

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjms20

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Published online: 01 May 2015.

To cite this article: Dani Carrillo (2015): Politics and Group Belonging: Predictors of Naturalisation Behaviour in France, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2015.1032900

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2015.1032900

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 2015
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2015.1032900

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Politics and Group Belonging: Predictors of Naturalisation Behaviour in France

Dani Carrillo

Citizenship scholars in Europe often focus on the institutional factors that influence naturalisation, but a less explored topic in the literature is the role of politics and group belonging in naturalisation behaviour—factors that have been proven to influence immigrants' behaviour in the North American context. Through analysis of the extensive Trajectories and Origins (2008) data-set, I find that interest in politics shapes naturalisation behaviour and outcomes, and living in an anti-immigrant climate, identifying as Muslim and feeling otherised is negatively correlated with naturalisation behaviour. Lastly, Arab immigrants are more likely to seek French naturalisation and have this status than White, non-EU immigrants. This paper sets a quantitative foundation for the role of political orientation and context, and ethnic group belonging in shaping immigrants' naturalisation behaviour in France. It ends with proposals for a future research agenda on studying the political integration of different ethnic groups in France, and Europe generally.

Keywords: Citizenship; *Exclusion*; *Ethnic Groups*; *France*; *Politics*

As the number of international migrants increases year after year (UN-DESA and OECD 2013), the question of naturalisation has received more scholarly attention (Dronkers and Vink 2012). For immigrants, naturalisation is one key strategy to gain political enfranchisement. It can also facilitate upward economic mobility (Fougère and Safi 2009) and solidify one's sense of belonging in a new nation (Maxwell and Bleich 2014). For host countries, naturalisation levels are an important indicator of a country's political inclusiveness, and they also reflect immigrants' overall political integration and incorporation into the state (Bloemraad 2006).

In France, a country with fairly liberal naturalisation criteria (Fougère and Safi 2009), only 35% of the foreign-born population was a French citizen in 2008, compared to 54% of foreign-born residents in the Netherlands and 66% of foreign-born residents in Sweden (Reichel 2012). In this paper, I explore what factors could be

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influencing immigrants' likelihood of being French citizens, and I examine how these factors correlate with plans to naturalise in France. I use the rich Trajectories and Origins (TeO) data-set to investigate these questions. While scholars in Europe often focus on the institutional factors that influence naturalisation (namely the openness or stringency of naturalisation laws and an immigrant's ability to meet them; Dronkers and Vink 2012; Reichel 2012), I borrow from North American theorists (Bueker 2005; Pantoja and Gershon 2006; Van Hook, Brown, and Bean 2006; Logan, Oh, and Darrah 2012), to explore the role of ethno-racial group belonging, religious affiliation and politics in naturalisation behaviour—the first such attempt in the French context. I find that living in a region with an anti-immigrant climate, being Muslim and/or being perceived as an other in France is negatively correlated with French citizenship, showing how stigmatisation can be a hindrance to political incorporation.

This paper opens a new conversation on the role of political orientation and context, as well as how ethnicity and religious affiliation shape immigrants' experiences and naturalisation behaviour in France—important extensions as more diverse populations from Asia and sub-Saharan Africa migrate to France (Beauchemin, Lagrange, and Safi 2011) and Europe generally. Before expanding on the theories I engage with in this article, I provide a very brief overview of immigration history and citizenship policies in France from the early twentieth century to the present.

Immigration in France

France is recognised as one of the top immigrant destinations in Europe, and in 2013, over 11% of its population, or over 7.5 million residents, was foreign-born, making France an important case study for naturalisation (Eurostat Database 2014). Many of France's immigrants came as labour migrants primarily from European countries in the first half of the twentieth century, shifting to primarily non-European labour migrants starting in the 1960s (Noiriel 1996). During the 1970s and 1980s, the gender and age demographic of the immigrant population changed as more female and older migrants came to France through family reunification (Bertossi and Hajjat 2013). The number of family reunifications has slightly declined as more restrictive immigration laws have passed since the 1990s (Joppke 2008). Several refugee populations have also flowed in from countries like Spain and Russia throughout the mid-twentieth century and Cambodia and Vietnam in the 1970s (Noiriel 1996). In 2011, the three largest immigrant groups in France came from Algeria (around 737,000 individuals), Morocco (around 680,000 individuals) and Portugal (around 592,000 individuals; INSEE 2011). In the mid-2000s, the naturalisation policy shifted to facilitate the entry and naturalisation of high-skilled migrants (Bertossi and Hajjat 2013).

Naturalisation Theories: Socio-economic Status, Politics and Group Belonging

Existing theories explaining naturalisation patterns in Europe have traditionally focused on the naturalisation laws of different European countries (Reichel 2012;

Dronkers and Vink 2012), and individuals' capacity to meet them. North American scholars have found that other, more sociopolitical factors are also key drivers of naturalisation behaviour, including one's political orientations (Pantoja and Gershon 2006), local political context (Van Hook, Brown, and Bean 2006) and ethno-racial group belonging (Logan, Oh, and Darrah 2012). These factors are neglected in most studies of French and other European naturalisation, however, making them an important avenue for research.

Socio-economic Status

French citizenship can provide more access to public jobs and ensure mobility to seek employment and freely travel throughout the European Union. Indeed, scholars have effectively shown that naturalisation leads to better employment outcomes and a higher income in France, and the pool of jobs one can apply to widens significantly (Bertossi and Hajjat 2013).[1] As such, if one assumes a rational choice approach to naturalisation, one would expect that migrants from lower socio-economic backgrounds would be more likely to *intend* to naturalise because they would have more to gain from it. However, when it comes to naturalisation *outcomes*, scholars have identified a positive association between higher socio-economic status (SES; namely education) and naturalisation in the USA and Europe (Bloemraad 2006, 46; Dronkers and Vink 2012). In addition, even though there is no explicit income requirement to apply for French citizenship, individuals must still demonstrate they are on a path towards 'professional integration' in France when applying for naturalisation.[2] This leads me to my first hypothesis.

> H1: Immigrants with lower SES will be more likely to seek naturalisation, but they will be less likely to have this status than immigrants with higher SES.

Political Orientation and Context

Apart from the economic incentives to naturalise, one notable political benefit of naturalisation is participating in French elections. Given this, immigrants who have a more positive political orientation may be more incentivised to naturalise in order to participate in the formal electoral process. American scholars have documented this pattern in the USA (Pantoja and Gershon 2006) where Latino/a immigrants who are more interested in politics are more likely to be US citizens. Beyond an immigrant's interest in politics, an immigrant's local political climate may also influence the incentive to naturalise in order to vote. In their study of immigrants in the USA, Van Hook, Brown, and Bean (2006) found that individuals were more likely to naturalise in states that had a more favourable reception towards immigrants than in states with less favourable environments.

Just as likely, I contend, is a reactive effect, such that xenophobic attitudes, in general, may lead to higher motivations to naturalise, especially in areas where there is potential for immigrant mobilisation. There is evidence of a resistance argument in the USA where more restrictive welfare policies against immigrants resulted in higher

voting outcomes among immigrants that lived in those states (Ramakrishnan 2005). There is also suggestive evidence of immigrant mobilisation in France where second-generation immigrants from North and sub-Saharan African countries have been involved in organised marches against racism and against discrimination towards ethno-racial minorities (Hargreaves 1991; Beaud and Masclet 2006). These incidents suggest that immigrants may be more likely to mobilise in the face of hostility in France, and one way of doing this is by seeking naturalisation. Lastly, scholars have examined the role of migrants' original political regimes in shaping political behaviour, and they concluded that coming from an authoritarian regime increases immigrants' chances of naturalisation because one is less likely to want to return to that country of origin (Bueker 2005). Thus, my next set of hypotheses:

> H2: Immigrants who are more interested in French politics will be more likely to seek naturalisation, and they will be more likely to be French citizens.
>
> H3: Immigrants in an anti-immigrant climate will be more likely to seek naturalisation, and they will be more likely to be French citizens.
>
> H4: Immigrants coming from an authoritarian regime will be more likely to seek naturalisation, and they will be more likely to be French citizens.

Group Belonging and Marginalisation

In addition to the economic and political factors that may influence immigrants' plans to naturalise, one's belonging to a particular ethnic group can shape one's experiences in France. These experiences may subsequently influence one's plans to naturalise and the actual citizenship outcome. Studies in the USA have highlighted how naturalisation is a self-protection strategy among ethno-racial minorities—Black immigrants being more likely to naturalise in the USA than White immigrants, holding other factors equal (Logan, Oh, and Darrah 2012). Scholars increasingly examine boundaries in constructing grouped-ness and moral distinctions (Alba 2005; Lamont 2000), and they show how these boundaries impact individuals' strategic behaviour. Prominent within this literature is Tajfel's social identity theory, for which Hochman (2011, 1408) gives the following summary:

> Social identity theory proposes that individual mobility makes sense only if the boundaries between one's current in-group and the target out-group are perceived to be permeable. If they are perceived to be impermeable, individuals are expected to turn to an alternative identity strategy in order to increase the relative value of their group.

This theorisation of social identity is particularly relevant in France, where immigrants are characterised by groups that are both 'more' and 'less' like the native French population, either due to their religion or ethnicity.[3]

Multiple studies have pointed to the strong, or 'bright', boundary that exists between Muslims and people of other religions, particularly Christians, in France and other Western European countries (Zolberg and Woon 1999; Alba 2005). This boundary became even more pronounced on 15 March 2004 when former president Jacques

Chirac passed a law banning all religious symbols, including Muslim headscarves, or *hijabs*, from public schools.[4] By being targeted for wearing headscarves, Muslims, particularly Muslim women, have felt otherised and marginalised by the French state (Killian 2003). Muslim men have also felt subject to this otherisation as documented by qualitative studies focusing on the experiences of North African men (many of them identifying as Muslim; Lamont 2000, 171; Sayad 2004).

Furthermore, in a report by the National Consulting Commission for Human Rights (CNCDH), a majority of French individuals (55%) claimed that Muslims were 'a group apart' in France (2012, 461), and only 22% of individuals surveyed had a positive opinion of Islam compared to 44% who had a positive opinion of Catholicism and 39% who had a positive opinion of religion in general (23). These opinions are not surprising given the portrayal of Islam as being incompatible with European values (Foner and Alba 2008). Lastly, in an experimental study by Adida, Laitin, and Valfort (2014), researchers found that Muslims and majority French individuals (i.e. those had been in France for three generations or more), were mutually less likely to trust each other, even when controlling for country of origin—further illustrating the boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims in France. This strong distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims in France makes them a severely stigmatised group when it comes to asserting their French identity.

France has generally prided itself on its colour-blind, Republican ideals that translate into a lack of recognition of ethno-racial identity and of measurement of race in government or social science research studies (Amiraux and Simon 2006). However, this does not eliminate the use of ethno-racial terms such as *beur* (French back slang for Arab), *noir* or *black*, and *blanc* (White) in everyday vernacular and the media (Hargreaves 2005), and it does not impede individuals from acknowledging these ethno-racial differences in everyday interactions. Academics have argued that racial boundaries in France are not as strong as racial boundaries in the USA (Alba 2005; Lamont 2000), but this does not preclude racially coded prejudices and negative attitudes against individuals coming from Arab countries (such as North Africa) and sub-Saharan African countries (Bleich 2009). In fact, Lamont (2000) found boundary-making processes between White French workers and North African workers in France as North Africans were depicted as 'unassimilable' in interviews. These negative opinions towards ethno-racial minorities have only grown in the early 2000s (Lamont and Duvoux 2014).

In the same report by the CNCDH, 42% of individuals indicated that North Africans, or Maghrebins were 'a group apart' in France, while 38% agreed with that statement for Asians, and 19% agreed with this statement for Blacks (CNCDH 2012, 19) further demonstrating the boundaries that are perceived to exist between different ethno-racial groups.[5] Analysis of the TeO survey by other researchers has also demonstrated the prevalence of both self-reported and situational discrimination among visible minorities, such as those from North African and sub-Saharan African countries, when compared to their European counterparts (Safi and Simon 2014). Lastly, other research finds that first and second-generation immigrants claim their

national origins as a strong component of their identity, indicating the salience of their origins as part of their lived experience (Simon and Tiberj 2012).

Given these ethno-racial and religious boundaries, we might expect that, in general, ethno-racial minorities will seek naturalisation as an inclusion strategy into the French majority group, but that groups especially stigmatised, such as Muslims, will seek naturalisation less because Muslims may perceive the boundary between them and the French majority as impermeable.

Extending this argument, and regardless of ethno-racial or religious background, immigrants who perceive a greater social distance from the majority will probably be less likely to seek naturalisation as a result of their perceived exclusion. Similarly, living in poorer areas, often suburbs or *banlieues*, may also make immigrants feel excluded and less likely to seek and have French citizenship.[6] The French government designates poorer areas, often suburbs, as *Zones Urbaines Sensibles* (ZUS) or Sensitive Urban Zones, and the media and academics alike often stigmatise these zones of poverty and exclusion (Avenel 2009).

Thus, my third set of hypotheses:

> H5a: Immigrants who belong to partially stigmatized groups (i.e. ethno-racial minorities) will be more likely to seek naturalisation to prove their sense of belonging in France, and they will also be more likely to be French citizens.
>
> H5b: However, immigrants who belong to severely stigmatized groups (i.e. Muslims) will be less likely to seek naturalisation because they do not feel entitled, nor welcomed, to be a French citizen. They will also be less likely to be French citizens.
>
> H6: Immigrants who report feeling otherised or who live in Zones Urbaines Sensibles (ZUS), or stigmatized French neighbourhoods, will be less likely to seek naturalisation. They will also be less likely to be French citizens.

In sum, naturalisation comes with economic, political and symbolic benefits that hold different values for migrants depending on their SES, political orientation and context, and ethnic group belonging. These factors notwithstanding, naturalisation can still come at a cost. For some individuals, naturalising can be seen as a mark of disloyalty to one's nation (Sayad 2004), and it may have penalties for those coming from countries that ban dual citizenship. Lastly, while the requirements for naturalisation in France may be seen as relatively relaxed compared to those in other countries,[7] it can still be a long process that requires a due amount of patience to acquire the necessary paperwork to apply and to go through the year and a half process of obtaining French citizenship (Simon 2010). In the following analyses, I set to explore how SES, political orientation and context and ethnic group belonging influence naturalisation behaviours, holding all else constant. I outline my data and methods below.

Data and Methods

Data

TeO is a nationally representative survey of first-generation immigrants, children of immigrants, and 'majority French' individuals that have extensive questions on migration histories, lifestyles, trajectories and identities. The survey was conducted from Fall 2008 to Spring 2009, and it covers over 22,000 individuals (approximately 8500 are first-generation immigrants, 8200 are second-generation immigrants, and about 5300 are 'majority French' or were born in French territories overseas).

Most TeO survey respondents (98%) had resided in France for at least three years (either with or without documents) and all were over 18 years of age at the time of the survey. The surveys were conducted during hour-long, face-to-face interviews by a team of researchers employed by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), and most interviews were conducted in French, even though interpreters were available to conduct interviews in 10 languages at the interviewee's request (Algava and Lhommeau 2013). The surveyors used a multi-stage probability sampling technique to construct a list of potential respondents. INSEE researchers started with a list of potential respondents from individuals that were surveyed in the 2007 census (which was already geographically representative of the population). They further trimmed down the list by selecting foreign-born respondents who were born from the 20th to 25th of the month, and the final respondents were selected to represent a wide variety of nationalities (Algava and Lhommeau 2013).[8]

In this analysis, I focus on the non-EU foreign-born immigrant population. Much immigration literature in France has focused on the experiences of North African immigrants, a majority of whom are Muslim (Hargreaves 1991; Sayad 2004). However, focusing only on this group prevents scholars from examining the behaviours of other major groups of immigrants and, especially, seeing whether the experiences of North Africans are distinct from other migrants. This survey adequately represents the smaller groups of immigrants that are often ignored but form an important part of the foreign-born mosaic in France—these groups include immigrants from Asian countries, such as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and Western countries, such as the USA or Australia. This is also the first survey to explicitly ask questions on religious identification to a wide range of individuals along with attitudinal questions on identity and belonging. Given that the pros and cons of naturalising are different for EU migrants (i.e. they can vote in local elections and move freely throughout the EU), I limit my sample to only non-EU immigrants.[9]

Dependent Variables: French Citizenship Status and Intentions to Naturalise

My primary outcome variable is a dichotomous variable indicating one's French citizenship status, that is, whether a foreign-born immigrant has acquired French citizenship. I classify individuals as naturalised French citizens if they indicate they are French citizens via reintegration, naturalisation or marriage (coded as one). If one is *exclusively* a foreign national, one's French citizenship status is coded as zero.

My secondary outcome variable examines intentions to naturalise among recent un-naturalised foreign citizens. This dependent variable looks at anticipated behaviours or experiences among non-French citizens. Because there could be a selection issue with surveying un-naturalised migrants who come from a variety of cohorts (from the more recently arrived to those who have spent many years in France), I limit my analysis on this variable to only more recent migrants (i.e. those who have lived in France for seven years or less). I calculate intentions to naturalise based on respondents' answer to the following question: 'do you intend to request French nationality?' The respondents could say: 'yes, my request is being processed; yes, but my request was refused; no, but I intend to do so; [or], no, and I do not intend to do so'. Respondents who currently have an application being processed, who have been refused naturalisation or who say they intend to naturalise are coded as one, while respondents who have *no intention* of requesting French nationality are coded as zero.

I have binary dependent variables, thus I use logit regressions in my analyses. In addition, I calculate the average marginal effect of each variable in my results to ease interpretation of the data, and I use survey weights that match the general immigrant population in France.[10] The first set of regression models on French citizenship status includes all immigrants who have lived in France for more than seven years (the length of the minimum residency requirement in addition to the average time it takes to become a naturalised citizen). For the second set of regression models on intentions to naturalise, I include all recently arrived *solely* foreign citizens. For both outcome variables, I only include immigrants who migrated to France as adults in order to capture individuals who would presumably have more autonomy in their naturalisation behaviour. In other words, I want to ensure that individuals did not naturalise due to a guardian's influence—although such influence may understandably have bearing on their behaviour.

It is difficult to draw causality in these analyses because I draw all my results from cross-sectional survey data. First, naturalisation levels are based on what is reported and nationality status was not verified after the survey, so some of these estimates could be overstated. However, the weighted naturalisation levels of first-generation immigrants in the TeO sample I analyse are the same as the naturalisation levels of foreign-born citizens in France in 2008, (35% according to Reichel 2012). Second, the cross-sectional nature of this survey does not allow one to track attitudes or behaviours over time. For example, achieving a certain level of economic stability or education may make one feel more included in France, *or* initial feelings of belonging could facilitate socio-economic integration. Cross-sectional data make it difficult to determine what behaviours or attitudes precede others, but they show linkages between attitudes and behaviours at a given moment that lend evidence to causal patterns. These limitations aside, the survey is one of the few data-sets that captures a diverse, nationally representative sample of first and second-generation immigrants in France, and it contains key variables on religious affiliation and local context factors that are typically absent from other surveys.

Independent Variables: Controls, SES, Politics and Group Belonging

Demographic Controls and Special Category Status

The control variables in my model include gender (coded as a dummy variable), and age (coded as a continuous variable), fluency in French (coded as a dummy), and number of years in France (coded as a continuous variable). I also distinguished whether one came to France as a refugee, came from a former French colony, and whether one is married to a French citizen by assigning dummy variables for the three categories (1 = yes, 0 = no).[11]

Socio-economic Status

I use three independent variables to measure a respondent's SES: employment status, income and education. For employment status, I distinguish between those who are employed, students and unemployed individuals by creating dummy variables for all three categories. I created a separate dummy variable for students because they are likely to be unemployed, but they are still on a presumed path to upward mobility. The income variable is similarly coded into two dummy variables: one to code for individuals who have a monthly income at or above the national average in France at the time of the survey (i.e. 2000 euros a month or more), and one to code for missing income values (no response was given, or the response was refused).[12] Those with a zero on both variables have a reported income below 2000 euros a month. For education, I create a dummy variable indicating if individuals have completed their high school education.

Political Variables

I include three sets of variables to capture one's political motivations to naturalise. Since citizenship is required for voting, I measure political interest; immigrants who strongly agree or agree that they are interested in French national politics, are coded as one, while individuals who strongly disagree or disagree with this statement are coded as zero. To examine an immigrant's local political context, I construct three dummy variables to identify departments with varying forms of hostility for immigrants. They range from hostile (i.e. the percentage of voters that voted for the extreme right-wing Front National (FN) is over 15% in the 2007 first-round presidential elections), somewhat hostile (FN vote between 10% and 15%) and not very hostile (less than 10%).[13] Finally, political motivations might also be related to the homeland, especially migration away from authoritarian regimes. I use Freedom House reports to identify un-free countries, or those with more authoritarian regimes, in 2008, and I use their classification system to create a dummy variable for authoritarian countries of origin for immigrants in France.[14]

Group Belonging and Marginalisation Variables

Because questions on race, or phenotype, are not allowed in France, there is no direct measure to indicate an individual's racial identity. However, I can roughly ascertain the ethnicity of an individual by the country they were born in. The ethno-racial group categories (Arab, Near/Middle-Eastern, Black, Asian and White), are mostly regionally

drawn, with the exception of White immigrants who come from majority White countries from a variety of geographic regions. Individuals from countries classified by the World Bank as belonging to the Arab world (i.e. North African countries or countries such as Lebanon and Syria) are coded as Arab. While individuals from Turkey and other Middle-Eastern, or Near-Eastern countries such as Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan are classified as Near/Middle-Eastern. Immigrants from all sub-Saharan African countries are classified as Black. Individuals from all countries in South and Southeast Asia comprise the Asian category. Those from Europe, North America and the Oceania are classified as White. While clearly there are important distinctions between these categories, or similarities among people across these categories, I classify individuals into these five groups because individuals from these countries are often racialised similarly, as discussed above, and this provides a first attempt at separating out ethno-racial background from religious background, something that is rarely tested in the French empirical studies of immigrant integration.[15]

I group the respondents' self-reported religious affiliations into four main categories that are coded as dummy variables: Atheist/Agnostic, Christian/Catholic, Muslim and Other. I capture one's subjective, self-reported perception of otherisation in France by creating two dummy variables indicating whether individuals said in the survey that they are 'seen as French' (or not), or if they do not know or refuse to answer this question. Lastly, I create a binary variable indicating if individuals lived in a stigmatised area, or a ZUS at the time of the survey.

Results

Before discussing the regression results, I provide some weighted descriptive statistics on the sample of survey respondents I focus on in Table 1.[16]

I display the descriptive statistics according to the sample population in each of my regression analyses. The first sample (the two columns on the left side of the table) includes only immigrants who have lived in France for more than seven years, while the second sample (the last column on the right-hand side of the table) includes all immigrants who are *not* naturalised that have migrated to France in the past seven years.

Descriptive Statistics

Immigrants with More than Seven Years in France

Among all the immigrants in my sample living for more than seven years in France, 45.7% of them are French citizens. The characteristics for naturalised immigrants who have lived in France for more than seven years do not differ too much from un-naturalised immigrants in my sample, with a few exceptions. A higher percentage of naturalised immigrants are fluent in French (82.3%) as opposed to (71.9%) of un-naturalised immigrants. Similarly, a higher percentage of naturalised immigrants are married to French citizens (17.7%) than un-naturalised immigrants (11.7%). Naturalised immigrants are more socio-economically advantaged than those without

Table 1. Weighted descriptive statistics of non-EU adult migrant samples.

	Immigrants with > 7 years in France		≤7 years in France
	Naturalised	Un-naturalised	Un-naturalised
Demographic controls and legal criteria			
Female	47.3%	48.1%	57.2%
Mean age	46.2	42.9	32.6
Former colony	64.9%	64.6%	58.9%
Refugee migrant	15.1%	9.4%	8.9%
Married to French citizen	17.7%	11.7%	22.7%
Fluent in French	82.3%	71.9%	62.0%
Years in France	20.5	16.9	4.3
Dual citizenship ban	29.4%	32.8%	32.5%
Socio-economic status			
Employed	74.6%	63.0%	48.3%
Student	0.5%	1.4%	13.2%
Unemployed	25.0%	35.6%	38.5%
Below monthly income of 2000 euros	16.8%	31.5%	40.9%
Missing monthly income	8.7%	8.1%	7.6%
High school diploma+	49.8%	35.8%	58.3%
Politics			
Interest in French politics	58.9%	42.6%	44.1%
Moderate FN presence (10–15%)	30.4%	35.1%	38.5%
Strong FN presence (15%+)	44.8%	46.4%	34.0%
Authoritarian regime	47.9%	49.6%	52.0%
Group belonging and marginalisation			
White	7.0%	6.7%	11.8%
Arab	50.4%	48.2%	41.3%
Near/Middle-Eastern	8.5%	11.0%	10.9%
Black	20.7%	21.8%	23.3%
Asian	13.5%	12.1%	12.7%
Christian/Catholic	25.1%	19.2%	24.8%
None	14.6%	12.6%	13.3%
Muslim	52.5%	62.0%	55.5%
Other	7.8%	6.2%	6.4%
Doesn't know if seen as French	8.0%	6.4%	9.4%
Not seen as French	51.9%	61.5%	67.3%
Lives in ZUS	19.9%	26.8%	22.6%
Dependent variables			
Intend to request French citizenship		74.7%	76.5%
Papers in process		22.2%	14.4%
Applied but refused		6.4%	3.7%
Plans, but has not done so		46.1%	57.3%
Has no plans to naturalise		25.3%	24.5%
Total number of non-EU adult immigrants in sample	1269	1376	802

Source: Trajectories and Origins (2008).

citizenship, and 58.9% of them are interested in French politics as opposed to 42.6% of un-naturalised immigrants. Muslims make up a larger portion of the un-naturalised immigrant population (62%) as opposed to making up 52.5% of the naturalised

immigrant population. Over 60% of un-naturalised citizens claim they are not seen as French as opposed to about half of naturalised citizens. Lastly, a larger percentage of un-naturalised immigrants live in ZUSs (26.8%) compared to their naturalised counterparts (19.9%).

Recent, Un-naturalised Immigrants

The more recent un-naturalised immigrant sample has a larger percentage of females (57.2%) than older un-naturalised immigrants, and they are also about a 10 years younger on average. Surprisingly, a majority of them (58.3%) have a high school diploma. The recent immigrant sample population has a slightly higher representation of people from majority 'White' countries (11.8% as opposed to about 7% from older cohorts) and a slightly lower representation of people from countries in the Arab world (41.3% as opposed to about half from older cohorts). Unsurprisingly, 67.3% of un-naturalised immigrants from recent cohorts believe they are not seen as French, as opposed to about 60% of un-naturalised immigrants and about 50% of naturalised immigrants from older cohorts. The recent cohort sample is similar to the older cohort sample on other variables displayed in Table 1.

Intentions and Outcome of Being a French Citizen

On the left-hand side of Table 2, I show the factors correlated with the outcome of being a French citizen, and on the right-hand side of the table, I show the factors correlated with individual intentions to naturalise. In both regressions, the first model includes demographic control variables and variables on migration history, along with variables on SES, politics and group belonging. The second model allows us to assess how feelings of marginalisation may influence naturalisation behaviour for ethno-racial or religious minorities. I describe the results of my control variables on demographics and migration history before discussing the variables of interest in my hypotheses.

When it comes to naturalisation *outcomes*, one's migration history and age are highly correlated with whether one is a French citizen or not. Females, refugees, spouses of French citizens and immigrants who are fluent in French have higher odds of being French citizens, particularly refugees and spouses of French citizens. I then examine if immigrants belonging to these particular categories are more likely to intend to naturalise. My results indicate that one control variable that is positively correlated with French citizenship status is similarly correlated with *intentions* to naturalise: refugees have about 30% higher odds of intending to request citizenship than non-refugees. Additionally, immigrants who come from a country that bans dual citizenship have about 9% lower odds of intending to naturalise. Less expectedly, being a spouse of a French citizen, being female, or having lived a longer period of time in France is not statistically significantly correlated with intending to naturalise. I now turn to the results on the particular variables of interest in this study: SES, political orientation and context, group belonging and naturalisation.

Table 2. Weighted average marginal effects of logistic regressions.

	Being a French citizen		Intention to become a French citizen	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Female	0.033* (2.43)	0.031* (2.33)	0.015 (0.94)	0.015 (0.96)
Age	0.006*** (3.91)	0.006*** (3.84)	0.000 (–0.18)	−0.001 (–0.31)
Former colony	0.009 (0.37)	0.016 (0.63)	−0.008 (–0.15)	0.002 (0.03)
Refugee migrant	0.207*** (8.21)	0.206*** (8.13)	0.315*** (3.87)	0.305*** (3.71)
Married to French citizen	0.163*** (4.33)	0.161*** (4.08)	−0.005 (–0.12)	−0.011 (–0.27)
Fluent in French	0.075** (3.02)	0.072** (3.02)	−0.034 (–1.02)	−0.037 (–1.14)
Number of years in France	0.007*** (4.58)	0.007*** (4.43)	0.011 (1.09)	0.010 (1.08)
Dual citizenship ban	−0.054 (–1.39)	−0.056 (–1.48)	−0.093* (–2.27)	−0.088* (–2.15)
Employment status (ref: employed)				
Student	−0.170* (–2.17)	−0.155* (–1.96)	−0.199* (–2.12)	−0.208* (–2.32)
Unemployed	−0.091*** (–3.41)	−0.084*** (–3.3)	−0.076 (–1.69)	−0.079 (–1.73)
Monthly income (ref: <2000 euros)				
≥ 2000 euros a month	0.145*** (7.57)	0.149*** (8.09)	0.052* (2.34)	0.054* (2.54)
Missing	0.123** (2.69)	0.126** (2.76)	−0.106 (–1.83)	−0.109 (–1.81)
High school diploma +	0.105** (2.94)	0.098** (2.76)	−0.022 (–0.53)	−0.024 (–0.57)
Interested in French politics	0.102*** (4.62)	0.096*** (4.48)	0.081** (2.84)	0.074** (2.59)
FN presence (ref: low <10% voters)				
Moderate (10–15% of voters)	−0.108** (–2.7)	−0.112** (–2.74)	0.022 (0.52)	0.020 (0.48)
High (>15% of voters)	−0.085** (–2.92)	−0.084** (–2.86)	0.053 (1.22)	0.050 (1.19)
Authoritarian regime	−0.038 (–1.25)	−0.039 (–1.24)	−0.006 (–0.15)	0.006 (0.17)
Ethnicity (ref: White)				
Arab	0.138** (2.85)	0.137** (2.77)	0.201* (2.3)	0.181* (2.2)
Near/Middle-Eastern	0.043 (0.83)	0.046 (0.9)	0.044 (0.58)	0.058 (0.83)
Black	0.026 (0.58)	0.041 (0.89)	0.104 (1.29)	0.111 (1.39)
Asian	0.029 (0.45)	0.043 (0.65)	−0.087 (–0.93)	−0.031 (–0.35)
Religion (ref: Christian/Catholic)				
None/Agnostic	−0.083* (–2.21)	−0.080* (–2.11)	−0.153* (–2.38)	−0.176** (–2.91)
Muslim	−0.119*** (–3.63)	−0.105** (–3.04)	−0.046 (–1.07)	−0.036 (–0.81)
Other	−0.025 (–0.7)	−0.023 (–0.64)	0.036 (0.38)	0.035 (0.37)
Seen as French (ref: seen as French)				
Don't know/ refusal		0.002 (0.05)		−0.078 (–1.3)
Not seen as French		−0.065* (–2.27)		−0.137*** (–3.85)
ZUS		−0.055 (–1.91)		0.004 (0.1)
Pseudo R^2	0.1245	0.1298	0.1688	0.1875
N	2645		802	

Source: Trajectories and Origins (2008).

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$; *z*-scores in parentheses.

Socio-economic Status

My first hypothesis predicted that lower SES immigrants were less likely to be French citizens, and this is supported in my results. Unemployed individuals have 8–9% lower odds of being French citizens than their employed counterparts, and conversely, immigrants with at least a high school diploma have about 10% higher odds of being a French citizen than those without a high school diploma. Individuals who make more than the monthly average income of 2000 euros have 14–15% higher odds of being French citizens, and individuals who refused to report their income also have 12% higher odds of being French citizens than those who stated they had a below average monthly income. When I explored how SES is correlated with intentions to naturalise, I found that immigrants with lower SES, or unemployed individuals, have 7% *lower* odds of intending to naturalise than employed individuals (at an almost statistically significant level), thus contradicting a theory of rational economic actors seeking citizenship for economic benefit. I found that students—likely unemployed, yet upwardly mobile individuals—have about 20% lower odds of intending to naturalise than employed immigrants. Lastly, individuals with an above average monthly income at the time of the survey have about 5% higher odds of intending to naturalise. Thus, higher SES is positively correlated with being a French citizen, and it is similarly positively correlated with plans to naturalise.

Political Orientation and Context

As hypothesised, immigrants with expressed interest in French politics have 10% higher odds of being French citizens. Interestingly, individuals living in a department with an anti-immigrant leaning have 8–11% *lower* odds of being a French citizen, while individuals coming from an authoritarian regime have slightly lower odds of being a French citizen (although not at a statistically significant level). In the secondary analysis on intentions to naturalise, I find that immigrants who express interest in French politics have about 8% higher odds of intending to naturalise. However, even though immigrants living in departments with an anti-immigrant climate have *lower* odds of *being* French citizens, immigrants living in a department with a moderately anti-immigrant climate have slightly *higher* odds of intending to naturalise (albeit not at a statistically significant level). Thus, immigrants' lower odds of naturalising in an anti-immigrant climate may *not* be due to a lack of interest in becoming a French citizen.

Group Belonging and Marginalisation

Looking at the effect of group belonging and marginalisation, I find that Arabs have about 14% higher odds of being French citizens than non-EU White immigrants, which goes along with my hypothesis of ethno-racial minorities having higher odds of being French citizens. When I include variables indicating marginalisation, the positive coefficient for being Arab decreases very slightly. With regard to intentions to naturalise, I hypothesised that immigrants belonging to partially stigmatised groups

(i.e. ethno-racial minorities) would be more likely to seek naturalisation to prove their belonging in France, and as predicted, I find that Arabs are more likely to plan to naturalise than non-EU White immigrants, with Arabs having about 20% higher odds of intending to naturalise. Other ethno-racial minorities are more likely to plan to naturalise, but the positive coefficients are not statistically significant. When I include variables on marginalisation, the positive coefficient for being Arab *decreases* indicating that feelings of marginalisation may partly *increase* the odds of Arab immigrants planning to naturalise, supporting my hypothesis of reactive naturalisation practices among immigrants from partially stigmatised groups. With respect to severely stigmatised groups (i.e. Muslims), I predicted that Muslim immigrants will be less likely to express an interest in seeking naturalisation because they do not feel entitled or welcomed to be a French citizen. For similar reasons, they are also hypothesised to be less likely to be French citizens. As predicted, Muslims have about 10–12% lower odds of being a French citizen than Catholics or Christians, holding ethnic origin constant. When I include variables indicative of marginalisation, the Muslim coefficient is not as negatively correlated with French citizenship, indicating that feelings of otherisation or marginalisation may *lower* the odds of Muslim immigrants being French citizens. When I look at intentions to naturalise among Muslim immigrants, I find that they have about 4% lower odds of intending to naturalise than Christian/Catholic immigrants, but this result is not statistically significant. In sum, these results provide partial evidence of reactive naturalisation behaviour among ethno-racial minorities (whereby feelings of stigmatisation lead to proactive citizenship behaviour), but less conclusive naturalisation patterns among Muslim immigrants. There is weak evidence that Muslims' lower likelihood of having French citizenship is due to a lack of intention to naturalise, but there is partial evidence that being otherised further lowers Muslims' odds of being French citizens.

Regardless of one's ethno-racial or religious group belonging, individuals who feel that they are not seen as French have about 6% lower odds of being French citizens. Similarly, individuals who feel they are not seen as French have nearly 14% lower odds of intending to naturalise, which supports my hypothesis that otherisation deters one from becoming a French citizen. Residing in a ZUS is negatively correlated with having French citizenship at an almost statistically significant level, but it is not correlated with intending to naturalise. These results signal that stigma deriving from one's place of residence may partially impact naturalisation outcomes, but it may not impact naturalisation intentions.

Discussion

In sum, I find that SES, politics and ethnic group belonging are all correlated with having French citizenship and with naturalisation intentions. Higher SES is positively correlated with being a French citizen and intending to naturalise; one's interest in politics is positively correlated with naturalisation behaviour; and one's ethnic group belonging does impact one's naturalisation behaviour and outcomes. Because this is cross-sectional survey data, it is hard to draw strong causal inferences but the findings

bring us one step closer to underlying causal patterns of naturalisation behaviour. For example, past work by Tiberj and Simon (2012) indicates that citizenship status impacts one's interest in politics, so it could be that once an immigrant becomes a citizen, they are more likely to be interested in politics; at the same time, Tiberj and Simon also use cross-sectional data, so it is also plausible that for some immigrants, an interest in politics drives one's citizenship behaviour, as outlined here. Similarly, individuals may feel otherised because they are not French citizens. However, the results of otherisation being negatively correlated with intentions to naturalise fall in line with a marginalisation argument leading to lower French citizenship levels. The results are admittedly complicated by the fact that people belonging to particular ethno-racial groups or individuals with particular religious affiliations are more likely to feel otherised in the first place, making it hard to fully examine the separate effect of each independent variable. Nevertheless, because several of the variables that are correlated with intentions to naturalise are *also* correlated with actual citizenship outcomes, the findings suggest that the independent variables of interest (on group belonging, politics and marginalisation) do indeed impact naturalisation behaviour.

More broadly, the analysis of data on citizenship among immigrants in France speaks to a range of academic debates. The finding on the effect of SES on naturalisation behaviour coincides with the work of other immigration scholars who find a positive effect of SES on citizenship outcomes (but mostly through the mediator of education) (Bloemraad 2006, 46; Dronkers and Vink 2012). Given that immigrants are required to report their employment status and have a path towards occupational integration in France, this result is not so surprising. Yet these results add another dimension to the naturalisation literature, which largely ignores citizenship intentions. Not only does lack of employment hurt naturalisation, not being employed may lower one's chances of even *intending* to seek naturalisation. This suggests that immigrants are making strategic decisions about whether they have a probability of being a citizen before going through with the application process. Thus, even though the naturalisation process in France may not appear discretionary based on income and employment status, both of these factors play a role in naturalisation behaviour.

The fact that being interested in French politics coincides with seeking and having French citizenship mirrors the patterns of immigrants in the USA (Pantoja and Gershon 2006). Less studied is the effect of anti-immigrant politics on naturalisation behaviour. The French data are instructive here, as it finds that immigrants living in departments with an anti-immigrant climate are less likely to be French citizens. Yet, recent un-naturalised immigrants living in departments with an anti-immigrant climate are *not* less likely to intend to naturalise. Two mechanisms might explain this trend. On the one hand, individuals may be indicating that they *intend* to naturalise in districts hostile towards immigrants, but they may actually not be doing so leading to lower citizenship attainment in those departments. Alternatively, bureaucrats may be exercising more discretion when handling naturalisation requests in more hostile departments. That is, bureaucrats in departments with an anti-immigrant climate

may be more likely to reject immigrants' applications to naturalise because they may hold prejudiced attitudes towards those groups and/or be hesitant of the backlash they may receive from high rates of acceptances. Future research needs to explore these mechanisms, among others, that would explain the negative correlation between living in a department with an anti-immigrant climate and being a French citizen.

The analysis here speaks to how dynamics of marginalisation might affect citizenship, particularly based on ethno-racial or religious origins, a topic less studied in France, and with important implications in other immigrant receiving countries. Ethno-racial minorities, specifically Arabs, are more likely to seek French citizenship, and Arabs are more likely to obtain citizenship when compared to non-EU White immigrants, controlling for other factors. One argument to explain these findings is that Arabs are more likely to naturalise because they are using naturalisation as a strategy to gain or solidify their belonging to the 'in group' in France. To support this hypothesis, the survey indicates that while under half of non-EU White individuals think others do not see them as French, the percentage for Arab immigrants is slightly higher (56.5%). These percentages indicate that Arab immigrants, on the whole, feel more otherised than White, non-EU immigrants, and they may seek naturalisation as an inclusion strategy to reduce these perceived boundaries.

Other explanations, however, are also plausible. Immigrants from countries in the Arab world could have longer established ties in France, and these ties can come in the form of family members, friends and ethnic organisations catering to North African and/or Arabic-speaking populations, that would aid their naturalisation process. The higher propensity to naturalise among Arab immigrants could also be reflective of the political culture of countries in the Arab world. Moreover, more detailed country results indicate that Moroccan immigrants may partly drive the results of higher naturalisation among people coming from Arab countries. In fact, detailed country analyses reveal that immigrants from Algeria and Morocco are more likely to intend to naturalise. Thus, contrary to theories that people from Algeria may be reluctant to naturalise (Sayad 2004), Algerians have much higher odds to naturalise than non-Algerian immigrants. Untangling the effects of phenotype, network ties and political culture within the Arab population requires more data on these determinants, an agenda for future research.[17]

Finally, with regard to religion, Muslims are less likely to be French citizens, and the results show that feelings of otherisation may further lower Muslims' odds of being French citizens. However, Muslims' lower likelihood of being a French citizen may *not* be due to their lack of an intention to naturalise; Muslims have slightly lower odds of naturalising, but this is not at a statistically significant level. These findings indicate the strong religious boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims may be most reflected in bureaucrats' behaviour towards immigrants in France. For example, if bureaucrats perceive a strong boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims, they may judge Muslims to be less 'socially integrated' than other immigrants and thus have reasons to reject their application.[18] And in fact, in Spire's (2008) ethnographic study of French immigration offices, he claimed that wearing a headscarf was sometimes

reason enough to reject an applicant's naturalisation application or a visa because they failed to meet assimilation requirements (87). The data demonstrate that identifying as Muslim may be particularly negatively impactful for all immigrants—despite their intentions to naturalise. Of course, ethnicity and religion are not wholly separate categories, and oftentimes people who identify as Muslim come from countries in the Arab world or sub-Saharan African countries. However, the results indicate that being Muslim, no matter what one's ethnicity, is negatively correlated with naturalisation outcomes—a noteworthy finding to further explore. Atheists/Agonistics are also less likely to plan to naturalise or be French citizens, but more research needs to be conducted on what could lead to this behaviour.

Lastly, irrespective of one's ethnicity or religious affiliation, immigrants who feel otherised are less likely to be French citizens. Both trends point to the role of exclusion in inhibiting naturalisation, and speak to ongoing debates in Europe about Islamophobia and the relative importance of ethno-racial versus religious boundaries.

Conclusion

In sum, this article is the first to examine the role of political orientation and context, group belonging and attitudinal questions on belonging in shaping naturalisation behaviour in France. The analysis uncovers noteworthy patterns on the role of exclusion in naturalisation behaviour that beckon further exploration. Researchers can conduct qualitative studies to determine what influences immigrants' decisions to naturalise (and how this may differ across ethno-racial and religious groups and political contexts). Similarly, more ethnographic studies could be conducted on the bureaucratic side of naturalisation to examine how group boundaries are created and taken into account during naturalisation decisions. To further dissect the role of ethnicity in shaping naturalisation behaviour, the French government can start collecting racial statistics to better determine the extent to which one's life experiences are shaped by phenotype, or if they are shaped by other factors, such as one's political culture or class. Lastly, longitudinal studies on immigrant populations in France would be crucial in identifying causal effects for different political and social outcomes (e.g. naturalisation, voting behaviour, employment and inter-ethnic relationships). Further exploring the experiences of diverse immigrant populations in France is imperative for the European research agenda because doing so leads to understanding what creates, hardens or softens social and political boundaries that impact the overall integration of immigrants.

Acknowledgements

I thank my colleagues in the Sociology Department and the Interdisciplinary Immigration Workshop, and I thank two anonymous reviewers for their engagement with my work. Irene Bloemraad and Cybelle Fox provided crucial support and ideas as I developed and clarified my arguments. I equally extend my gratitude to the University of California-Berkeley, the Ford Foundation and the National Science Foundation (NSF) for financial support for my studies. Finally, I express my utmost gratitude to the creators of the survey, Patrick Simon and Cris

Beauchemin, who provided guidance and support as I conducted analyses at the National Institute of Demographic Studies in Paris.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding

This work is supported by the NSF [grant number 11066400] and the Ford Foundation. Any opinion, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or the Ford Foundation.

Notes

[1] Non-citizens are allowed to have welfare benefits as long as they are able to prove their legal residency in France: http://vosdroits.service-public.fr/particuliers/F2787.xhtml.

[2] This is an assimilation requirement according to the French Ministry of Justice website: http://www.vos-droits.justice.gouv.fr/nationalite-francaise-11963/nationalite-francaise-par-naturalisation-12047/conditions-a-remplir-20781.html.

[3] From this point on, whenever I refer to ethnicity, I refer to belonging a particular ethno-racial group, as opposed to a religious one.

[4] This law followed a series of heated headscarf debates beginning with the 'headscarf affair' in 1989 when three teenage girls of North African origin were expelled for wearing *hijabs* in school (Killian 2003).

[5] Surely, ethno-racial minorities, such as *Maghrebins* (or North Africans) are typically conflated with being Muslim, but the overlap between people from Arab countries and Muslims is not perfect. Over a quarter of immigrants who identify as Muslim in my sample do not come from countries in the Arab world, and about 15% of immigrants in my sample who come from countries in the Arab world are not Muslim. Because questions on race and religion are not typically captured in French surveys, few, if any, scholars have disentangled the effects of race and religion in their research, with the exception of Adida, Laitin, and Valfort's (2014) study. This analysis is another step in that direction.

[6] In the TeO survey, one in five immigrants lived in a ZUS, most often located in *banlieues*, compared to 5% of the majority French population. I should note that this varies widely by ethnicity. In my weighted sample of respondents, about a quarter of people from Arab countries, Near/Middle-Easterners and Black immigrants live in a ZUS compared to 16% of Asians and only 12% of non-EU Whites.

[7] In order to be a citizen, one has to have lived in France for at least five years, be occupationally stable, or at least be well on the way towards it, and have adequate French language skills and demonstrated social integration (Article 21-14-1 and 21-25-1, Paragraph 5: Acquisition of French Nationality by Public Authority Decision).

[8] For a more detailed information on the survey, visit the TeO website at: http://teo.site.ined.fr/ or refer to: https://www.epsilon.insee.fr/jspui/bitstream/1/16994/1/f1304.pdf.

[9] In fact, less than a third of EU immigrants in the TeO survey plan to request French citizenship as opposed to 75% of non-EU immigrants overall.

[10] Immigrants from sub-Saharan African countries and Asian countries were oversampled in this survey, so the weights account for this and better reflect the general immigrant population in France.

[11] Refugees, spouses of French citizens, and those who come from a 'culturally and linguistically French country' do not have to meet the five-year residency period to apply for citizenship (Article 21–19 and 21–20, Paragraph 5: Acquisition of French Nationality by Public Authority Decision).

[12] The average monthly income for 2008 was retrieved from the annual economic report published by INSEE: http://www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/tef/tef2011/tef2011.pdf. Over 8% of respondents refused to report their income; thus, I created another dummy variable in order to retain other individual information in my analyses.

[13] In 2007, the upper limit of FN voters was 17.3% in Aisne, with the lower limit of FN voters being 5.5% in Hauts-de-Seine. Generally, about a third of departments had over 15% of FN voters, another third had between 10% and 15% of FN voters, and the rest of departments had less than 10% of FN voters. The election data were gathered from the Ministry of Interior's website at: http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats/Presidentielles/elecresult__presidentielle_2007/(path)/presidentielle_2007/index.html.

[14] The full report can be accessed at the following site: http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2008/introduction#.U-PbMoBdUjM.

[15] For scholars interested in the effects of coming from particular countries, please refer to Appendix 2.

[16] Because I only focus on adult migrants from non-EU countries, my sample size is initially limited to 4431 immigrants. I further trim my sample by focusing on individuals who come from countries with at least five migrants to France, and who have no missing responses on variables other than income and being 'seen as French' (variables that have 'missing' response dummies in my analyses). I end up with a total of 3447 individuals that I analyse in the two separate samples I describe in this section.

[17] More detailed country analyses also reveal that Vietnamese immigrants and non-Turkish Near/Middle-Eastern immigrants are more likely to be French citizens; and individuals from Senegal, Vietnam, Cambodia and other sub-Saharan African countries are more likely to intend to naturalise than non-EU White immigrants.

[18] According to EUDO's evaluation of France's outreach and implementation of citizenship policies, France is generally strong at implementing citizenship policies fairly, but a lot of individual discretion is given to lower-level bureaucrats to determine if a naturalisation application is accepted. Refer to: http://ind.eudo-citizenship.eu/acit/topic/citimp for more detailed country information.

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Appendix 1. Country-level variable classifications in TeO data-set (2008)

	Colony	Authoritarian	No dual citizenship
Arab ethnicity			
Algeria	X	X	X
Egypt		X	
Lebanon			
Morocco	X		
Syria		X	
Tunisia	X	X	
Near/Middle-Eastern ethnicity			
Afghanistan		X	
Iran		X	
Pakistan			
Turkey			
Black ethnicity			
Angola			
Benin	X		
Burkina Faso	X		
Cameroon	X	X	
Cape Verde			
Comoros			
Ivory Coast	X	X	
Gabon	X		X
The Gambia			
Ghana			
Equatorial Guinea		X	X
Guinea Bissau			X
Mauritius			
Madagascar			
Mali	X		
Mauritania	X	X	
Niger	X		
Nigeria			
Democratic Republic of the Congo	X	X	X
Central African Republic			
Guinea	X	X	X
Congo (Brazzaville)	X	X	
Senegal	X		
Chad	X	X	X
Togo	X		
Asian ethnicity			
Cambodia	X		X
South Korea			X
India			
Japan			X
Laos	X	X	X
Philippines			
China		X	X
Sri Lanka			
Thailand			
Vietnam	X		X
White ethnicity			
Armenia			
Australia			

Appendix 1 (*Continued*)

	Colony	Authoritarian	No dual citizenship
Belarus		X	
Bosnia-Herzegovina			
Canada			
Croatia			X
USA			
Georgia			X
Kosovo		X	
Macedonia			
Moldavia			
Russia		X	
Serbia			
Switzerland			
Chechnya		X	
Ukraine			X

Sources: Freedom in the World 2008 (Freedom House), and Blatter, Erdmann, and Schwanke (2009).

Appendix 2. Weighted average marginal effects of logistic regressions (with and without country dummies)

	Being a French citizen		Intention to become a French citizen	
	No dummies	Country dummies	No dummies	Country dummies
Female	0.031* (2.33)	0.032* (2.36)	0.015 (0.96)	0.017 (1.19)
Age	0.006*** (3.84)	0.005** (3.13)	−0.001 (−0.31)	−0.001 (−0.29)
Former colony	0.016 (0.63)	0.021 (0.55)	0.002 (0.03)	−0.135 (−1.24)
Refugee migrant	0.206*** (8.13)	0.184*** (6.46)	0.305*** (3.71)	0.343*** (3.8)
Married to French citizen	0.161*** (4.08)	0.170*** (4.26)	−0.011 (−0.27)	−0.012 (−0.26)
Fluent in French	0.072** (3.02)	0.076** (2.92)	−0.037 (−1.14)	−0.020 (−0.58)
Number of years in France	0.007*** (4.43)	0.007*** (3.86)	0.010 (1.08)	0.008 (0.84)
Dual citizenship ban	−0.056 (−1.48)	−0.014 (−0.32)	−0.088* (−2.15)	−0.193*** (−3.38)
Employment status (ref: employed)				
Student	−0.155* (−1.96)	−0.132 (−1.7)	−0.208* (−2.32)	−0.205* (−2.46)
Unemployed	−0.084*** (−3.3)	−0.090*** (−3.29)	−0.079 (−1.73)	−0.092* (−2.06)
Monthly income (ref: <2000 euros)				
Above 2000 euros a month	0.149*** (8.09)	0.141*** (7.68)	0.054* (2.54)	0.060* (2.44)
Missing	0.126** (2.76)	0.118** (2.7)	−0.109 (−1.81)	−0.085 (−1.53)
High school diploma+	0.098** (2.76)	0.071 (1.81)	−0.024 (−0.57)	−0.027 (−0.66)
Interested in French politics	0.096*** (4.48)	0.093*** (4.18)	0.074** (2.59)	0.079** (2.79)
FN presence (ref: low <10% voters)				
Moderate (10–15% of voters)	−0.112** (−2.74)	−0.111* (−2.55)	0.020 (0.48)	0.026 (0.6)
High (>15% of voters)	−0.084** (−2.86)	−0.084** (−2.96)	0.050 (1.19)	0.055 (1.27)
Authoritarian regime	−0.039 (−1.24)	−0.036 (−0.83)	0.006 (0.17)	0.043 (1.12)
Ethnicity (ref: white)				
Arab	0.137** (2.77)	0.314*** (4.54)	0.181* (2.2)	0.230* (2.01)
Near/Middle-Eastern	0.046 (0.9)	0.271** (2.85)	0.058 (0.83)	−0.087 (−0.72)
Black	0.041 (0.89)	0.039 (0.87)	0.111 (1.39)	0.243* (2)
Asian	0.043 (0.65)	−0.020 (−0.29)	−0.031 (−0.35)	−0.031 (−0.34)
Religion (ref: Christian/Catholic)				
None/Agnostic	−0.080* (−2.11)	−0.072* (−2.06)	−0.176** (−2.91)	−0.161* (−2.52)
Muslim	−0.105** (−3.04)	−0.079* (−2.39)	−0.036 (−0.81)	−0.044 (−1.06)
Other	−0.023 (−0.64)	−0.033 (−1.09)	0.035 (0.37)	0.018 (0.18)

Appendix 2 (*Continued*)

	Being a French citizen		Intention to become a French citizen	
	No dummies	Country dummies	No dummies	Country dummies
Seen as French (ref: seen as French)				
Don't know/refusal	0.002 (0.05)	0.010 (0.24)	−0.078 (−1.3)	−0.076 (−1.25)
Not seen as French	−0.065* (−2.27)	−0.059* (−2.1)	−0.137*** (−3.85)	−0.130*** (−3.72)
ZUS	−0.055 (−1.91)	−0.046 (−1.63)	0.004 (0.1)	−0.005 (−0.1)
Algeria		0.050 (0.67)		0.391*** (3.47)
Morocco		0.127* (2.06)		0.320** (2.63)
Tunisia		0.092 (1.28)		0.261 (1.8)
Turkey		−0.020 (−0.34)		0.116 (1.28)
Senegal		0.061 (0.93)		0.299* (2.18)
Cameroon		0.023 (0.3)		0.088 (0.66)
Democratic Republic of the Congo		−0.012 (−0.23)		0.336 (1.8)
Vietnam		0.280*** (4.16)		0.444*** (4.72)
Cambodia		0.147 (1.85)		0.440*** (4.04)
Pseudo R^2	0.1298	0.145	0.1875	0.2124
N	2645		802	

Source: Trajectories and Origins (2008).

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$; z-scores in parentheses.