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Faiths with a Heart and Heartless Religions: Devout Alternatives to the Merciless Rationalization of Charity

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The Left usually dismisses charity as demeaning intervention into the lives of oppressed classes, an obfuscation through which exploitation is legitimated. Few arguments by Marx and Engels are as deeply ingrained in Marxism as their statements on charity. This can be traced back to Marxism’s common roots with liberalism. Marketization, religious reform, and liberal political economy undermined traditional conceptions of poverty and relief, which upheld interdependence between God, the rich, and the poor as sacrosanct. Marxism thus inherited an unshakable suspicion of heartfelt poverty alleviation, whereas today’s liberalism has moved beyond its classical vulgarity to invigorate charity with a new spirit. Exploring Lucien Goldmann’s take on Blaise Pascal and the ongoing reformulation of caritas within Christianity, this essay contends that a radically different conception of charity is possible and that charitable love is a battleground between conservative, liberal, and emancipatory understandings of religion, as recent developments within the Catholic Church demonstrate.

Key Words: Charity, Liberalism, Marxism, Poverty, Religion

The sole aim of the Scripture is charity ... All bodies together, and all minds together, and all their products, are not equal to the least feeling of charity.
—Blaise Pascal, Pensées

To what extent want and suffering prevail among these unemployed ... I need not describe ... The philanthropy of the rich is a rain-drop in the ocean, lost in the moment of falling.
—Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England

Playing on Marx’s comments on religion, this essay explores faith’s contribution to the “merciless” thrusts of rationalization, liberalization, and capitalist development, as well as to their criticism. Some religious revivals have attacked traditionalist modes of generosity. These revivals have met resistance from religious circles in their quest to subordinate generosity to the making of the liberal subject. Neglecting such dimensions of charity, the Marxist criticism of philanthropy has narrowly focused on generosity’s role in perpetrating and hiding the exploitation, dependence, and degradation of subordinate classes. This thinness of accepted Marxist wisdom on charity can actually be traced back to Marxism’s common roots with liberalism and their shared distrust of interdependence. But the historical and contemporary struggles within charitable
fields require a radical rethinking (if not total rejection) of Marx’s and Engels’s theses on charity, which remain unchallenged aspects of their theorization of religion.

Right before labeling religion the opium of the masses, Marx (2008a, 42) called it “the heart of a heartless world” (as well as “the spirit of a spiritless situation”)—a once less emphasized twist in his essay “A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.” When we scrutinize modern religion, however, we face a more complex reality. For instance, from the standpoint of modern volunteers and providers of charity, their actions indeed integrate “heart” and “spirit” with care. But the irony is that today’s volunteering spirit deepens capitalist spiritlessness by pervading religion itself with means-ends calculations and an obsession with individual independence. Can we still call religion the spirit of a spiritless world? Was it always so in the nineteenth century? Can today’s religion even be labeled “the opium” when it cultivates sober responsibility rather than drowsiness?

A second relatively neglected point in Marx’s (2008a, 42) essay is the recognition that religion offers (not only an inverted expression but) a “protest” of the soulless (capitalist) world. Marx soon followed this with the claims that real criticism would replace spirited criticism and that religious protest only leads to an illusory happiness. Marx’s statements were poetic, but his conclusions were hasty. We could rather look at religious protest of “soulless conditions” as one kind of valid criticism that does not necessarily invalidate other kinds of criticism. Some charitable practices constitute not simply the heart of a heartless world but rather a heart yearning for a different world order. A fresh look at the Salvation Army, Pascal, liberation theology, and today’s Vatican could contribute to a strategy of sustainable redistributive transformation that would integrate love.

In recent philosophy, agape (the ancient Greek word for love) has indeed gained traction, suggesting that some Marxists now take “the heart” to be a necessary agent in socialist transformation rather than a distracting impediment in real criticism’s path. But such realization has come at the expense of a further attack on charity, as both Badiou (2005) and Žižek (2010), today’s foremost theorists of agape, have defined love in contradistinction to charity. This essay, in contrast, draws attention to the historical kinship between agape and charity by tracking the evolution of the concept of caritas in Christian thought and practice.

Charity in the Marxist Legacy

Marxists have learned from many aspects of faith. They have even contributed to the rehabilitation of some facets of religion.¹ In the past century and a half, however, charity has received only passing mention. Boer’s (2007, 2009, 2011) massive three volumes, possibly the most comprehensive and in-depth discussion of Marxist debates on religion, mention charity less than a dozen times, even though they examine in depth the works of twenty-five key Marxists in some eleven hundred

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¹. These facets include the organization of the Catholic Church, the role of the clergy, and moral reform (Gramsci); messianism as well as the myths, stories, themes, theology, and doctrines of the Bible (Bloch 2009, 27); religion’s role in protest, local autonomy, and community and class formation (Thompson 1966, 26–54, 118–20, 391–3, 397–9, 422–3); and last but not least, controversial religious figures such as Saint Paul (Badiou 2003, 4).
pages. Is this simply a coincidence or is it because the original attack against charity by Marx and Engels is so ingrained in the social ethos of Marxism that it has remained unquestioned?

Rejection of charity is arguably at the foundation of the proletariat as an emancipatory class. When faced with the suggestion that a true practice of the social principles of Christianity would obviate communism, Marx (2008b, 83–4) fired back:

The social principles of Christianity preach the necessity of a ruling and an oppressed class, and all they have for the latter is the pious wish the former will be charitable... The social principles of Christianity preach cowardice, self-contempt, abasement, submission, dejection, in a word all the qualities of the canaille; and the proletariat, not wishing to be treated as canaille, needs its courage, its self-reliance, its pride and its sense of independence more than its bread. The social principles of Christianity are sneakish and the proletariat is revolutionary.

In this poignant passage, Marx equated charity with cowardice and dependence. He opposed these to the rising (liberal) value of his age: self-reliance. Charity was so degrading that it should not taint the class that would liberate society; in fact, this class was defined by its lack of need for charitable acts.

Engels provided a much more empirically based critique of charity. He was indeed a firsthand observer of charity in a very specific and dramatic historical context: England of the Industrial Revolution, with its Malthusian liberalism. Under the influence of political economy and the increasing clout of the business class, much of traditional English poor relief had been recently dismantled. The remaining public relief and private philanthropy were only raindrops in an “ocean” of misery (Engels 1987, 117, 122). Engels perceived these relics of cross-class care as strong indicators of “hypocrisy” (224). And what could be a closer parallel to our own liberalizing global context and the mushrooming of philanthropies therein, as well as to the current critical perception of the latter?

Under these circumstances, Engels turned to the ethical consequences of philanthropy, since its actual financial impact was so little. The conclusions he reached about these effects resonate with what Marxism has come to regard as the essential traits of charity. Philanthropy is a hypocritical and diminished returning to “the plundered victims the hundredth part of what belongs to them” (Engels 2001, 391), but its real significance lies in the way in which it weakens the proletariat’s spirit and restricts its mobility. It not only legitimates ill-gotten wealth by hiding the fact that what is being given to the poor was extracted from them in the first place but it is also used to further enslave them:

Charity which degrades him who gives more than him who takes; charity which treads the downtrodden still deeper in the dust, which demands that the degraded,

2. This otherwise extensive survey mostly neglects Marxist theorization of non-Judeo-Christian religion, but Marxists seem to be thin on Islamic charity too. For instance, Marxism and the Muslim World (Rodinson 1972), arguably the major classic in this field, mentions zakat, sadaqa, and charity only a few times and quite dismissively.

3. This is a modified translation based on Draper (1971).
the pariah cast out by society, shall first surrender the last that remains to him, his very claim to manhood, shall first beg for mercy before your mercy deigns to press, in the shape of an alms, the brand of degradation upon his brow ... The English bourgeoisie is charitable out of self-interest; it gives nothing outright, but regards its gifts as a business matter, makes a bargain with the poor, saying: “If I spend this much upon benevolent institutions, I thereby purchase the right not to be troubled any further, and you are bound thereby to stay in your dusky holes and not to irritate my tender nerves by exposing your misery.”

Marx’s and Engels’s generalizations about charity were oft repeated across generations of Marxists. Kautsky (2001) traced the emergence of charity to the breaking up of primitive communism among the early Christians and to the emergence of classes and exploitation among them. In early Christianity, mutual aid societies had fostered collective property, but these mutated into charitable institutions as the community came to depend on rich members; class hatred against them was abolished within it.4

After these classical contributions to the discussion of religion, there has been even less focus on charity, almsgiving, and related topics5 as Marxists and neo-Marxists became more concerned with other aspects of religion. Antonio Gramsci (1992, 100), even though he was among the handful of Marxists to have written extensively on religion, reproduced this orthodoxy regarding the social doctrine of Christianity. That alms is a Christian duty, he pointed out, implies that there will always be poor people. The timelessness of this duty also implied that class distinction and inequality too were inseparable parts of human existence.6 As a consequence, Gramsci concluded, charity is simply a way to moralize social questions and thereby avoid political interventions.

In what seems to be the only explicit Marxist theorization of charity after Marx and Engels, Žižek (2010, 117, and see 4, 356) constructs it as the absolute other of proper love: “Charity is one of the names (and practices) of non-love today. When, confronted with the starving child, we are told: ‘For the price of a couple of cappuccinos, you can save her life,’ the true message is: ‘For the price of a couple of cappuccinos, you can continue in your ignorant and pleasurable life, not only not feeling any guilt, but even feeling good for having participated in the struggle against suffering!’” For Žižek, the ultimate function of charity is reproduction—that of the consumerist individual, but that of the economy as well: capitalism needs to be injected with charity to postpone its crisis (240). Charity is reduced, in this account, to a functional instrument of capitalist domination.

Even when Marxists have stumbled upon the emancipatory potential of charity (and upon elements of it that cannot simply be reduced to capitalist control), they have sought to dismiss it. Badiou (2003, 87) singles out a term that is key to Paul’s epistles, “agape,” which he laments has been “translated for a long time as ‘charity,’ a term

5. An essay by Hal Draper (1971), which treats charity as the negative reference point against which the Marxist idea of self-emancipation develops, is an exception.
6. For a criticism of the argument that Christianity assumes that inequality and poverty are immutable, see Collier (2001, 89–101).
that no longer means much to us.” In a quite compelling way, Badiou reconstructs agape as the subjective operation that would allow a revolutionary intervention in the situation. But who is the “us” in this quote? Marxists? Christians? (Post)modern wo/men? And why was agape translated as charity for a long time?

A quick look at the numbers reveals that charity is increasingly central to our era. In the world’s leader of giving, the United States, around 95 percent of households contribute to charity. Lest this be perceived as an essentially American practice, it should be noted that within the United States charitable giving has also sharply increased in the last decades. The total amount of dollars donated to charity has climbed from roughly $50 billion in 1980 to $325 billion in 2014. The number of charitable organizations in the United States is nearly a whopping one and a half million.7 While the statistics might not be as impressive in much of the rest of the world, the numbers of people who donate to charity and who volunteer worldwide have increased from 2009 to 2013 (Charities Aid Foundation 2014, 15). Charity clearly means a lot to many people. Badiou’s ambiguous “us” is symptomatic of the Marxist (and modern, sometimes even Christian) downplaying of charity.

Nevertheless, the linguistic confusion that Badiou points out is not accidental. By the early fourth century, Christians had exchanged the Latin word caritas in place of the Greek agape (Lindberg 2008, 16). The issue at stake was not just translating a word. For the Greeks, agape connoted love of family, friends, and the motherland. But in biblical usage, it came to be identified with the love of God and of one’s “neighbor.” The Bible used the word “neighbor” metaphorically: in reality, it urged Christians to reach beyond their immediate networks and care for excluded groups, which were usually neglected by the Romans (see Gutiérrez 1988, 116; Lindberg 2008). Behavioral transformations paralleled this etymological shift. In the classical Greco-Roman world, “philanthropy” involved help among and between the nobles; it further distinguished them from the rabble. Charitable “love” replaced philanthropic “love” to mark the common humanity of the rich and the poor (Lindberg 2008, 46). In sum, love came to mean something new for the Christians, and this necessitated a transformed vocabulary with novel connotations.

In many recent translations and exegeses, the biblical agape is indeed rendered as love (since it involves more than almsgiving). This is a remarkable break from, for example, the King James Version, which used love and charity interchangeably. Nevertheless, this clarification has introduced another potential misunderstanding: for centuries, charity did not simply mean almsgiving. It rather suggested the inseparability of aid and divine love.8 If one strong window into the meaning of a word shows what it is semantically differentiated from, we can see the disastrousness of this linguistic shift by considering the following: in Badiou’s and Žižek’s work, we understand the true nature of love by distinguishing it from charity.

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8. See, for instance, Pullan (1994, 31–2) for the blurred lines between divine love, charity, and communion during the Counter-Reformation, as well as for the continuum between acts of love and acts of charity in medieval confraternities (183–4).
By contrast, for one early modern Christian thinker (Pascal; see more about him below), the primary binary opposite of charity was cupidity/covetousness (and its secondary binary opposite was reason). Charity as divine love could have been primarily opposed to (the emergent) spiritual callousness and/or atheism, but Pascal instead took the atheist as an interlocutor. By directly targeting cupidity, Pascal communicated a very strong message that has been relatively neglected: charity, not only as love but simultaneously as care of the self and others, is the only way to reach the Divinity who has forsaken this earth. I thus argue that recognizing the historical kinship between agape and caritas would open new paths for emancipatory politics rather than undermine it, if charity is understood as the loving engagement with the less fortunate rather than pouring breadcrumbs upon them.

It is with Goldmann’s foray into the Pauline “orthodoxy” of the Jansenists that we can start to restore charitable love’s revolutionary potential. Even though this is not his intention, Goldmann teaches us that caring engagement with the wretched of the earth involves a love not simply of what they are but also of what they have the potential to become (as followers and leaders). Just like Lenin discovered in the Russian worker a potential interlocutor of the revolutionary intellectual (Lih 2011, 43–4), a reconstructed Goldmann would invite a wager for charitable love. Nevertheless, as will be discussed further below, a full rehabilitation of charity requires a discussion beyond Goldmann, whose Marxist incorporation of Christianity stops at the figure of Pascal. For this, we will have to engage with how Catholicism dealt with attacks against charity well after Pascal.

**Goldmann’s Hidden Theme**

Illuminating insights regarding charity, though not any theorization of it, come from an unexpected figure. After (implicitly) recognizing the historical centrality of the attack against medieval charity early in his opus magnum, *The Hidden God*, Lucien Goldmann (renowned for his literary criticism rather than for theorizing charitable religion) buries generosity in between the lines. Yet we will see that the obliteration of medieval charity was the key to the making of a godless, individualist world (which is at the center of his theorization). Let’s first walk through Goldmann’s main arguments and then return later to our theme (with Pascal’s help).

In his analysis of literature and its religious and philosophical roots, Goldmann emphasizes that the Cartesian understanding of the individual obliterates the need for (the Christian) God and transcendental values. Goldmann does not discuss charity in this context but quotes a paragraph from Descartes arguing that in a (deist) world where individuals took full responsibility for their actions there would be no need for charity. Descartes (quoted in Goldmann 1964, 28) has coolly stated that “God has so established the order of things and has joined men together in so

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9. Saints Augustine and Thomas Aquinas also opposed caritas and cupidity, but for them the latter was disorderly love for earthly goods (Lindberg 2008, 106–7). Pascal’s revolutionary break with this premodern theology lies in his recognition that the love of earthly goods constitutes an order, which in Pascal’s language means a realm of being and acting with its specific ethics and system.
close a society, that even if every man were to be concerned only with himself, and to show no charity towards others, he would still, in the normal course of events, be working on their behalf in everything that lay within his power.” The “hidden hand of the market” might have been explicitly theorized by Adam Smith, but it was clearly anticipated by earlier modern philosophy.

As Goldmann rightly points out, the consequences of the apotheosis of the responsible individual are momentous. If individuals can and should completely control their actions, then other human beings (along with the rest of nature) become mere objects for their responsible calculations. Even if the believer in such a position is still a Christian on paper, this becomes nominal Christianity: such a viewpoint recognizes no real authority beyond the individual (and therefore, no truly Christian God). This has epochal social consequences too. Individualists are hostile to the ignorant masses who fail to put reason at the center of their actions (Goldmann 1964, 28–34). Their rationalist God is pointedly elitist, Goldmann suggests: “The rationalists were all the more ready to accept the God who manifested himself through the rational order ... since, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, He also came to perform a very useful service: that of controlling the ‘irrational’ and dangerous reactions of the ‘ignorant masses’ who could neither understand nor appreciate the value of the consistently selfish and rational activity of economic man and of his social and political creations” (32). It is indeed through mass action that any real authority beyond the individual remains after the eighteenth century: “If—in defiance of the God of enlightened rationalism—the ignorant masses have used political and trade-union action in order to impose some measure of control on the excesses of individualism in economic life, the absence of ethical forces capable of directing the use of scientific discoveries and of using them for the benefit of a genuine human community threatens to have unimaginable consequences” (32–3). God has left this earth. And the masses, Goldmann implies, have become a weak substitute for this absence (a quite different, and provocative, reading of the emergence of the proletariat when compared to those of Marx, Polanyi, and Draper). With Pascal, Western thought seeks to rediscover ethics in the absence of Church-sanctioned values. Pascal attempts this through “wagering” the existence of God: not a deist God that can be proven to exist through rational thinking (as for Descartes) but a God the existence of whom one can only “risk” and “hope.”

Pascal’s God is unlike the medieval Christian God too, since he is no longer immediately present. Still, his absence is starkly different from the removed, deist God, for he still expects certain actions and judges people. God is now “hidden”: both present (as observer and judge) and absent (as supreme and effective authority). This is Goldman’s reconstruction of Pascal, to whom we will return later in order to highlight the theme that Goldmann has downplayed (that of charity).

In Marxism, Goldmann (1964, 300–2) argues, this risky hope changes direction. Marx’s wager is the proletariat and its historical mission to build the classless society: according to Goldmann’s heterodox reading, Marx’s singling out of the proletariat was a hope-driven act of the will (much like Pascal’s wager) rather than solely a result of rational analysis. The trajectory that connected Pascal to Marx and made them both essential to Goldmann’s project was the unlikely duo’s common objection
to the liberal-rationalist belief that the pursuits of the utilitarian individual would ensure stability and happiness in a post-Christian world. Success and reason, Goldmann held, were poor replacements for good and evil. The tragedy of the modern condition was that it necessitated a “wager” in a scenario on which the individual had little impact. Goldmann’s concept of the wager involved “risk”—the likelihood of “failure”—coupled with (somewhat illusory) “hope” (187–8, 302). Whereas the medieval Christian sought and found God and the modern individual has ceased seeking, the authentic Christian was bound to perpetually seek God, even after finding him (295).

Goldmann’s ultimate heresy was not simply taking religion seriously (that would be forgivable for many Marxists today) but was also putting ethical creativity at the center of the Marxist emancipatory project. He oversimplified history, however, by attributing nihilism to the arc that connects Descartes to Ricardo and Smith. Rather than necessarily undoing transcendental values, being success oriented can actually foster its own ethics through a novel understanding of charity, as we shall see further below. In order to appreciate the complexity of this new development, we first need to unearth the theme that Goldmann has so carefully concealed.

From Goldmann Back to Pascal

It is symptomatic that charity is mentioned only a few times in *The Hidden God*, yet (through the discussion of several key quotes from others and in one of Goldmann’s characteristically long footnotes) it turns out to be pivotal to the whole book. The “faculty of charity,” as Goldmann (1964, 72–3n1) recognizes in a footnote only to never mention again, is indispensable for the believer’s wager: “It is, in my view, obvious that this ‘wholly pure light’ [by which Pascal wishes to find goodness] can come only from Divine Grace, which reveals itself not to reason but to that faculty of charity which surpasses the intellect, and which is not an intellectual light but an illumination of the heart.”

Moreover, charity’s centrality to Divine Grace was not Pascal’s invention but a recurrent theme in Jansenism. Pascal’s contribution, according to Goldmann, was combining this absolute faith in charity with a deep dedication to reason. This Goldmann shows through discussing moderate and extremist Jansenism (the former a compromise between faith and reason, the latter a complete rejection of reason). According to Goldmann, Barcos (quoted in Goldmann 1964, 159) exemplifies extremist Jansenism, as demonstrated by one of his letters to Mother Angelique, another prominent Jansenist: “Thus, Reverend Mother, I like both the matter and the style of your letter, for the ease with which you allow your mind to wander from the laws of human reason, placing no other limits upon it but those of charity, which has no limits when it is perfect and yet too many when it is weak.” Pascal also extensively polemicized

10. Today, it appears that the proletariat has left the earth (in the Pascalian sense). Whether it can come back is a faith question as much as an empirical one. This essay, however, would not be the right place to discuss whether the proletariat is still worthy of such quasi-theological “investment.” Regarding Goldmann’s own position on the topic, see Cohen (1994, chap. 8).
against reason, but he still spent a great deal of his life on scientific projects. In Pascal (quoted in Goldmann 1964, 200) we again see the centrality of charity to Jansenist antirationalism, followed again by Goldmann’s silence on charity: “Jesus Christ and Saint Paul follow the order of charity and not that of the mind; for they wanted to stir men up, not to instruct them.” Goldmann insists that the above is not an argument against reason. It is part of a larger argument in which reason cannot attain God/order: it needs help from the heart. Human existence is a quest for order, but reason cannot capture order; it can only construct fragments. The existence of order/God is a wager.

The belief in limitless charity struck home when Pascal’s sister Jacqueline gave her wealth and life to charity and prayer, thus depriving Pascal of funds, which he intended to use for scientific research. For Goldmann, the discussion of Jacqueline’s sacrifice serves the same purpose as his discussion of Barcos: to demonstrate that (in the Pascalian “tragic” vision) charity without calculation (i.e., pure submission to love) is not Christian enough. Goldmann defines the Pascalian tragic vision as a desire for a paradoxical unity between two apparently contradictory ideals (atomistic reason and totality), defying Badiou’s (2003, 50) reading of Pascal as a thinker of balanced contradictions. Pascalian Christianity aimed to unite total submission to charitable love and complete dedication to reason. Giving away everything to charity (even if the proceeds go to the religious sect on the correct path) would deter one from science and therefore from the dialectical tragedy so dear to Goldmann. A charitable way of life is potentially self-destructive, though it is also the only way to God.

We can further appreciate the place of charity in the tragic vision by directly consulting the Pensées. In Pascal’s seminal work, charity is total devotion to God and everything that entails. It is used almost interchangeably with love and heart. Charity involves pity and care not only of others but also of oneself: “But as for those who live without knowing Him and without seeking Him, they judge themselves so little worthy of their own care, that they are not worthy of the care of others; and it needs all the charity of the religion which they despise, not to despise them even to the point of leaving them to their folly” (Pascal 2003, 58).

This is not at all surprising given the premodern, noncondescending usage of charity. Early Christians’ use of the word caritas is complex and ambiguous. Saint Augustine’s focus on caritas is as open to interpretation as Saint Paul’s agape. While some commentators render Augustine’s caritas as love of Christ, others see in it a call for love of fellow human beings and for the recognition of their dignity. Arguably, Saint Augustine paved the way for the later melding of benevolence and love (in the word charity) through his Christian rehabilitation of the classical Roman notion of self-sacrificing friendship with one’s neighbor. In the Roman tradition, such friendship was based on common taste (and by implication, shared class status). Saint Augustine erected caring for one’s neighbor on a new foundation: the love of God, who wanted to see the formation of tight human bonds (Augustine 1944, 48): “There is no true friendship unless You [God] weld it between souls that cleave together through that charity which is shed in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us.” With this discursive move, caritas lost its class boundedness and became a name for the love of human

ii. See Badiou (2005, 212–22) for a more sympathetic reading of Pascal.
beings in general. It is very clear, however, that Saint Augustine did not develop this thought in the direction of charitable giving in today’s sense.

In medieval times, charity involved benevolent giving but went beyond it. Charity’s meaning was more institutionalized and fixed. According to Thomas Aquinas, caritas was the Christian’s closeness to God, which requires loving one’s neighbor (as for Saint Augustine), the outward appearance of which is beneficence. A new formula crystallized with Aquinas’s (1917, 262–372) writings: love of Christ and love of the poor are an indissoluble whole. Aquinas’s reconceptualization of charity also involved a defense of socioeconomic hierarchies against a few sects that had developed more egalitarian interpretations of caritas (Rubin 1987, 62–3, 95–6).

As Geremek (1994) shows, the centrality of charity marked not only high theology but also everyday practice. Medieval Christianity assumed that the rich and the poor mutually required each other’s existence: the former needed the blessings and prayers of the latter to secure a place in heaven while the latter needed help from the former even to survive (living wages were not on the horizon for the crushing majority of society). Geremek also demonstrates that this explicit recognition of interdependence was part and parcel of a broader philosophy of interconnection. The moral well-being of the good (well-to-do) Christian depended on a proper relation with the poor. Nevertheless, as the Middle Ages drew to a close and as marketization created immense wealth and misery, medieval charity proved to be highly inadequate in addressing the emergent problems (Dyer 2012). Moreover, despite growing uneasiness with the hierarchical assumptions of medieval charity and attempts to overhaul them (including those of the Franciscans), late medieval theology could not change donors’ habitually condescending approach to the poor (Mollat 1986, 102–13, 156–7, 182–3). Under these economic and moral pressures, traditional charity would either be completely revamped or else marginalized by a rival ethic.

The defense came from Pascal. While building on the medieval notions discussed above, he developed a novel understanding of charity. He called charity an “order”: a way of orienting oneself to existence. Each order has a logic peculiar to itself, internalized by its practitioners (an idea that foreshadowed Bourdieu’s concepts of

12. Some have argued, however, that a tradition that runs from Saint Paul to Saint Aquinas also posits a clear hierarchy between the love of God and the love of the poor. It is only with Saint Francis, according to these scholars, that the love of the poor becomes a good in itself (without hierarchical dependence on the love of God), though some precursors are observable in Eastern Christianity and in Old English homilies (Buhrer 2012).

13. Similar notions of interdependence marked class relations in the beginning of the modern era too. Kayatekin and Charusheela (2004) point out that sharecropping African Americans deployed notions of fairness, justness, reciprocity, and dignity to protest, to insult, and to make demands on landlords within the postbellum order. They did not base their claims on the independent, individual rights of black people but on the mutual obligations of interdependent sharecroppers and landlords. The landlords’ assumptions about blacks’ inferiority came with a set of obligations on their part to protect and care for sharecroppers, which enabled blacks’ protests and demands. While in both the postbellum order and in medieval charity reciprocity and interdependence are based on essentially hierarchical assumptions, twentieth-century “solidarism” demonstrated how they could be wedded to relatively more egalitarian values and practices.

14. Others, including Aquinas, also called charity an order, but not with the same sociological overtones and insights.
field and habitus). Charity was, for Pascal, superior to the two other orders (of flesh and intellect, which have as their logic the accumulation of power/wealth and knowledge). It is not accidental that “during the last four years of his life Pascal’s health grew steadily worse, and he also led an increasingly austere life, devoting much of his time, energy and money to caring for the poor” (Goldmann 1964, 410). Philosophical and sociological discussions of Pascal’s “order” of charity usually omit discussion of care (e.g., Bourdieu 2000, 102, and see 97), but for this “post-Jansenist,” love of God and of fellow human beings were inseparable. If caritas did not involve giving to the poor for the man who said that “the sole aim of the Scripture is charity,” he would have spent his last years in silent contemplation of God. Instead, he sought the creator through “caring for the poor.” With Pascal, charitable love became the solid linchpin (an “order”) that connects theology and care. Nevertheless, whereas Aquinas’s formulation of charity was in sync with his times, Pascal’s was an untimely intervention.

Liberal Ethics

Pascal’s clinging to charity as the fundamental “order” of Christianity came at dusk. During his lifetime, charity was already under debilitating attack, even from within Christianity itself. Pascal’s pleas did not constitute an adequate shield. A fuller Christian reformulation would have to wait for liberation theology’s discovery of charity’s sworn enemy: political economy, along with its insider’s critique.

As European markets expanded from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries, so did cults of charity. Mendicant orders challenged the authority of the church. Cities became flooded with vagrants, posing both a moral and an administrative problem. From the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries, Catholic charity went through considerable rationalization, which prepared the scene for the Reformation—despite common belief, Protestantism did not invent suspicion of the poor and of charity (Geremek 1994; Mollat 1986, 290–2). Moreover, the Protestant attack against medieval charitable ethics was not as harsh as the Malthusian one. The Elizabethan poor laws, the most institutionalized policy outcome of Protestantism, put the poor in their places but were not completely heartless. For instance, they punished (or imposed compulsory work on) the able-bodied vagrant but also dictated relief for the aged, the orphaned, and the disabled. Every Christian was guaranteed, in ideal conditions, a proper place in the community (Polanyi 2001, 91).

It was neither the bare functioning of the economy nor Protestantism but rather political economic thought that decisively swept away medieval protections of the poor. Ricardo, Malthus, Burke, and others reasoned that the best method of creating an efficient society was to starve those unwilling or unable to work (Polanyi 2001, chap. 10). These worthless creatures were artificially sustained by human laws; under natural circumstances, most of them would be eliminated. As a result of their influence, the negation of religious generosity reached its peak in the mid-nineteenth century. This was the height of the bourgeoisie’s fight against all other existing classes
and their cultures. The fight was eventually lost, and bourgeois ethics had to be tempered through the welfare state’s caring for the poor.

One of the most dangerous tendencies of the ideas of Marx and Engels (and consequently of Marxism) is to inherit this ultrarationalist bourgeois attack against religious generosity. Here we need to recall Ernst Bloch’s (2009) warning against the conflation of the Enlightenment as such with bourgeois hyperrationalism. Today’s Marxist attacks against charity indeed reproduce bourgeois rationalism instead of creating a new ethos of generosity.

We should also seriously consider how the bourgeoisie itself needed to tone down its own hyperrationalist tendencies in order to become a hegemonic class. Right before the rise of the welfare state, the bourgeoisie experimented with a form of generosity that would be in line with the sway of the market. Even if many of the institutions that resulted died away by the end of the nineteenth century, one of them is with us today: the Salvation Army.

The 1870s and 1880s moved away from the initial heartlessness of early Victorianism and political economy. Reformers decided that the poor had a right to exist too. Yet sufficiently infused with merciless political economy, they could not go back to medieval charity or even to earlier forms of Protestant care. The charitable organizations springing up especially throughout the Anglo-Saxon world during these decades put an emphasis on transforming the poor. The right form of care would take the most wretched, seemingly most hopeless, most undeserving of the poor and create good workers out of them.

The Salvation Army’s positive emphasis on the poor and their capacity for regeneration led Engels (2004, 24) to exalt the organization: “The Salvation Army ... revives the propaganda of early Christianity, appeals to the poor as the elect, fights capitalism in a religious way, and thus fosters an element of early Christian class antagonism, which one day may become troublesome to the well-to-do people who now find the ready money for it.” Engels’s misrepresentation of this new type of charity as a class war partially emanated from Marxism’s kinship with liberalism. The moment Engels perceived initiative and independence on the part of subordinate strata, he glorified this initiative as class struggle. Any serious blow to interdependence was welcome.

Engels thus neglected a new style and era in the making of class power: the willing and active mobilization of subordinate strata for the sustenance and expansion of upper-class rule (which Gramsci would later conceptualize as “hegemonic” politics). Whereas the bourgeoisie built its hegemony mostly through political and economic concessions for a century or so, at the end of the twentieth century religion (and particularly charity) again moved to the core of active subaltern consent for capitalism. Religion no longer only puts to sleep—quite the contrary. It empowers, energizes, and mobilizes the poor. Caffeine has displaced opium.

There should be no surprise that the Salvation Army is today one of the biggest civic organizations in the United States. In 1993, it was the organization that Americans contributed to most (Allahyari 2000). Today, the organization not only shelters the poor but transforms them. The massive funds it receives are mobilized to build prison-like environments where the poor learn the virtues of sobriety and hard work through a strict regimentation of their lives.
The Catholic Wars over Caritas

If Badiou is partially right in stating that charity no longer means much, it is because of the centuries-long attack against its traditional pillars. Catholicism has been fighting a rearguard battle to retain charity’s import. Until recently, this struggle rarely made headlines. But the last two popes’ efforts have pushed charity to the top of the agenda.

Benedict’s Way

While caritas might not mean much to “us,” it found its way into the titles of the previous pope’s two pathbreaking encyclicals. In these writings Pope Benedict XVI made two important interventions. First, and quite crucial for our purposes, he recentered Christian attention on the concept of caritas and sought to give it a new, more conservative, meaning. Even though the meanings of love and charity had been evolving in the Christian tradition for centuries, this was arguably the most major theological intervention since Pascal into the concept of caritas (a condensed term that captures both love and charity). Second, not only did he utilize this theological intervention to reinforce Pope John Paul II’s disruption of Catholic social doctrine’s shift to the left but he also attempted to swing it further to the right.

Pope Benedict XVI’s first encyclical, God is Love (Deus Caritas est), issued in 2005, took its title from a phrase in the First Epistle of John. This encyclical attacked sex-centered modern (and ancient) culture and reminded moderns of Christian love’s superiority to their flesh-bound version. Having thus reinforced his conservative credentials (if they needed any beefing up), Pope Benedict XVI moved on to claim the territory of the Christian Left.

In 2009, Benedict issued a third encyclical, Love in Truth (Caritas in Veritate), that directly addressed the issue of charity, playing on the ambiguity and double meaning of caritas. The second half of Benedict’s (2005, sec. 26–7, 31) first encyclical had also focused on charity, evaluating the Marxist criticism thereof. These encyclicals (fulfilling all Marxist worries) offered charity as an alternative to collectivization and state property (though not to the state’s support of social initiative), yet “chose” not to discuss the other dimension of the Marxist prescription: the self-organization of

15. Exceptions include Pius XII’s calls to stop the Nazi threat through charitable love and Paul VI’s speech during the last general meeting of the Second Vatican Council, in which he stated that “charity has been the principal religious feature of this council.” See “Address of Pope Paul VI During the Last General Meeting of the Second Vatican Council,” 7 December 1965, https://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-ii/en/speeches/1965/documents/hf_p-ii_spe_19651207_epilogo-concilio.html.
16. Certainly, these efforts had precursors in previous papal thinking (see especially Paul VI 1967, sec. 44, 67).
17. In actual modern practice, it may not be that easy to disentangle the two, since Christians may draw on more than one framework, and even among the most committed, it takes a lot of effort to align prescriptions with everyday activity (see Swidler 2001, 46–51, 60–6, 69).
disadvantaged strata. The Christian “base communities,” the spiritual leaders of which Cardinal Ratzinger had repressed, were also left out of the discussion.

In Love in Truth, Benedict shifted away from earlier, more structural church doctrine on poverty. The document boldly called for an economy based on gratuity and reciprocity (Benedict 2009, sec. 36, 38–9) in an apparently antiliberal (almost “Polanyian”) fashion. Nevertheless, the broader logic of the document insidiously (even if still partially) aligned caritas with liberalism. From 1891 onward, social encyclicals had targeted free-market economics and capitalism (not in order to abolish private property but to put it to social use through the moral guardianship of the church and the state). The word caritas came to capture both spiritual love and the care of others, especially the poor (O’Brien 2013, 576–7). These encyclicals not only criticized the unpleasant aspects of modernity but also openly named their root causes: liberal ideology and the capitalist economy (Laurent 2010).

Benedict’s encyclical, in contrast, made no reference to liberalism or capitalism. Unlike his predecessors, he blamed the selfish individuals who abuse property (and occasionally backward and irresponsible countries) rather than liberalism and capitalism as such (Laurent 2010, 532–3; Benedict 2009, sec. 22, 33, 36). While avoiding open confrontation with (either economic or cultural) liberalism, the pope’s first encyclical had targeted the obsession with eroticism. Caritas thus became the proper antidote to both cultural liberalism (as eros without divine love) and poverty.

Benedict’s encyclical provided ample documentation of liberalism’s crushing consequences but did so without discussing the political and ideological causes, unlike even Jean Paul II, who is sometimes taken to be more favorable to capitalism than Benedict XVI (2009, sec. 22; Griffiths 2010, 113; Laurent 2010, 534–5). Benedict thus remained a critic of inequality, unemployment, and greed but sought solutions in the further encouragement of (individual and “social”) “responsibility.” To the extent that the encyclical called for redistribution, it highlighted that public assistance should promote individual responsibility and initiative, much in line with the Salvation Army’s liberal charity (Benedict 2009, sec. 47; Laurent 2010, 542).

Jean Paul II had successfully aborted post-1960s leftist heresies within the Vatican (see Eagleton 2005), with ample help from Cardinal Ratzinger, yet the Catholic Church had apparently remained committed to an “option for the poor” in line with the heretics’ teachings. The words “option for the poor” were first mentioned by a Jesuit leader in 1968 and were then systematized into a whole new way of thinking by the liberation theologian Gustavo Gutiérrez (1988), and “some devotees of Cardinal Ratzinger’s early critiques of political theology were longing for a retrenchment from the Catholic Church’s heavy involvement in social action, an engagement that, the suppression of Liberation Theology aside, had proceeded apace under his predecessor John Paul II” (Christiansen 2010, 4). But when Ratzinger was ordained as the Pope,

19. Benedict’s language is reminiscent of Polanyi’s critique of the liberal economy and creates the impression that he has read the author (or at least, those Polanyi has inspired). There are also close parallels between his arguments and Mauss’s (1990). Nevertheless, he departs from both thinkers by ultimately subordinating reciprocity to markets and individuals.

20. See Benedict XVI (2005, sec. 5, 11). The other face of cultural liberalism on which Benedict (2009, sec. 26, 61) waged war was “relativism.”
he embarked on a path of *taming* Gutiérrez’s preference for the poor rather than excluding it. He further fortified the doctrinal investment in caritas and accentuated the term’s tight links to the care of the poor, but he laid a strong slant of individual responsibility onto this package. For liberation theologians, the “option for the poor” involved promoting the self-organization of the poor in “base communities”; for Benedict, it instead meant socially responsible business, a more caring (and church-promoting) state, and stronger international oversight (by mainstream organizations such as the United Nations).

### Liberation Theology Travels to the Vatican

In glaring contrast to Benedict, his successor Pope Francis has incited Caritas Internationalis, a platform of 165 Catholic charitable organizations, to uphold the Christianity of the poor against the current world order (Roberts 2015). While Benedict banished Gutiérrez even when appropriating his words, Francis had Gutiérrez in his company when addressing Caritas.

Francis pursues the same line in his papal exhortations and encyclicals. He is not content with simply attacking capitalism and upholding charity (which he frequently does), but he also wages a war against self-centered, pleasure-seeking, consumerist charitable philistinism, suggesting that he has perhaps read and absorbed Marxist criticisms of charity (Francis 2013, sec. 180): “Nor should our loving response to God be seen simply as an accumulation of small personal gestures to individuals in need, a kind of ‘charity à la carte,’ or a series of acts aimed solely at easing our conscience… Both Christian preaching and life…are meant to have an impact on society.”

What more could a pope say to urge Christians to avoid soothing their guilt with “a couple of cappuccinos” worth of dollars? In line with his approach to charity, Francis (2013, sec. 59, 188, 202, 218) also draws attention to economic “structures” that put poor people at a disadvantage, whereas Benedict (2009, sec. 17, 42) sought to reduce (though not dismiss) the centrality of this concept in Church doctrine. Francis also avoids begging the poor to become responsible; he instead calls for globally shared (and “differentiated”) responsibility while pointing out that the poor usually suffer the most from society’s (and power-holders’) irresponsible practices (Francis 2013, sec. 54, 90, 206, 240; 2015, sec. 2, 26, 48–52, 95, 158). Conservative forces in the Church are highly suspicious of these pro-poor moves (see Gagliarducci 2015). They are also scandalized to see the Vatican’s charitable arm, Caritas, join the World Social Forum, allegedly a crypto-communist organization (see Skojec 2014). The fight over caritas remains unresolved.22

21. Despite being solidly anti–liberation theology, Benedict (unsurprisingly) appropriated the phrase “option for the poor” by citing two encyclicals of Jean Paul II rather than the original coiners of the phrase (Cahill 2010, 304).

22. Just as Benedict claimed continuity with all post-1891 social encyclicals, Francis claims he follows those of Benedict XVI. See “Pope Francis: Charity in Truth Is the Basis for Peace,” Vatican Radio, 10 February 2014, [http://en.radiovaticana.va/news/2014/10/02/pope francis charity in truth is the basis for peace/1107727](http://en.radiovaticana.va/news/2014/10/02/pope_frankis_charity_in_truth_is_the_basis_for_peace/1107727). The struggle over caritas frequently erupts between the lines rather than being fought openly. Benedict XVI’s (2005, sec. 33) encyclicals sustained Ratzinger’s witch hunt but did so without openly
The current pope’s approach to charity is open to the usual misunderstandings, both of rightist and leftist varieties. Conservative criticism of liberation theology assumes that its proponents have moved away from charity to social justice (Lynch 1994). This assumption also shapes some left-wing criticism of Pope Francis: the pope emphasizes charity, so he has not really internalized liberation theology; he should emphasize social justice instead. Neither the Left nor the Right completely understands liberation theology since they both tend to see it as Marxism in Christian clothing. Both positions misconstrue liberation theology’s position on charity, which does not construct charitable love and structural transformation as binary opposites, no matter how ingrained the absolute belief in their mutual exclusivity might be in leftist thought. Rather, as Gutiérrez points out, charity necessitates an investment in structural transformation.

In his recent 2015 address to the Caritas assembly, Gutiérrez plainly stated that theology “is not religious metaphysics, it is a reflection on the practice of charity and justice; it can provide inspiration to those who are engaged in the practice of charity and justice” when faced with “the biggest gap between rich and poor that humanity has ever witnessed.” Gutiérrez’s ongoing commitment to charity is not random but is an essential part of liberation theology, as his classic book on the subject clarifies. His comments invalidate one kind of attack against the liberationist embrace of charity: “By preaching the Gospel message, by its sacraments, and by the charity of its members, the Church proclaims and shelters the gift of the Kingdom of God in the heart of human history. The Christian community professes a ‘faith which works through charity.’ It is—at least ought to be—real charity, action, and commitment to the service of others” (Gutiérrez 1988, 9, and see 6). Significantly, Gutiérrez supports this argument by a quote from Pascal (quoted in Gutiérrez 1988, 181n39): “All bodies together, and all minds together, and all their products, are not equal to the least feeling of charity ... From all bodies and minds, we cannot produce a feeling of true charity.”

But as crucial as Pascal’s incorporation into liberation theology is the sublation of his theorization. As mentioned above, Pascal’s preliminary theorization of charity could not protect the term from the liberal-rationalist (and ultimately political-economic) onslaught. Gutiérrez (1988, 116) offers a much more comprehensive understanding of charity by sublating (the critique of) political economy too:

It is also necessary to avoid the pitfalls of an individualistic charity. As it has been insisted in recent years, the neighbor is not only a person viewed individually. The term refers also to a person considered in the fabric of social relationships ... It likewise refers to the exploited social class, the dominated people, the marginalized.

declaring war: “The personnel who carry out the Church’s charitable activity on the practical level ... must not be inspired by ideologies aimed at improving the world, but should rather be guided by the faith which works through love.” This was Benedict’s way of advocating for the dismissal of those who believe that caritas involves radical change. Also see Francis (2015, sec. 231) for a critical appropriation of Benedict’s emphasis on charity.

23. Even the title of an article is enough to demonstrate the binary nature of our thinking on this issue. See Eric Frith’s (2014) “Charity or Justice? Pope Francis Revisits Liberation Theology.”

24. For a recent example, see Snow (2015).

The masses are also our neighbor... Charity is today a “political charity”... to offer food or drink in our day is a political action; it means the transformation of a society structured to benefit a few who appropriate to themselves the value of the work of others. This transformation ought to be directed toward a radical change in the foundation of society, that is, the private ownership of the means of production.

This reformulation of charity also goes to the heart of the overall Marxist attacks against it. If practiced in the correct way, with an intense eye on transforming the structures of ownership, charity would no longer obfuscate the true sources of wealth. Liberation theology shares with Marxism the idea that what is given to the poor through charity is already theirs to begin with (indeed, the very idea that what is given was at one point or another extracted from the poor themselves), but it departs from Marxism by revolutionizing charity rather than abandoning it.

In sum, the Vatican’s simultaneous turn to caritas and liberation theology signals neither a surreptitious Marxism veiled by the Bible nor the emptying out of Gutiérrez’s message. It rather expresses the necessity to integrate the critique of political economy with a transformed understanding of centuries of Christian thought, even if the integration is far from finalized. It is a reminder that political economy without a charitable heart is empty, and charitable love without a critique of exploitation is blind.

What has caused the Vatican’s recent flirtation with the emancipatory vision of charity (after decades of repression and containment)? More than simply expressing the temperament of an individual pope, Francis’s moves are indicative of a collective will within the Vatican to tilt the balance of forces in favor of the oppressed classes. It is no accident that the theme of the Caritas General Assembly in 2015 was “A Poor Church for the Poor.” The increasing visibility of the Vatican’s emancipatory wing might also be due to worldwide developments (such as the 2008 financial crisis and intensifying ecological problems). As the Vatican faces internal crises (financial corruption, child abuse) and growing competition from Protestantism and Islam in the developing world, it might be resorting to one of its unique resources (Catholic social doctrine) as a way to weather the storms. Only further research can reveal which of these dynamics are more decisive and whether the emancipatory version of caritas can make a lasting impact beyond the boundaries of Catholicism itself.

To See the Universe in a Raindrop ... and Transform It

What should militants do when they encounter a petty bourgeois who pours breadcrumbs on the tables of the poor? Should they scold or simply shrug and walk away? Or should they rather intervene in the situation by saying, “If you are going to love thy neighbor, do it in the proper way”? What tools has Marxism given them to transfigure the raindrop into a veritable weapon so that they can plunge into the ocean of suffering to reverse the tide? So far, close to none.

Marxism certainly cannot accept religious generosity (or for that matter, its secular, mostly antiradical counterparts) as it was traditionally practiced. But it can claim for itself benevolence, of which traditional giving is but one historical expression. It can approach charity with a spirit of rehabilitation, as did liberalism at the end of the nineteenth century (and as it does more aggressively today). Only then will the raindrops become essential parts of the poor’s arsenal.
Such a novel approach to charity could only come with some change in Marxism’s overall orientations to questions of social transformation. Most of twentieth-century Marxism focused on macro structures and therefore on big solutions.\textsuperscript{26} Resolving poverty through taking over the state was at the center of its strategies. Integrating benevolence into the Left’s arsenal will not necessarily repudiate all of this experience but will require the recognition of its insufficiency.

Detractors of any such change in Marxism will point out how state-socialist countries have rapidly reduced poverty. Indeed, if capitalism is the true cause of poverty, why look for other paths in its amelioration than the quick overthrow of that mode of production?

It is true that state socialisms have worked some miracles (given the constraints of the countries where they have been implemented)—a fact conveniently buried in the post–Cold War era. It is as obvious, however, that these miracles have come at the cost of a spiritless (at times brutal) rationalization. Moreover, they were not based on the consent of broad strata. These shortcomings have made state socialism quite unsustainable. Benevolence can be one (but is certainly not the only) way to fill the process of postcapitalist transformation with a spirit.

Charity, from the Marxist point of view, is a way of managing, legitimating, and maintaining capitalism. But this insistence on the one-dimensionality of charity contradicts with many actual practices. Pope Francis, for example, wants to give with a heart, but he also wants to give in a way that could undermine capitalism. In this regard he takes from both Marxism and varieties of traditionalism and conservatism. Such innovative benevolence can indeed help build a more willing, more sustainable, less statist, and more socially embedded socialism—if combined with other pertinent strategies. Melding processes of redistribution with processes of the heart, with charitable love (caritas), is meant to be no silver bullet but a necessary supplement (to class struggle, the self-organization of the oppressed, and state planning) in the combat against poverty and the subordination of the poor.

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\textbf{References}


\textsuperscript{26} For a partial synopsis of remarkable exceptions, see Gardiner (2000). Also see Dhar (2015, 8–11), Chakrabarti and Dhar (2015), and Gibson-Graham (2006) along these lines.


