.
Education: secondary completed	-0.44*** (0.048)	-0.48*** (0.051)	-0.44*** (0.048)	-0.47*** (0.051)	-0.44*** (0.048)	-0.47*** (0.051)
Education: post-secondary	-0.97*** (0.056)	-1.09*** (0.059)	-0.97*** (0.056)	-1.08*** (0.059)	-0.97*** (0.056)	-1.08*** (0.059)
Occupation: (ref: Not in labor force)	.	.	.	.	.	.
Occupation: blue collar and service	0.12* (0.047)	0.026 (0.046)	0.12* (0.047)	0.025 (0.046)	0.12* (0.047)	0.027 (0.046)
Occupation: managers	-0.35*** (0.064)	-0.29*** (0.063)	-0.35*** (0.064)	-0.29*** (0.063)	-0.34*** (0.064)	-0.29*** (0.063)
Occupation: professionals	-0.60*** (0.11)	-0.38*** (0.11)	-0.59*** (0.11)	-0.37*** (0.11)	-0.59*** (0.11)	-0.37*** (0.11)
Occupation: other white collar	-0.28*** (0.059)	-0.10 (0.055)	-0.28*** (0.058)	-0.10 (0.055)	-0.28*** (0.058)	-0.096 (0.055)
Occupation: owners	-0.043 (0.067)	-0.21** (0.066)	-0.043 (0.066)	-0.21** (0.066)	-0.043 (0.066)	-0.20** (0.066)
Trust in EU institutions	-0.94*** (0.038)	-0.96*** (0.037)	-0.94*** (0.037)	-0.96*** (0.037)	-0.94*** (0.037)	-0.96*** (0.037)
Trust in national government	-0.068 (0.039)	-0.19*** (0.039)	-0.069 (0.039)	-0.19*** (0.039)	-0.070 (0.039)	-0.19*** (0.039)
Political identification (right)	0.053 (0.042)	0.000077 (0.040)	0.052 (0.042)	-0.0015 (0.040)	0.052 (0.042)	-0.0014 (0.040)
GDP per capita (\$US)			-0.018	-0.0095	-0.0038	-0.020**

810	805	800	795	790	785	780	775	770
Unemployment rate (%)					(0.0098)	(0.010)	(0.0099)	(0.0078)
					-0.026	0.0023	-0.032	-0.028
Debt (% of GDP)					(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.027)
					-0.0058	-0.0013	0.00046	-0.0054*
Years since EU entry					(0.0031)	(0.0030)	(0.0034)	(0.0025)
					0.00083	-0.0022	0.000077	-0.0050
Eurozone (dummy)					(0.0062)	(0.0062)	(0.0054)	(0.0044)
					0.036	-0.43*	0.036	-0.32**
Change in GDP (%) (M5: 2002–4; M6: 2007–9)					(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.12)
							0.047*	-0.055***
Change in gross debt (%) (M5: 2002–5; M6: 2007–9)							(0.018)	(0.016)
							0.0019	0.018***
Change in unemployment (%) (M5: 2002–4; M6: 2007–9)							(0.0094)	(0.0052)
							-0.035	-0.067
Dummies for 27 countries (ref: Austria)	not shown	not shown					(0.062)	(0.044)
Constant	0.23	0.42***	1.14**	1.10**	0.23	1.50***		
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.46)	(0.35)		
Log country level variance			-2.22***	-2.09***	-2.53***	-2.91***		
			(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.32)		
Intraclass correlation (full model)			0.032	0.036	0.024	0.016		
Intraclass correlation (null model)			0.041	0.047	0.041	0.047		
Pseudo $R^2$	0.096	0.11						
Countries			27	27	27	27		
Observations	17214	17502	17214	17502	17214	17502		

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

model that includes change variables for 2005 (Model 5). The change variables in 2005 are coded exactly the same as in 2010. If Model 5 and Model 6 produced similar results, this would signal that changes in identity could not be explained by the economic crisis. However, comparing Model 5 (2005) and Model 6 (2010) shows that this is not the case. In the 2010 Crisis Model, the coefficients on *GDP*, *debt*, *change in GDP* and *change in debt* are all highly significant, with the predicted effect on the dependent variable.

The coefficient on *change in GDP* (-0.055) indicates that for every one per cent decrease in GDP between 2007 and 2009, the probability of identifying as exclusively national increases by 0.8 per cent. When we consider that in the most effected countries, GDP dropped by upwards of 10 per cent between 2007 and 2009, the effect is significant: a 10 per cent decrease in GDP increases the probability of an individual being nationalist by 8 per cent. The implication is that in countries experiencing the largest drops in GDP, citizens turn to their national governments for protection.

The coefficient on *change in debt* is smaller (0.018) but highly significant. For every one percentage point increase in debt, the probability of being national increases by 0.08. EU member states experienced soaring deficits between 2007 and 2010, often upwards of 20 per cent. For example, in Ireland the debt ratio increased by 67 per cent and in Greece by 37 per cent between 2007 and 2010, which increases the probability of identifying as national by 5.4 and 3 per cent respectively.

The third crisis variable, *change in unemployment* is not significant in Model 6. However, this outcome is not surprising, given that the unemployment rate did not have a significant effect in Model 4. One reason may be that at the individual level, their being unemployed (which we cannot measure in the data) is what might affect identity. Another possibility is simply that unemployment, while widely discussed in public discourse, does not capture the effects of the crisis as effectively as our two other measures. Our results in 2010 (M6) provide very strong evidence for our argument that the economic and sovereign debt crises pushed Europeans to embrace national rather than European identities. Individuals in countries that were worst hit by the crisis were most likely to become nationalists.

## CONCLUSION

The European economic integration project has worked to produce economic growth and create political co-operation across Europe. Most citizens across Europe view it as a good thing for their country. It has also produced amongst some citizens a shared identity that they are Europeans. But, for many citizens, European integration, along with globalization and neoliberalism, are viewed as threats to their well-being. The EU has been an agent of these processes by creating more open markets and trying to prevent national governments from putting up various forms of trade barriers and social protection. Citizens have seen the nation as the main bulwark against such changes and

embraced political parties that preserve forms of social protection. The vast majority of citizens have predominantly a national identity.

We set out to observe how the financial crisis of 2007–9 affected any sense of ‘Europeanness’. The crisis, caused by global finance, spread across Europe and created widespread recession. The supranational authorities in the EU and the European Central Bank have pushed member state governments towards policies of austerity and away from social protection. We hypothesized that in countries where the recession was most severe, citizens would become more nationalist and less likely to see other Europeans as the solution to their problems. This would cause them to increase their identification with the nation and decrease their identification with other people in Europe. The findings showed that these effects are stronger in countries that were worst hit economically, such as the Baltic states, Great Britain, Italy, Ireland, France and Greece. Our results are tentative because of our inability to obtain panel data. But they show that policy responses to economic crises that focus on policies that do not include empathy for the plight of citizens in more hard hit countries are likely to produce more conflict in Europe. It remains to be seen whether or not these effects will persist.

What does this mean for the future of Europe and the EU? While politicians pushed for more co-ordinated measures to solve the sovereign debt crisis, their constituents are becoming increasingly more alienated from Europe and its politics. The recent decisions to increase banking supervision and the agreement to co-ordinate fiscal policy are all directed at decreasing the ability of national governments to respond to their citizens’ preferences in future economic crises. If we are right, then the ironic effect of more co-ordination on issues that appear to undermine many citizens’ economic security, the more likely citizens will be to turn to political parties that will offer them a nationally focused alternative based on their national identities.

The financial crisis has been a key test of Europe’s economic and political project. Economically, the EU was able to prevent complete default and hold the eurozone together, but politically it has taken losses. In **Great Britain**, where 72 per cent of citizens only have a national identity, there will be a referendum on the withdrawing from the EU all together in the next couple of years. The May 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections demonstrated the strength of our argument: anti-EU parties received an unprecedented support and anti-EU parliamentarians hold almost a third of the EP seats. Nationalist and populist parties running on an anti-EU platform – France’s National Front, Britain’s Ukip, Denmark’s People’s Party and Greece’s Syriza – topped their country’s elections. These electoral results sent a clear message to elected politicians: European voters want to curtail EU expansion, and they are willing to put nationalist and populist parties into power to get their voices heard.

Ironically, policies to pursue deepened integration make sense to some scholars and policy-makers. They argue that the problems of Europe are not ones of too much co-operation but too little. Even before the current crisis, scholars and policy-makers have pointed out that many of Europe’s problems stemmed from



A. Polyakova & N. Fligstein: Is European integration causing Europe to become more nationalist? 21  
not enough integration (Kuhnhardt 2009; Verhofstadt 2006). The financial crisis has brought out criticisms of the existing architecture of the EU as insufficient to solve European wide problems as well (Visco 2013). What remains to be seen is whether decision-makers will be able to find institutions that will facilitate economic stabilization while also dealing with the concerns of the majority of Europeans that such institutions do not really help them, but make them more vulnerable. But doing this is fraught with great difficulty. The resurgence of national identities and populist parties means that voters will be skeptical of any attempts to do so. But without a positive agenda that appears to directly help all of the citizens of Europe, the EU is in danger of finding its entire structure delegitimized by citizens who increasingly do not identify with other Europeans but only the nation.

915 **Biographical notes:** Alina Polyakova is associate director at the Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Council, USA. Neil Fligstein is professor of sociology at the University of California, Berkeley, USA.

920 **Addresses for correspondence:** Alina Polyakova, Atlantic Council, 1030 15th Street NW, Washington, DC 20005, USA. email: [apolyakova@atlanticcouncil.org](mailto:apolyakova@atlanticcouncil.org) / Neil Fligstein



## 925 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to thank the reviewers for useful comments on earlier drafts.

## SUPPLEMENTAL DATA AND RESEARCH MATERIALS

930 Supplemental data for this article can be accessed on the Taylor & Francis website, doi 10.1080/13501763.2015.1080286.

## NOTES

- 935 1 We note that we choose these two surveys because they are the only ones in this period that include measures of European identity. By looking at a survey well before the crisis and again after three years into the crisis, we hope to be able to detect changes in identities.
- 940 2 The exact question is: 'In the future do you see yourself as a) Nationality (only) b) Nationality and European c) European and Nationality d) European only e) Don't know. We exclude respondents who answered 'Don't know' as well as missing responses in our analysis.
- 945 3 The Eurobarometer surveys have become the standard measure of European identity in the literature. However, the European Values Survey (EVS) also asks respondents to identify on five choices of geographic belonging: locality/town; region/country; country as a whole; Europe; world as a whole. The Eurobarometer, however, only asks about national and European identity in the future. However, the Eurobarometer is the best data source for our purposes because: (1) we are interested specifically

in national versus European identity, rather than regional identities; and (2) the EVS is only conducted every nine years. The last two EVS surveys were conducted in 2008 and 1999. These data thus do not allow us to isolate the financial crisis, which took place between 2007 and 2009.

4 In analysis not reported here, an ordered logit model that assumes an underlying ordered logic to the dependent variable did not produce significantly different results when the dependent variable was scaled into four categories.

5 Because individuals who trust EU institutions are also more likely to identify as European, there is a risk of introducing simultaneity bias that arises from such codetermination. However, our main argument is not focused on the relationship between trust and identity. Rather, we use both trust variables as indicators of support (or lack of it) for the European project.

6 The exact calculation is:  $\text{Change in GDP} = (\text{GDP}_{t2} - \text{GDP}_{t1}) / (\text{GDP}_{t1})$ .

7 The exact calculation is:  $\text{Change in unemployment} = (\text{Unemployment rate}_{t2} - \text{Unemployment rate}_{t1})$

8 A pooled model for 2005 and 2010 with year controls and interaction terms for the variables of interest (crisis variables) was also calculated. The results were not significantly different in terms of effects on the key significant variables.

9 We use a predicted probability interpretation of coefficients in our models. For those interested, we report the marginal effect for the models of interest, Model 5 and Model 6, in the Online Appendix.

## 965 REFERENCES

- Anderson, B. (1983) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso.
- Breuilly, J. (1985) *Nationalism and the State*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Brubaker, R. (1996) *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 790 Brubaker, R. (2004) 'In the name of the nation: reflections on nationalism and patriotism', *Citizenship Studies* 8(2): 115–27.
- Calhoun, C. (1993) 'Nationalism and ethnicity', *Annual Review of Sociology* 19: 211–39.
- Campbell, D. and Stanley, J. (1963) *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research*, Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.
- 795 Citrin, J. and Sides, J. (2004) 'Can there be a Europe without Europeans?' R. Herrmann, T. Risse and M. Brewer (eds), *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Deffem, M. and Pampel, F. (1996) 'The myth of post national identity: popular support for European unification', *Social Forces* 75(1): 119–43.
- 980 Deutsch, K. (1953) *Nationalism and Social Communication*, Cambridge, MA: MIT University Press.
- Eichenberg, R. and Dalton, R. (2003) 'Theory matters: cumulation on the study of citizen support for European integration', Unpublished manuscript.
- Ertürk, I., Froud, J., Johal, S., Law, J., Leaver, A., Moran, M. and Williams, K. (2012) 'Deep stall? The eurozone crisis, banking reform, and politics', *Working Paper Series No. 110*, Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural Change.
- 985 Eurobarometer (2005) 'Eurobarometer 64.2', available at [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/cf/index\\_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm) (accessed 10 May 2012).
- Eurobarometer (2010) 'Eurobarometer 73.4', available at [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/cf/index\\_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm) (accessed 10 May 2012).
- 990 Eurostat. (2013) 'Youth unemployment', available at <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/> (accessed 23 June 2013).

AQ9

AQ10

A. Polyakova & N. Fligstein: Is European integration causing Europe to become more nationalist? 23

Favell, A. (2008) *Eurostars and Eurocities: Free Movement and Mobility in an Integrating Europe*, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Flesher Fominaya, C. and Cox, L. (2013) *Understanding European Movements: New Social Movements, Global Justice Struggles, Anti-Austerity Protest*, London: Routledge.

995

Fligstein, N. (2008) *Euroclash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fligstein, N. and Habinek, J. (2014) 'Sucker punched by the invisible hand: the spread of the worldwide financial crisis', *Socio-Economic Review*: 1–29.

AQ11

Gabel, M.J. (1998) *Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion, and European Union*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

1000

Galpin, C. (2012) 'Unity or disunity? Conceptualizing change in European identity discourses during the eurozone crisis', Paper presented at the Workshop on European Identity in Times of Crisis: Sociological Perspectives on Identification with Europe in Turbulent Times', European University Institute, Florence, 11–12 June 2012.

Gellner, E. (1983) *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Green, D.M. (2007) *The Europeans: Political Identity in an Emerging Polity*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

1005

Haas, E. (1958) *The Uniting of Europe*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Hix, S. (2008) *What's Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It*, Cambridge: Polity.

~~Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2005) 'Calculation, community, and clues: public opinion and European integration', *European Union Politics* 6(4): 419–43.~~

AQ12

Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2008) 'A postfunctionalist theory of European integration: from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus', *British Journal of Political Science* 39(1): 1–23.

1010

International Monetary Fund (2013) 'World economic outlook database', available at <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weodata/index.aspx> (accessed 9 March 2013).

~~Kohli, M. (2000) 'The battlegrounds of European identity', *European Societies* 2(2): 113–37.~~

AQ13

1015

Koopmans, R. (2004) 'Movements and media: selection processes and evolutionary dynamics in the public sphere', *Theory and Society* 33(3/4): 367–91.

Kufer, A. (2009) 'Images of Europe – the meaning and perception of Europe by citizens of EU member states', in D. Fuchs, R. Magni-Berton and A. Roger (eds), *Euroscepticism: Images of Europe among Mass Publics and Political Elites*, Opladen: Barbara Budrich.

AQ14

Kuhnhardt, L. (2009) *Crisis in European Integration*, London: Berghahn.

1020

Long, S. and Freese, J. (2006) *Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata*, 2nd ed., College Station, TX: Stata Press.

Mood, C. (2010) 'Logistic regression: why we cannot do what we think we can do, and what we can do about it', *European Sociological Review* 26(1): 67–82.

Monnet, J. (1978) *Memoirs*, London: Doubleday.

1025

Mudde, C. (2007) *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pew Research Center (2013) 'The new sick man of Europe: the European Union', *Global Attitudes Project*, Pew Research Center.

AQ15

Polavieja, J. (2013) 'Economic crisis, political legitimacy and social cohesion', in D. Gallie (ed.), *Economic Crisis, Quality of Work and Social Integration: The European Experience*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 256–78.

1030

~~Risse, T. (2003) 'The euro between national and European identity', *Journal of European Public Policy* 10(4): 487–505.~~

AQ16

Risse, T. (2010) *A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Shore, C. (2000) *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, London: Routledge.

1035

Sigalas, E. (2010) 'Cross-border mobility and European identity: the effectiveness of intergroup contact during the ERASMUS year abroad', *European Union Politics* 11(2): 241–65.

1040 Trenz, H. (2004) 'Media coverage on European governance: exploring the European public sphere in national quality newspapers', *European Journal of Communication* 19(3): 291–319.

Verhofstadt, G. (2006) *The United States of Europe*, London: The Federal Trust.

Visco, I. (2013) 'The sovereign debt crisis and the process of European integration', Speech given at the 32nd Seminar 'Federalism in Europe and in the World,' Istituto di Studi Federalisti 'Altiero Spinelli,' Ventotene, 1 September 2013.

1045 Werts, H., Scheepers, P. and Lubbers, M. (2012) 'Euro-scepticism and radical right-wing voting in Europe, 2002–2008: social cleavages, socio-political attitudes and contextual characteristics determining voting for the radical right', *European Union Politics* 1–23.

World Bank (2013) 'World development indicators', available at <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators> (accessed 9 March 2013).

AQ17 

1050

1055

1060

1065

1070

1075

1080