

in Reflections on
Regionalism Bruce Katz (ed.)
Washington DC: Brookings
Institution Press 2000

CHAPTER FIVE

Coalition Building for Regionalism

MARGARET WEIR

For over a century, urban planners and supporters of "good government" have argued in favor of metropolitanism. These advocates have criticized the growth of conflicting and overlapping local political and administrative jurisdictions on grounds of both efficiency and equity. In the postwar era, as suburbs grew and metropolitan political jurisdictions multiplied, a chorus of planners—many enjoying positions of influence within an expanding federal government—called for solutions ranging from outright government consolidations to voluntary cooperation among the maze of metropolitan governments. Despite the persistent complaints from urban experts about the irrationality and unfairness of metropolitan fragmentation, their ideas have had very limited practical impact on postwar American cities and suburbs. The wave of expert enthusiasm for metropolitan regionalism in the 1960s and 1970s left only a handful of city-county consolidations and a legacy of weak regional organizations with few resources and even less power.

There were two important exceptions to this pattern of failure: Oregon adopted effective land-use regulation that provided a basis for strengthening metropolitanism in the coming decades; Minnesota created a Metropolitan Council for the Twin Cities area and passed fiscal disparities legislation that helped compensate for the financial

consequences of metropolitan political fragmentation. It is revealing to compare the successes in Oregon and Minnesota with the failures to adopt comparable measures in Illinois and California, states that faced significant metropolitan fragmentation and suburban sprawl in the 1960s and 1970s. In the former two states, coalition building in state politics was the key to success. Studies of metropolitanism have focused on federal initiatives and on features of particular metropolitan areas, but the examples of Oregon and Minnesota illustrate the central role of states in enacting or blocking legislation needed to promote metropolitan regionalism.

The successful cases had three common elements: at least one politically powerful interest that saw metropolitan regionalism as a way to address its concerns, bipartisan coalition building, and relatively weak opposing groups. In Oregon, farmers, the environmental movement, and Portland city leaders, for different reasons, all supported the land-use legislation enacted in 1973. Oregon's Republican governor, Tom McCall, was pivotal to success. In Minnesota, Minneapolis city leaders pressed for legislation to create the Metropolitan Council and found support in a sympathetic governor. As in Oregon, moderate Republicans were critical to the victory. In both states, the groups most likely to oppose metropolitan initiatives—developers and suburban interests—were unusually weak or quiescent.

The politics of Illinois and California looked much different on each of these dimensions. The availability of alternative goals and resources meant that environmental and urban interests in these states did not look to metropolitanism as a way to achieve their objectives. Thus even though a strong environmental movement existed in California and both states experienced significant sprawl and urban decline, those concerned with these problems sought other ways to address them. In addition, given the nature of political party divisions in these states, bipartisanship and gubernatorial support for metropolitanism were most unlikely. The election of Ronald Reagan as governor in 1966 effectively ruled out such an alliance in California; longstanding animosity and partisan division between city and suburb in the Chicago metropolitan region blocked the way in Illinois. Finally, opponents in these states were stronger. In California the political system magnified the power of developers, who staunchly opposed land-use regulation. In both Illinois and California, racial divisions between city and suburb promised that any serious efforts to promote metropolitan cooperation or to "open up the suburbs"

could trigger venomous political fights that few politicians wanted to confront.

The conditions for building coalitions around metropolitan-oriented legislation were clearly much more favorable in Oregon and Minnesota during the early 1970s. Yet even in these cases, favorable legislation was not inevitable. It took the political effort of environmental and urban interests (and agricultural interests in Oregon) and sympathetic politicians to enact the charter legislation. The divergent fate of the initiatives in Oregon and Minnesota underscores the importance of political coalition building at the state level as key to successful metropolitanism. In Oregon ongoing political mobilization of supporters created a "virtuous cycle" in which the initial legislation provided a springboard for strengthening the regional approach and winning new support. In Minnesota, where there was much less mobilization, the virtuous cycle came to a halt when the politically weak Metropolitan Council lost support in the legislature in the 1980s. In fact, the Metropolitan Council was nearly moribund until recent efforts to build legislative coalitions between the Twin Cities and less affluent suburbs. Thus, while the particular political configurations that enacted regional initiatives in Oregon and Minnesota two decades ago are unlikely to be reproduced in other states, many aspects of their coalition-building and mobilization strategies offer valuable lessons for proponents of metropolitanism today.

Metropolitan Regionalism in Oregon and Minnesota

The successful legislation in Oregon and Minnesota in the early 1970s reflected the unusually favorable social and political conditions in both states. However, each followed a different political path: In Oregon important social and economic groups mobilized in favor of reforms and created a broad political debate. In Minnesota the process was much more elite driven—a practical good-government response to problems facing the Twin Cities metropolitan area. In both states the initial legislation provided a wedge for expanding the scope of regional efforts, but the continuing strength of regionalism in Oregon and its growing weakness in Minnesota highlight the need for broad and ongoing political mobilization to support regional approaches to urban issues.

Two Paths

In Oregon state regulation of land use provided the essential framework for metropolitan regionalism. The critical piece of legislation was a 1973 law that created a new Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC), appointed by the governor and charged with formulating goals for land use across the state.¹ The law required counties and cities to draw up comprehensive plans that conformed to the LCDC goals. What put teeth in the act—and distinguished Oregon's land-use legislation—was the LCDC's power to reject local plans. In the year after its creation, the LCDC formulated goals that had important implications for the pattern of urban growth in Oregon. It required cities and counties to create urban growth boundaries, areas within which the cities could be expected to grow over the next twenty years and in which development would be encouraged. Outside these boundaries, land was zoned exclusively for farm use, making development much more difficult. The aim of the growth boundaries was to limit sprawl by making urban growth contiguous and stopping leapfrog patterns of development.

Bowing to political realities, the law did not create a new state agency responsible for drawing up plans but rather delegated planning responsibility to counties. The one exception was the Portland metropolitan area, which was designated as a special planning district ranging over three separate counties. Like many metropolitan regions, the Portland area in 1969 had established a council of local governments, the Columbia Region Association of Governments (CRAAG), to meet federal requirements for a metropolitan planning district. As in other metropolitan areas, the organization operated on a voluntary basis and was composed of local governments, each of which had an equal vote. In 1973, however, the state legislature gave CRAAG the legal authority to require the counties to comply with its land-use plans (including the urban growth boundary) and made membership mandatory for the three counties in the Portland metropolitan area. It also weighted voting within the association by population, thus giving the more densely populated city of Portland 40 percent of the votes.² The local voters approved this delegation of power in a referendum. The strong city support for the agency and its dominant voice within the organization gave the city unusual leverage in metropolitan politics.

State-level initiatives for land-use planning were thus critical in supporting metropolitan planning efforts already under way in the Port-

land area. In 1969, with a local transportation system on the verge of bankruptcy, Portland had pressed the state legislature to establish a regional transportation agency that would allow it to tap into the suburban tax base. In return, the city agreed to the creation of a Metropolitan Services District, whose initial responsibilities included solid waste disposal and a financially precarious zoo.³ In 1978 the Metropolitan Service District (MSD) took over the responsibilities of CRAAG, which was abolished, and in a departure from the usual organization of regional bodies across the county, the new MSD commissioners were to be directly elected, not appointed. Over time the responsibilities of the MSD grew to encompass authority over metropolitan land-use policies, including the urban growth boundary, as well as key metropolitan services and facilities ranging from garbage disposal to a major convention center. In 1992 the MSD was redesignated "Metro" and given even more authority with the status of a home rule government.

One of the most striking political features of these initiatives was the broad range of active support they generated. On the urban side, it was not just planners and good-government groups but politicians with substantial constituencies, such as Portland mayor Neil Goldschmidt, who strongly supported the land-use law and the other metropolitan initiatives associated with it. Likewise, environmentalists, an important new force in politics in the early 1970s, focused on the land-use regulation law as the central means of achieving their goals. This intertwining of urban and environmental interests and their support of a single legislative agenda was the only one of its kind across the nation. At the same time that Oregon was debating its land-use law, Congress was considering a land-use bill that provided incentives for states to engage in precisely the kind of planning Oregon was considering. In stark contrast to the political coalition that backed Oregon's bill, the national legislation never attracted strong support from either environmental groups or urban interests, who did not see their agendas as intertwined.⁴ Perhaps most unusual, agricultural interests were key initiators of the 1973 Oregon legislation.

What facilitated this unusual political cooperation between urban, environmental, and agricultural groups? Part of the answer lies in Oregon's distinctive geography. With nearly half of the state's population concentrated in the Willamette Valley, which contains the state's major cities as well as its richest agricultural land, the trade-offs between urbanization and the limited supply of rural land were much more starkly drawn in Oregon than in most states. In fact, the land-

use legislation of 1973 only passed because of strong support from legislators in the Willamette Valley. Forty-nine of the sixty legislators from the valley backed it, whereas only nine of the thirty legislators from eastern and coastal regions supported it.⁵ This distinctive geography and the sharp trade-offs it posed accounted for the critical support of agricultural interests. In places where land is more plentiful, agricultural interests either have shown little interest in land-use regulation or have opposed it, fearing that it would strengthen state government at the expense of local decisionmaking. Moreover, in most places farmers have sought to preserve the right to dispose of their land as they wished—including the right to benefit from the higher land prices that come with development. Such sentiments also existed in Oregon, especially from rural interests outside the Willamette Valley.⁶ However, the limited supply of land in the Willamette Valley altered the perspective of its farmers because of the obvious threat that urban sprawl posed to the entire agricultural industry there and the way of life it supported.

Key interests were thus predisposed to endorse land-use regulation; however, such predispositions had to be mobilized if they were to unite and become politically powerful. In this task Oregon governor Tom McCall played an important role. A moderate Republican and a long-time leader on environmental issues, McCall wanted to make Oregon the "environmental model for the nation."⁷ Such sentiments were on display in his 1972 address to the legislature, which castigated the "unfettered despoiling of the land" by "sagebrush subdivisions, coastal condominiums, and the ravenous rampage of suburbia." McCall's galvanizing role helped ensure that support for land-use regulation would be bipartisan. But the geographic basis of support also made bipartisan support possible: cities in the Willamette Valley tended to be Democratic, while the rural areas voted Republican. Both, however, shared a concern about sprawl that provided the basis for cooperation.

In addition to these favorable political conditions, the interests that posed the greatest opposition to metropolitan regionalism elsewhere in the country were unusually weak in Oregon during the 1960s and 1970s. Suburban interests were particularly weak. Oregon's slow growth in the 1950s and 1960s meant that it had few full-service suburban governments and not much of a distinct suburban agenda when land-use regulation and metropolitan regionalism came under consideration.⁸ Oregon's racial homogeneity also played a role. In

such racially homogenous metropolitan areas, the division between city and suburb is much less fraught with tension and conflict. For all of these reasons, suburban interests played little role in blocking state land-use legislation or in contesting the development of metropolitan government in Portland.⁹ The other major interests generally opposed to land-use regulation—developers and the housing industry—indeed did work against the 1973 legislation, but slow suburbanization left them weaker than in other states. Moreover, because other commercial interests with a stake in Portland supported metropolitan regionalism, business did not speak with a single voice on this issue. Together the broad support for land-use legislation, gubernatorial initiative, and bipartisan cooperation overwhelmed the weak opposition.

In Minnesota metropolitan regionalism took a different form and stemmed from distinct political impulses. Two key pieces of legislation in Minnesota created the Metropolitan Council in 1967 and the Fiscal Disparities Act of 1971. The immediate impetus for establishing the Metropolitan Council was a crisis over water and sewer lines in growing suburban areas, a problem that had become so severe that the federal government was threatening to withhold its home mortgage insurance from these areas. The legislature initially charged the new council with finding solutions to the sewage problems and later extended its purview to include a broad range of regional issues, including the sewers, solid waste disposal, and regional parks.¹⁰ Although early discussion had called for an elected board, the legislature ultimately decided that the governor would appoint board members. As the board worked to define its role during its first year, it became clear that it would function as a general policymaker and overseer of regional concerns rather than as a direct operational agency.

Most histories of the Metropolitan Council stress the practical problem-solving orientation that its initial supporters shared. Indeed, the debate about metropolitanism in Minnesota was much more technocratic and elite oriented than in Oregon. One of the most important groups pushing for the creation of the council was the Citizens League, a nonpartisan civic organization that sponsored research on metropolitan policy concerns. With close ties to elites in business and politics, the Citizens League was a politically influential organization but not one that mobilized grass-roots support. In fact, the debate over metropolitanism in Minnesota displayed very little grass-roots organization of the kind that occurred in Oregon. The environmental

movement was not much of a presence in Minnesota in 1967 when the legislation passed, and rural interests, who feared the expansion of metropolitan power, were largely opposed. Most important in creating the Metropolitan Council was the state legislature, where one-person one-vote reapportionment finally broke the rural stranglehold on the legislature and gave the Twin Cities region nearly half the seats in 1967. The long tradition of progressive politics in Minnesota, the well-organized civic elites of the Twin Cities, and the new dominance of the region in the legislature all made the creation of the Metropolitan Council a largely uncontroversial affair.¹¹

More sharply contested was the 1971 fiscal disparities bill. As passed, the act established regional tax-base sharing.¹² Forty percent of the tax income from new commercial and industrial development would go into a common pool to be redistributed among political jurisdictions throughout the six-county metropolitan region on the basis of their commercial and industrial wealth. Drawing on ideas developed by the Citizens League, a Republican representative from a low-tax-capacity suburb led the effort to pass the bill. Driving him was the fear that the movement toward regional land-use planning and development would prevent districts such as his from developing more taxing capacity in the future. Representatives of affluent suburbs bitterly contested the bill, denouncing it as "communitistic," "Robin Hood" legislation. These opponents nearly defeated the bill in the state senate. Only a political alliance with rural Republicans, forged through longstanding personal ties with the bill's author, allowed the fiscal disparities legislation to pass. Suburban cities immediately contested the act in the courts, where it was upheld.

Thus the Twin Cities experienced conflicts between city and suburbs, but these disputes were not broad enough to block the development of regional legislation. The ease with which the Metropolitan Council was created suggests that as in Oregon, cities and suburbs did not have the separate and conflictual identities characteristic of more racially divided metropolitan areas.¹³ The line between city and suburb was not perceived as a racial line, and this homogeneity allowed the legislature to treat the problems surrounding metropolitan service provision as practical or technical concerns that did not invoke highly charged political issues. Moreover, as in Oregon, the Twin Cities had no tradition of the machine politics that made suburbs in many other metropolitan areas suspicious of any forms of cooperation with the city. Racial homogeneity also made it easier for Republican

representatives from lower-tax-capacity suburbs to join with Democratic representatives from the city in support of the fiscal disparities legislation. Common economic interests could not be overshadowed by racial divisions. A history of bipartisan compromise in the legislature further facilitated political coalition building as rural Republicans were persuaded to support the bill despite opposition from Republicans representing affluent suburbs.

Political Mobilization and Virtuous Cycles

In both Oregon and Minnesota, initial legislation provided little more than an opening for further developments. The scope and content of metropolitan regionalism depended on how these initial achievements were defined and expanded over time. In both states the scope of metropolitanism expanded significantly in the 1970s, as regional bodies assumed authority over key decisions about land use, public services, transportation, and housing. But in Oregon this growing authority developed into a virtuous cycle in which policy and politics reinforced one another: as regional decisionmakers moved into new areas, the political coalition that supported them actually grew stronger. In Minnesota, by contrast, after an initial ten years of growing authority and accomplishment, the Metropolitan Council began to languish. The difference was that Oregon's approach to land-use planning was inherently more political and was accompanied by ongoing mobilization and coalition-building efforts, whereas Minnesota's approach remained more narrowly technocratic and dependent on the political winds in the legislature.

In both states the scope of regionalism grew from rather ambiguous beginnings, but because so many regional issues were interrelated, action in one area often led to efforts in new areas. For example, in Oregon the LCDC initially focused on stopping development in rural and agricultural areas. However, the commission quickly realized that effectiveness on this issue required that development be free to occur in other areas. Thus the commission began to press for the removal of barriers to development within urban growth boundaries. This meant directly challenging local efforts to establish large-lot zoning, building moratoria, and other measures designed to limit development. In its first such case in 1977, the LCDC struck down a zoning ordinance in the city of Durham that increased minimum lot sizes. The commission ruled that the zoning ordinance violated the housing

goal that all localities accommodate housing to meet the needs of all their citizens. The zoning restrictions would, in the words of the commission, promote "economic and social homogeneity" at odds with the housing goal.¹⁴ Similar pressures directed the LCDC's attention to the development and location of large public facilities, such as convention centers. In the Twin Cities the Metropolitan Council gradually took on a similar range of responsibilities as the legislature added responsibilities that went far beyond the initial charge of addressing the sewage problem. By 1977 the council bore responsibility for establishing regional policy on transportation, waste control, airports, affordable housing, and land use. While it did not have direct operational authority in these areas, the council had significant leverage over the operational commissions because it had the power to approve their capital budgets and, in most cases, to appoint their members.¹⁵

The loosely similar policy trajectories in Oregon and Minnesota belie important underlying political differences. From the start Oregon's law required far more grass-roots political engagement. The 1973 legislation charged the new Land Conservation and Development Commission with drawing up a set of goals to guide counties as they devised their land-use plans. The commission developed these goals in a year-long process of statewide public meetings. Nineteen goals emerged, covering a broad range of housing, transportation, environmental, and service issues. Number one was the requirement for broad citizen participation in all future planning. By contrast, in Minnesota the newly created Metropolitan Council reported to the legislature; it had no charge to engage in grass-roots discussion about regional matters, but rather was expected to recommend the best policy solutions to the legislature. The fiscal disparities legislation was more controversial and reliant on a distinctive political coalition, but the self-executing nature of the legislation meant that it did not require ongoing political mobilization to operate.

In addition, in Oregon, as Governor McCall left office in 1975, he helped to create a nonprofit organization, 1,000 Friends of Oregon, to monitor the implementation of land-use legislation. Since its inception 1,000 Friends of Oregon has functioned in a wide range of arenas to defend and expand the scope of land-use legislation and to build political support for it. One of its major activities has been to file lawsuits strategically aimed to establish precedents that strengthen and extend the law. But its activities have not been confined to the legal

arena; 1,000 Friends also mobilizes grass-roots support, lobbies the legislature, provides timely studies designed to bolster its arguments, and assists localities in drawing up their land-use plans.¹⁶ Minnesota's Metropolitan Council had no comparable defender. The Citizens League, which had been so important in its creation, had never viewed its mission as that of building political support or devising legal strategies to extend the council's authority. Moreover, in the 1980s the Citizens League became increasingly cautious and unwilling to go out on a limb in support of regional initiatives. Created by the legislature, the Metropolitan Council did not have any independent grass-roots political allies to bolster its political standing or advance the metropolitan agenda. In contrast to Oregon, no Minnesota governor stepped forward to champion the regional agenda. The council remained dependent on the goodwill of the legislature, which it had little power to influence. Nor did it seek legal authority to bolster its power: the council never brought a lawsuit to enforce its land-use powers.¹⁷

The support behind Oregon's law has made it increasingly effective, which in turn, has helped to curb the political power of potential opponents. The urban growth boundary has helped to stem speculative development in the suburbs and as a consequence, has "discouraged the emergence of suburban 'super developers' with overwhelming political clout."¹⁸ At the same time, deliberate political compromises further strengthened support for the legislation. An important role was played by 1,000 Friends of Oregon by pressuring local governments to eliminate restrictions on development and in the process winning the support of the homebuilding industry.¹⁹ This ability to create common interests through a political process is one of the most striking features of the implementation of land-use law in Oregon. It has allowed the law to withstand five major challenges in statewide initiatives. During the second such challenge, in 1978, the growing base of support was evident when the Home Builders of Metropolitan Portland voted to oppose the initiative, providing vital support for land-use law and dividing the business community.²⁰ The LCDC has also maintained political support by strategically compromising on its goals on occasion. For example, it agreed to a substantially larger urban growth boundary for the Portland area than it believed justified in order to avoid a major political conflict that could have caused severe political damage.²¹

Despite these strategic political actions designed to sustain political support, the land-use law has come under heavy fire in recent

years.²² Pressures for economic development, combined with the rise of a "property rights" movement, and a much more highly polarized political setting produced a major assault on land-use laws in the 1995 legislature. Oregonians In Action, a new organization dedicated to rolling back land-use restrictions, had formed in the early 1990s and worked to elect a Republican legislature, where its views enjoyed a warm reception. In this setting, a long history of organized support, capable of mobilizing a broad base of allies, made all the difference for preserving the land-use law. Groups such as 1,000 Friends of Oregon, the Oregon Conservation Network, and others mobilized grassroots supporters among organizations of urban advocates and environmentalists, activated their supporters in the Portland business community, and stepped up lobbying and research efforts to challenge their opponents. In the end the land-use legislation remained largely intact, although protected on some measures only by the governor's veto. The future of land-use legislation in Oregon thus rests very much on the back of its organized supporters.

In contrast to this virtuous cycle of growing authority and political support, Minnesota's Metropolitan Council became less effective over time and lost political backing. Lacking the kind of active advocacy that sustained Oregon's law, the Metropolitan Council grew timid and its opponents grew stronger. The council did little to resist heavy political pressure to accommodate growth in outlying suburbs. Likewise, it had little say in major development decisions that would shape the entire metropolitan area, such as the siting of a race track, a domed stadium, and the largest shopping mall in the country (the Mall of America).²³ By 1991 the council was widely viewed as so ineffective that newly elected governor Arne Carlson threatened to abolish it. The elite base that had supported its activities in the 1970s had eroded significantly in the intervening decade. The Citizens League, as we have seen, had pulled back from its once active support. Corporate restructuring left much of the urban business community with a reduced stake in local government issues.²⁴ This was an important shift in the Twin Cities, where local business leaders formerly had played a key role in civic affairs and had supported a regional perspective as a way to strengthen the urban core. Moreover, the Metropolitan Council now had new competition from the county governments, which had grown stronger and viewed any efforts to bolster the authority of the council as a threat to their own power. Finally, the prospects for metropolitanism weakened still further as political par-

ties in the legislature became sharply polarized in the 1990s. In this more highly charged political environment, the kind of bipartisan alliance that had supported metropolitan initiatives in the past was much harder to orchestrate.

Only through concerted attempts at new coalition building in the 1990s did metropolitanism in the Twin Cities begin to revive. State representative Myron Orfield, a Democrat from Minneapolis, put metropolitan issues back on the political agenda with a series of legislative initiatives.²⁵ These linked bills included proposals to give the Metropolitan Council operational power over transit and waste control, implement a policy of "fair share housing" throughout the metropolitan area, enlarge the base of the regional tax scheme, and enact stronger land-use controls. To support this agenda, Orfield sought to build a new coalition between the cities and less affluent inner-ring suburbs on the basis of common economic interests: the political goal was to split the suburbs along economic lines. Confronted with evidence that their tax dollars were subsidizing development in the outer suburbs and that they shouldered more than their fair share of low- and moderate-income housing for the region, representatives of these tax-poor suburbs began to see their own problems from a regional perspective. Although such common economic interests are the core coalition-building strategy, efforts have been made to expand the base to include environmental groups, social justice organizations (including churches), and good-government groups. The political process departed from the good-government, elite orientation of the past in two ways: it mobilized political support primarily on the basis of economic interest and it deployed a much more participatory bottom-up strategy. As Orfield noted in connection with the fair-share housing proposals, "Solution and design of the proposal came from the bottom up, not the top down. It was a legislative solution with broad community input, not a litigation-based court decision lacking grassroots input."²⁶

These coalition-building efforts have thus far produced only limited legislative victories. Partisan division has been part of the problem: the few Republican representatives of inner-ring suburbs have been reluctant to support the initiatives, and representatives of rural areas have been suspicious of them. More important were the vetoes of the Republican governor. Several of Orfield's key proposals, including the increased tax-base sharing and fair housing, passed the legislature only to be vetoed by the governor. Others, however, including increased powers for the Metropolitan Council, have been enacted.

The shifting face of metropolitan regionalism in Oregon and Minnesota highlights the importance of ongoing coalition building. Regionalism cannot be considered secure once legislation is enacted. The economic and political pressures for growth and local (rather than regional) decisionmaking are too strong. Challenges will come from developers concerned that land-use controls will hurt business and from communities aiming to preserve local prerogatives—even at the expense of their neighbors. As state legislatures have become more dependent on private campaign money, the power of monied groups, such as developers, has grown. Yet the cases of Oregon and Minnesota show that the base of potential support for regionalism is broad; with political mobilization it is possible to build coalitions of common economic interest and shared ideals to support metropolitan regionalism.

Sprawl and Localism in California and Illinois

The failed efforts to create forms of metropolitan regionalism and land-use controls in California and Illinois in the 1960s and 1970s stand in marked contrast to the successes in Minnesota and Oregon. Yet Californians expressed intense concern about environmental degradation and urban sprawl,²⁷ and in Illinois growing sprawl and urban flight sparked new interest in metropolitan regionalism in the early 1970s. Why did these sentiments not produce either elite-oriented or broad-based coalitions for metropolitan regionalism as in Minnesota and Oregon? A comparison of these states shows that California and Illinois adopted particularistic and often exclusionary solutions to the kinds of problems that had sparked the coalitions for metropolitan regionalism in Minnesota and Oregon. These decisions deflected pressures and diverted energies away from coalition building toward alternative, less encompassing political and policy strategies. The different patterns and timing of urban-suburban development as well as distinctive partisan alignments in the state legislatures help explain why metropolitan regionalism remained so weak in California and Illinois.

The Politics of Particularism

Suburban development exploded in California in the decades after World War II and with it concerns about service delivery and the

impact on cities. These problems usually were attacked with remedies that not only were ineffective in controlling sprawl, but also exacerbated fragmentation and exclusionary barriers in the suburbs. Two key examples are the 1954 Lakewood Plan, which was designed to address the suburban services problem, and the Local Agency Formation Committee (LAFCO), formed in 1963 to oversee incorporations and annexations.

The Lakewood Plan approached the problem of suburban services in Los Angeles County in a way that promoted political fragmentation, class stratification, and racial exclusion. The plan allowed smaller cities to contract with the county to receive basic services such as fire and police protection. Prior to the plan's adoption, incorporating as a separate city was economically infeasible for most developing suburbs.²⁸ The high cost of providing local services meant that such new cities would have to charge very high tax rates. If these areas remained unincorporated, they could receive services from the county but would lack local control over such essential matters as land use, zoning, and services. Moreover, unincorporated areas remained vulnerable to annexation by neighboring cities. Although earlier incorporations had already hemmed in the city of Los Angeles, making further annexation impossible, other cities in the county, such as Long Beach, were annexing large new tracts of the developing suburbs. By making small cities economically viable, the Lakewood Plan stymied this annexation strategy and set off a wave of new municipal incorporations. Over the next fifteen years, thirty-two new cities incorporated, thirty-one of them contracting with the county for services.

As Gary Miller's careful study shows, the Lakewood Plan created a sharp stratification by class among Los Angeles County municipalities, dividing the metropolitan area into jurisdictions of "service seekers" and "tax avoiders."²⁹ These divisions followed racial lines as well. In the fifteen years after the Lakewood Plan went into effect, the county's black population became concentrated in just a few cities, and the number of nearly all-white jurisdictions grew. As Miller notes, "The Lakewood Plan cities were essentially white political movements."³⁰ By allowing contracting, Los Angeles County had provided the means for separation and exit from broader political arenas rather than for building a common purpose throughout the metropolitan areas. Instead of linking the problems of the suburbs and the cities as Minnesota had sought to do, Los Angeles County widened the gulf.

Concern about metropolitan political fragmentation and unchecked growth in California lay behind the creation of LAFCO in 1963. In 1960 both the state legislature and Democratic governor Pat Brown launched studies of the proliferation of local governments and its impact on California's metropolitan areas.³¹ Prior to 1963, decisions about annexation and incorporation had to be approved by the counties alone, subject to electoral approval by the affected districts. One group in the state legislature, echoing the governor's commission, wanted to create a strong state agency that would have power over local boundaries. A second group, supported by the counties, wanted the power to reside with the counties. The compromise legislation called for county-level LAFCO boards composed of two representatives from cities, two county supervisors, and a fifth member to be chosen by the other four. In contrast to Oregon, California failed to create any new statewide or multicounty authority over local boundaries and growth. The highest level of decisionmaking was the county.

The new county-level LAFCOs did little to control the pace and direction of growth, nor did they stem jurisdictional fragmentation. Instead, the LAFCO process set off a power struggle among cities, counties, developers, and homeowners with the result that "rational analysis of issues like sprawl, efficient service provision, and fiscal equity has been no more apparent than in the days before LAFCO."³² With few resources for drawing up plans to guide growth and riven by political disputes, the LAFCOs have been reactive agencies with little independent impact on land-use patterns.³³

In 1970 the California legislature once again considered a spate of proposals for regional approaches to land use, all of which failed.³⁴ In Oregon the burgeoning environmental movement had provided one pillar of vital political support for land-use legislation. By contrast, California's environmental movement played a negligible role in debates related to metropolitan regionalism in the 1960s and 1970s. The debate about LAFCO in California occurred before the emergence of the modern environmental movement, but even in the late 1960s and 1970s, California's environmentalists showed little interest in metropolitan regionalism. Instead, they focused their concern on wilderness and coastal areas. Moreover, as a new social movement that had grown by leaps and bounds, environmentalists were riven by factionalism and ideology. A 1971 report by Ralph Nader's organization on the politics of land in California characterized the state's environmental

movement as congeries of small ideological and parochial organizations that "usually don't know what their counterparts in the next city or county are doing."³⁵ Even the venerable Sierra Club, long organized in California, was so divided that even on important matters it could not effectively mobilize its membership.

Not surprisingly, environmentalists in California lacked the skills of coalition building and legislative bargaining. Their biggest success—the creation of the California Coastal Commission, which delegated strong regulatory powers over coastal development to new regional commissions—reflected the distinctive orientation and capabilities of the environmental movement. The new law was concerned with the natural environment, not metropolitan areas, and it was the product of a statewide initiative held in 1972, at the crest of broad enthusiasm for environmentalism. Even so, fearing the weakness of environmental groups, the initiative campaign stressed the issue of public access, not environmental protection. As an initiative campaign, played out largely in the media, the new legislation did not involve environmentalists in ongoing legislative bargaining or coalition building.³⁶

Although California failed to devise a regulatory process to manage metropolitan growth, the issues of land use, development, and housing did not disappear; instead, their politics played out in different arenas using different tools. Local political NIMBYism enacted through lawsuits and the initiative process became the central way that disputes over metropolitan land use were adjudicated. The impulse to manage development became intertwined with localism and exclusivism as slow-growth initiatives spread throughout California in the 1980s. The slow-growth movement proposed initiative after initiative, aiming to lodge growth controls at the most local levels of government.³⁷ Many of the same impulses that led to coalition building and statewide legislation in Oregon were thus localized and much more narrowly cast in California. The civic elites, who took a rational problem-solving approach to metropolitan issues in Minnesota, were mostly invisible on land-use issues in California.

What made the politics of metropolitan regionalism so different in California? Most important was the central place of land-development interests in the California economy and in the political system. In much of the Southwest, land development and local boosterism provided the key to economic growth during the twentieth century.³⁸ In contrast to Oregon, the power of land interests was well established

long before the modern environmental movement appeared on the scene. And in contrast to Minnesota, most local elites were closely intertwined with development interests, who sharply opposed restrictions in the pattern of growth. The importance of money in California's political system magnified the power of development interests. In the 1960s the California legislature led the nation in the number of lobbyists and in the role of interest-group money in electoral campaigns.³⁹ Land interests predominated in both. The power of land interests permeated both political parties, but their impact was especially significant for Republicans, because it effectively blocked the emergence of a moderate Republican leadership around metropolitan regionalism that was so important in Oregon and Minnesota. The much more partisan politics of California—intensified with the 1966 election of Ronald Reagan as governor—further hampered any coalition building around land-use policy in California. With environmentalists and land interests taking an all-or-nothing stance on policy and with a legislature awash in interest-group money and sharply divided on party lines, neither rational technocratic legislation nor broad compromise approaches stood much chance of enactment in California.

In Illinois, despite growing suburban sprawl and urban decline, metropolitan regionalism and land-use regulation did not draw the same kind of political attention they attracted in Oregon, Minnesota, or California. Broad regional organizations had existed in the Chicago area since the 1950s. The Chicago Area Transportation Study formed in 1955 to draw up transportation plans for the metropolitan area. Two years later the state created the Northeastern Illinois Regional Planning Commission to develop a comprehensive general plan for the region.⁴⁰ In the mid-1960s, a group of prestigious civic, business, financial, and educational leaders in the Chicago metropolitan area revived the call for metropolitan government. But the achievements of these organizations remained largely on paper, as they had little real authority to guide development. Instead, a maze of special districts with operational responsibilities carved up the region into functional areas for water, parks, and waste disposal. For the most part, the problems of growing suburbs were addressed through these ad hoc and functionally specific entities, among which there was little coordination and no overarching vision.⁴¹

The contrast with Minnesota is striking. Although some elites showed an interest in devising a regional perspective, these ideas never made any headway in the state legislature. To understand why,

we must examine both how the city of Chicago operated in the state legislature and how political divisions between Chicago and its suburbs made metropolitan cooperation a political nonstarter. Of critical importance was the power of the Chicago Democratic political organization. Although Chicago never commanded a majority in the state legislature, the tight organization of its delegation allowed the city to make legislative deals in its favor. For example, in 1966 Minneapolis mayor Arthur Naftalin bemoaned his state's failure to make the county, rather than the city, responsible for local welfare costs; Chicago, by contrast, had succeeded in pushing these costs up to the county a decade earlier.⁴² Likewise, when necessary, Chicago was able to get state approval for major development initiatives, such as convention centers, designed to ensure its primacy in the metropolitan region. Thus concern about the fate of the central business district—which had spurred Portland mayor Neil Goldschmidt and his allies in the business community to support state land-use regulation—had no counterpart in Illinois. Chicago had little interest in regionalism, because it could generally get what it needed from the state and accordingly, saw no real threat to its dominance in the region. Moreover, through the Democratic organization, Chicago's mayor effectively controlled political arenas outside the city, including Cook County. Any new regional organizations would only dilute the city's power—and more important, that of the Democratic organization.⁴³

If the city was uninterested in regionalism, the suburbs abhorred the idea. In contrast to Minnesota, Chicago suburbs had a longstanding and deep animosity toward the city. With a tradition of reform that prided itself on efficient, honest government, suburban Chicago viewed the city as a pit of political corruption rife with dishonesty. Compounding this animosity were sharp partisan differences: most of the suburbs had long been dominated by Republicans. Any form of regional government threatened to disrupt the political balance in the metropolitan area.

Finally, proponents of metropolitan regionalism in Chicago ignored the way racial divisions affected their proposals. By the 1960s, as ethnic whites began to leave Chicago for the suburbs, race became a key factor dividing city from suburb, choking off suburban interest in any regional initiatives that might be linked with racial equity. Moreover, race cut two ways. Black leaders in Chicago had little interest in new forms of regional governance that would simply dilute black political power. As Gilbert Steiner, commenting on proposals

for metropolitan government in 1966, noted, "The prospects for success in planning Chicago metropolitan area development will be pretty slim unless some explicit case can be made to support the proposition that there is a community of interest between the Negro on Chicago's South Side and the white commuter from the North Shore suburb."⁴⁴ Ignoring the racial issue, proponents of metropolitan government did not even begin to make the case.

These political realities left little room for the state legislature to consider measures promoting metropolitan regionalism. Although regional organizations continued to exist, they had no power. Instead, as George C. Hennings notes in his study of the Chicago area, discussions with implications for the region occurred in two unconnected arenas: "Side by side, at the same time, with minimal interaction, there is a highly rational, civil, public process working on regional infrastructure decisions, and a highly political, combative, political process working on regional infrastructure decisions."⁴⁵ The political process, driven by particularistic local interests as opposed to a broader regional vision, was the one that counted.

Politics and Vicious Cycles

The triumph of more particular and narrow approaches to urban problems and land-use concerns in California and Illinois exacerbated the problems of urban decline and suburban sprawl. As a consequence, some of the political barriers to metropolitan regionalism became more deeply entrenched. White flight from the cities made race an even more central division in metropolitan areas than it had been in the 1960s, when city populations were more racially diverse. The continuing development of the suburbs led to the creation of more capable full-service suburban governments, making suburbs even more formidable as political forces. Likewise, the power of developers and other land interests continued to grow, while some defenders of urban interests, especially urban-based business concerns, became less visible. Yet the gathering force of unregulated metropolitan growth also generated opposition. Much of this opposition has taken a defensive form that does little to build alternative coalitions. But these same forces have also created new possibilities for coalition building around metropolitan regionalism.

In California the interest in metropolitanism in the 1960s left a meager legacy. Weak regional agencies continued to convene and

churn out reports, but they had little real power. The regional council of governments in southern California, the Southern California Association of Governments, could not even retain the membership of many local governments.⁴⁶ In place of any regional approach, the politics of land use occurred at the county level, where formal authority was lodged. Yet California's political process made it difficult to engage in coalition-building politics even at the county level, because decisionmaking occurred by the initiative process, which made compromise nearly impossible and tended to push opponents further apart.⁴⁷ Moreover, the importance of money in such campaigns favored well-funded development interests. In Orange County, for example, a slow-growth movement emerged in the 1980s to challenge decades of unrestrained growth. Viewing the county government as hopelessly tied to developers, the movement sought to restrict growth by a countywide initiative. The "Citizens' Sensible Growth and Traffic Control Initiative" would have forced developers to widen roads and undertake other measures to reduce traffic problems before they could develop unincorporated areas. Despite widespread dissatisfaction with the pattern of growth and a large early lead, the initiative lost. Land development interests had poured some \$2.5 million into the campaign, the most ever on a growth initiative.⁴⁸

In Illinois Chicago's go-it-alone strategy in the state legislature became less successful as suburbs gained population and power. When suburban Republican leaders took over the state legislature in 1993, they made their desire to advance a low-tax, anti-Chicago agenda clear. As the new Senate president, Pate Philip, declared, "[Suburbanites have] always been paying for Chicago, they've been doing it forever. . . . The day of the free ride is over."⁴⁹ This sentiment took political form as Republican legislators successfully blocked key Chicago development initiatives, such as a third regional airport, that required legislative approval.⁵⁰

But suburban expansion has raised a new set of issues in many older suburbs. The residential profile of the inner-ring suburbs has changed as more lower-income minorities, especially Latinos, have left Chicago or immigrated directly to suburban locations. The initial response of many such suburbs has been to resist the influx of poorer residents or to try to contain the costs they present. For example, one Chicago suburb, Mt. Prospect, sought to impose a special tax on an area of apartment buildings after they had attracted a substantial number of Latino families.⁵¹ Strict enforcement of building codes and

occupancy limits in apartments is another common tactic aimed to reduce the number of low-income Latino families in suburbs. But such defensive tactics are likely only stopgaps: on their own, inner-ring suburbs cannot control the powerful economic and demographic shifts that are weakening their tax bases and making their residents more needy.

The slow-growth movement in many California communities and the defensive measures taken by Chicago's inner suburbs are evidence of the strains that the pattern of unregulated growth has engendered. Thus far the responses to these strains have largely been narrow defensive measures. But, as the case of Minnesota shows, it may be possible to build new kinds of coalitions that take a broader, more regional perspective on metropolitan development. "Urban" problems are no longer the province of cities alone, suggesting that it may be possible to reproduce Orfield's city-suburban coalition in other metropolitan areas. Many cities that were once confident that they could go it alone are more attentive to the need to find allies in state politics. Moreover, as sprawl has continued to eat up farmland and encroach on natural settings, environmental and some agricultural groups have shown more interest in policies to manage growth. These elements of an alternative approach to metropolitan problems are as yet faint and unassembled, but discontent from many quarters with the older model of metropolitan growth and urban abandonment suggests new possibilities for the future.

Lessons for the Future

The diverse experiences of Oregon, Minnesota, California, and Illinois suggest some lessons for advocates of metropolitanism today. Changed social and economic forces have altered the metropolitan landscape, but key aspects of the experiences of two decades ago are still relevant today.

First, ongoing political mobilization must accompany efforts to create metropolitan regionalism. The contrasting experiences of Minnesota and Oregon show the importance of building widespread grass-roots support for regional initiatives as well as using the courts. The initial legislation in Oregon simply created a "foot in the door" for establishing meaningful metropolitan regionalism. It took ongoing involvement in the implementation process to make it a reality.

Likewise, a readily mobilized base of support was essential for preserving the legislation from the many political challenges it attracted over the past two decades. Oregon's experience also suggests that much can grow from even modest initial legislation. Metropolitan regionalism is best conceived as a political process that develops over time rather than something that is achieved in a single blow.

Second, it is possible to turn enemies into allies in the course of creating metropolitan regionalism. Because metropolitan regionalism is a compromise strategy that manages growth rather than imposing blanket restrictions, it can be beneficial to development interests, who most often tend to oppose it. By removing local barriers to growth and creating more predictability, growth management can ease development. While it is unlikely that all homebuilding and development interests will be converted into allies, it is possible that the positive experience of some will at least split this opposition.

Third, go-it-alone strategies do not work. In the 1970s environmental and urban interests sought to achieve their goals on separate tracks. Environmentalists sought federal regulation, while urban advocates relied on a growing pool of federal grants. Each of these strategies has run into barriers in the past decade and a half. Coalition-building strategies in which cities and environmental interests combine forces and work to build a common agenda are needed to effectively address future problems in each domain. It is important that these efforts at coalition building occur at the local level and build up to the statehouse. Too often in the past, cities and environmentalists neglected the states. Yet that is where constitutional authority for land use is lodged; these interests have ignored the states at their own peril.

Fourth, land-use controls and other measures associated with metropolitanism need not be partisan issues. In recent years, a strong property rights movement, hostile to any land-use regulation, has emerged within the Republican party, especially in the West. It is a mistake to make measures associated with metropolitan regionalism a partisan issue. In the face of strong opposition to unregulated growth and concern about the consequences of urban decline, such a narrow interpretation of constituents' interests is doomed to failure in the long run.

Fifth, metropolitanism has different implications across racial groups, and this cannot be ignored. Metropolitan regionalism can only succeed as a strategy for building common interests and accom-

modating diverse needs, not as a way of cutting out the "inconvenient" concerns of racial minorities. Accordingly, the institutional goals of regionalism and the legislative initiatives it embraces must be designed to work toward building common interests in a racially inclusive decisionmaking process.

Notes

1. On the development and early implementation of Oregon's plan, see H. Jeffrey Leonard, *Managing Oregon's Growth: The Politics of Development Planning* (Washington, D.C.: Conservation Foundation, 1983).
2. Paul G. Lewis, *Shaping Suburbia: How Political Institutions Organize Urban Development* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), pp. 105-06; Carl Abbott, *Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth in a Twentieth Century City* (University of Nebraska Press, 1983), p. 257.
3. Abbott notes that Portland city officials were not enthusiastic about Metro because they feared it would take over responsibility for the city's profitable water supply system, *Portland*, p. 254.
4. Margaret Weir, "Planning, Environmentalism, and Urban Poverty: The Political Failure of National Land Use Planning Legislation, 1970-1975," in Robert Fishman, ed., *The American Planning Tradition: Culture and Policy* (Washington, D.C., and Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center and Johns Hopkins University Press, in press).
5. Abbott, *Portland*, p. 251.
6. See the discussion in Gerrit Knaap, "Land Use Politics in Oregon," in Carl Abbott, Deborah Howe, and Sy Adler, eds., *Planning the Oregon Way: A Twenty-Year Evaluation* (Oregon State University Press, 1994), pp. 6-7.
7. Abbott, *Portland*, p. 250.
8. Carl Abbott, "The Capital of Good Planning: Metropolitan Portland, Oregon since 1970," in Fishman, *The American Planning Tradition*, Leonard, *Managing Oregon's Growth*, p. 89.
9. Also, as Abbott notes, the election of MSD commission members made Metro more palatable to suburbanites, *Portland*, p. 262.
10. John J. Harrigan and William C. Johnson, *Governing the Twin Cities Region: The Metropolitan Council in Regional Perspective* (University of Minnesota Press, 1978), p. 33.
11. There was opposition from some suburban areas and from the counties. See Arthur Natalin and John Brandl, *The Twin Cities Regional Strategy* (St. Paul, Minn.: Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities Area, 1980), p. 24.
12. Myron Orfield, *Metropolitics: A Regional Agenda for Community and Stability* (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and Brookings, 1997), pp. 143-44.
13. Harrigan and Johnson, *Governing the Twin Cities Region*, pp. 23-24; see also John J. Harrigan, "The Politics of Regionalism in the Twin Cities," paper

- prepared for HUD Roundtable on Regionalism, Washington, D.C., December 8-9, 1994, table 2; Judith A. Martin, "In Fits and Starts: The Twin Cities Metropolitan Framework," in Donald N. Rothblatt and Andrew Sanction, eds., *Metropolitan Governance: American/Canadian Intergovernmental Perspectives* (University of California, Institute of Governmental Studies, 1993), pp. 205-43.
14. Leonard, *Managing Oregon's Growth*, pp. 17-18, 119.
 15. Harrigan, "The Politics of Regionalism in the Twin Cities," p. 10.
 16. Leonard, *Managing Oregon's Growth*, pp. 20-25.
 17. On the governors, see Natalin and Brandl, *The Twin Cities Regional Strategy*, pp. 25-26; Orfield, *Metropolitics*, p. 102.
 18. Abbott, "The Capital of Good Planning," pp. 17-18; see also Nohad A. Toulan, "Housing as a State Planning Goal," in Abbott, Howe, and Adler, *Planning the Oregon Way*, pp. 91-120.
 19. Leonard, *Managing Oregon's Growth*, pp. 109-10.
 20. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
 21. *Ibid.*, pp. 103-04.
 22. See Robert Liberty, "The Battle over Tom McCall's Legacy: The Story of Land Use in the 1995 Oregon Legislature," *Environmental and Urban Issues*, vol. 23, no. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 1-12.
 23. Judith A. Martin, "Renegotiating Metropolitan Consciousness: The Twin Cities Faces Its Future," in Donald N. Rothblatt and Andrew Sanction, eds., *Metropolitan Governance Revisited: American/Canadian Intergovernmental Perspectives*, (University of California, Institute for Governmental Studies, 1998), pp. 245-53; Harrigan, "The Politics of Regionalism in the Twin Cities," pp. 13-15; and Orfield, *Metropolitics*, pp. 173-80.
 24. Harrigan, "The Politics of Regionalism in the Twin Cities," pp. 17-18.
 25. Orfield, *Metropolitics*, pp. 104-55; Judith A. Martin, "Renegotiating Metropolitan Consciousness," pp. 243-44.
 26. Orfield, *Metropolitics*, p. 111.
 27. See Francine F. Rabinowitz and James Lamare, "After Suburbia What? The New Communities Movement in Los Angeles," in Werner Z. Hirsch, ed., *Los Angeles: Viability and Prospects for Metropolitan Leadership* (Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 189.
 28. For a careful analysis, see Gary J. Miller, *Cities by Contract: The Politics of Municipal Incorporation* (MIT Press, 1981).
 29. *Ibid.*, chaps. 6 and 7.
 30. *Ibid.*, p. 135.
 31. Jon C. Teaford, *Post-Suburbia: Government and Politics in the Edge Cities* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp. 103-05; Stephanie Pincetl, "The Regional Management of Growth in California: A History of Failure," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, vol. 18, no. 2 (June 1994), pp. 256-74.
 32. Miller, *Cities by Contract*, p. 124.
 33. Teaford, *Post-Suburbia*, pp. 105-08. See the case study of Irvine, California, by Martin J. Schiesl, "Designing the Model Community: The Irvine Company and Suburban Development, 1950-88," in Rob Kling, Spencer Olin, and

Mark Poster, eds., *Post Suburban California: The Transformation of Orange County Since World War II* (University of California Press, 1991), pp. 55-91.

34. Robert C. Fellmeth, *The Politics of Land* (Crossman Publishers, 1973), pp. 391-92; "Environment," *California Journal* (August 1970), pp. 228-29.

35. Fellmeth, *The Politics of Land*, p. 462.

36. On the Coastal Commission, see Melvin B. Mogulof, *Saving the Coast: California's Experiment in Intergovernmental Land Use Control* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1975); Paul A. Sabatier and Daniel A. Mazmanian, *Can Regulation Work? The Implementation of the 1972 California Coastal Initiative* (Plenum Press, 1983), chap. 2.

37. See Mike Davis, *City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles* (London: Verso Press, 1990), chap. 3; Pincel, "The Regional Management of Growth," pp. 267-72.

38. On politics and land development interests in the Southwest more generally, see Amy Bridges, *Morning Glories: Municipal Reform in the Southwest* (Princeton University Press, 1997).

39. See Fellmeth, *The Politics of Land*, chap. 12; Lou Cannon, *Ronnie and Jesse* (Doubleday, 1969).

40. See George C. Hemmens and Janet McBride, "Planning and Development Decision Making in the Chicago Region," in Rothblatt and Sanction, *Metropolitan Governance*, pp. 111-52.

41. These arrangements also benefited the city. See Ester Fuchs, *Mayors and Money: Fiscal Policy in New York and Chicago* (University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 192-200. On the Metropolitan Sanitary District, see Judith A. Martin and Sam Bass Warner, Jr., "Local Initiative and Metropolitan Repetition: Chicago 1972-1990," in Fishman, *The American Planning Tradition*.

42. See Arthur Nattalin, "A Mayor Looks at the States," in James H. Andrews, ed., *The State and Its Cities*, University of Illinois Bulletin, vol. 64, no. 108 (April 28, 1967), p. 110. On public assistance in Chicago, see Edward C. Banfield, *Political Influence* (Free Press, 1961).

43. Milton Rakove, *Don't Make No Waves, Don't Back No Losers: An Insider's Analysis of the Daley Machine* (Indiana University Press, 1975), chap. 5 and pp. 234-56.

44. See Gilbert Y. Steiner, *Metropolitan Government and the Real World: The Case of Chicago* (Loyola University, Center for Research in Urban Government, 1966), p. 12.

45. George C. Hemmens, "Planning and Development Decision Making in the Chicago Region," in Rothblatt and Sanction, *Metropolitan Governance Revisited*, p. 151.

46. Teaford, *Post-Suburbia*, p. 125.

47. For an argument about the effects of the initiative process on California, see Peter Schrag, *Paradise Lost: A California Experience, America's Future* (New Press, 1998).

48. See Spencer Olin, "Intraclass Conflict and the Politics of a Fragmented Region," in *Post Suburban California*, pp. 238-41.

49. See Margaret Weir, "Central Cities' Loss of Power in State Politics," *Citiescape*, vol. 2, no. 2 (May 1996), pp. 23-26.

50. For a discussion of the dispute over the third regional airport, see Hemmens, "Planning and Development Decision Making in the Chicago Region," in Rothblatt and Sanction, *Metropolitan Governance Revisited*, pp. 140-43.

51. See Philip Franching, "Mt. Prospect Debates Plan for 'Crime Tax,'" *Chicago Sun-Times*, September 20, 1993, p. 6. The plan was ultimately defeated by the owners of the apartment buildings.