THE ISLAMIC MAKING OF A CAPITALIST HABITUS: THE TURKISH SUB-PROLETARIAT’S TURN TO THE MARKET

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ABSTRACT

Purpose – Turkey has undergone a major market transformation during the recent decades. This chapter seeks to explore the role of religious politics in some Turkish informal workers’ pro-capitalistic change of heart as a response to that transformation.

Methodology/approach – The study is based on participant observation and interviews in a squatter district in Istanbul, Sultanbeyli. This is a two-phase ethnography, consisting of first-hand observations first during 2000–2002, and then in 2006. The fieldnotes are supplemented by 90 interviews.

Findings – Islamic mobilization eases the transformation of habitus in a liberalizing society and the transition from the predominance of social capital to the predominance of economic capital. I contend that the sub-proletariat’s dispositions depend on (urban as well as national) historical context and articulation to political and religious movements.
Originality/value of paper — I discuss Bourdieu’s study of the transition from subsistence-driven economies to market economies. The chapter points out that Bourdieu’s approach to the problem of transition is more satisfactory in comparison to modernization theory and resistance studies. However, I will show that the problems Bourdieu identifies in Kabyla and Béarn (such as “fatalism of despair”) are less salient in Istanbul because of a sociopolitical movement (Islamism) that garners consent among the sub-proletarians by using religion as a disciplining force.

**Keywords:** sub-proletariat; Islam; Turkey; habitus; market; Bourdieu

Residents of Sultanbeyli, the poorest district of Istanbul, frequently visit the municipal building to talk about problems they, their kin, or their fellow townsfolk face. Several months before the general elections of 2002, an angry retired construction worker came to the office of a municipal official to complain about the new development plan of the Islamist local municipality, the aim of which was formalizing the informal land structure in Sultanbeyli. His building was on Sayid Qutb street, which the municipality decided to broaden from 5 to 10 m. This new regulation necessitated that his garden wall and trellis be destroyed. He was very angry, and tried to look decided, but talked in a crying tone. He started shedding tears when talking about the places in his garden that were going to be destroyed:

They are taking three meters of my garden. I am doomed!

Official: Uncle, I can listen to your problems, but I am only an official. I can only give information. I can not do anything.

The retired construction worker was getting ready to leave, when the official interjected a final remark:

The municipality should have given plots of land of equal size to everybody years ago. Yet we could not get accurate information from everybody about what they were doing with the land. But you are also at fault. Why did you construct buildings without title deeds? That was a risk. And you know it was a risk when you were doing it. You either get rich or go bankrupt when you take such risks. Now you’re paying the price. So tell me, who is to blame?

Man: It’s again the municipality. Why did it let us construct those buildings? Didn’t it see us while doing it?

Official: The municipality was aware of everything, but they were firing officials who intervened. Once a man told the Sultanbeyli mayor that he had 200 votes, nobody was able to touch his building.

After this, the tone of the retired man changed entirely. He was no longer crying. To the contrary, he started smiling and talking in a jovial tone:

Now I have 20 votes. In fact, I have voted for every party, including the CHP [center-left] and the MHP [right-nationalist]. Then I stuck with a certain [Islamist] line. But because of this development plan, my line is going to change.

Official (mockingly): Uncle, how could you vote for so many different parties? Who are you going to vote for after this?

Man: Who I’m going to vote for now is evident and certain!

Official: For the AKP [Justice and Development Party]?

Man (with pride): Yes, that party!

The retired construction worker left the office with an air of victory, ultimately able to assert his political strength. This interaction raises a number of questions: what does having 20 votes mean? How can it transform a crying face into a smiling one? What does mentioning the AKP (a center-rightist offshoot of the main Islamist party) do for this performance? Why do these all add up to a perceived victory on the part of a retired worker? Finally, why has the Islamist party (and the municipality under its control) gone from being the main source of hope for the residents of this district to being the scapegoat for their suffering?

The analyses at hand attempt to answer these questions by focusing not only on sub-proletarians, but also on institutions and other social sectors (such as intellectuals) that have an influence on them. Drawing on Bourdieu (1979), I define the sub-proletarian as an intermittently employed worker, with no regular wages, no organization, no security, and no skills. In the overall class hierarchy, the sub-proletariat is situated between the organized (and especially skilled) working class and the lumpenproletariat (whose subsistence depends on crime, begging, and so on), though the lines between these three sectors are often blurred in actual reality. The sub-proletariat in Turkey constitutes a much larger sector within the working classes when compared to its counterparts in Western Europe.¹

As will become clear, the earlier incident is indicative of the structure of politics in Sultanbeyli, as well as some recent trends that put pressure on this structure. For a full understanding of the implications of this interaction, we have to situate Sultanbeyli’s workers in social theory and Turkish political history.
BOURDIEU'S CHALLENGE TO THEORIES OF TRANSITION

One of the puzzles that the earlier interaction poses is that the AKP is not a political party that resists the formalization of urban property. To the contrary, it can be characterized as the most consistently legal–formal capitalist force in urban Turkey, as I will highlight later. In this context, it is not evident why the working populations would so enthusiastically support this party.² I submit that a Bourdieusian analysis resolves this puzzle: the secret lies in the way the AKP deals with the habitus and capital of the laboring classes.

Bourdieu’s analyses of Kabylia (Algeria) and Béarn (France) highlights unexplored aspects of the transition from subsistence-driven economies to market economies. Bourdieu points out that what is involved in these transitions is first and foremost passage from a social life dominated by cultural capital to one where economic and cultural capital gain the upper hand. Since social actors’ naturalized dispositions (“habitus”) in subsistence economies are geared toward the accumulation of symbolic and social capital, they experience a crisis when the new social setting imposes the primacy of economic capital.

This approach to the problem of transition provides an alternative to the dominant paradigms across the disciplines. The first one, modernization theory,³ holds that peasants and tribal people resist modernization because they prefer stability to change (Critchfield, 1978; Lerner, 1967; Rostow, 1960). Traditionalism is mostly a mental problem. It can be overcome by modern education.

The (post-structuralism-inspired) resistance studies either dismiss this problem or tend to romanticize the resistance to transition (de Certeau, 1984; Scott, 1985). As opposed to modernization theory, these paradigms might actually acknowledge that it is not in the best interests of subaltern populations to change: “traditionalism” is not simply a cultural problem. Nevertheless, by celebrating a battle that subordinate people are ultimately bound to lose, these paradigms reproduce the structural impotency and lack of capital of the dominated, rather than recommending tools to empower them.

Bourdieu’s theories of capital and habitus, by contrast, demonstrate that the micro-logics of two different economies underlie most of the crises of “modernization.” Instead of the either/or approach of modernization theory, his framework allows for a more complex picture where combinations of different sorts of capital might lead to unexpected results. In this account, transition turns out to be much messier and dynamic. Unlike the post-structuralists and their heirs, Bourdieu also helps us understand why at least some sectors might buy into the transition and even partially empower themselves when doing so (see especially Bourdieu, 2000 for an analysis of the Algerian working class along these lines).

This chapter will apply Bourdieu’s approach to the sub-proletariat of a district in Istanbul. I will show that the problems Bourdieu identifies in Kabylia and Béarn (“fatalism of despair,” etc.) are less salient in Istanbul because of a sociopolitical movement (Islamism) that garners consent among the sub-proletariat by using Islam as a disciplining force.⁴ This deployment of Islam eases the transformation of habitus and the transition from the predominance of social capital to the predominance of economic capital.

NATIONAL CONTEXT: THE RECENTERING OF THE ISLAMIC HABITUS

If the cultural accomplishment of the modernizing elites in Turkey is to be summed in a sentence, one would note instituting secular education as a cultural and economic necessity and the persistent centrality of secularist cultural capital in upward mobility. At least, this was the picture until the 1980s. After the end of the 1970s, Islamists in Turkey succeeded in developing a hegemonic politics of consent and regulation, while both the state and the Left failed in this regard. I argue that we have to go beyond theories of power that emphasize either ideology or practice if we are to understand the dynamics of this success. Although Gramscians, who emphasize ideology over practice, grant that ideology is always produced in material contexts and forms, they tend to privilege the analysis of discourses over the analysis of concrete everyday practices (Althusser, 1984; Williams, 1977). By contrast, practice theorists have focused on everyday practices, arguing that ideas and beliefs are, broadly speaking, inconsequential (Bourdieu, 1977; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Foucault, 1980). They hold that power is mainly exercised through the regulation of embodied everyday practices. However, I do not think that Gramscian and practice theories have to be pitted against each other. By combining these approaches, I argue that power operates through regulating both ideology and practice.

Islamism became popular in Turkey because it “articulated”⁵ many different and conflicting ideologies and practices. It combined religious
projects such as rendering urban centers and university campuses more pious with leftist projects such as public housing, redistribution, and welfare. It fused the interests of the growing sectors of the urban poor with the interests of provincial businessmen and upwardly mobile middle classes of provincial origin.

Moreover, Islamist struggle was not only about ideas and interests, but also about everyday life and uses of the body: Islamists sought to legitimate and expand the symbolic and cultural capital of excluded sectors (provincial businessmen, rural immigrants, and the urban poor) against the symbolic and cultural capital of the dominant sectors. For instance, the last decades have been marked by the struggle for establishing religiously informed cultural capital (as manifested in, say, the ability to recite the holy book Kur’an in its Arabic original) as more valid than other types of cultural capital (such as the knowledge of republican Turkish history and the ability to recite nationalist poems with patriotic zeal). Similarly, Islamists have struggled to institute religiously informed symbolic capital (e.g., praying regularly) as more valid than other forms of symbolic capital (such as attending republican celebrations). However, the ability of Islamists to speak to different sectors came especially from their ability to articulate seemingly conflicting cultural capitals, as in their combination of Western and Islamic dress codes.

The tight connection between socioeconomic and cultural developments was crucial to the making of Islamism. By the late 1980s, the provincial economic capital that constituted the driving force of the Islamist movement in the 1970s was no longer a sector on the offensive. Owing to globalization and the transformation to flexible production, small and medium-sized firms had acquired unprecedented relevance. The provincial businessmen who were more or less dependent on the Islamist political party (National Salvation Party) in the 1970s slowly acquired a voice of their own. They balanced their economic and political disadvantage with respect to the businessmen created and protected by the state through emphasizing piety and puritanism. They thereby started to produce and accumulate an alternative cultural and symbolic capital which functioned to balance their dearth of economic and (“official”) social capital.

Moreover, the significance of the nationalist bourgeoisie’s ties with the bureaucracy had decreased anyway after globalisation, increasing the importance of alternative sources of social capital. Although social capital based on ties with the bureaucracy – or “political capital” (Bourdieu, 1998, pp. 14–18) – was key to capital accumulation in an import-substituting economy, it tended to lose its centrality after the economic liberalization of the 1980s. In this environment, the religious bourgeoisie’s access to provincial and rural networks of extended kin, fellow countrymen, and religious orders – a type of social capital that the nationalist bourgeoisie relatively lacked – became quite significant. At first, this alternative social and cultural capital also prevented class conflict, as religion and religious communities worked as bridges between businessmen and workers. These businessmen were imagined to be so strong that in time they came to be called “Anatolian tigers” after the example of the Asian tigers.

Islamism’s Mutation into Conservative Neo-Liberalism

In the 1980s and 1990s, the rising Anatolian capital that backed the Islamist movement was disturbed by the anti-capitalist overtones of its discourse and by some of the party’s municipal and national policies. After a relatively bloodless military coup against the Islamists in 1997, this wing of the movement stepped forward and split the (Islamist) Virtue Party to establish the conservative (rather than Islamist) AKP. Because of the military defeat of Islamism, this pragmatic move did not face any mass resistance.

Although the leaders of the AKP still practice religion in private and public, they also emphasize that politics and economics have their own, self-regulating, and rational logics, which should be protected from religious influence. They act upon this understanding primarily by following neo-conservative principles in politics and neo-liberal principles in economics. Along the lines of this transformation, they work closely with the IMF to cut public spending, control wages, crush unions, and privatize enterprises as well as natural resources.

Even though the ideologues of the new party presented it as the agent of flexible capitalism to the educated public, the broad popular sectors saw different things in it. The multiplicity of interpretations was made possible by the transfer of many cadres from the Islamist party, some of whom retained the old Islamist discourse and ideology, as well as the transfer of the (symbolic, cultural, and social) capital and strategies of these cadres. Although the leader of AKP (Erdoğan) had openly shunned Islamism and adapted neo-liberalism, his past involvement as an Islamist, his shared everyday practices with the poor, and his origins in an urban poor neighborhood enabled popular sectors to read non-neo-liberal meanings into the party. Although he was the municipal mayor of Istanbul, Erdoğan broke his fasts in slums or shanties together with the poor. Right after he was elected as the mayor, he had his haircut in the poor neighborhoods where he
grew up. Erdoğan became even more popular after he spent time in jail due to an Islamist poem he had read at a rally before he had shunned Islamism. Hence, the symbolic capital circulated by the Islamist movement (piety, suffering for the religious cause, shared origin and practices with the people, etc.) was still deployed by the AKP even though it had ideologically quit Islamism.

**Religious Field in Turkey**

Terms such as Islamism, traditionalism, and secularism might be confusing, especially when applied without proper differentiation in multiple contexts. The following analysis of religion, though, is not only intended for those not familiar with the religious trends in Turkey. It also shows that “Islamism” is not simply the translation of theology into politics. Islamism is the outcome of a field, in the Bourdieusian sense, and an intervention in that field.

Islamism can be understood only if it is situated in the broader religious field in Turkey, that is, among the actors and institutions which compete for the control of religious goods and services (Bourdieu, 1991). State institutions occupy the dominant positions in this field. The state controls religion especially through the Directorate General of Religious Affairs, which exercises a monopoly over the appointment of legal preachers and prayer leaders, and the distribution of Friday sermons (Bromley, 1994; Heper, 1985; Mardin, 1983). On top of establishing this institution which is almost as old as the Republic of Turkey, the state also embarked on providing Islamic education in the late 1940s, through Imam-Hatip (clerical) schools, Kur'an schools, and Westernized divinity schools (which replaced the traditional Ottoman madrasas). This legal monopolization of the system of religious education meant that the state monopolized the production of religious specialists too, thereby further monopolizing religious legitimacy and the definition of a good Muslim.

The official control of religion underwent a significant transformation after the 1970s. The strong challenge from the Left led the ruling sectors in Turkey to deploy religion in a way that ended up shaking their own hegemony. The military intervention of 1980 introduced standard religion lessons to the curriculum of secular public education, whereas the emphasis on some scientific theories (such as evolutionism) was reduced. Certain (officially banned) religious communities (such as the Suleymancis) gained public visibility under the protection of the state. The constitution drafted after the military intervention included for the first time religious references in the definition of Turkishness (Parla, 1995). These moves aimed to unite the religious masses and the rulers against the Left. A unique product of these transformations over the decades, “official Islam” was characterized by the public use of religion for national cohesion, the struggle against “communism,” the making of compliance among the masses, and the glorification of capitalism and modernization.

Though legally excluded from the religious field, sufi orders and madrasas (seminaries) remained the secondary most important players in the religious field in Turkey, at least until the 1970s. A remarkable competence of the sufis was their control of some religious services (such as dhikr), which official religious institutions did not provide. Such differences ensured the longevity of these orders despite illegality, while the madrasas (specializing in scholarly, written Islam, and therefore direct competitors of official divinity schools) waned in influence, even though their specialists did have some advantages over official specialists, like a better grasp of Arabic and better connections with the larger Muslim world. The orders and the madrasas were united ideologically against official Islam by their “traditionalism”: rejection of modernization and Western influence in Turkey, and abstention from formal politics.⁷

Islamism developed as a response to official Islam and the traditionalist opposition of the sufi orders and madrasas. This response was partially the result of the position-taking of some newcomers in the religious field: actors who spoke in the name of religion, but had little or no recognized religious credentials (either through official, madrasa or sufi channels). These figures were likely to have had some religious education, but were not recognized specialists of religion, leading them to reject the taken-for-granted assumptions (the doxa) of the field. Their refusal of official and traditionalist interpretations of Islam crystallized in their espousal of a counter-hegemonic ideology, “Islamism,” a project that aims to restructure society, state and the economy along Islamic lines. Islamists differ sharply from the traditionalists in their openly political stance and their acceptance of such modern ideas as development and the responsibility of lay actors to shape society and state.⁸

Although sufi orders and official actors dominated the religious field until the 1970s, Islamism came to be a strong position after the 1970s. This was not only due to changes in religious ideas, but to a structural resemblance (a “homology”) between changes in religious ideas and changes in the class and political structure of society, and the articulation of this link by an Islamist party: in the 1970s, small businessmen of the provinces organized to oppose the state-protected bourgeoisie of the cities. Their opposition to the
dominant class structure and the political parties which backed it bore a structural analogy to the lay figures’ opposition to the dominant religious specialists; these two oppositional forces were combined by the political work of the new Islamist party, back then called the National (Milli) Salvation Party. In the 1980s, the rural immigrants to cities who became the new urban poor also joined forces with the party, further strengthening Islamism against official Islam and traditionalism.

As the incoming immigrants became more pious (partially as a result of the Islamist party’s responsiveness to their economic as well as other needs and the repression of the Left which could speak to these needs), the official mosques and appointed imams started to be insufficient and self-appointed imams with sufi, madrasa or lay training filled in the gaps. Community-built and officially unregistered mosques sprouted all over the major cities of Turkey. This was the making of an alternative space for Islamism, through the use of an alternative habitus. This shift further weakened official Islam with respect to Islamism.

With these transformations, certain sufi orders and madrasa scholars, along with many İmam-Hatip and divinity schools graduates who did not rise to prominent positions in top religious official institutions (i.e. the Directorate of Religious Affairs and divinity schools), also lined up behind Islamism against official Islam. This was the secular state’s own doing to an extent, since it had created an inflation in İmam-Hatip graduates, with the main purpose of combating the Left, but did not create new positions of religious authority with high prestige or income that these new graduates could go into. Together with the state’s ideological opening to Islam’s politicization and deployment in public after 1980, this structural change also contributed to the rise of Islamism.

After the secularist military intervention of 1997, the Islamists themselves fled from the Islamist position in the field, but not without taking stock of the strategies they had developed while they occupied that position. Ironically, official Islam came back with a vengeance, and an unintended one. The ex-Islamists now used Islamic discourse to support modernity, national identity, and capitalism. Most importantly, they appropriated the Islamist attack against traditionalism to solidify modernity in Turkey. The AKP was the organizer of this passive revolution whereby once oppositional strategies were deployed to consolidate capitalism. With the rise of the AKP, it became common sense to argue that it was indeed authentically Islamic to support the Turkish nation-state, work for capital accumulation, and leave behind old “peasant” habits to adjust to a global and urbanized world.

The Islamic Making of a Capitalist Habitus

URBAN CONTEXT

The changing classification patterns in Turkey were paralleled by a change in the use of space. With neo-liberal globalization, the decreasing central (national and metropolitan) control over urban space allowed families, kin networks, and larger communities to occupy land and build homes collectively without much meddling. Although this was also true for most urban regions of Turkey, it was more so for Sultanbeyli which was established exactly when central control was decreasing.

Sultanbeyli, located on the outskirts of the city, is marked by the preponderance of its rural-to-urban immigrant population and the unparalleled strength of the Islamist party. The district, with its population of 175,000 (in 2001), is the poorest district of Istanbul, and also the locality with the highest Islamist party votes (İşik & Pınarçoğlu, 2001). Even though the class structure of the district is complex, most inhabitants are informal workers in construction and textile.

I observed political and religious life in Sultanbeyli between 2000 and 2002, and conducted 50 interviews on urban life, religion and politics. I then carried out an ethnographic revisit of the district between January 2006 and August 2006. I conducted an additional 40 interviews during this revisit. During both visits, my study focused on the interactions in mosques, teahouses frequented by workers in the informal sector, the municipality and political parties.

A village of 3,700 people before 1985, Sultanbeyli had become a district of 80,000 in 1989, which mostly occurred through the semi-legal occupation of land. Such collective occupation and construction strengthened existing kin and communal ties, which constituted the “social capital” of rural immigrants. For example, family members who lived in different parts of the country gathered together in Sultanbeyli to help each other occupy land and build residence. Protecting the newly built homes under the legal confusion caused by the informal status of land also required the cohesion of community. In this context, phrases such as “I have 20 votes,” with which I introduced this chapter, became the cornerstone of everyday political discourse in the district. These phrases indicated the largeness of the occupying community, which was typically represented by a male elder, and asserted its strength. In other words, the social capital of the immigrants was readily convertible to economic capital (land and housing) and to political power. The (Islamist) Welfare Party controlled squatting during occupation, construction, and protection. This patronage system both secured the housing of the immigrants and the stable local power of the Welfare Party.
Bourdieu has pointed out that giving and protecting are subtle ways of exercising power, rather than selfless and uninterested acts. A person or group who gives and protects instills a sense of indebtedness in the receiver, which encourages humble and submissive attitudes with respect to the donor. By giving more and protecting more, the powerful party becomes more and more honorable and prestigious, that is, accumulates symbolic capital. The payoff of this capital is sustained dependence of the receiver. Hence, patronage mechanisms are not based on a simple calculation of (financial) costs and benefits, but are driven by honor codes.\textsuperscript{11} Therefore, it was the Welfare Party’s role as a dedicated giver and protector that ensured it a loyal base over the decades. As different from other parties, which were also immersed in patronage, the Islamists made giving to and protecting the poor one of their central activities and also interwove this with ideological activities.

The interaction between the retired construction worker and the municipal official that introduced this chapter indicates that politics in Sultanbeyli depends on patronage, family, and land structure, as much as on ideology and religion – these can be seen as the sociopolitical and socioeconomic bases of Islamist influence in the district. Having a big family means voting and bargaining power, and hence larger plots of land and larger buildings. Men of the district derive honor (“symbolic capital”) from this political and familial power. Masculinity is constructed not only through securing land and lodging with the help of big families, but also enforcing masculine honor in daily situations thanks to these, as when the retired construction worker said, “I have 20 votes.” When they cannot protect their land, which amounts to failing to protect their family honor and masculinity, men feel that they are “doomed.” When economic capital is risked, so is symbolic capital. Given the present political conventions of Sultanbeyli, this goes along with risking political power.

Nevertheless, the trouble that informality creates has pushed the local municipality to formalize the land structure in the district. Informality has meant that the allocation of metropolitan funds, the building of roads, the resolution of individual land conflicts have all become unreasonably difficult. For this very reason, the officials in the municipality have started telling the inhabitants that they have certain tasks and duties and can do nothing beyond them. The response of the municipal official to the retired worker earlier, “I am only an official, I can only give information. I can not do anything,” has become a standard line. Likewise, the vice mayor of the local municipality in 2002 expressed as follows his discontent with the municipal régime they had inherited in an interview with me:

The level of education here is very low. We are having a difficult time in communicating with people. They are expecting everything from us. When we cannot give what they want, they are offended. They come [to the municipality] for marriage, divorce, and funeral ceremonies and agreements. They also come here for the businesses of the security forces and the local government. Since the popular base is close to us, the local governor sends us the people who initially go to him. Official institutions treat people very bureaucratically anyway. The official functionaries treat them very cold. People take their clothing, food, and wood from us. These are not our duties. We are not able to carry out our real tasks because we concentrate on these.

Although Islamist municipalities had undertaken these tasks as a part of their religio-political project when Islamism was on the rise, now Islamists attributed the popular expectations (or, “dispositions”) that they had themselves partially created to the “ignorance” of the people. In fact, these tasks were an important source of symbolic capital for the party, which differentiated it from the state and made it able to compete with secularism. Even though there was a lot of popular pressure on the municipality to stick to its positions of legal arbiter, welfare institution, and security enforcer, in 2002 Islamists wanted to shake off the burden of this “dual power,” now that they had softened their ideological project or had completely dropped it. It remains to be seen how the sub-proletarians are going to survive once even the Islamists (or ex-Islamists) adapt themselves to neo-liberalization and restrict municipal activities to formally defined “tasks.”

In other words, the municipality has started to reject recognizing certain types of social and symbolic capital which were normalized in the district in the 1980s and the 1990s. These can no longer be easily converted into economic capital. Against this backdrop, in 2006, the officials and the inhabitants blamed each other for the problems created by informality.

With this thorough change among the ranks of the Islamists, it is worth asking why the informal workers still support them.\textsuperscript{12} An easy answer would be the persisting mechanisms of patronage which have survived partial formalization. Owing to the informality of land markets and housing regulations, squatters have tended to vote for the potentially most effective patron – that is, whoever is most likely to come to power in the next elections. This can be seen as one of the primary reasons why they have shifted their votes so often and why they now tend to vote for AKP. However, it is still interesting that most squatters have remained loyal to the Islamist party throughout the 1990s. In the words of the retired construction worker, they have “stuck with a certain line” during this decade. I will
discuss in the sections below whether this “loyalty” implies embodied principles of vision and division which now make the workers likely to support the AKP.

The AKP has replaced the Islamists in the municipality only in 2004. Starting that year, it has sought to impose a modern spatial order. Although Bourdieu noted that the imposition of such an order in Algeria led to “disarray” and “malaise” (Bourdieu & Sayed, 2004, pp. 460–461), the response was somewhat different in Sultanbeyli. It was not a colonial army, but a political party deemed to be authentic, which was imposing this order. The Islamists had built a spatial order that revolved around mosques, graveyards and schools in the 1980s and 1990s. Everything was painted green, the color of Islam. The AKP, by contrast, repainted official buildings with bright colors and hid or demolished Islamic architecture. One of its most spectacular moves was demolishing the municipal building. This building, with its windows which resembled mosque windows and its dome, was the major symbol of Islamism in the district. It will be replaced by a “modern” building with huge glass surfaces and without a dome.

In 2006, the AKP was also in the middle of building what it sees to be a “modern boulevard”: a walking street where the residents can stroll and shop. The shopkeepers of the main boulevard, worried by the prospect of months of construction, opposed this measure, but the other spatial changes in the district were implemented without any trouble. This opposition aside, the main boulevard was already moving in a “modern” direction for a long time. There has been an explosion in the number of women walking the main boulevard, whereas this was a man’s land five years ago (in 2001). There was an explosion too in the ratio of unveiled women. More, even the veiled women have much more colorful clothes and veils, and they have heavy makeup. In the restaurants I frequented in 2000, there were family sections upstairs (this means that women go to those sections rather than sitting with men). Even those family sections were mostly empty and the restaurants were mostly populated by men. In 2006, the family sections were frequented more. But women sat and ate even in the main sections!

The transition from an “Islamist” to a “modern” urban space was unfolding relatively peacefully in Sultanbeyli, thanks to the leadership of the ex-Islamists themselves. How can we interpret the complaisance of the sub-proletariat, which Bourdieu (as well as modernization and post-structuralist theories) would expect to resist such a situation? I will make a detour through the strategic uses of religion to answer that question.

The Islamic Making of a Capitalist Habitus

EVERYDAY USES OF RELIGIOUS HABITUS
AND CAPITAL IN SULTANBEEYLI

Following the military coup in 1980, the Turkish state had immensely supported the Kur’an schools (a rough equivalent of American Sunday schools) to fight leftist movements. Allowing kids to get their high school diplomas by external examinations was a part of this support, as this made it possible to attend the Kur’an schools instead of going to a regular school. Hence, the cultural capital accumulated in Kur’an schools was even recognized officially. This mechanism was abolished after the state started to regard the graduates of the schools as security threats after 1997, as most participants in Islamist activism turned out to be graduates of these schools. In Sultanbeyli, after the capable students have left the schools to be able to go on with their secular education, the administrators of the central schools have lowered their expectations to fit the new situation. Now they aim at teaching their new students, who are much less talented than the old ones, the basic pillars of religion and morality. As long as the state supported the schools, they worked as promoters of social mobility. The cultural capital they provided was convertible into economic capital (primarily, jobs). It was only after the state started to restrict their activities that they confined themselves to a more narrowly defined religious role. Still, the administrators and the instructors of the schools define the ideal situation as one in which the graduates of the schools can go on to occupy central positions in secular society and their education is deemed legitimate and useful. In sum, the convertibility of one capital into another has political determinants, and, as Bourdieu (1994) has noted, in modern conditions the state tends to be the final arbiter of all legitimate capital.

Distinction (Bourdieu, 1984) in everyday life is another dimension of Islamist activity in Sultanbeyli. Theories of practice postulate that through revealing to the other that one is more knowledgeable, people both establish authority, and call the other to their position of knowledge-practice (Bourdieu, 1990; Foucault, 1980). The criteria that constitute significant knowledge, however, change in each context depending on political as well as cultural factors. The Republic, and in general secularization and modernization, have attempted to discredit religious knowledge in Turkey. However, religious knowledge has again become publicly legitimate and desired knowledge due to several developments, among which the rise of Islamism as the primary force of opposition. Owing to the conjunction between the 1980s and late 1990s (the repression of the Left, the global rise
of revolutionary Islam, and the official promotion of nonrevolutionary religious knowledge as an antidote to the Left and revolutionary Islam), the alternative discourse easiest to access in squatter areas was religious discourse. Before the 1980s, squatters dissatisfied with official knowledge had access to Marxist and Third Worldist bodies of knowledge thanks to the activity of left-wing groups in their settlements. The military coup in 1980 imprisoned and exiled left-wing activists en masse and populatated squatter settlements with religious scholars. Concomitant to this development, Islamic revolutionaries emerged in the same spaces, now in conflict with officially appointed scholars, now in coordination with them. Most squatters who doubted the relevance of received wisdom could now only hear distant echoes of leftist jargon (emanating from marginalized and hardly visible grouplets), whereas they were faced with wealthy varieties of Islamic knowledge. Consequently, including men (and less so women) who have been formerly on the Left, intellectually thirsty people displeased with the system have opted for a religious outlook on life. Not only university graduates, but also people with modicum of formal education have started to accumulate religious knowledge from whichever source possible. These self-made intellectuals distinguish themselves from the “rabbles” through religious knowledge, making religious knowledge which generally brings about religious practice, except in highly educated circles a center of attraction among the squatters. In other words, religious knowledge had become easily recognizable cultural capital. We should again note that this trend slowed down after 1997, but was not aborted.

Conversion of Islamic Cultural Capital into Political Capital

These social transformations found their counterparts at the political level. In the 1980s and 1990s, leaders with religious cultural capital could easily convert this into political capital. A salient example of this was Sultanbeyli’s former municipal mayor, Ali Nabi Koçak (1989–1999). A former mufti, Koçak became extremely popular among the residents through his extralegal religious arbitration of legal problems in the district. Yet, this was not only because he had full knowledge of Islam and Arabic: he was revered as he got his religious education in public schools (of the secularist republic) and was a former official. Also, he combined modern and religious elements in his habitus and in the way he managed space. For example, in a photograph in the bulletin of the municipality that presented him as the mayor, Koçak is on the phone, there is a Kur’an on his desk, and there is a computer and a wireless to his left. This photograph gives the message that Koçak is in control of modern technology and religion at the same time. His socialization, which has made him a composite of conflicting imaginaries, has enabled Koçak to articulate different forms of cultural capital in his management of office space too.

Another photograph from the municipal bulletin in 1995 also demonstrates the hybridity of Islamism. Koçak always had his visitors take their shoes off in this highest elected office in the district. In Turkey, most families do not wear shoes at home. However, the ruling elite regard wearing this behavior to the public sphere as uncivilized, provincial, and reactionary. By taking shoes off in formal offices, Islamists give the message that their offices are not just offices; they are like home. Islamists argue that common people, who are usually treated degradingly in public offices because of their perception as ignorant and rural, can feel at ease in their offices. They legitimate this practice further by emphasizing that they pray regularly in their offices and therefore the floors have to be kept clean. What secularists see as uncivilized and filthy, they reinterpret as the sign of cleanliness and civility. This photograph also exhibits the hybridity of Islamism: in Turkey, the tie is one of the strongest symbols of modernity and westernization. Before 1980, most Islamists did not wear a tie.

By exhibiting four union representatives and Koçak who are all wearing ties but no shoes, this picture is basically saying, “We are both modern and Islamic.” This photograph from the municipality bulletin exemplifies how Islamism in the 1990s expressed a desire to occupy the center without quitting totally the bodily practices associated with the periphery. Therefore, Islamists did not only salvage a type of cultural capital that was depreciated by secularist modernization; they also combined this cultural capital with the cultural capital of secularists. In fact, such articulation of dissimilar bodily practices (wearing a tie and walking around without shoes) problematized the center-periphery opposition, demonstrating how Islamism blurred the boundary between the two and articulated both to its project.

The challenge that now awaits the ex-Islamists is taking stock of this religious habitus and its political uses, whereas at the same time convincing the Turkish secular establishment and the West that they are secular(ized) conservatives. The AKP has, for example, quit the practice of taking shoes off in public offices. Yet, a crushing majority of its local and national leaders are still deeply pious and they demonstrate their religiosity in public, as by praying communally. (Yet we must also note that their religiosity is not as obvious as those of the old style Islamist leaders, as can be seen in the difference between the municipal mayor of Sultanbeyli between 2004 and
WORK ETHIC OF THE SUB-PROLETARIAT

Bourdieu's peasants and sub-proletarians were plagued by a "pathological traditionalism": as opposed to the traditionalists of rural society, they were aware of superior production techniques, but moralistically rejected production for the market (Bourdieu & Sayed, 2004, pp. 454–455). Although some among the sub-proletariat in Sultanbeyli indeed wait for that permanent job which will probably never cross their path (their major similarity with Bourdieu's sub-proletariat), most are no longer subsistence-oriented. Even when they are hungry, they plan on starting a small business. The modesty of this yearning contrasts starkly with that of Bourdieu's French and Algerian sub-proletarians who dream of becoming big millionaires even though they are aware of their position in society, which makes the realization of this dream almost impossible (Bourdieu, 1979, p. 69; Bourdieu et al., 1998, p. 429). This requires us to modify Bourdieu's take on the sub-proletariat in the light of the Turkish context.

We can summarize Bourdieu's arguments about rural traditionalism, the capitalist logic and pathological traditionalism by looking at the dispositions and the expectations of the actors (Bourdieu, 1979; Bourdieu, 2000; Bourdieu & Sayed, 2004; Table 1):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Peasants</th>
<th>Capitalists and &quot;adjusted&quot; workers</th>
<th>Disenfranchised peasants and the subproletariat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Object</td>
<td>Honor (social function)</td>
<td>Profit</td>
<td>Being occupied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Retention of ancestral property</td>
<td>Savings</td>
<td>Miniscule savings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispositions</td>
<td>Security, reflexive organization, customary foresight, and prestige</td>
<td>Calculation, reflexive organization, quantification, and profit</td>
<td>Hopelessness, disorganized conduct, unsystematic innovation, and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The experience</td>
<td>A part of the order of nature</td>
<td>Planned activity</td>
<td>Arbitrary and dependent on string-pullings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of the labor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Bourdieu's Theorization of Different Orientations to Work among Peasants and Workers.

In order to understand how all this is possible, we have to look at the general political context in which the sub-proletariat is situated. That is, the sub-proletariat does not have immutable qualities, as Bourdieu's otherwise anti-essentialist and relational work seems to imply. It acquires its characteristics in certain contexts. The absence of a colonial occupation is the main factor that differentiates Turkey from Algeria. The second is Turkey's place in the world system as one of the showcases of neo-liberal globalization (i.e. the IMF and the United States take special steps to make sure that the same economic processes do not engender the same results in Argentina and in Turkey, so as to show that the market economy can function in a Muslim society). The third is the salience of a political party (the AKP) that garners consent among the sub-proletariat for this role as a showcase and for neo-liberalization in general. The combination of these factors has allowed the sub-proletarians to avoid isolation and frustration even in a time of neo-liberalization.

This by no means implies that the incorporation of Sultanbeyli's sub-proletariat was painless. This adjustment actually unfolded through the rise of a counter-hegemonic movement, its defeat, and finally its absorption into neo-liberal hegemony. The sub-proletariat first organized to fight against capitalism, then went through a stage where it expected developmentalist interventions in the economy (in the absence of any political agents who
could fulfill these expectations and in the “wrong” socioeconomic context), finally to be convinced by the AKP’s neo-liberalism.

This historicization also puts in doubt Bourdieu’s overarching claims regarding the political vision of the sub-proletariat. Bourdieu (1979, pp. 58–62) has posited that the sub-proletarians cannot think systematically, as they are trapped in the present. Therefore, they revolt against individuals rather than against the system. Stable employment, security, and regular wages are necessary for developing the disposition to have a life plan, which teaches a proletarian to think systematically, thereby making revolutionary radicalism possible. In this framework, the political alignment of classes is reduced to their position in the socioeconomic structure. But different sociopolitical projects can do different things with divergent tendencies. For example, with the AKP, the sub-proletariat is no longer a class in revolt, but a class which seeks to be integrated into the system, that is, into Turkish, European, and even global capitalism.

When Islamism first became a mass leading force in the 1980s, it built itself on the communal work ethic (or what Bourdieu calls the peasant habitus) and ideologically opposed this to capitalism. The Islamists posed exchange, reciprocity, and mutual work as alternatives to calculating self-interest and nurtured these in everyday interaction. This mutual work was to be organized in communally or worker controlled (and in some cases, owned) enterprises functioning in a free market (Erbakan, 1991)). This program enraged both the religious businessmen who supported the party and the secular capitalist establishment of Turkey. Under pressure from both sides, it was eventually dropped after the 1997 military coup.

During the first phase of my fieldwork, I witnessed that these anti-capitalist ambitions had been scaled down to developmentalist and state-capitalist expectations among the sub-proletariat: most saw it as the state’s responsibility to open factories all over Sultanbeyli and fully employ and insure them. They could not see that this was highly unlikely in a world that had shifted away from national developmentalism – short of a total (and isolated) social revolution, which they were not willing to commit to after the military defeat in 1997. Finally, in 2006, the same workers expected Islamic businessmen to provide them with jobs, and were willing to offer their labor not only as individual laborers, but as extended kin groups in search of prestige, trust and warmth. Whereas before 1997 the communalist dispositions of the sub-proletariat were organized under the banner of Islamist anti-capitalism, now they were domesticated by Islamic (economic) capital.

The second noncapitalist resistance that had to be overcome was the sub-proletariat’s relation to land. Most of Sultanbeyli’s residents, like most other sub-proletarians in Turkey, are first or second generation rural-to-urban immigrants. Coming from a peasant past, they have certain dispositions toward land. According to the Ottoman-Islamic conception, if a piece of land is not being used, it belongs to the state, which means that anybody can claim it and use it. Although this orientation to land cannot be seen among the urbanized groups in Turkey, it has survived in the ranks of the peasantry. The rural-to-urban immigrants have revived this strategy of land appropriation, and the state has allowed them to squat.

Even though the modern Turkish state had to reluctantly accept this noncapitalist understanding of property for a long time due to worries about legitimacy, both the state and the mainstream parties have started to interpret this concession as poisonous “populism” following the liberalization of the economy in the 1980s, and there has been more and more emphasis on “legitimate” private property on land since then. The Islamist party resisted this current, and the municipalities under its control worked in a partially noncapitalist mode informed by religious principles and Ottoman practices. The sub-proletariat was encouraged by this, as seen in this example of a construction worker talking in 2000 about squatting in Sultanbeyli. This middle-aged worker of Kurdish origin legitimizes the residents’ practices by referring to their “principles of vision”:

The people of this district do not know “parcels” and “green areas.” In our village we call pasture [nered] what they call green areas. And what they call parcels is just arable fields for us.

However, the current AKP municipality is trying to roll back this property regime through a reconstruction plan throughout the district. The plan aims to formalize every bit of informal property. Yet, the municipality is running across difficulties. A team of professionals who tried to apply this plan consistently drew a lot of reaction from the elite of the district and they were eventually demoted by the local mayor of the municipality. Before 2001, property acquisition in the district was based on populist procedures instead of strictly capitalist ones. Now things have definitely changed, but not in the direction of a purely legal-rational capitalism. Instead there is something like pillaging by the new capitalist elite: the notables of the district can act against legal procedures (and keep their lands and houses intact despite the reconstruction plan), but the weak cannot: their houses are demolished if they interfere with the plan. The municipality has been so far unsuccessful in using Islam to fully consolidate legal capitalism across class lines. But at least the sub-proletarians have practically accepted the general
contours of the plan (even though they do not find it fully legitimate) and are working with the municipality to implement it (Table 2).

It was only through the military defeat of Islamism in 1997 and the AKP’s peace with neo-liberalism that the sub-proletariat gave its consent to the system, bought into neo-liberalization and grudgingly accepted the commodification of land in Sultanbeyli. This goes against Bourdieu’s depiction of the peasants in transition as actors who resist in vain because of their failure to understand fully either the traditional rural system or the new capitalist system (Bourdieu & Sayed, 2004). When there is a “hegemonic” political guide, the transition from the predominance of social capital to that of economic capital can function with much less trouble.

**Transformation of the Intellectuals**

The intellectuals of the district have undergone a more thorough transformation in their relation to work and to the market. Indeed, they are spearheading the pro-market transformation of the sub-proletariat, just like 15 years ago they were leading its anti-capitalism. We can see among the intellectuals how the temporal dispositions of Muslims, as well as their orientation to money, have changed dramatically. The sub-proletarians have not yet become as deeply “Calvinistic” as the intellectuals, but to the extent that the opinion formers’ transformation persists, we can expect to see a more thorough change among their ranks in the future.

Below is the conversation between two former radical Islamist intellectuals of the district. Saffet (45) runs a clothing store (where he sells especially Islamic clothes). He is now an AKP representative in the Istanbul municipal council. He also writes regularly in an influential Islamist web journal. Numan (37) is a religion teacher in a public school, and a regular contributor to a new Islamist literature magazine. He approaches the AKP with some caution. Born in villages in the Kurdish populated region of Turkey, both have actively participated in radical groups in their youth, but have become disillusioned with their ineffectiveness and deserted them. During a discussion in his store, Saffet said:

We [the Islamists] used to say that even standing in the shade of a bank is a sin. Now Islamists get in line to put money in the bank. They are now after the money they have not earned all their lives [because of Islamist activities and beliefs].

Numan: Doing this is one thing. What annoys me is that the former Islamists see this as a right.

Saffet: But if they don’t do this, if they don’t see it as a right, they will lose their heads. We fought all our lives for an Islamic order. We could not achieve it. This is not a light load to carry. ... The situation of Islamists is like this: if we [as the family members who run this clothing store] have a loss at the end of the month, I gather my children and say, “What can we do? This is our nasip [that which is allotted one by God].” If I don’t approach the situation like this, I will lose my head. Just like this, I see the present condition of the Islamists as our nasip.

This interaction exemplifies the naturalization of capitalism and the making of a capitalist habitus at several levels. As Numan’s interrogation shows, there was still an Islamist rejection of the modern banking system that circulated in the district in 2006. But the system was nevertheless naturalized through a sense of loss/defeat and also fate (“nasip”). Saffet implies that the absorption of Islamists in the system is just like the cycles of a business month, which is itself naturalized, or even stronger, sacralized, through the word nasip. Saffet’s approach naturalizes market society (and its tempo), as well as Islamists’ recent integration to it.

Such integration with capitalism presents a parallel to the Reformation when Protestants channeled their religious energies to the market after political stalemate and defeat, strengthening the emergent capitalism. Even though scholars like Ernest Gellner (1991) think that the same historical pattern cannot be repeated in the case of Islam (because of the latter’s all-encompassing theological system), the transformed conduct of the former radicals in Sultanbeyli manifests a rechanneling of religious energies to the market. In the context of the preceding historical discussions, we can say that this rechanneling demonstrates a relationship between political struggle on the one hand and religious and economic transformation on the other: it is not differentiation (or disenchantment) by itself that induces a religiously inspired capitalist orientation to time and money, but military-political defeats and new political alignments.

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**Table 2.** The Sub-Proletariat’s Relation to Legal-Rational Capitalism in Three Different Phases of the Islamist Movement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work ethic</td>
<td>“Communal” attack against capitalist logic</td>
<td><strong>Hysteresis:</strong> developmentalist expectations</td>
<td>The domestication of the communal work ethic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation to land</td>
<td>“Peasant” resistance to commodification</td>
<td>“Peasant” resistance to commodification</td>
<td>Partial rationalization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONCLUSION: A BOURDIEUSIAN REVISION OF BOURDIEU

One of Bourdieu's main contributions to the social sciences is "thinking relationally" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Nonetheless, this relational thinking is somewhat lacking in Bourdieu's analysis of capitalist transition, and especially the sub-proletariat's position in that transition. I am interested in what introducing relational thinking would do to Bourdieu's analysis of the capitalist transformation.

Bourdieu (2000, pp. 26–27) has posited that the passage from the economy of honor, gifts, trust, and equity to the economic economy (of calculation) requires a complete break. This theorization of the capitalist transition, I argue, has resulted from Bourdieu's grounding in two particular contexts: a colony ravaged by war (Algeria in 1960) and a core country of world capitalism where the market is almost completely hegemonic (post–World War II France). These contexts leave no space for negotiation. By contrast, when we look at a country like contemporary Turkey, which has suffered a counter-hegemonic (Islamist) attack and is now on its path toward European integration, we see a much more fluid context where seemingly conflicting habitus can be combined to cope with neo-liberalism.

This has important implications for the world's fastest growing class, the sub-proletariat. Bourdieu emphasizes time and again (e.g., 1979, pp. 51–53; 2000, pp. 27–28) that sub-proletarians earn below the threshold that makes calculation (as regards to housing, fertility, education, etc.) possible. Therefore, they cannot develop the economic habitus. In the light of my analysis, this again turns out to be context dependent: the sub-proletariat cannot develop the economic habitus under colonial and developed capitalist conditions. Nevertheless, they can develop it in an upwardly mobile country of the world capitalist system, if led by a trusted sociopolitical movement. This might be even truer if that movement has evolved from being a counter-hegemonic movement to a centrist movement that integrates once oppositional habitus into the system. In such a case, the sub-proletariat can turn into a production machine. One might wonder whether seemingly anti-capitalist and revolutionary but ultimately pro-capitalist movements like Nazism, Italian fascism and Iranian Islamism created similar production machines from their sub-proletarian supporters by taming their oppositional habitus in a similar way. This Bourdieusian revision of Bourdieu might indeed provide new lenses for looking at the religious and extreme nationalist leanings of the sub-proletariat, and the treasures and nightmares these leanings harbor.

NOTES

1. For the steady and sharp increase in the ratio of informal laborers (defined as laborers with no social security) to formal laborers in Turkey from 1980 to 2005, see Kaya (2008, pp. 173, 177).

2. This is indeed the problem of hegemony long ago posed by Antonio Gramsci (1971): why do subaltern sectors give their consent to the political and social projects of the dominant social groups?

3. Even though the word modernization has been deployed by multiple schools of thought, here I am referring to Parsons-inspired studies which assume that linear and gradual development across historical and local contexts is desirable and almost inevitable. These scholars see negative attitudes toward change as the main impediments in the path of progress (also see Lipset, 1963). Although strictly functionalist versions of modernization theory are no longer in fashion, its offshoots such as civilizational analysis still perceive traditionalist values as the main enemies of healthy change (Huntington, 1991).

4. The disciplining impact of religion and the unintended capitalist consequences of this have been central themes in social theory (Gorski, 2003; Weber, 1992). In Turkey, the capital accumulation aspect of the Islamic-disciplinary revolution has evolved from an unintended to an intended consequence.

5. Ernesto Laclau has defined "articulation of differences" as the combination of different discursive elements around a central principle, where each element is transformed in the process (Laclau, 1977; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). I embrace Laclau's conceptualization of articulation, while I do not adopt his theory of antagonism, which leaves almost no room for imagining alternative social formations and focuses mostly on criticizing the claims to totality of given social formations (Norris, 2002).

6. Symbolic capital is the accumulated honor and prestige of a person or group. It is amassed through giving (of gifts or debt), exchange, protection, and the practice of what the community imagines to be "virtuous" (Bourdieu, 1977). Cultural capital is the set of skills, taste, and knowledge a person has, which can be objectified into artifacts such as books and paintings, or institutionalized as diplomas (Bourdieu, 1986).

7. As the hegemony of official Islam and the counter-hegemony of Islamism expanded, sufi communities and madrasas gradually incorporated modern practices and started to participate in politics (Mardin, 1989).

8. Hence, Islamism's politicization of religion was not an outcome of the Islamic civilization, as some have argued or assumed (Huntington, 1996; Lewis, 1993), but of the dynamics of the religious field.

9. Radical Islamists typically attack tradition for being intuition-based rather than text-based, impure, irrational, personalistic, fatalistic, and apolitical. These critical elements were once deployed to convince Muslims to engage in actively building an Islamic society (Tuğal, 2006). Now ex-Islamists deploy the same elements to arouse passion for the establishment of a market society.

10. The name of the Islamist political party has changed every time after it was closed down by the secularist military or courts. See Koğacioglu (2004) for a sociological analysis of the issues involved in these closures.
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The Islamic Making of a Capitalist Habitus


REFERENCES


