

# ***Who Claims Dual Citizenship? The Limits of Postnationalism, the Possibilities of Transnationalism, and the Persistence of Traditional Citizenship<sup>1</sup>***

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The dynamics of globalization, especially international migration, challenge traditional frameworks of citizenship and prompted scholars to develop new models of membership: transnationalism and postnationalism. All three – the traditional, transnational and postnational – explicitly or implicitly address the controversial topic of dual citizenship, or multiple membership. Lack of statistical data, however, has made it difficult to adjudicate between these models or to undertake a broad empirical assessment of dual citizenship, either over time or between people from different countries and socioeconomic backgrounds. This article outlines the testable implications of traditional, transnational and postnational frameworks and evaluates these hypotheses using a unique statistical data source that asked respondents to report multiple citizenship, the 1981, 1991 and 1996 20% Canadian census samples. The data offer little evidence that immigrants adopt a strict postnational view of citizenship, but they reveal the possibilities of transnationalism and the continued relevance of traditional frameworks. Over time, we observe a rapid increase in the aggregate level of reported dual citizenship from 1981 to 1996. We also find that those with higher human capital, rather than the economically marginalized, are more likely to embrace dual citizenship. After controlling for individual attributes, important contextual or group effects nonetheless remain: self-reports of dual citizenship vary significantly by birthplace and are higher if an immigrant lives in Quebec. Since naturalization levels seem to rise in tandem with reports of dual citizenship, this research suggests a certain paradox: while multiple belonging

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undermines some aspects of conventional state sovereignty, dual citizenship might be a means for countries to promote immigrants' political and legal attachments.

Citizenship has long been considered a progressive force within nation-states. The desire for full citizenship has animated struggles by the working class (Marshall, 1950), women (Bredbenner, 1998) and ethnoracial minorities (Smith, 1997) seeking the same rights and legal status as their compatriots. Yet, a growing number of scholars suggest that traditional citizenship is fundamentally illiberal in today's global world (Carens, 1987; Bauböck, 1994; Stasiulis, 1997). According to Carens, citizenship in Western liberal democracies is "the modern equivalent of feudal privilege – an inherited status that greatly enhances one's life chances" (1987:252). Older notions of state sovereignty butt against advances in communication and transportation, the spread of international norms, a global economy and, in particular, substantial international migration. The consequences of globalization have led scholars to advance new approaches to citizenship, theories of transnational belonging (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994; Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt, 1999) and postnational membership (Soysal, 1994; Jacobson, 1996). In these debates, dual citizenship holds a prominent place.

Traditionally, nation-states have frowned upon dual citizenship since it undermines the single and exclusive link between an individual and a sovereign nation-state. Reservations include split loyalties, dual military service, double taxation and conflicting diplomatic protection (Hammar, 1985). Students of transnationalism claim that the multiple belongings inherent in the contemporary world demand dual citizenship. Migrants', and, increasingly, countries', desire for multiple citizenship creates new 'deterritorialized' nation-states (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994). For scholars of postnationalism, the critique goes further: over the long-term, citizenship will cease to be relevant as rights increasingly are invested in the person, not in a legal relationship between individuals and the state. Dual citizenship can, at best, be an interim trend.

Adjudication between these different models has been difficult. There is a rich theoretical literature on dual citizenship (Hammar, 1990; Schuck, 1998; Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2000) and burgeoning research on states' decisionmaking on dual nationality (Guarnizo, 1998; Jones-Correa, 2001).<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup>Largely for stylistic reasons, I use the terms "dual citizenship" and "dual nationality" interchangeably. The data presented here come from individuals' self-reported status; it is not clear whether respondents would make a distinction between these two terms.



Yet we know little about dual citizenship among ordinary people: Who claims dual citizenship? How do individuals' claims vary by country of origin or socioeconomic background? Has support for dual citizenship changed over time? As a number of scholars point out, researchers have been unable to provide accurate statistics or analyses of dual citizenship for want of adequate data (Hammar, 1985; Spiro, 1997; Aleinikoff, 1998).

Using self-reported census data from immigrants in Canada, this article aims for a broad empirical overview and analysis of dual citizenship, assessing the data's implications for the traditional, transnational and postnational frameworks of citizenship.<sup>3</sup> The bulk of the literature on transnationalism relies on case studies of immigrants living in the United States, especially those from Latin America and the Caribbean. The research methodology is frequently ethnographic or based on detailed qualitative interviews with a relatively small number of respondents. In contrast, most claims for postnational membership use data from Europe, particularly the member countries of the European Union. Evidence comes from government documents, legal decisions, international agreements and interviews with government officials and leaders of community organizations. Differences in research sites and methodologies might go far in explaining why scholars have produced divergent responses to the challenge of globalization on traditional citizenship regimes.

Here I employ a unique data source, the Canadian census 20% micro-files from 1981, 1991 and 1996. In all three enumerations, members in one in five households were asked their citizenship and encouraged to report multiple nationalities. Canada provides an ideal context to study dual citizenship since it possesses many characteristics identified by scholars of all three frameworks: Canada encourages naturalization, in accordance with traditional models; it officially accepts dual citizenship, central to transnational belonging; and it makes almost no distinction between noncitizen permanent residents and naturalized Canadian citizens, a key feature of postnational theorizing.

First, I review traditional, transnational and postnational models, drawing out each framework's propositions regarding dual citizenship. Second, I

<sup>3</sup>Nonimmigrants can also hold dual citizenship through marriage to a foreign national or by descent from an immigrant parent or grandparent. Indeed, growing numbers of the native born are expressing interest in dual nationality – in North America, individuals often wish to gain access to the European Union (*cf.* Cortese, 2001). In a very few cases, individuals with large capital assets can buy a foreign nationality. The focus here, however, is on immigrant dual citizens.

introduce the Canadian census data and examine aggregate trends in dual citizenship from 1981 to 1996. I pay particular attention to change over time and differences between immigrant groups. In the third section, I focus on variation in individuals' propensity to identify as dual citizens. Using logistic regression, I model an immigrant's probability of reporting dual citizenship given the independent variables suggested by the three theories of citizenship. The conclusion summarizes the main findings, discusses the implications of these findings, and offers suggestions for future research.

To anticipate those conclusions somewhat, the evidence demonstrates the continued relevance of traditional approaches to citizenship, the limits of postnationalism, and the growing possibilities of transnationalism. Immigrants are eager to naturalize and embrace Canadian citizenship, but they are also increasingly likely to retain their nationality of origin. At an aggregate level, only a small minority reports dual citizenship, but within certain immigrant groups this minority can be substantial. The propensity for dual citizenship appears negatively linked to indicators of host country integration: claims of multiple nationality decrease over time, are lower for child migrants, and are higher for immigrants who speak a household language other than English or French. The dual national appears to be someone who is highly educated and mobile with relatively few family ties. Dual citizenship might consequently be the purview of an educated global elite, although there is evidence that the desire to identify as a dual citizen is rapidly diffusing within certain immigrant groups.

## *CITIZENSHIP, IMMIGRATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBALIZATION*

### *The Traditional Model: Citizenship in Sovereign Nation-States*

During the nineteenth century, the notion that the apparatus of government – the state – should overlap and be congruent with a community of identity – the nation – gained prominence (Hobsbawm, 1992; Anderson, 1991). Citizenship provides legal standing and rights from the state and it signals belonging to a subjective nation. Brubaker (1990) proposes that the ideal-typical model of traditional citizenship suggests that membership is egalitarian, sacred, national, democratic, unique and socially consequential. When immigrants move from one country to another, they complicate the link between the citizen and the nation-state. Since countries can only exert sovereignty over the inhabitants of their bounded territories, traditional approaches assume that immigrants gradually lose their attachment to the



sending country, then 'naturalize' by adopting the citizenship of the receiving country. To a large extent, this process is an "either/or" proposition: either you are a citizen of your home country or you adopt the nationality of the host country.

In this context, dual citizenship inhabits a curious place. On one hand, it undermines traditional citizenship by allowing, and even promoting, multiple belonging, claims-making, rights and responsibilities. Given that citizenship involves a certain sacralization of social and political membership, ties should be unique, not multiple (Brubaker, 1990). Opponents of dual citizenship, and even some supporters, worry that dual nationals might lack sufficient loyalty to their new country or undermine the state's political interests (Renshon, 2001; Schuck, 1998:244-246). On the other hand, dual nationality reinforces the centrality of nation-states because they continue to be the bodies that grant citizenship. Some argue that dual nationality can reduce the "in-betweenness" immigrants feel by encouraging them to naturalize, become politically active, and integrate further into the host society (Jones-Correa, 1998). Rather than less loyal and committed, dual citizenship might increase an individual's ties to the nation-state.

Those who support a traditional model of citizenship recognize the challenges that globalization poses for nation-state sovereignty. Some accept the need for limited dual nationality, usually as a means to encourage incorporation in the host country. It is implied, however, that the former citizenship becomes less salient over time and might be dropped altogether. In this respect, nation-states continue to exhibit political relevance and exert strong forces of socialization: "[t]hose who herald the emerging postnational age are too hasty in condemning the nation-state to the dustbin of history" since citizenship continues to be "a powerful instrument of social closure" (Brubaker, 1992:189, x; Koopmans and Statham, 1999).

What does a traditional approach to citizenship imply for dual nationality? First, we should find high levels of naturalization among immigrants and relatively few claims of dual citizenship. Most people will recognize the need to adopt one primary identity and political loyalty and they will transfer their subjective and objective attachments to their new home. Second, if some immigrants initially identify as dual nationals, over time they should increasingly favor the unique citizenship of the receiving country. Finally, those who claim multiple citizenship will be the least integrated in the host country. With integration, immigrants should embrace a single membership status.

*Transnationalism: Deterritorialized Citizenship*

For scholars of transnationalism, dual citizenship recognizes that immigrants' lives transcend borders. Transnational researchers conceptualize a deterritorialized nation-state where "immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement" and "in which the nation's people may live anywhere in the world and still not live outside the state" (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994:7, 269). World capitalism is often fingered as a driving force of change (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994; Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt, 1999). Due to the core-periphery structure of the international economic system, migrants from developing countries are forced to find employment in the developed world. Once there, they frequently hold jobs in secondary markets, either in low-skilled manufacturing or poorly paid service positions. At the peripheries of the labor market, these immigrants feel marginalized from the host society, and they simultaneously retain links to the sending country through remittances or entrepreneurial activities. Ironically, while many are forced to migrate due to global capitalism, some subsequently engage in transnational economic activities themselves.

Economic marginalization is frequently aggravated by racial and ethnic alienation (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994:9, 30-45; Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt, 1999:228-229). For example, nonwhite immigrants to the United States might feel ambivalent about their place in American racial categorizations and challenge designations such as "African-American" or "black" by affirming homeland nationalities as "ethnic" identities (Waters, 1994). Yet, since their daily lives are shaped by American paradigms, they also internalize and transfer American social norms to relatives and friends in the sending country (Levitt, 1998). Consequently, immigrants both challenge and transfer cultural idioms across geographical space (Vertovec, 1999:450-452).

Within these structuring dynamics – global capitalism and ethnoracial hierarchies – immigrants create transnational lives through "occupations and activities that require regular and sustained social contacts over time [and] across national borders for their implementation" (Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt, 1999:219). Dual citizenship is both a cause and an effect of transnationalism. Dual citizenship can facilitate transnationalism – multiple passports provide easy access to and rights in different geopolitical spaces – and it designates dual identities, reflecting attachment to both sending and receiving countries. Immigrants often lobby for dual nationality laws to reflect these multiple attachments while countries of origin, and some countries of reception, encour-



age dual nationality to further state interests (Jones-Correa, 2001; Guarnizo, 2001; Portes, 1999:466-468). Many developing countries, in particular, are moving from a traditional notion of bounded, sovereign states to a deterritorialized vision of membership (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994).

The transnational approach has clear implications for dual citizenship. It suggests that where dual citizenship is possible, large numbers of immigrants will embrace this status to reflect multiple identities and transnational lives. Second, as globalization expands, dual citizenship should increase over time. While proponents of transnationalism recognize that migrants have long forged cross-national links between sending and receiving countries, they argue that "early transnational economic and political enterprises were not normative or even common among the vast majority of immigrants, nor were they undergirded by the thick web of regular instantaneous communication and easy personal travel" of today (Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt, 1999:227; Vertovec, 1999; for a dissenting argument, *see* Foner, 1997). Third, if the world is increasingly transnational, each successive cohort of immigrants will be more likely to claim dual citizenship.

Scholars of transnationalism are only now beginning to hypothesize the ways in which transnational activity and belonging change over the course of an immigrant's life or vary between individuals. Nancy Foner (1997) cautions that the transnational impulse might diminish with time, while Peggy Levitt (2003) speculates that ties and activities can vary over the life course. There is a potential overlap with hypotheses from traditional frameworks: the bulk of the transnationalism literature suggests that the less rooted an immigrant, the more likely he or she will identify as a dual national (*but see* Morawska, 2003 on why assimilation and transnationalism might be complementary).

In contrast, explaining variation between individuals raises somewhat contradictory hypotheses. One strand of transnationalism suggests that poor, nonwhite immigrants from developing countries are particularly apt to lead transnational lives and favor dual citizenship. These individuals use cross-border activities and multiple identities to challenge their marginal racial, economic and social positions in the receiving country (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994). Since most contemporary transnationalism scholarship relies on case studies of Caribbean and Latino immigrants, we have no data to indicate whether contemporary European immigrants lead similar transnational lives. We therefore do not know whether dual citizenship is more of a Third World or First World phenomenon.

Other students of transnationalism posit that the possession of skills and resources encourages transnationalism and dual citizenship. Those with “greater average economic resources and human capital (education and professional skills) should register higher levels of transnationalism because of their superior access to the infrastructure that makes these activities possible” (Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt, 1999:224). Among New York’s Indian community, Lessinger (1995) found the most transnational immigrants to be successful professionals and business people (*see also* Ong’s (1999) study of Chinese migrants). Consequently, we might expect that immigrants able to buy, use and benefit from the technologies necessary for transnationalism are more likely to be dual citizens. Socioeconomic advantage, not marginality, would be critical to explaining dual citizenship claims.

### *Postnational Citizenship – Beyond the Nation-State*

Theories of postnationalism challenge the very idea that citizenship remains linked with state membership, be it territorialized or not. Proponents argue that the advantages of citizenship, such as civil rights and social welfare, are increasingly vested in individuals – or ‘personhood’ – rather than through membership in a nation-state (Bauböck, 1994; Soysal, 1994; Jacobson, 1996). This occurs because “in North America and Western Europe, the basis of state legitimacy is shifting from principles of sovereignty and national self-determination to international human rights” (Jacobson, 1996:2). Diverging from transnationalism’s focus on global capitalism and racial hierarchies, the postnational perspective emphasizes the influence of international moral and legal norms.

According to postnational scholars, human rights undermine traditional notions of citizenship due to their power as an accepted normative framework and through their institutionalization. As a normative resource, human rights provide migrants with a discourse to make claims regardless of citizenship status. Politicians and policymakers “find it much harder to deny social and civil rights – those directly linked to the person, such as individual liberties and a minimum standard of living – to new groups of people, even if they do not belong to the formal national polity” (Soysal, 1994:131). When these norms become institutionalized in supranational organizations like the European Union (Soysal, 1994), codified in international law (Jacobson, 1996), or propagated by international social movements (Risse, 2000), they become even more powerful.

The implications of postnationalism for dual citizenship are implicit rather than explicit. The logic of the theory suggests that immigrants will shun



the receiving country's citizenship altogether. Secure in the knowledge that their rights are guaranteed based on personhood and that their identities transcend the trappings of citizenship, one would expect immigrants to not naturalize at all, retaining the nationality of the home country by fiat. Such a hypothesis runs in direct contradiction to traditional notions of immigrant integration, where home country nationality is abandoned in favor of host country citizenship. I call this argument "strict postnationalism." In reality, many proponents of post-national citizenship fail to go so far, although some hint at the possibility (*e.g.*, Soysal, 1994:26-27).

More often, those who identify an emerging postnational system suggest that the short-term result of globalization will be increased claims of dual citizenship. Eventually, residence will determine legal status and state-bound citizenship will wither away, but, during the interim, states continue to play an important role. I label this strand "weak postnationalism." Like transnationalism, a weak postnational perspective hypothesizes significant levels of dual citizenship where it is permitted. In contrast, the postnational model suggests that claims of dual citizenship should decrease over time.

The literature on postnational membership does not specify who is most likely to embrace dual nationality. Advocates imply that the language of human rights is so strongly diffused that all groups are equally aware of this resource (Soysal, 1994:154-155). If differences exist, they relate to the type of receiving society. Established liberal democracies in Western Europe, North America and Oceania will be more sensitive to human rights appeals than fledgling states. Extending this logic, it is possible that immigrants from Western Europe are more postnational – and thus less likely to naturalize or claim dual citizenship – since they are more cognizant of human rights discourses.

In short, the traditional, transnational and postnational approaches offer quite different hypotheses concerning the prevalence of dual citizenship among immigrants. Table 1 summarizes the implications of all three perspectives. The next section begins to evaluate these hypotheses. First, I introduce the Canadian census data, and then I outline trends in naturalization and dual citizenship over time and across groups.

## *DUAL CITIZENSHIP ACROSS TIME AND BETWEEN GROUPS: EVALUATING TRENDS*

### *Immigration to Canada and the Canadian Census*

In 1997, Peter Spiro lamented, "Statistical surveys of the number of dual

TABLE 1  
THREE MODELS OF CITIZENSHIP: IMPLICATIONS FOR DUAL CITIZENSHIP

|  | Traditional Model  | Transnational Model   | Postnational Model  |
|--|--|---|---|
| Theoretical Claim                                  | Each person has a single citizenship that links the individual to a nation-state.<br><br>Rights and identity are congruent with citizenship.                                     | Immigrants' lives span geopolitical borders, creating transnational activities and identities. Citizenship can be multiple; memberships are in deterritorialized nation-states.                               | Normative changes valorizing personhood are eclipsing state-centered citizenship. Rights do not depend on citizenship; identities transcend nation-states.                            |
| Implications for Dual Citizenship                  | Immigrants will naturalize; few will claim dual citizenship.<br><br>Over time, people who initially asserted dual citizenship will only claim the receiving country citizenship. | Significant numbers of immigrants will adopt dual citizenship.<br><br>Levels of dual citizenship will increase over time as more countries allow it and more people want multiple memberships.                | Strict view: immigrants will retain homeland citizenship; weak view: possible dual citizenship. Dual citizenship will decrease over time as human rights norms diffuse and take root. |
| Potential Individual Variation in Dual Citizenship | Poorly integrated immigrants (those who are not 'rooted' in the receiving society) are more likely to have dual citizenship.   | The marginalized (poor, racial minorities from developing countries) will identify as dual nationals; OR business people, those with higher education and income are more likely to embrace dual citizenship. | Immigrants from the EU, more exposed to human rights discourses, will naturalize less and be less likely to claim dual citizenship.   |

nationals appear never to have been undertaken, nor have the United States or other governments sought to collect such information” (1997:1455). While Spiro is correct about the dearth of statistical scholarship and general lack of such data, he overlooks one critical source of information on multiple nationality: the Canadian Census of Population, held every five years. Since 1981, Canadian residents have been repeatedly asked to report their citizenship and explicitly directed to give multiple answers. The bulk of research on transnationalism and postnationalism relies on qualitative evidence collected from ethnography, in-depth interviews, government documents and international law. The richness of this data comes at the expense of understanding how far-reaching the phenomenon of dual citizenship really is. Is dual nationality mostly found among a few immigrant communities and some isolated individuals, or are broad groups of people embracing multiple attachments?

To answer this question and evaluate the arguments outlined in Table 1, I analyze immigrants’ self-reports of dual citizenship using the full 20 percent microfile sample from the 1981, 1991 and 1996 Canadian censuses. The 20



percent sample includes all respondents who answered the “long form” of the census (1 in 5 households). In 1981 and 1991, respondents were presented with four closed-ended citizenship choices: Canada by birth, Canada by naturalization, same as the country of birth (other than Canada), and another country. Allowing for multiple answers, an individual could fall into one of nine different citizenship categories; immigrants could conceivably fall into one of seven.<sup>4</sup> The 1996 question varied slightly, giving the options “Canada, by birth” and “Canada, by naturalization,” then it provided space for respondents to write in other countries of citizenship, if applicable. For the analysis that follows, I drew a sample of all foreign-born adults who were permanent residents or naturalized Canadian citizens.<sup>5</sup> The resulting dataset contains 1,025,109 respondents in 1996, 783,911 individuals in 1991, and 645,157 in 1981. In contrast to the 3% Public Use Microfile sample released by Statistics Canada, these data permit a detailed analysis of dual citizenship.

It is important to emphasize that the citizenship question measures reported citizenship status. While in many cases we can assume that respondents’ reported citizenship corresponds to their actual legal status, this is not necessarily the case. First, immigrants might profess to be dual citizens even if their former country does not allow multiple nationalities. The legal codes of various countries, such as India and the Netherlands, specify that naturalization in another nation-state results in the automatic loss of one’s former citizenship. In such a case, an immigrant’s claim of dual nationality is either a function of poor information or a statement of dual identity despite legal statute. Second, immigrants might be *de jure* dual nationals but not recognize or acknowledge this fact. A growing number of states explicitly declare that citizens who naturalize in another country do not lose their former citizenship. For example, Portugal made this change in 1981 and El Salvador did the same in 1983. Anyone from these countries who became a naturalized Canadian after the law changed would be a legal dual national. Those failing to

<sup>4</sup>The nine possibilities are 1) Canadian by birth, 2) Canadian by birth and citizen of another country, 3) naturalized Canadian, 4) naturalized Canadian and citizen of birth country, 5) naturalized Canadian and citizen of another country (not country of birth), 6) naturalized Canadian, citizen of birth country and citizen of another country, 7) citizen of birth country, 8) citizen of birth country and another country, 9) citizen of another country (not country of birth).

<sup>5</sup>Excluded are those who are foreign born but received Canadian citizenship at birth through their parents. Also excluded are foreign-born adults who, at the time of the census, were non-immigrant residents (*e.g.*, they held a student visa or refugee status). Those who were permanent residents at the time of the census but previously held nonresident visas or refugee status are included.

report their objective status might do so because they do not realize or do not wish to acknowledge dual citizenship.

These contradictory tendencies introduce a certain level of ambiguity to the interpretation of census statistics, but self-reported data offer distinct advantages. Both transnational and postnational frameworks claim that subjective identities and lived experience trump legal constructs dividing people into geographically bounded nation-states. To the extent that people claim dual citizenship despite legal interdictions, we find support for these perspectives. In contrast, if immigrants who are *de jure* dual citizens fail to report such status on the census (an instrument aimed at eliciting factual information), traditional notions of citizenship gain credence. Like research on ethnic identity, the disjuncture between objective and reported status reveals much about individuals' identities and sense of place in a larger social structure (Waters, 1994; Boyd, 1999). The limit of census data, however, is that we know little about the content of such identities.

Beyond the unique statistical opportunity offered by Canadian census data, the Canadian case provides a number of theoretical advantages when testing citizenship paradigms. Canada shares many key characteristics with Western Europe and the United States, the sites where postnational and transnational theories were developed. First, like the United States, Canada is a longstanding country of immigration. Today about 19 percent of the Canadian population is foreign born, a percentage that has increased gradually from 15 percent immediately after World War II. Prior to 1962, migration drew heavily from European countries because immigration regulations made it difficult for non-Europeans to gain entry. Since then, Canada attracts individuals from around the world. In 1996, 31 percent of the more than 4,971,000 immigrants living in Canada were born in Asia and 6 percent hailed from the Caribbean. Considering only migrants with fifteen years of residence or less, fully half were born in Asia. Since some transnational scholars maintain that nonwhite immigrants from developing countries are particularly apt to lead transnational lives and adopt dual citizenship, the Canadian context allows us to test such claims.

Second, as in Western Europe, Canada provides a broad range of social benefits to its residents, regardless of citizenship status. Immigrants receive the same health care coverage, unemployment insurance and welfare benefits as Canadian citizens. In contrast, the United States reinforced the link between citizenship and social rights in 1996 by denying welfare benefits to noncitizens, even if they are legal residents. Although it is difficult to make the postnation-



al argument in the American case, it is plausible in the Canadian one. Conversely, like the United States, Canada sees itself as a country of immigration and administers a liberal and relatively open naturalization policy.<sup>6</sup> Traditional patterns of citizenship are consequently more plausible in Canada than in Europe.

Finally, unlike the United States or many European countries, as of 1977 Canada has explicitly allowed dual citizenship. Indeed, to a certain extent the government promotes this option as a symbol of Canadian tolerance and as a reflection of its multicultural society. If dual citizenship is rampant, we should find many dual nationals in Canada. Traditional, transnational and postnational models are equally plausible in the Canadian case, allowing these theories to be tested fairly.

### *Naturalization: The Limits of Postnationalism and Persistence of Traditionalism*

According to a strict reading of postnationalism, we should expect low levels of dual citizenship because immigrants will not naturalize. In countries such as Canada, rights traditionally associated with legal citizenship are given to all immigrants. For example, provincial governments provide Medicare benefits and welfare payments to all eligible residents, regardless of citizenship status. Consequently, migrants face no need to acquire Canadian citizenship for socioeconomic benefits.<sup>7</sup> Yet, in 1996, 75 percent of all adult immigrants claimed Canadian citizenship through naturalization. In 1991, this figure was 73 percent, and in 1981, it was 72 percent. Naturalization figures in Canada consequently support traditional notions of citizenship: a substantial majority of immigrants continues to acquire citizenship in their new country.<sup>8</sup> Naturalization levels are even more striking once we exclude those ineligible for naturalization because they have not yet met the three-year residency requirement. Considering only eligible adult immigrants, fully 84 percent were nat-

<sup>6</sup>Immigrants to Canada generally need only three years of residence, some English or French language skills and a basic knowledge of the country to acquire Canadian citizenship.


<sup>7</sup>The major rights that citizenship accords is the absolute right of entry onto Canadian soil and political rights such as the right to vote and run for office.

<sup>8</sup>In comparison, 35.1 percent of the U.S. foreign born had acquired American citizenship in 1997 (Schmidley and Gibson, 1999). Clarke, van Dam and Gooster (1998) find that the average naturalization rate in the core European Union and European Free Trade Area countries is about 2 percent. This rate – calculated as the annual number of naturalizations over the noncitizen foreign ‘stock’ – ranged widely across Europe in the early 1990s, from less than 1 percent in Germany, Ireland, Italy and Switzerland to 6.5 percent in the Netherlands and Sweden. Reproducing this calculation in North America, we find a naturalization rate of about 3 percent in the United States and 10 percent in Canada over the same period.

uralized in 1996, 82 percent in 1991 and 77 percent in 1981. These high levels of naturalization suggest that key propositions of strict postnationalism are incorrect.

Scholars of postnationalism might respond that aggregate naturalization levels are not a fair test since the theory rests on recent changes in the world system. The importance of human rights has grown during the post-World War II era. Older immigrants came at a time when naturalization was still important; only recent immigrants face a postnational age where citizenship acquisition ceases to matter. Yet, as Figure I demonstrates, immigrants' propensity to naturalize has increased over time, casting doubt on a strict version of postnationalism. Figure I plots naturalization levels by length of residence in Canada for the three census years under consideration. The trend lines clearly show that immigrants migrating later in the twentieth century become Canadian citizens more quickly than the comparable cohort a census earlier. If we consider immigrants who have lived in Canada for eleven to fifteen years, 83 percent were naturalized in 1996, 78 percent had taken Canadian citizenship in 1991, and 68 percent were Canadian in 1981. It is possible that low levels of naturalization in Europe – the source of most evidence for the postnational perspective – are less a function of postnationalism than onerous citizenship laws and naturalization regulations (Clarke, van Dam and Gooster, 1998; de Rham, 1990).

**Figure I.**                      **Percent of Adult Immigrants Naturalized, by Length of Residence, 1981, 1991 and 1996 Canadian Census**





The postnationalist argument also implies that conceptions of postnational membership should be more prevalent among immigrants from the member states of the European Union. These people are most likely to be aware of norms that favor personhood over nation-state membership since they migrate from stable liberal democracies.

Evidence for this hypothesis is mixed. Table 2 breaks down naturalization levels by birthplace for twenty countries in 1991. The first column reports the aggregate naturalization level for all adult immigrants who have met the three-year residency requirement. The second and third columns report naturalization levels for recent cohorts, those who migrated in the period of postnationalism identified by Soysal and Jacobson. We find that while some EU nationals appear slightly slower to adopt Canadian citizenship than immigrants from other countries, the majority do so within eleven years of residence and, in some cases, after only six to eight years in Canada. Those least likely to acquire Canadian citizenship are Americans, not Europeans. After eleven to fifteen years in Canada, only 39.7 percent of the American born had naturalized. Dutch immigrants have the second lowest level of naturalization at 49.6 percent, while the Portuguese are third at 57.5 percent. Those hailing from France, a member of the EU since its inception, have a level of naturalization that, at 86.7 percent, is higher than Mexicans, Jamaicans, Indians and Salvadorans. Some Europeans might hold postnational views, but the evidence is not overwhelming. Traditional notions of citizenship appear reinforced since, with few exceptions, naturalization levels are high regardless of origin.

### *Dual Citizenship: The Possibilities of Transnationalism*

If immigrants do not shun Canadian citizenship, as a strict postnational model would suggest, they might instead inhabit a transnational world and embrace dual citizenship. Scholars of transnationalism do not specify a level of dual citizenship that would clearly undermine the traditional paradigm. Does proof of significant transnationalism require that a quarter, a third or even half of naturalized Canadian immigrants claim dual citizenship? To investigate the level and determinants of dual citizenship, I consider only those immigrants who have acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization and divide them into two categories, those claiming a single citizenship status (Canadian) and those reporting more than one nationality. All multiple citizenship permutations are collapsed into one 'dual citizen' category, even if the person is, in effect, a citizen of more than two countries.

**TABLE 2**  
**NATURALIZATION LEVELS OF ADULT IMMIGRANTS, BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH**  
**AND LENGTH OF RESIDENCE, 1991 CANADIAN CENSUS**

| Place of Birth              | All eligible immigrants | Length of Residence in Canada |            | Sample N |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------|------------|----------|
|                             |                         | 6-8 yrs.                      | 11-15 yrs. |          |
| Europe                      |                         |                               |            |          |
| France                      | 88.0                    | 73.9                          | 86.7       | 10,269   |
| Greece                      | 88.0                    | 72.5                          | 81.0       | 15,646   |
| Netherlands                 | 87.0                    | 32.1                          | 49.6       | 25,182   |
| Germany                     | 83.1                    | 41.6                          | 60.9       | 35,221   |
| Italy                       | 82.2                    | 59.2                          | 68.7       | 67,127   |
| UK                          | 81.9                    | 56.4                          | 69.3       | 136,387  |
| Ireland                     | 79.3                    | 45.7                          | 69.7       | 5,254    |
| Portugal                    | 65.6                    | 44.7                          | 57.5       | 28,600   |
| North America               |                         |                               |            |          |
| Mexico                      | 81.4                    | 72.1                          | 79.3       | 2,957    |
| USA                         | 55.0                    | 30.9                          | 39.7       | 48,038   |
| Caribbean and Latin America |                         |                               |            |          |
| Haiti                       | 89.3                    | 92.1                          | 93.5       | 6,719    |
| Guyana                      | 86.1                    | 78.7                          | 90.0       | 11,538   |
| Jamaica                     | 81.1                    | 58.8                          | 81.2       | 17,876   |
| El Salvador                 | 63.8                    | 69.3                          | 81.2       | 3,931    |
| Asia                        |                         |                               |            |          |
| China (PRC)                 | 88.5                    | 84.0                          | 89.8       | 29,253   |
| Philippines                 | 87.1                    | 81.4                          | 91.3       | 21,465   |
| Pakistan                    | 85.5                    | 75.1                          | 87.3       | 4,342    |
| Lebanon                     | 85.4                    | 86.0                          | 88.0       | 8,871    |
| Vietnam                     | 84.6                    | 83.0                          | 88.3       | 18,211   |
| India                       | 73.1                    | 53.4                          | 72.2       | 31,737   |

Over time, we find rapidly increasing levels of dual citizenship, though only among a minority of naturalized immigrants. Table 3 calculates dual citizenship for various age groups. Considering all naturalized immigrants in Canada, 5.5 percent claim dual citizenship in 1981, 10.7 percent report dual nationality in 1991, and 16.6 percent do so in 1996.<sup>9</sup> Canada began permitting dual citizenship in 1977, so it is not surprising that reports of dual nationality in 1981 are relatively low. The increase over time is substantial. From 1981 to 1991, claims of dual citizenship almost double, and from 1991 to 1996 they increase another 50 percent. The sharp rise appears suggestive, although the figures in Table 3 show that dual citizenship is prevalent among only a minority of immigrants.

<sup>9</sup>As a percent of all immigrants (including non-Canadian citizens), 12.1 percent of all immigrants claimed dual citizenship in 1996, 8.2 percent in 1991 and 3.9 percent in 1981. These figures include a small fraction of people reporting dual nationality in which Canada is not one of the countries of citizenship.



**TABLE 3**  
**CLAIMS OF DUAL CITIZENSHIP BY NATURALIZED CANADIAN IMMIGRANTS,**  
**1981, 1991 AND 1996 CANADIAN CENSUS (20% SAMPLE)**

| Population                                 | 1981 | 1991  | 1996  |
|--|------|-------|-------|
| Immigrants of all ages                     | 5.5% | 10.7% | 16.6% |
| Immigrant adults                           | 5.1  | 10.4  | 16.1  |
| Immigrant children                         | 11.8 | 19.8  | 25.2  |
| Immigrants who moved to Canada as adults   | 6.1  | 11.2  | 17.8  |
| Immigrants who moved to Canada as children | 4.6  | 9.9   | 14.3  |

### *The Unique Case of Immigrant Children*

Children occupy a unique status under citizenship law, in the statutes of the receiving country and often in the legal code of the sending country. Under Canadian law, individuals under the age of 18 cannot naturalize independently. To become a Canadian citizen, the parent of an immigrant child must naturalize and indicate that he or she also wishes to naturalize his or her child. For the sending country, child naturalization is not always viewed in the same light as the naturalization of an adult national. Even when an adult loses his or her former nationality by acquiring Canadian citizenship, children can fall into three categories. In some cases, children also automatically lose their former citizenship (*e.g.*, citizens of India). In others, the child continues to be a dual national until the age of majority at which time he or she must choose one citizenship (this used to be the case for American emigrants). Finally, some countries do not recognize child naturalization, since the child had no independent choice in the matter. These states continue to view the individual as their citizen, even after the child reaches the age of majority (such is the case under Dutch law).

To get a sense of how age matters, Table 3 breaks down dual citizenship figures by age, first distinguishing between those who are adults or children at the time of the census enumeration and then distinguishing between individuals who migrated to Canada as adults compared to those who came as children. Interestingly, dual citizenship tendencies reverse. Looking at age at the time of the census, children have higher reported levels of citizenship than their parents and other adults. Among adults, 16.1 percent declare dual citizenship in 1996, 10.4 percent in 1991 and 5.1 percent do so in 1981. Reported dual citizenship among children is 25.2 percent in 1996, 19.8 percent in 1991, and 11.8 percent in 1981.

This finding is not surprising given the legal complexities surrounding children's citizenship. In a number of cases, children may be dual citizens while their parents cannot be. In addition, if a child's parents hold two dif-

ferent nationalities, upon birth the child often becomes a *de jure* dual citizen if the parent's citizenship can be passed down through descent. Finally, citizenship data for children are rarely self-reported. Parents fill in the census form on the child's behalf, and the immigrant parent might feel a strong desire to identify their children with both the country of origin and the new home.

Parents' reporting of their children's dual status might not mirror the child's perception of his or her citizenship when the latter reaches adulthood. Indeed, when we compare reported dual citizenship for immigrants who moved to Canada as adults and those who migrated as children, the pattern is the reverse of the previous one. Those who came to Canada as adults are more likely to profess dual nationality (17.8% in 1996; 11.2% in 1991; 6.1% in 1981) than those who moved as children (14.3% in 1996; 9.9% in 1991; 4.6% in 1981). It appears that once immigrant children enter adulthood, as many as half cease to identify as dual citizens.

The remainder of this article focuses on adult immigrants, mostly due to the complications of citizenship law as it applies to children. At a theoretical level, the exclusive focus on adults should have no adverse effect on testing the frameworks outlined in Table 1. All three theories are largely built on the perceptions and activities of adult migrants, not dependent children.

### *DUAL CITIZENSHIP AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN*

Aggregate figures of dual citizenship obscure vast differences between immigrant communities. Each country has its own particular citizenship laws that strongly influence the ability of immigrants to legally claim dual nationality.

The increase in reported dual citizenship shown in Table 3 reflects individuals' increased propensity to claim multiple nationalities and changes in home country laws as more and more states allow dual citizenship. Part of the transnational argument rests on the actions of sending countries. Students of transnationalism contend that pressures from nationals abroad, the need for financial and human resources, and forces of globalization spur sending countries to adopt dual nationality (Guarnizo, 2001).

Table 4 clearly documents cross-national variation. The table shows the percentage of naturalized immigrants claiming dual citizenship for 30 significant immigrant groups in 1981, 1991 and 1996.<sup>10</sup> The last column of the

<sup>10</sup>In this table and the following analyses, dual citizenship is defined as having at least joint citizenship in Canada and the country of birth. Excluded are dual citizens who do not hold at least Canadian citizenship (0.1% of all immigrants) or those whose dual nationality does not include their country of birth (0.9% of all immigrants). Immigrants with these multiple



table lists whether the birth country legally accepts multiple citizenship and, if this represents a legal change, the date after which dual citizenship was allowed. In many cases, these regulations become complicated. Thus, New Zealand does not have a formal law on dual citizenship but has allowed the practice by fiat since New Zealand citizenship was first established in 1949 (correspondence from government official, July 17, 2001). Argentina allows dual nationality, but does not allow nationals to hold dual passports. Dual nationals living permanently outside of the country must use their other passports, but they can reclaim an Argentine passport if they move back to Argentina (correspondence from consular official, July 25, 2001). Poland allows its nationals to acquire another country's citizenship but does not recognize that citizenship, producing *de facto* dual nationals (Polish Consulate of Los Angeles website: <<http://pan.net/konsulat/law/dualct.htm>>, July 18, 2001). In some cases, governments enter into special agreements: Pakistani nationals who naturalize in Canada may be dual citizens while their compatriots in the United States lose Pakistani citizenship.

Not surprisingly, countries with higher levels of dual citizenship tend to be those allowing multiple nationalities. Over two fifths of naturalized Canadians born in Switzerland, New Zealand, Lebanon and Israel professed dual citizenship in 1996. In comparison, less than 5 percent of those born in India, China, Germany or the Netherlands reported that they held Canadian citizenship and the nationality of their birthplace. Once we control for place of birth, large pluralities – and in one case a majority – of people from states allowing dual citizenship report such a status. Claims of dual citizenship are also rising quickly. The fourth column of Table 4 calculates the percentage change in reported dual citizenship from 1981 to 1996. In many cases, the growth is enormous: from 1981, when El Salvador did not allow dual citizenship, to 1996, thirteen years after the law changed, claims of dual citizenship increased 1,430 percent, rising from 2.3 percent in 1981 to more than 35 percent in 1996.

Yet, home country citizenship regulations are neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for dual citizenship. Home country dual nationality laws are not necessary to the extent that a minority of immigrants report dual nationality regardless of legal statutes. This group is small – implying most immigrants are aware of dual citizenship laws – but the group's existence sug-

nationalities had to be dropped since neither the 1981 nor the 1991 census asked respondents to specify their other countries of citizenship. It is consequently impossible to compare these types of citizenship over time.

**TABLE 4**  
**PERCENTAGE OF NATURALIZED CANADIAN ADULTS REPORTING DUAL CITIZENSHIP,**  
**BY PLACE OF BIRTH (1981, 1991 AND 1996 CANADIAN CENSUS, 20% SAMPLE<sup>a</sup>)**

| Country of Birth    | 1981  | 1991  | 1996  | Percent<br>Change<br>from 1981-1996 | Adult Dual Cit.<br>Allowed?<br>(yr. allowed,<br>if specified) |
|---------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------------------------------------|---|
| Switzerland         | 28.6% | 32.1% | 57.0% | 99%                                 | yes (1952)  |
| New Zealand         | 26.5  | 31.7  | 45.0  | 70                                  | yes (1949)  |
| Lebanon             | 10.3  | 16.8  | 42.0  | 308                                 | yes   |
| Israel              | 10.5  | 14.5  | 40.0  | 281                                 | yes   |
| Uruguay             | 15.9  | 24.7  | 38.7  | 143                                 | yes (1919)  |
| France              | 18.7  | 24.0  | 37.9  | 103                                 | yes (1973)  |
| El Salvador         | 2.3   | 15.9  | 35.2  | 1430                                | yes (1983)  |
| Argentina           | 11.0  | 15.5  | 32.7  | 197                                 | yes (limited)   |
| Pakistan            | 7.4   | 9.3   | 30.8  | 316                                 | yes   |
| Barbados            | 11.3  | 17.1  | 26.2  | 132                                 | yes (1966)  |
| Poland              | 1.0   | 6.8   | 26.1  | 2510                                | de facto  |
| Egypt               | 7.2   | 11.4  | 24.0  | 233                                 | de facto  |
| Spain               | 4.7   | 13.0  | 22.0  | 368                                 | no  |
| United Kingdom      | 8.3   | 14.5  | 21.9  | 164                                 | yes   |
| United States       | 2.8   | 11.6  | 20.8  | 643                                 | de facto  |
| Portugal            | 2.4   | 8.4   | 20.4  | 750                                 | yes (1981)  |
| Greece              | 5.9   | 11.5  | 20.1  | 241                                 | de facto  |
| Ireland (Eire)      | 7.8   | 13.6  | 18.1  | 132                                 | yes (1922)  |
| Guyana              | 10.0  | 8.3   | 16.1  | 61                                  | yes   |
| Jamaica             | 7.7   | 9.0   | 16.0  | 108                                 | yes (1962)  |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 2.4   | 5.2   | 14.7  | 513                                 | yes (1988)  |
| Hungary             | 2.5   | 4.8   | 11.2  | 348                                 | yes (1993)  |
| Italy               | 2.5   | 4.8   | 10.3  | 312                                 | yes (1992)  |
| Philippines         | 2.6   | 3.8   | 8.5   | 227                                 | no  |
| Haiti               | 1.8   | 2.4   | 7.4   | 311                                 | no  |
| Vietnam             | 4.7   | 5.8   | 6.7   | 43                                  | no (de facto)   |
| India               | 1.2   | 2.2   | 3.6   | 200                                 | no  |
| China               | 1.8   | 3.4   | 2.7   | 50                                  | no  |
| Germany             | 0.8   | 1.7   | 2.5   | 213                                 | no  |
| Netherlands         | 0.6   | 1.5   | 2.3   | 283                                 | no  |

Sources: Government documents, embassy officials, Jones-Correa (2001), Renshon (2000) and Defense Security Service of the U.S. Department of Defense.

Note: <sup>a</sup>Here, dual citizens include those with, at least, citizenship in Canada and their country of birth.

gests that for some, assertions of dual citizenship reflect dual identities and loyalties regardless of legal constructs. For example, Indian law states that individuals who naturalize in another country lose their Indian nationality. Yet, in 1996, 4,595 people, or 3.6 percent of all naturalized Indians, claimed they held dual citizenship. Likewise, 4.8 percent of naturalized Italians reported dual nationality in 1991, a year before Italian law changed to allow dual citizenship. Those who reported dual nationality in 1991 either anticipated that they would get their former citizenship back, did not understand the legal code, or reported dual nationality as an identity claim rather than as a legal status.



On the other hand, favorable legislation is not a sufficient condition for dual citizenship claims. Indeed, a majority of legal dual citizens never report dual nationality. This absence might be as telling as the presence of dual citizenship. Take, for example, the case of those born in Uruguay. Since 1919, naturalization in another country has no effect on Uruguayans' birth nationality. Legally, almost everyone born in Uruguay and naturalized in Canada should declare dual citizenship. Yet, in 1996, more than 60 percent did not, reporting only "Canadian by naturalization." The same holds true for other countries that formally accept dual nationality. Jamaican law recognized dual citizenship in 1962. Since most Jamaican immigrants naturalized after 1962, all are objectively dual citizens. Yet, only 16.0 percent claimed dual citizenship in 1996. It is noteworthy that in both cases reports of dual citizenship increased from 1981 to 1996, although there was no change in the legal regulations surrounding dual citizenship. This increase has been more striking in the case of Uruguay than for Jamaica. Such a rise might reflect the identity politics some scholars of transnationalism incorporate into their discussions.

What do these statistics imply for the three models outlined earlier? First, they provide evidence of growing transnationalism or, at the least, a clear increase in multiple state-based identities. A minority of immigrants – in some cases a large minority – reject traditional views of citizenship. Thus, in 1996 more than 30 percent of naturalized immigrants from at least ten countries claimed multiple affiliations, apparently feeling little pressure to choose one citizenship over another.

Yet, despite significant pockets of dual citizenship, in only one case does a majority of immigrants declare dual nationality. Reported dual citizenship is high for a few countries, but since almost all immigrants from these countries are dual nationals by statute, perhaps more noteworthy is the large number of people who fail to identify as dual citizens. Claiming dual citizenship on the census is a relatively undemanding test of transnationalism: one merely checks a box on the census form. Nevertheless, a majority of immigrants apparently embrace a traditional identity, reporting a single citizenship. Transnationalism – at least as measured by formal political membership – might capture the lives of some immigrants, but this group remains a minority, albeit a growing one.

### *EXPLAINING VARIATION IN DUAL CITIZENSHIP CLAIMS*

The data in Table 4 remind us that factors other than laws influence claims of dual nationality. Significant variation exists among countries allowing mul-

tiple citizenship. Since the 1960s, both Barbados and Jamaica allow dual nationality, yet, in 1996, 26.2 percent of Barbadians claimed dual citizenship, whereas only 16.0 percent of Jamaicans did. The difference implies that the characteristics of the sending country, political and cultural beliefs of migrant groups, and/or the sociodemographic traits of their members play a role in determining dual citizenship. Due to the limits of space and census data, a detailed analysis of home country effects is not possible. We can, however, probe which individual characteristics are associated with claims of dual citizenship.

As outlined earlier, some students of transnationalism suggest that marginalized individuals – notably poor, nonwhite immigrants from developing countries – are particularly apt to lead transnational lives and favor dual citizenship. Table 4 reveals, however, that significant numbers of First World immigrants also adopt dual citizenship where the law permits. Over 30 percent of naturalized Canadians born in Uruguay, El Salvador and Pakistan declare dual citizenship, but so, too, do people from France, New Zealand and Switzerland. Immigrants from these three developed countries should be among the least likely to feel economic or social oppression in Canada: they probably look like the majority of native-born Canadians, possess the skills necessary to be economically successful, and can speak one of Canada's two official languages (English or French). The desire to identify as a dual national clearly includes immigrants from developed countries.

Other transnational scholars suggest that those immigrants with the most financial resources and human capital will lead transnational lives and adopt dual citizenship. To the extent that many migrants from developed countries possess these attributes, they are likely to embrace dual nationality. Significant minorities from developing countries also have the needed skills and resources, especially in the case of independent immigrants to Canada. These people are chosen by immigration officials based on their education, language ability and work experience.<sup>11</sup>

A comparison by level of education between those reporting only Canadian citizenship and those claiming dual citizenship lends support to the human capital hypothesis. Without controlling for other factors, education and dual citizenship appear to be positively correlated. In 1996, only 10 percent of immigrants who had a primary education identified as dual citizens. In contrast, 14.6 percent of high school graduates and 19.8 percent of uni-

<sup>11</sup>There are three general categories of entrants under Canadian immigration policy: independent immigrants, family-sponsored migrants and refugees.



versity graduates reported dual nationality. Education can impact dual citizenship in various ways. The more educated might receive higher career and income benefits from transnational activities. More schooling can aid in negotiating the bureaucracies that administer citizenship. Finally, higher education correlates with a greater sense of personal political efficacy, so people with more education might feel greater justification in claiming dual citizenship rights.

### *Modeling the Micro-level Determinants of Dual Citizenship*

While descriptive statistics suggest a relationship between education and dual citizenship, ideally we want to determine this effect net of other variables that could influence claims of dual nationality. The census microfiles, by providing a wide range of demographic and socioeconomic indicators, permit such an analysis. To model the determinants of dual citizenship, I selected a subsample of naturalized adult immigrants from eight countries that have allowed dual citizenship for at least fifteen years prior to the 1996 census. Countries were chosen for their acceptance of dual citizenship, the relatively large number of immigrants they send to Canada, and their geographic diversity. The resulting 102,601 individuals include people born in the United States, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, El Salvador, Guyana, France, Portugal or Lebanon. Using potential explanatory variables from existing theories of dual citizenship, I construct a maximum-likelihood logit model predicting the probability a naturalized Canadian will claim dual citizenship. Table 5 provides summary statistics for the independent variables used.

The length of residence and age variables are suggested by traditional citizenship theory and the descriptive statistics presented earlier. The traditional framework corresponds to an assimilatory model of immigrant integration: dual citizenship claims should decrease as length of residence increases. Similarly, those who migrate as children should be less likely to identify with multiple nation-states because their formative years are spent in Canada.

None of the three theories proposes an explicit hypothesis for the effect of gender on dual citizenship. If a relationship exists, one could imagine two contradictory impacts. On one hand, Ong (1999) argues that cultural idioms often idealize mobile masculinity contrasted to localized femininity. We might therefore expect men to be more likely to report dual citizenship than women. On the other hand, women often act as the bridge between families in the home country and the host country. They consequently could be more engaged in transnational activities than their husbands, fathers or brothers.

**TABLE 5**  
**SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VARIABLES IN LOGIT ANALYSIS, 1996 CANADIAN CENSUS**

|  | Mean    | Std. Dev. | Minimum | Maximum |
|--|---------|-----------|---------|---------|
| Length of Residence                              |         |           |         |         |
| Logged years of residence in Can.                | 2.97    | 0.63      | 1.39    | 4.58    |
| Age  |         |           |         |         |
| Age at time of the census in years               | 46.47   | 16.40     | 18      | 108     |
| Census age squared                               | 2428.58 | 1687.87   | 324     | 11664   |
| Age at time of migration, in years               | 23.05   | 14.36     | 0       | 95      |
| Sex  |         |           |         |         |
| 0=male, 1=female                                 | 0.53    | 0.50      | 0       | 1       |
| Racial Minority Status                           |         |           |         |         |
| Visible minority (0=no, 1=yes)                   | 0.43    | 0.50      | 0       | 1       |
| Economic Indicators                              |         |           |         |         |
| Logged income                                    | 9.20    | 2.46      | 0       | 14.61   |
| Living in poverty                                | 0.21    | 0.41      | 0       | 1       |
| (1=under Can. poverty line, 0=not)               |         |           |         |         |
| Self-employed (0=no, 1=yes)                      | 0.09    | 0.28      | 0       | 1       |
| Education  |         |           |         |         |
| Primary education or less                        | 0.16    | 0.37      | 0       | 1       |
| Some high school education                       | 0.17    | 0.37      | 0       | 1       |
| High school diploma (base category)              | 0.16    | 0.37      | 0       | 1       |
| Some post-secondary education                    | 0.35    | 0.48      | 0       | 1       |
| University degree (Bachelor, +)                  | 0.16    | 0.37      | 0       | 1       |
| Language (0=no, 1=yes)                           |         |           |         |         |
| Conversational knowledge of Eng. or Fr.          | 0.97    | 0.18      | 0       | 1       |
| Eng. or Fr. spoken mostly in the home            | 0.78    | 0.41      | 0       | 1       |
| "Rootedness"                                     |         |           |         |         |
| Single, never married (0=no, 1=yes)              | 0.19    | 0.39      | 0       | 1       |
| Homeownership                                    | 0.63    | 0.48      | 0       | 1       |
| (1=owns own home, 0=other)                       |         |           |         |         |
| Int'l mobility                                   |         |           |         |         |
| (lived in Can. 1 yr earlier=0,                   |         |           |         |         |
| other country=0)                                 | 0.004   | 0.066     | 0       | 1       |
| Country of Birth (0=no, 1=yes)                   |         |           |         |         |
| United States (base category)                    | 0.22    | 0.43      | 0       | 1       |
| Jamaica  | 0.16    | 0.37      | 0       | 1       |
| Trinidad and Tobago                              | 0.08    | 0.27      | 0       | 1       |
| El Salvador                                      | 0.04    | 0.20      | 0       | 1       |
| Guyana   | 0.11    | 0.31      | 0       | 1       |
| France   | 0.09    | 0.29      | 0       | 1       |
| Portugal   | 0.20    | 0.40      | 0       | 1       |
| Lebanon  | 0.08    | 0.27      | 0       | 1       |
| Province of Residence (0=no, 1=yes) <sup>a</sup> |         |           |         |         |
| British Columbia                                 | 0.09    | 0.29      | 0       | 1       |
| Ontario  | 0.58    | 0.49      | 0       | 1       |
| Quebec   | 0.19    | 0.40      | 0       | 1       |
| Sample N   | 102,601 |           |         |         |
| Pct. naturalized claiming dual citizenship       | 22.7    |           |         |         |

Note: <sup>a</sup>The base category is all immigrants living in the other seven provinces and three Canadian territories.



The variables for racial minority and economic status test the marginalization argument discussed earlier. The coding for "visible minority," the Canadian government's term for nonwhite populations, derives from a self-reported item on the 1996 census. The question is not explicitly labeled as one probing race; potential answers include a mix of racial ("White," "Black"), geographic ("South Asian," "Latin American") and ethnic or national identifiers ("Chinese," "Filipino"). Statistics Canada coding, essentially labeling all non-"Whites" as visible minority, was followed here. Given this definition, visible minorities constitute 43 percent of the sample. Economic indicators include logged total income and a dummy variable coding poverty status according to Statistics Canada definitions.<sup>12</sup> Twenty-one percent of the immigrants fell below the poverty line in 1996.

Others propose that transnationalism correlates with greater human capital, such as education and entrepreneurial activities, not marginalization. I consequently include dummy variables measuring self-employment and level of education. Nine percent of respondents reported being self-employed. There is wide variation in educational background: 16 percent of the sample completed grade 8 or less while another 16 percent hold at least one university degree.

Language and "rootedness" variables (Portes and Curtis, 1987) test the extent to which facility in and ties to the host country influence dual citizenship. A traditional paradigm would expect those who speak one of Canada's two official languages, English or French, and who have stable bonds in Canada, such as owning a home, to be less likely to claim dual citizenship. Language is measured in two different ways. Language ability is self-reported ability to carry out a basic conversation in English or French. Because some language knowledge is generally needed to naturalize, it is not surprising that 97 percent of the sample speaks at least one of Canada's official languages.<sup>13</sup> The second variable, home language, codes whether the individual mostly speaks an official language in the home. Twenty-two percent of respondents speak a language other than English or French in their households. Transnational and traditional models suggest similar hypotheses: those with few fam-

<sup>12</sup>The logged variable reflects the idea that absolute increases in income do not have the same impact at all income levels. Thus, for example, a \$20,000 increase in income might have a substantial impact on a family earning only \$20,000 but a relatively minor impact on a family with a yearly income of \$120,000. Because immigrant populations can have a bifurcated income distribution, I include the dummy variable for poverty status.

<sup>13</sup>There is an exception for those over age 60. They do not need to demonstrate official language skills.

ily ties (who have never been married) or who are highly mobile (operationalized as those who lived outside of Canada a year earlier) are more likely to report dual citizenship.

Finally, the logit model includes geographic dummy variables for country of birth and province of residence in Canada. Including birthplace helps control for omitted variables related to country of origin, such as the homeland political situation, cultural norms or country-specific tax laws. The province variable is included to control for the potential effect of the Canadian political context, notably the situation faced by immigrants in Quebec. Living in Quebec, home to a vibrant Francophone independence movement, might make immigrants particularly sensitive to dual nationality claims and multiple identities. The majority of the immigrants in this sample live in Ontario (58%), 19 percent live in Quebec, 9 percent reside in British Columbia, and the remainder lives in another province or territory.

Table 6 presents results from the logit regression model. Given the extremely large sample size, even a slight variation will show up as statistically significant. It is consequently not surprising that most independent variables are significant at the  $p < 0.01$  level. In the case of those variables that fail to achieve statistical significance at  $p < 0.05$ , we can be quite sure that they exert no independent effect on dual citizenship net of the other variables in the model. Thus, income, self-employment and home ownership do not appear to influence immigrants' reports of dual citizenship. These findings undermine human capital and traditional explanations of dual citizenship. Owning one's own business or having a high income does not increase the probability of dual citizenship, unlike what Portes and associates (1999) speculate. Similarly, if home ownership can be taken as an indicator of rootedness, the latter does not decrease dual citizenship, in contrast to the prediction of a traditional model.

Given the large sample size, it makes more sense to consider the substantive effects of various predictors (King, Tomz and Wittenburg, 2000). These effects are difficult to interpret from logit model coefficients since they represent the effect of the independent variable on the logged odds of dual citizenship. The relative effect of a change in an independent variable depends on where the predicted probability lies on the logistic regression curve or, put another way, it depends on the value of all the other independent variables (Long, 1997). As a result, the impact of the explanatory variables cannot be easily compared from a table of results as with standard linear regression. To facilitate comparison, Table 7 calculates predicted probabilities and estimates



**TABLE 6**  
**LOGIT REGRESSION RESULTS:**  
**MODELLING NATURALIZED IMMIGRANTS' REPORTED DUAL CITIZENSHIP, 1996**

|  | Logit<br>Coefficient | Std. Error |
|--|----------------------|------------|
| Length of Residence  |                      |            |
| Logged years of residence in Can.                              | -0.380 <sup>a</sup>  | 0.035      |
| Age  |                      |            |
| Age at time of the census in years                             | 0.039 <sup>a</sup>   | 0.004      |
| Census age squared   | -0.001 <sup>a</sup>  | 0.00003    |
| Age at time of migration, in years                             | 0.014 <sup>a</sup>   | 0.002      |
| Sex  |                      |            |
| 0=male, 1=female   | -0.003 <sup>b</sup>  | 0.016      |
| Racial Minority Status   |                      |            |
| Visible minority (0=no, 1=yes)                                 | 0.131 <sup>a</sup>   | 0.032      |
| Economic Indicators  |                      |            |
| Logged income  | -0.002               | 0.003      |
| Living in poverty (1=under Can. poverty line, 0=not)           | -0.142 <sup>a</sup>  | 0.021      |
| Self-employed (0=no, 1=yes)                                    | -0.014               | 0.027      |
| Education  |                      |            |
| Primary education or less                                      | -0.158 <sup>a</sup>  | 0.032      |
| Some high school education                                     | -0.211 <sup>a</sup>  | 0.030      |
| High school diploma (base category)                            | —                    |            |
| Some post-secondary education                                  | 0.234 <sup>a</sup>   | 0.024      |
| University degree (Bachelor, +)                                | 0.584 <sup>a</sup>   | 0.027      |
| Language (0=no, 1=yes)   |                      |            |
| Conversational knowledge of Eng. or Fr.                        | -0.193 <sup>a</sup>  | 0.045      |
| Eng. or Fr. spoken mostly in the home                          | -0.503 <sup>a</sup>  | 0.028      |
| "Rootedness"   |                      |            |
| Single, never married (0=no, 1=yes)                            | 0.139 <sup>a</sup>   | 0.023      |
| Homeownership (1=owns own home, 0=other)                       | -0.003               | 0.018      |
| Int'l mobility (lived in Can. 1 yr earlier=0, other country=0) | 0.394 <sup>a</sup>   | 0.104      |
| Country of Birth (0=no, 1=yes)                                 |                      |            |
| United States (base category)                                  | —                    |            |
| Jamaica  | -0.617 <sup>a</sup>  | 0.041      |
| Trinidad and Tobago  | -0.817 <sup>a</sup>  | 0.046      |
| El Salvador  | -0.332 <sup>a</sup>  | 0.520      |
| Guyana   | -0.675 <sup>a</sup>  | 0.043      |
| France   | 0.540 <sup>a</sup>   | 0.031      |
| Portugal   | -0.273 <sup>a</sup>  | 0.033      |
| Lebanon  | 0.087 <sup>b</sup>   | 0.041      |
| Province of Residence (0=no, 1=yes) <sup>c</sup>               |                      |            |
| British Columbia   | -0.113 <sup>a</sup>  | 0.035      |
| Ontario  | 0.006                | 0.026      |
| Quebec   | 0.346 <sup>a</sup>   | 0.029      |
| Constant   | -0.503 <sup>a</sup>  | 0.111      |
| Sample N   | 102,601              |            |

Note: <sup>a</sup>p<0.01

<sup>b</sup>p<0.05

<sup>c</sup>The base category is all immigrants living in the other seven provinces and three Canadian territories.

change in those probabilities under certain conditions. The first column of the table reports the predicted probability of dual citizenship, given a certain value for the specified independent variable. The second column calculates

the change in probability associated with a move from one value of the independent variable to another, holding all other variables at their mean. For example, a change in the number of years an immigrant has resided in Canada, from ten to twenty, decreases the probability of reporting dual citizenship from .253 to .206, a decline of .046.

Table 7 demonstrates that while some variables are statistically significant, substantively they do not influence dual citizenship much. For example, the effect of gender is statistically significant at the  $p < 0.05$  level, yet when we calculate the probability of self-identifying as a dual citizen, we find that the result for men and women, rounded to three decimal places, is the same at .208. There appears to be no substantive influence of gender on the propensity to report dual citizenship status.

The traditional model of citizenship, rooted in an assimilatory perspective of immigrants' political and national belonging, receives moderate support. As predicted, the longer an immigrant resides in Canada, the less likely he or she is to identify as a dual citizen. The decrease in probability is modest, -.046, moving from ten to twenty years. The traditional model also correctly predicts that individuals who migrated as children are less likely to claim dual citizenship than adult migrants. Comparing someone who moved to Canada at age 10 to someone who came as a 30 year old, we find a moderate increase of .044 in the predicted probability of dual citizenship.

The predictions of traditional and transnational frameworks overlap in the areas of language use and "rootedness." A traditional model would predict that individuals more rooted in Canadian life are less likely to identify as dual citizens. Transnational theory holds that people who lead transnational lives will be more apt to embrace dual citizenship. Table 7 shows that whether we look at language ability or language use in the home, immigrants who do not use English or French have a greater tendency to report dual citizenship. The effect of household language is most dramatic: the predicted probability for those using a non-official language is .280 compared to .190 for immigrants speaking English or French in the home. This represents a decrease in the probability of dual citizenship by about a third.

Of the rootedness variables, living abroad the year prior to the census had the strongest effect on dual citizenship. As reported above, home ownership has no significant effect. The impact of marital status is in the expected direction – those who are single are more likely to identify as dual citizens – but the substantive effect is quite weak, a change in probability of -.023. In comparison, the probability of dual citizenship among those who lived



**TABLE 7**  
**EFFECT OF CHANGES IN THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ON PREDICTED PROBABILITIES**

|  | Predicted<br>Probability | Probability<br>Change |
|--|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| Length of Residence                                    |                          |                       |
| 10 years residence                                     | 0.253                    |                       |
| 20 years residence                                     | 0.206                    | -0.046                |
| Age  |                          |                       |
| 25 years at time of census                             | 0.220                    |                       |
| 45 years at time of census                             | 0.233                    | 0.013                 |
| 10 years at time of migration                          | 0.180                    |                       |
| 30 years at time of migration                          | 0.224                    | 0.044                 |
| Sex  |                          |                       |
| Male   | 0.208                    |                       |
| Female   | 0.208                    | -0.001                |
| Visible Minority Status                                |                          |                       |
| White  | 0.199                    |                       |
| Nonwhite   | 0.220                    | 0.022                 |
| Economic Indicators                                    |                          |                       |
| \$15,000 total income                                  | 0.208                    |                       |
| \$60,000 total income                                  | 0.207                    | 0.000                 |
| Below the poverty line                                 | 0.190                    |                       |
| Above the poverty line                                 | 0.213                    | 0.023                 |
| Not self-employed                                      | 0.208                    |                       |
| Self-employed  | 0.206                    | -0.002                |
| Education  |                          |                       |
| Primary education or less                              | 0.166                    | -0.023                |
| High school completion (base category)                 | 0.189                    |                       |
| University degree (Bachelor, +)                        | 0.295                    | 0.106                 |
| Language (0=no, 1=yes)                                 |                          |                       |
| No knowledge of English or French                      | 0.240                    |                       |
| Ability to conduct a basic conversation in Eng. or Fr. | 0.207                    | -0.033                |
| Non-official language in the home                      | 0.280                    |                       |
| English or French spoken in the home                   | 0.190                    | -0.090                |
| "Rootedness"   |                          |                       |
| Single   | 0.227                    |                       |
| Married (present or past)                              | 0.204                    | -0.023                |
| Non-homeowner  | 0.208                    |                       |
| Homeowner  | 0.208                    | 0.000                 |
| Lived in Canada year before census                     | 0.208                    |                       |
| Lived abroad year before census                        | 0.280                    | 0.072                 |
| Country of Birth (0=no, 1=yes)                         |                          |                       |
| United States (base category)                          | 0.252                    |                       |
| Jamaica  | 0.153                    |                       |
| Trinidad and Tobago                                    | 0.129                    |                       |
| El Salvador  | 0.194                    |                       |
| Guyana   | 0.146                    |                       |
| France   | 0.366                    |                       |
| Portugal   | 0.204                    |                       |
| Lebanon  | 0.268                    |                       |
| Province of Residence (0=no, 1=yes)                    |                          |                       |
| Base category (other 7 provs. or 3 territories)        | 0.198                    |                       |
| British Columbia                                       | 0.181                    |                       |
| Ontario  | 0.199                    |                       |
| Quebec   | 0.259                    |                       |

abroad in 1995 is .280, .072 more than those living in Canada in 1995. International mobility thus increases reported dual citizenship by about a third. Traditional and transnational frameworks are both supported.

Within the transnational literature, there are competing hypotheses about who engages in transnational activity, those who are most marginalized or those with the greatest resources. The results imply that the debate might be a false one, at least if we use economic indicators of marginality or resources. There is no effect for income or self-employment on reported dual citizenship. Living in poverty has a weak negative effect on dual citizenship: moving out of poverty increases the probability of dual nationality claims by .023, suggesting economic marginalization is not a cause of dual nationality claims. If marginalization is instead measured in racial terms, we find a weak effect of visible minority status on reported dual citizenship. White immigrants have a predicted probability of .199, while nonwhites' predicted probability is .220, a difference of .022. There is thus weak support for the contention that racial minorities are most likely to embrace dual citizenship status.

In contrast, the human capital variant of transnationalism receives strong support when we examine the impact of education. The effect is non-linear across various levels of education with the most dramatic impact seen at high levels of schooling. The predicted probability for immigrants with a high school diploma, the base category in the model, is .189. If we compare this to individuals with at least one university degree, the predicted probability shoots up over 50 percent to .295, an increase of .106. The relative decrease for immigrants with only primary education is less striking, but still in the expected direction: the predicted probability falls .023 compared to those with high school diplomas. Level of education clearly has a substantial impact on individuals' reports of dual citizenship.

Finally, geographic variables also have substantively significant effects on an immigrant's propensity to identify as a dual citizen. Within the Canadian context, the effect of living in Quebec clearly has a greater impact than residing in any of the English-speaking provinces or territories. The predicted probabilities for English Canada hover between .18 and .20. The predicted probability of claiming dual citizenship for a Quebec resident is .259, .060 higher than similar individuals living in Ontario. The direction and size of the effect supports the hypothesis that the Quebec political situation increases the salience of dual nationality for immigrants in that province.

If the political context of the reception area matters for dual citizenship, it should come as no surprise that the characteristics of the sending country



also exert a significant influence on dual nationality. In fact, some of the differences in predicted probability between various countries of origin are higher than any of the individual-level variables. The predicted probability can be as high as .336 for migrants born in France and as low as .129 for those from Jamaica, even though we consider only countries allowing dual citizenship and we control for a host of individual-level characteristics. The analysis here, based on micro-level census data, can provide insight into variation within and between groups based on individual characteristics, but future research should focus on the dynamics that make dual nationality decisionmaking unique to each sending/receiving country dyad. The socioeconomic and political contexts of both sending and receiving countries – and even regions within those countries – clearly impact immigrants' propensity to identify as dual citizens.

**TABLE 8**  
**SUMMARY OF RESULTS**

|  | Traditional Model   | Transnational Model   | Postnational Model   |
|--|---|---|--|
| Implications for Dual Citizenship                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Most immigrants do naturalize and only a minority claim dual citizenship.</li> <li>✓ The longer an immigrant resides in Canada, the less likely he or she is to claim dual citizenship.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>x Aggregate levels of dual citizenship are low, about 16% (1996).</li> <li>? Controlling for place of birth reveals higher levels of dual citizenship for some countries, but these tend to be substantially lower than what is legally possible.</li> <li>✓ Levels of dual citizenship are increasing rapidly from 1981 to 1996.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>x Strict view: widespread naturalization implies immigrants are embracing citizenship despite few legal differences between citizens and permanent residents.</li> <li>x Dual citizenship is increasing, not falling.</li> <li>Weak view: evidence for dual citizenship.</li> </ul> |
| Potential Individual-level Variation in Dual Citizenship | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Some indicators of 'rootedness' correlate with reporting only a single citizenship (but others are insignificant).</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ The internationally mobile are more likely to embrace dual citizenship.</li> <li>✓ Dual citizenship is more likely among those with more education.</li> <li>x No relationship between owning a business or income and dual citizenship.</li> <li>x Little evidence for marginalization hypothesis.</li> </ul>                             | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>x Although immigrants from some European countries naturalize slowly, other EU nationals naturalize rapidly and hold dual citizenship; within 15 years, the majority of EU nationals adopt Canadian citizenship.</li> </ul>   |

## CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Immigrants' self-reports of dual citizenship suggest that there is little evidence for postnationalism, growing support for transnationalism, and significant evidence for the continued relevance of traditional frameworks. Table 8 summarizes the evidence for the hypotheses presented in the first section of this study.

We find, in line with the traditional paradigm, that the vast majority of immigrants to Canada naturalize rapidly after entering the country and that declared dual citizenship decreases as length of residence increases. Statistical analysis shows some support for the argument that 'rootedness' is correlated with traditional citizenship – child migrants and those who speak English or French in the home are less likely to claim dual nationality – but other variables, like home ownership, are insignificant indicators of reported dual citizenship. These findings provide empirical support for Nancy Foner's warning, written for an American audience but equally applicable in Canada, that "there is now a risk of overemphasizing the centrality of transnationalism and minimizing the extent to which contemporary immigrants 'become American' and undergo changes in behavior and outlook in response to circumstances in this country" (1997:369). The vast majority of immigrants to Canada rapidly become Canadian citizens. This implies that some notion of traditional belonging remains relevant despite globalization.

In contrast, the empirical analysis presented here offers little support for a strict model of postnational membership. Most immigrants naturalize, reports of dual citizenship are increasing despite of the spread of human rights, and EU nationals appear no less likely to naturalize and claim dual citizenship than other immigrant groups. These findings parallel those of Koopmans and Statham (1999), who show that political claims-making by migrants in Europe centers around national rather than postnational models, and Joppke's (1998) argument that asylum policies reveal more about the continued relevance of state sovereignty than externally imposed human rights norms. Stasiulis (1997) notes that although academics might be sympathetic to the normative thrust of postnationalism, evidence for the theory is weak: results differ "depending on whether the analysis is based on legal, formal rules or on the empirical condition of noncitizens where formal rights are often unenforced or unenforceable" (p. 199). Only if we adopt a weak postnational perspective, one very similar to transnationalism, do we find some statistical support for this approach.

Perhaps the most provocative evidence concerns theories of transnationalism. Reports of dual nationality increase significantly from 1981 to



1996, as sending countries increasingly allow their nationals to hold dual citizenship. Even where the laws did not change, more immigrants are identifying as dual nationals. At an aggregate level, only 16 percent of adult immigrants identified as dual citizens, a rather small minority. However, if we control for country of origin, we find a number of immigrant groups in which two fifths or more report dual citizenship. Essentially, we are confronted with a problem of finding the glass half-full or half-empty. In some cases, significant minorities identify as dual citizens, yet the majority of immigrants – even when they are legally and objectively dual nationals – report only a single, Canadian, nationality. Given the rapid rise in dual citizenship claims, however, it is likely that multiple nationalities will increasingly become the norm.

Scholars of transnationalism debate whether immigrants with greater human capital or those facing greater marginalization engage in higher levels of transnationalism. There is little support for either theory when we consider economic indicators of marginality or success. The marginalization argument finds limited backing when we consider racial minority status: it is a significant predictor of dual citizenship claims, but substantively the effect is small. In contrast, a strong and significant correlation exists between level of education and dual citizenship, suggesting some empirical basis for human capital theories of transnationalism. While economic resources might not matter significantly, educational skills clearly do. It is possible that multiple patterns of transnationalism exist (Levitt, 2003; Morawska, 2003), but combined with the significant relationship between international mobility and dual nationality, it appears that professional, cosmopolitan individuals embrace multiple citizenships and belongings more than the marginalized.

Census data do not provide a rich understanding of individuals' identities and participatory horizons, but the increase in reported dual citizenship implies that a growing number of people feel ties beyond the geopolitical borders of their country of residence. Such findings feed into arguments regarding the erosion of nation-states' sovereignty and the creation of new types of community. However, dual citizenship also reinforces the relevance of nation-states since the latter continue to be the grantors of citizenship, even if they allow their nationals more than one passport. Students of developing countries, in particular, argue that while sovereignty might be differentiating, new forms of citizenship act to build nation-states rather than destroy them (Ong, 1999; Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994).

Canada, conventionally grouped with the established liberal democracies, might be involved in a similar nation-building exercise. As it moved

from being a British dominion to establishing an independent identity as a nation-state, dual citizenship and multiculturalism have played an important role in differentiating Canadians from Britons and Americans. Canadian naturalization levels are significantly higher than those in the United States or Europe, and they have been rising over the past 30 years, at the same time as claims of dual citizenship have increased. As recent research by Jones-Correa (2001) suggests, these two trends might be linked. Allowing immigrants to keep multiple citizenship could further Canadian nation-building and integration efforts, reinforcing the state rather than undermining it.

Future research needs to consider the impact of macro-level variables and structural dynamics on immigrant dual citizenship. There are clear differences between sending countries in their nationals' propensity to claim dual citizenship, even after we control for individual-level variation such as length of residence, race and socioeconomic status. In addition, it appears that unique contexts in the receiving country also influence claims of dual nationality: immigrants in Quebec are much more likely to identify as dual citizens than compatriots in the Anglophone provinces. The Canadian context – sharing features with both Western Europe and the United States – offers a unique environment to test theories of citizenship. Yet, its uniqueness might mean that conclusions from Canadian data need to be modified before they can be applied to other countries. With the development of new data sources, future research should employ comparative designs to investigate how reception contexts influence immigrants' sense of citizenship.

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