Qual Sociol (2013) 36:141–159
DOI 10.1007/s11133-013-9248-6

Contesting Benevolence: Market Orientations among Muslim Aid Providers in Egypt

Cihan Tuğal

Published online: 20 March 2013

Abstract This paper studies the pro-market and communitarian tendencies among Egypt's *khayr* (benevolence) organizations based on interviews with and observation of managers, staff and volunteers. Can the conflicting market and community orientations in the field of benevolence be interpreted as an instance of the "double movement" of marketization and protection against the market? The analyses demonstrate a growing tendency of marketization and only weak tendencies to transform established communitarian ways of giving into more systematic ways of non-marketized giving. Due to an emergent state-business-civil society nexus, market-oriented voluntary associations hold the potential to undermine or absorb the actually more entrenched communitarian associations. Potentials for a double movement in the era of neoliberalism seem to be weaker than in the classical liberal era because of the deeper permeation of society by market ethics.

Keywords Charity · Philanthropy · Neoliberalism · Communitarianism · Double movement · Islam · Egypt · Market

Different strands of benevolent activity in the Middle East have been characterized as neoliberal (Atia 2012; Roy 2010) and communitarian (Davis and Robertson 2012). Can this contrast among aid providers be studied using Polanyian lenses, as the two legs of the "double movement" (marketization vs. society's self-protection against the market)? In studying the transition to the market in European modernity, Karl Polanyi (1944) has suggested that a double movement characterizes economic liberalization. On the one hand, actors tend to reduce every social relation to one of calculation, production and exchange, interacting with other human beings solely on the basis of the commodity logic (the first leg of the movement). On the other hand, new webs of solidarity emerge to cope with the impoverishment that this marketization fosters (the second leg of the double movement).

Present Address:
C. Tuğal (✉)
Sociology, UC Berkeley, 410 Barrows Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720-1980, USA
e-mail: ctugal@berkeley.edu

In the context of the Middle East, it could be posited that market-oriented charities constitute the first leg of the double movement: they strive to go beyond simply protecting the poor to turn them into responsible market agents. The communitarian charities, it could be argued, seek to control and restrict the market. The analyses below focus on the field of charitable and philanthropic organizations in Egypt and discuss whether their contrasting understandings of *khayr* (benevolence) might signal the crystallization of a double movement. Are Muslim aid organizations among the leaders of a counter-movement against marketization?

The dictionary meaning of khayr is broad, ranging from blessing, charity, good, beneficence, and welfare to property, wealth, and philanthropy. It is one of the most repeated words in the Qur'an, in many verses simply referring to the benefits believers expect from God. While for communitarian associations benevolence involves a range of communal responsibilities, for the market-oriented associations it requires an investment in training, development, and income generation. Through an analysis of interviews with and observations of benevolent actors in Egypt, and secondarily an analysis of associational documents and websites, this paper will propose that benevolence is moving in a marketized direction, accompanied with only a weak communitarian counterpoint.

Aid, Islam and Ethics: Neoliberal and Communitarian Orientations

A number of scholars have argued that there is a tight link between the increase in charitable and philanthropic activity and neoliberalization all over the world (Atia 2012; Bayat 2007, 137–139; Raddon 2008; Roy 2010; Sullivan 1994, 58–59). The multiple ways in which aid organizations relate to the market has been less explored (see Allahyari 2000 for an exception).

Neoliberalism is usually defined as an economic program that involves privatization, deregulation, and enhancement of the role of finance and the market as an alternative to social democracy, socialism, and state capitalism. Micro-approaches, however, have focused on the cultural and everyday aspects of neoliberalism. Drawing on these approaches, this paper will adopt Brown's (2005, 57) definition of neoliberalism as a formation that shapes "citizens as individual entrepreneurial actors across all dimensions of their lives" (also see Burchell 1993, 271, 274–276; Foucault 2008 [2004]). It could thus be posited that aid organizations form a node of civil society where entrepreneurial dispositions (and a competitive individualism) are nurtured (Roy 2010).

My analysis is partially based on a perspective that sees aid as reinforcing the dominance of powerful groups. The theoretical backdrop of this approach to contemporary charity and philanthropy is the argument that giving, throughout ages and societies, has most often served the prestige-accumulation of the rich (Baylouny 2010, 141–142). By giving to the poor, the rich not only legitimate their wealth, but also accumulate respect, which they can later exchange for labor or loyalty (Bourdieu 1980/1990, 125–134). Moreover, starting with early modernity, charitable work has allowed disciplinary mechanisms to spread out from enclosed institutions (such as factories, schools, and prisons) and enter the homes and bedrooms of the poor to further regulate them (Foucault 1975/1977, 212). While this perspective gives us rich insights into modern benevolence (and seems apropos given that the strong Egyptian move toward neoliberalism in the 1990s went hand-in-hand with the explosion of benevolent organizations), we still need to ask whether it exhausts all dimensions of voluntary giving.

Another tradition in sociology draws attention to the community-making aspect of religion, which constitutes a counter-point to the individualism (and instrumental rationality)

of the market place (Bellah et al. 1985, 223–224, 239, 248; Habermas 1981/1985).[1] Human beings have an innate desire to please, share, communicate, connect, and form community (Bellah 2011). This is a fundamentally different assumption about social actors than those found in the accounts of giving that emphasize the upper classes' concerns of prestige and control. One of religion's core roles is to sustain community as a counter to the rise of individualism and the market (Casanova 1994).[2] I use the word "communitarian" to designate associations where these aspects of religious giving are (at least apparently) more predominant.

Robert Wuthnow states that people learn to care for others from the way their family cares about them. They then want to replicate this behavior by helping others during their childhood years (1995, 7–13). Patterned on parental love, the urge to give is beyond concerns about prestige and control. But then, in the transition to adulthood, people "forget" about giving to others under the pressure of their professional and family lives. Charity and philanthropy—institutionalized giving—are the only ways the (deeply-seated, yet threatened) motivation to give can be sustained in adulthood. Bartkowski and Regis (2003, 17–20) also hold that giving is generative of community. Its altruistic principles constitute *alternatives* to the individualism and instrumentalism of the market. Charity and philanthropy foster morality and positive social change.

Islamic Voluntary Giving in the Middle East

Is Islamically inspired benevolence[3] also primarily a way to discipline the poor? Or can its communitarian structure evolve toward "embedding" the market in Polanyi's sense: Can it allow society to develop mechanisms of redistribution and protection to deal with the destructive aspects of economic liberalization?

Charity in historically Islamic societies was based on the religious obligation to donate a certain amount of one's wealth (through *zakat* or alms, one of the five pillars of Sunni Islam) and, additionally, strong religious incentives to give beyond the obligatory amount. Much of the scholarship on the rise of Islamic charities in the Middle East focuses on the transition from such traditional charity and relief to what has been called "developmental" philanthropy (Atia 2008; Baylouny 2010, 113–115; Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003; Ibrahim 2008, 2, 12; Sullivan 1994).

[1] Yet another understanding of volunteerism and giving is based on the rational choice model, which holds that people give with calculated expectations of compensation. For instance, volunteers bring their human, social and cultural capital to organizations, and organizations in turn give them other goods, such as new valuable networks (Wilson and Musick 1997, 709). Whereas the Foucaultian and Bourdieusian accounts covered here hold that marketized relations are a result and *goal* of charitable giving, in the rational choice account the market exchange logic is the driving *causal* mechanism (Borgonovi 2008, 107–110, 122–124). An evaluation of the rational choice model was left out because the material analyzed here speaks more directly to the disagreements between Foucaultian/Bourdieusian and communitarian accounts.

[2] These scholars do not necessarily advocate the logic of community *against* the logic of the market. Actually, there are two strands in this literature regarding the exact nature of the relation between the two. One strand does emphasize the contradiction between the market and community (this dates back to Mauss 1923–24/1990 and Titmuss 1997 [1970]). But some others see the market and community as complementary, as in the debate on social capitalism, mostly inspired by Robert Putnam, e.g. see Annette (2011).

[3] This paper focuses only on benevolent activity which has Islamic references. The organizations under scrutiny, even when they do not have an explicitly Islamic mission, have roots in the Islamic movement, use Islamic ethical discourse, and incorporate Muslim clerics in their top positions. Future work could discuss whether the broader aid field (which comprises secular as well as Christian organizations) displays signs of a double movement as well. It should also be noted that the data in this paper cannot allow a conclusive judgment about whether there is a stronger double movement in the broader Egyptian society (when compared to the field of benevolence).

The partial institutionalization of traditional charity over the centuries makes an absolute distinction between charitable organizations and modern philanthropic ones impossible (Singer 2008, 176–177), but some scholars still distinguish between what they classify as charitable (religiously-based, short-lived and immediately consumable) and developmental (rationalized, cumulative) giving (Ibrahim 2008, 12). Sullivan (1994, 67–69) notes that many Islamic associations in Egypt provide not only health care and day care (the domain of traditional charities), but also job training (sewing, carpentry, etc.). Jonathan Benthall and Jérôme Bellion-Jourdan (2003, 75–80) point out that even among charity organizations that had roots in Islamic movements, credentials have started to replace commitment to ideology and conversion of non-Muslims. CVs, degrees (especially MBA, banking, etc.) have started to be central to recruitment of staff, rather than the applicants' ideological formation.

The increase in this new type of charity does not resemble the self-protection of society, as portrayed by Polanyians, but seems to entail a deeper marketization of society.[4] Atia's (2012) and Harb's (2010, 109, 115) emphasis on the "responsibilization" of the individual (that is, the singling out of the individual and his/her shortcomings as the real cause of poverty) gets at the heart of what makes all of these developmental efforts specifically market-oriented and "neoliberal": Some Islamic organizations' discourse shifts the agency and the blame from society to the individual.

In short, the predominant tendency in the literature is to emphasize the growing salience of market-oriented charity (or philanthropy) in the Islamic Middle East. Taking a cue from Davis and Robertson (1999, 2012), who argue that the more orthodox religious communities are more egalitarian and communitarian than the rest of the population, the analyses below will explore whether there are strong counter-market tendencies too in Egyptian benevolence. The Polanyian expectation is that whenever marketization generates wealth and inequality (Richards and Waterbury 2007; Stiglitz 2002), society will respond by weaving new webs of protection and redistribution (Block 2003; Somers 2008), which might actually recast such communitarian orientations in new form. Hence, the Polanyian question (to be posed as a counterpoint to the literature covered above) would be: Do communitarian aid groups represent a counter-movement to marketization?

Each wave of commodification brings about a wave of embedding of market forces, Polanyians hold. Analysts have emphasized that this is as true of the contemporary wave of marketization (neoliberalism) as it was for the classical age of liberalism (Birchfield 1999; Evans 2008; Munck 2006; Riain 2006). Consequently, some have warned against tendencies (especially in critical scholarship) to exaggerate the vigor of neoliberalization (its capacity to commodify all hitherto non-marketized entities and activities); they underline, instead, instances of "embedding" in the neoliberal age (Hann 2007). For instance, Polanyians see faith-based aid organizations in the neoliberal era as one instance of the double movement's second leg (Sandbrook 2011).

Applying these insights to the study of Egyptian communitarian associations (which predate the last wave of marketization) will require us to revise one of Polanyi's arguments. Polanyi maintained that marketization destroys traditional communities; movements respond by developing modern ways of protecting society from the market. Based on E.P. Thompson's work,

[4] In contrast to previous work which had emphasized how Islamic charity changes the *religious* lives of the poor (Zubaida 1989), these analyses shift the focus to the economic conduct component of charity work. In parallel fashion, Janine Clark (2004) argues that Islamic charity has no influence on the religious lives of the poor and the beneficiaries, but involves a transformation of the middle class providers (see Bayat 1997 for a similar argument). However, Mona Atia (2012) argues that new forms of Islamic giving strive to make the poor and the beneficiaries simultaneously more pious and more neoliberal: they motivate them to develop management skills, efficiency, and entrepreneurialism as a part of their search for salvation.

Burawoy (2003) has criticized this neat distinction between traditional and modern counter-market tendencies: Modern institutions and movements of protection were partially built on traditions of self-organization. Similarly, Somers (1993) has pointed out that counter-market tendencies could make an impact only when strong participatory communities pre-dated marketization. Hence, in the Islamic context, pre-existing charities (their methods, networks, and discourses of organization) might become resources for a novel "embedding" of the market.

We could conclude that charity activities indeed embed the market if they subordinate individualizing and disciplining activities to social purposes. This could be analyzed by studying an organization's explanation of poverty and the way it apportions blame (individual versus social); that organization's expectations from the poor; the degree of pro-market professionalization (e.g. competitive salaries and training for staff, that is, the institutionalization of charity as a career rather than sociable activity); the weight of market-oriented activities in the overall activities and budget of the organization (in comparison to provision, direct aid, and pietistic activities). Table 1 demonstrates how market-oriented charity and communitarian charity would be differentiated along these four axes.

My analyses show that market-oriented and communitarian charity organizations in Egypt are differentiated in this manner only to a certain extent. The emergent business-association-state nexus makes a strong double movement unlikely. I argue that civil society menaces to undermine the double movement in the neoliberal age, whereas it had helped that movement in the classical age of liberalism (Burawoy 2003). My findings corroborate critical literature that draws attention to the close linkage and mutual reinforcement between NGOs and neoliberalization (Karim 2010; Schild 2007; Tadros 2010; Wolch 1990). The neoliberal era has witnessed, this literature holds, the rise of a "regulatory apparatus" that tightly links the state and associations (religious organizations, community service organizations, even progressive social movements), which work in conjunction to individualize responsibility (Bumiller 2008, 5–6, 66–68). Even though the paper also explores dynamics—unlike some of this literature—that can allow NGOs to repose questions of poverty alleviation in local ethical idioms (cf. Ong 2011, 31, 35) and hence embed the market, it underlines the neoliberal trends which could absorb these dynamics. The findings also support critical takes on Polanyi, which maintain that a vigorous embedding of the market is much more difficult in the age of neoliberalism (Dale 2012).

Benevolent Associations in Egypt

The recent increase in the significance of aid organizations in Egypt is linked to the state's withdrawal from social provision. After 1952, Nasser's regime had established a corporatist system with a strong welfare component. The government nationalized many Islamic

Table 1 The (hypothetical) dispositions of market-oriented and communitarian benevolent organizations

	Market-oriented associations	Communitarian associations
Explanation of poverty	1) Individual failure (of the poor) 2) Governmental blockage of voluntary activities and individual initiative	1) Immorality (among both the rich and the poor) 2) The rich's and the government's failure to care
Expectation from the poor	More productivity	More moral lives
Careers of staff and managers	Competitive	Social
Main activities	Training	Provision

foundations, while also tightly controlling remaining charitable activities. After Nasser's death in 1970, the new president Sadat sought to liberalize the economy and cut welfare spending. While the "bread riots" of 1977 (against the IMF-imposed subsidy cuts of bread, sugar, and other necessities) slowed down the market reforms, these picked up pace with Mubarak's presidency in 1981. The reforms suffered intermittent setbacks due to more bread riots and strikes, as well as Islamist insurgency.

Nevertheless, subsidies were gradually eliminated. Only bread, wheat flour, sugar, and edible oil were subsidized in 1995, while 18 items of food were covered by the state in 1980 (Salevurakis and Abdel-Haleim 2008, 40). Privatization and deregulation brought with them sustained growth in the first half of the 1980s along with declining real wages, and increasing unemployment and poverty (Kienle 1998). The Mubarak regime intensified welfare cuts, deregulation and privatization in the 1990s and 2000s. The last quarter of the century saw a sharp increase in poverty (Ibrahim 2004, 482). While the future is far from certain, the new Muslim Brotherhood-led regime is unlikely to alter these neoliberal patterns because pro-business elements within the MB seem to be in control.

Another dynamic behind the spread of aid organizations is the regeneration of da'wa. Da'wa (which referred in the Qur'an to God's "invitation" to Islam) was reinterpreted at the end of the 19th century to mean the mission, incumbent upon each Muslim, of spreading the correct understanding and practice of Islam (Mahmood 2005, 57–64). Through perpetual refashioning over the last decades, the concept came to include a variety of activities ranging from the establishment of Qur'anic schools, mosques, and printing presses to the building of charity and welfare organizations. Benevolent activity is now one of the emblematic markers of being a Muslim.

After the 1970s, benevolence came to be more central to Islamists' activities as a response to increasing impoverishment in Egypt: The decline of the welfare state and the reinterpretation of da'wa coincided to give a boost to khayr. Interestingly, some members and affiliates of Islamist organizations split from the main body to establish less religiously oriented aid organizations. These joined the largest complexes of aid-provision in the region, one of them boasting around a 100,000 volunteers a year.

While Islamic NGOs, most of them involved in aid, comprised 16 % of all Egyptian NGOs in the 1960s, in the 1970s this ratio increased to 30 %, and then to 43 % in the 1990s (Abdelrahman 2004, 138). Bayat (2002, 12) reports that Islamic aid organizations "accounted for one-third of all Egyptian private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in the late 1980s, and at least 50 % of all welfare associations (or 6,327) in the late 1990s." Kandil (1998, 145–146) notes that the 4,000 registered zakat committees collected $10 million in 1992 and provided health services to 15 million people (as opposed to 4.5 million in 1980). These numbers, it should be added, do not take into account the informal (as well as illegal) Islamic aid activities.

Methods

During 2009 and 2010, I interviewed 52 people and conducted research on 17 organizations involved in aid. These associations were located in Cairo and one other major Egyptian city. I visited the headquarters, branches and premises of some of these organizations and observed their activities on site.

The interviewees were contacted through snowballing. I aimed to talk to people of various ages and backgrounds, though high and middle socioeconomic status interviewees constitute the majority of the sample due to the nature of benevolent work. Ten of the benevolence providers were in their 20s, six in their 30s, twelve in their 40s, twelve in their

50s, and five in their 60s (the two who declined to provide their age appeared to be in their 40s or 50s). Twenty-five of them held managerial positions in the associations studied, nine were staff and thirteen were volunteers. Twenty-one worked in professional jobs (as professors, engineers, architects, veterinaries, doctors, and NGO professionals), five were businessmen, one was a banker, three were managers in companies, two of them retired military officers, two were shopkeepers, two were teachers, five worked in clerical and technical positions, three were workers and three were housewives. All of the five beneficiaries interviewed were illiterate housewives in their 30s and 40s. The sample was composed of 20 women (including the beneficiaries) and 32 men.

The main goal of data collection was to understand how the organizations differed with respect to their dispositions to benevolence (as specified in Table 1) and the state. Along these lines, I asked the managers and staff about organizational structures, recruitment strategies, the weight of each benevolent activity in the overall budget, the criteria with which the beneficiaries are selected, expectations from beneficiaries, and cooperation with ministries. I also asked all of the interviewees (managers, staff, volunteers, and beneficiaries) about their own personal history of involvement in benevolent activities, their understanding of the reasons behind poverty, and the changes in their understanding of poverty and the poor throughout the years. Most interviews were recorded and lasted between half an hour and 1 hr and a half. In addition, I had structured conversations with journalists, academics, and government representatives, who ranged from being sympathizers to opponents of pious charitable organizations.

As the research was based mostly on interviews (and less on direct observation), some points of public concern remained unresolved. For instance, even though the activists in the communitarian associations were forthcoming about their investment in elevating the religious level of the poor, this paper cannot demonstrate whether these associations make conservative forms of piety a condition for aid (a very common accusation against them). Similarly, the data cannot reveal whether the associations are transparent about their sources of funding.

Multiple aspects of my status as a researcher have affected data collection. As a male researcher, I had restricted access to the female sphere. My origins in a predominantly Muslim country (Turkey) eased access to the field. Nevertheless, being a foreigner and having an affiliation with an American university still posed problems. The fact that I could speak (albeit with limitations) and read Arabic, however, dissipated some of the initial tension. Most of the interviews were conducted in Arabic. Some of the interviews (with the neoliberal organizations only) were conducted in English, while systematically mixing in Arabic in order to get information on the local terms used in charitable work.[5]

The Field of Benevolence in Egypt

The pious aid organizations in Egypt tend to fall into four categories. I have developed this categorization as a heuristic (the respondents did not classify the field in this way). The core difference I want to highlight is between communitarian groups (A and B) and market-oriented groups (C and D), but it is also important that we notice differences of emphasis within these two overarching categories:

A) Protection and *da'wa*-oriented. These associations, the most influential and oldest in Egypt, combine Islamic educational activities with the provision of basic necessities.

[5] Even though I received help from a research assistant and interpreters for some of the interviews that were conducted in Arabic, the final translations of the quotations are mine.

B) Protection and politics-oriented. Political organizations invested in charity work are also old. They focus mostly on the provision of necessities and establishing political influence. I still classify them as communitarian despite their differences from associations in group A, as they subordinate individual ethics, expectations and explanations to communal ones.
C) Protection and training-oriented. A new wave of charitable associations have pushed da'wa to the background and mostly focus on the provision of necessities, while also aiming to make the poor self-sufficient in a market society.
D) Predominantly market-oriented. Also a part of the same wave, these associations differentiate themselves from the former by focusing mostly on developmental activities and only marginally on direct provision.[6]

Below, I chart a map of the benevolence field.[7] The largest market-oriented and communitarian organizations were included in the research, with the exception of one major communitarian charity (which was not accessible, partially due to the tense political climate in 2010, but also in part due to the relative insularity of the organization). Other smaller organizations were also included based on availability.

While there are innumerable Egyptian associations that fall under the categories A, C and D, category B is sparsely populated due to the scope of its ambition (combining all imaginable aspects of political, religious, and economic work with charitable activity). The analyses below start by discussing the most prominent organization in each category and then move on to other large and small ones, with the exception of category B, where the only organization under scrutiny is the Muslim Brotherhood. Each section provides a short history of a major organization in that category, as well as a study of its structure, activities and funding sources; these descriptions are then followed by the analysis of that category's actors' dispositions and their understandings of poverty and expectations from the poor.

Communitarian Associations

Protection and Da'wa-oriented

The Piety Association[8] is one of the biggest representatives of communitarian charity. The Piety Association was established (by a cleric) at the beginning of the 20th century and hence predates the Muslim Brotherhood (established by a teacher in 1928). According to the documents of the association, it takes care of more orphans than the government (close to 600,000).

It allocates around 50 % of its funds to da'wa (establishing and running Qur'anic schools, building mosques, organizing sermons and lessons, and shaping individual lives according

[6] Swidler and Watkins' (2009) analysis of the use of development funding in Malawi can help us better understand the differences between groups C and D. The authors point out that international agencies that promote a "sustainable" approach to funding the poor (the most market-oriented way of giving in terms of the vocabulary used in this paper) have three axes of giving: training, support of volunteer activity, and direct funds only for income-generating projects. While we see a high concentration of training and income-generating projects in group D, training and volunteerism (but not income-generating projects) are emphasized in group C.

[7] Since systematically comparable numbers on budgets of each association are not available, the numbers provided throughout the analysis are tentative. This is due to widespread reluctance in the Middle East to reveal financial details about giving (Ibrahim 2008, 9). Ibrahim states that "the realm of philanthropy is surrounded by a great deal of secrecy, especially with regard to finance and the amount of assistance offered" (Ibrahim, 10). Moreover, even executive managers are not fully aware of the full financial picture.

[8] Except the Muslim Brotherhood (which is inevitably exposed due to its sheer centrality and fame), I will use pseudonyms for all the associations involved in charity work.

to Qur'anic principles),[9] 20 % to medical services, 10 % to other necessities and orphanages, less than 10 % to administrative costs, and 10 % of its funds to development.

The members of the organization argue that its funds come from *zakat* and volunteer money. The critics of the organization (ranging from a prominent Egyptian journalist to a politicized cab driver) argue that it is secretly funded by the Saudis. They also accuse the organization for not being accountable about how the zakat money is spent.

Both insiders and outsiders of the association emphasized that its members are paid very little. The top managers are volunteers rather than professional staff. But significantly, they use a distinct, religiously based word for volunteer (*muhtasib*, rather than *mutatawwi'*, which is the standard Arabic word for volunteer). Muhtasib comes from the verb *ihtasaba*: "To anticipate a reward in the hereafter by adding a pious deed to one's account with God." Muhtasibin, then, are anticipators of heavenly reward, not just volunteers. The word also implies that these volunteers have a religious duty to "inspect" society.[10] In short, the modus operandi of the managers is not marketized.

The association's director told me that when he goes on a trip, he pays out of pocket. The managers of some other organizations confirmed that such self-sacrificing behavior is a pattern in associations such as Piety and indicative of their unprofessional approach and low quality (from the market-oriented perspective). While these communitarian actors did not openly denigrate their market-oriented rivals, one could sense, in between the lines, a deep suspicion regarding the administrative costs of these associations. Hence the implicit strategy of distinction: the insistence that they were "anticipators," not volunteers.

One distinguishing feature of protection-oriented charities regards the way they apportion blame for social ills. In opposition to market-oriented charities, they do not see poverty as a resultant of individual characteristics, but of the oppressive and non-Islamic nature of Egyptian society and state. One of the managers of a small association, who attributed the responsibility for dire conditions directly to the better off and powerholders, exemplified this tendency:

> [The cause of poverty is] *zulm* [un-Islamic oppression]. The responsible persons severed their links with the poor. They don't hear the pain and the suffering. Poverty is increasing. … Islam is the solution. It is just rule: rule based on God's book (Islam, huwa al-hal. huwa hakim 'adil. Hukm bi kitab Allah) … And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed—then it is those who are the disbelievers.[11] … Every leader has the responsibility to [take care of his group] and listen to citizens' problems and complaints.

Finally, he got very concrete about how this should be done: "Every factory should build homes for their workers ["'an kulli masna' yebni sakan lil-'ummal]. The public sector should be as it was under Nasser." While the managers of market-oriented associations attributed corruption and inefficiency to state-owned enterprises, this manager constructed them as strong and efficient, at least during Nasser's rule. He interestingly combined an allegiance to Muslim Brotherhood rhetoric with a yearning for "Arab socialism" (which the

[9] Note that while in some theological scholarship da'wa is used in a comprehensive way to refer not only to these strictly religious activities, but also to welfare and politics (to the degree they serve religion); in the brochures, websites and spoken discourse of most aid organizations, the concept was used in the sense specified in this paragraph, along its late 19th-early 20th century (pre-Muslim Brotherhood) re-interpretation.

[10] In pre-modern Islamic societies, muhtasibin was the word used for public employees in charge of inspecting markets and crafts (as well as urban infrastructure, welfare, and the religious correctness of people's private lives) with an explicit Qur'anic duty to enjoin good and prohibit evil (Foster 1970, 140–142). In some Arab countries such as Tunisia, it means "treasurer" in the modern times.

[11] This sentence is a verse from the Qur'an (5:44), though the interviewee did not highlight it as such.

Brotherhood had subscribed to in the 1950s and early 1960s, and then repudiated after Nasser's extremely repressive, anti-Islamist moves).

Protection and Politics-Oriented

The Brotherhood is by far the biggest representative of the political protection-oriented organizations. Insiders and outsiders' estimates of its number of volunteers ranged from hundreds of thousands to millions. Its beneficiaries are said to be in the hundreds of thousands.

The old regime has attempted to register the Brotherhood as a charitable association, but the organization has denied this offer, along with some other organizations in groups A and B (though one major organization in group A has accepted this legalization). As the old regime suspected Islamic associations, especially those in groups A and B, association laws (such as those of 1964 and 2002) tightly regulated their provision activities (Abdelrahman 2004). Under these circumstances, remaining an illegal organization allowed the Brotherhood to be much more flexible than some of the other major players in group A.

In the old regime, the Brotherhood managed charity activities in four major ways:

i) Through partnership and merger with semi-independent charity organizations. Due to the illegal status of the Brotherhood, some of its partner organizations were unregistered. They had neither official buildings or headquarters, nor official bank accounts.
ii) Through professional syndicates, such as the medical syndicate, which provide free medical services to the needy. The Brotherhood has dominated most syndicates starting with the mid-1980s. The syndicates were legal, but Brotherhood control over them has not always been legal and transparent. At the end of the 1980s, Brotherhood members started to win the elections in these syndicates. After 1992, the regime tightened syndicate laws and regulations to make such clear election victories impossible. In the 2000s, the Brotherhood was reported to exert influence on the syndicates through having its members elected to key offices.
iii) Through the direct contact of the Brotherhood with neighborhoods, families, and individuals in need.
iv) Through infiltrating legal, registered aid organizations. Brotherhood activists joined legal associations and worked as quite dedicated members. According to some allegations, when they distributed goods and services, Brotherhood activists told the beneficiaries that the source of this benevolence was the Brotherhood.

The Brotherhood's sources of funding are zakat and sadaqa, as in the organizations in group A. In addition, every member of the organization has to give 7–10 % of his income to the Brotherhood. Moreover, the Brotherhood organizes the shopkeepers (butchers, barbers, grocers, etc.) and medical experts of each neighborhood so that they can provide their goods and services to the poor for free—which is also seen as a khayr activity.

The organization provides monthly salaries, food bags, clothes, writing materials, medical services, elderly care, conflict resolution, and education to the poor and orphans. It has only recently started to provide employment skills. One MP stated very bluntly, differentiating their organization of charity from the newer associations: "The priority for us is to feed [the poor and the elderly]," not "developmental" and training activities. In other words, while the Brotherhood's understanding of charity is not restricted to distributing immediate necessities to the poor, it self-consciously avoids putting self-help market-oriented activities

in the center. Despite all, the Brotherhood *is* marginally involved in providing poultry and farm animals in some rural regions to encourage the poor to feed themselves and occasionally, to use them for the market, if possible. This so far feeble shift of the Brotherhood to market-oriented aid displays a parallel to the organization's more advanced shift to a market-oriented macro-policy position.

As a response to the question about the root causes of poverty, Brotherhood members emphasize the weakness of the "correct" understanding of religion among potential donors, attesting to the non-neoliberalization of their understanding of poverty. Hence, the Brotherhood's religious activities are not differentiated from its provision activities (a non-differentiation that also characterized group A). A director of a Brotherhood-controlled professional syndicate explained why we should not think of provision apart from making people more religious (and religious in the right way):

> Charity culture in Egypt and in the Arab world is weak, in comparison with the USA, England, etc. But Islam is the religion of good works. Charity culture is weak because people are far from the true understanding of religion (li enne an-nas ba'id 'an fehm haqiqi ad-din)! You can find in the mosques people who have memorized the Qur'an … but they don't know khayr. This will change through lectures, by talking about Islam, by talking about good works … by spreading this idea (muhadarat, bi kellim 'an Islam, bi kellim 'an al-athar al-'amel khayri … bi nashr hadal-fikr) … as well as building hospitals that provide cheap services.

He then gave examples of imprisoned Brotherhood members who have done this. The open target of these comments was unidentified and unspecified mosque-goers; Muslim associations that did not combine benevolence with vibrant religion were not criticized, at least openly.

The managers of communitarian organizations also emphasized that, unlike in (what I call) market-oriented organizations, their administrative costs were minimal, which minimized the risk of corruption. They were also proud of the more voluntary (rather than salary-based) participation of many managers (and some staff), again attesting to the non-marketized management structure. Unlike the market-oriented actors, the communitarian actors did not have a thorough and sustained critique of the overall vision of the other party.

Market-Oriented Associations

The organizations in these two last categories are smaller and relatively new. They started to be established in the 1990s. Almost all of these organizations emphasize that they are not engaged in da'wa, even though their work is inspired by Islam and they depend on (zakat and) sadaqa. However, there were shades of difference among the newer associations, as the managers in some associations emphasized that they are happy to see some beneficiaries become more pious in the process of working with their association. Also, some of these facilitate Qur'an recitation competitions and celebrations of religious festivals.

All of these organizations defined themselves as *gam'iyyat khayriyya* (benevolent associations), just like the associations in groups A and B. They had a claim to the same religious word and thus to comparable sensibilities. This also implies they were competing for overlapping (though not completely identical) pools of zakat and sadaqa.

Protection and Training-Oriented

Though both groups of organizations are market-oriented, there are certain differences between them. The third group, larger than the fourth group in terms of the number of volunteers and

activists it mobilizes, combines provision of necessities and developmental activities. In most group C associations, provision outweighs developmental programs. Yet, the Chinese proverb regarding the value of teaching people how to catch fish rather than giving them fish is a commonplace among this group's activists. The top management is professionalized to a certain degree, but the organizations still depend on a lot of volunteer work.

One of the largest organizations in this group, Nour Association, was founded by a professor and his students at the end of the 1990s. In about a decade, the organization was able to establish more than 50 branches all over Egypt. The association now mobilizes around a 100,000 volunteers a year, most of them young people.

The organization targets not the richest, but average Egyptians as its source of funding. Most of the funds are spent on orphanages. The other activities are elderly care, distributing clothes, transportation, recycling, and training in literacy and communication skills. The director of the organization emphasized one central characteristic that differentiates them from other charity organizations: the spirit of volunteerism (also emphasized by a board member of the second biggest organization in group C).

The director of Nour pictured their project of giving to the poor as a necessary ingredient of marketization, an approach I did not encounter in any of the communitarian associations:

> For Egypt to become strong and good, it has to have a great civil society where people depend on themselves. … It is wrong for the government to do everything. This paralyzes society. … I don't wait for the government to do anything. We help if we can help.

The director also differentiated his Islamically-inspired benevolence from Islamist benevolence based on a few principles: more restricted goals, non-political goals, and individualized motivation.

> We are trying to spread volunteerism. Our dream is that everybody helps everybody else as a volunteer. … This is different from the Islamic movement. They are thinking of building a new society. We do not dream that way. … People consider this charity work as a way of coming closer to God. But this does not make them Islamists. … Our volunteers are religious in the sense that they love the religion … and they think what they do will make them closer to God. And [what they do] is a part of religion. … But they do not have the ideology of making everyone else like us.

Some of the respondents in this category combined protective policies and anti-market discourse with market-oriented metaphors (such as calling care a "business"). The director of another large organization reacted to what he saw as traditional charity:

> Our goal is alleviating hunger (qada al-gu'). … We work B to B, that is, business-to-business, not business to consumer. We do not deal with poor people, at all. We work with NGOs located in certain places, because they are more capable of reaching people. … [Through them] we reach the poorest villages. … We concentrate on orphans, widows, [the disabled], and elderly people—people who cannot work—so that we don't make people lazy.

However, shortly afterwards, he also criticized rival philanthropists who had told him to exit "the charity market" if he is not up to the competition. According to the director, "Khayr is beyond any marketing philosophy or tools because the reward of being good is beyond what any product can promise you. It is *gannah* [heaven], you cannot quantify it."

This director differentiated his organization from more market-oriented associations (which work with an explicit market "philosophy," pressure their rivals to exit the market,

and which allegedly strive to quantify everything, even faith) *and* communitarian associations (which allegedly tend to make people lazy).

Predominantly Market-Oriented

The organizations in this last group are small in terms of their staff (ranging from a dozen to 200 people), but they have extensive funds. Almost all of their staff is composed of professionals. The salaries are competitive, attesting to the marketization of benevolent activities. The managers of these associations are also among the primary sources of funding for their organizations: whereas in groups A, B and C most managers are also donors (as all better off Muslims are required to be), the class background of the managers in D allows a stronger overlap between the role of donor and aid manager.

The developmental tendencies among these organizations are stronger than those in group C. A few of them told me that everybody already knows we should teach poor people how to fish rather than giving them fish, but their mission is teaching how to be clever fishermen, how to catch the fish with less cost, and even how to *make* a fishing net, underlining the deeper marketization of both discourse and practice within group D.

One of the largest organizations in this category is the Sirat al-Mustaqim Association. It was established in the beginning of the 2000s. The founders were mostly businessmen. The organization operates more than 200 primary schools, which serve close to 6,000 students. It also supports (what it defines as) "productive families" through means such as constant income, provision of livestock, and debt relief.

The organization invests sadaqa (but not zakat) in finance and industry, with the aim of then circulating this money back to charitable activities. Its managers want to create companies along these lines and build up "a circle of stakeholders." This heavy involvement in finance (another dimension of deeper marketization) raises suspicion in some Islamic circles, but the grand mufti's involvement as a board member serves as a shield against such doubts (or, alternatively, further reinforces some Islamists' indictment that these types of associations are merged with the state).[12]

The managers of the Sirat al-Mustaqim Association are critical of volunteer activity (predominant in groups A through C), which they associate with lack of awareness and commitment. The organization recruits multinational companies' employees in order to build a professional staff. Demonstrating the deep marketization of their actions and mentality, the managers underline the high returns such highly qualified professionals would bring to their associations when compared to volunteers.

The director of one of the smaller associations also exemplified how some benevolent activity is market oriented not only in a negative sense (as in removing the need for the state) but also positively constructive of the disciplined subjects needed for a market society:

> In our training center, we offer [the beneficiaries] professions, just like the Polytechnique. Carpenting, plumbing … whatever profession is required. And we don't just train them and let them go into the market without any job opportunities. We talk to the factories. There are clothes and furniture factories around. We ask them if they need workers. And all of them do because they have a problem with consistency: people come, they work for 2 months, factories invest in their training, and then they leave! We take the unemployed,

[12] The grand mufti is the highest *official* authority in charge of issuing *Islamic* legal opinions. A prominent Islamic law expert brings credibility to the association, together with the complicating factor that the grand mufti is appointed by the (old) regime.

> train them, and factories hire them. … [We tell the trainees:] "If you don't work [for that factory], you are no longer in our database."

Previous research has shown that micro-credit disciplines the poor through the burden of debt (Karim 2008; Roy 2010). Some Egyptian khayr organizations seem to have discovered much more direct and ingenious ways of disciplining the poor: making loyalty to a specific industrialist the condition of sustained help.

Whereas attitudes toward privatization are mostly mixed or negative in groups A and B, and mostly mixed in group C, managers and staff of group D are in favor of privatizing everything (but this is less true of volunteers and female staff, and there was one exception among male managers too). Moreover, they see their activities as a resultant of privatization and they also pick people who have worked in the private sector as their staff. They distrust former government employees, whom they see as inefficient and unprofessional. One of them told me that privatization not only creates the funds and the appropriate social environment for benevolent activity, but also the right mentality.

Mobilization, State and Capital in the Making of the Benevolence Field

What accounts for the relative weight of each group in the benevolence field? Egypt is home to quite large organizations that have undergone only partial neoliberalization (group C). The communitarian organizations (groups A and B) are still predominant (in terms of the people they reach and take care of, as well as the number of activists they mobilize). However, given the extensive funds and growing dynamism of group D organizations, a thorough marketization of benevolence might be on the horizon. Why do communitarian organizations still outweigh marketized organizations? Do they have the capacity to sustain their predominance?

I propose some preliminary answers based on the interactions between mobilization, civil society, and the state. The Muslim Brotherhood's (and others') tight linkage of political, charity, and da'wa activities throughout a century creates an inertia that is hard to break. What is more, this cannot be taken as an unreflexive inertia: The Brotherhood mobilizes all its resources in support of a comprehensive understanding of Islam (*fehm ed-din esh-shamil*, a key phrase that came up in all Brotherhood interviews).[13] It controls—through public and secretive, legal and illegal ways—civil society to a certain extant, preventing a complete shift in a market-oriented direction.

However, Egyptian communitarian charities have not sufficiently gone beyond reproducing paternalistic elements: They have not developed new mechanisms that could present alternatives to neoliberal *techniques*. As critics of these associations point out (Bayat 2002; Ibrahim 2008), they have a tendency to stick to pre-marketization routines, rather than constructing mechanisms that could go beyond both paternalism and marketization, and perhaps thereby redefine the meaning of "development" in the aid field. Only market-oriented philanthropy has been able to develop ways to transform the poor into "empowered" actors in the struggle against their blight. Communitarian charitable techniques, by contrast, tend to preserve the passive status of the poor as (solely) the receivers of aid. They are paternalist in the sense that they implicitly picture the poor as in need of

[13] This emphasis can be seen also in the texts of a sociologist revered by and connected to both the Brotherhood and the market-oriented associations: Ghaanim (2010, 13–14, 70) argues that a meticulous study and knowledge of Islamic law (as well as morality based on the knowledge of that law) is necessary for effective benevolent activity.

protection by the wealthy, whereas market-oriented philanthropy is relatively less paternalistic to the extent it seeks to involve the poor as participants.

Furthermore, while the actors in the communitarian organizations harshly attacked the current system (sometimes using the word "capitalism") none of the interviewees presented even the outline of an alternative to neoliberalism (either inside or outside the boundaries of capitalism). The few concrete non-neoliberal suggestions fell back on Nasser's failed state capitalism (as evinced by one of the quotations above) rather than drawing on novel post-neoliberal projects. The knowledge of such projects, it must be emphasized, mostly remain restricted to academic elites (plus a few practitioners) rather than having a mass circulation worldwide, which can be seen as one reason why benevolent activists might find it difficult to imagine concrete alternatives. The decreasing interest of Islamists in post-capitalist ways of organizing society might be a related reason why these aid providers do not think about serious alternatives to neoliberalism. Islamic critiques of capitalism, and theological discussions of alternatives, have been increasingly marginalized in pious circles throughout the region (Tuğal 2009). The communitarian organizations still build on the more moralistic aspects of such critiques. For instance, they point out that focus on material gain prevents people from thinking about God and developing a refined understanding of Islam (while the pious neoliberals might not see a contradiction between materialistic and pietistic orientations). Yet, the communitarians do not use such moralism as a jumping board to question the socioeconomic mechanisms of capitalism (despite their emphasis on "comprehensive" religion).

To the degree that these associations have incorporated more rational and systematic techniques, the lines between them and the market-oriented association blur. An example of this is the increasing number of market-oriented programs they deploy. Even though still outweighed by their provision and pietistic programs, organizations such as the Piety Association have initiated developmental programs. The Piety Association's website also emphasizes that volunteering to help the poor teaches young people self-confidence, ability to make decisions, and hard work (the very vocabulary the market-oriented associations have popularized).

In other words, despite their verbose attacks against capitalism, communitarian organizations' suspicion of market ethics does not sublate into alternative techniques; these organizations, therefore, risk being absorbed into expanding marketization. Neoliberalism has already appropriated the anti-paternalist arguments of bottom-up (e.g. feminist) movements for its anti-communitarian agenda of rendering the poor individuals responsible for their own destiny (Bumiller 2008; Tadros 2010, 225). The study of Islamic movements once again underlines that when movements (whether feminist or communitarian) do not develop solid alternative techniques, they risk being incorporated.

The market-oriented associations were not, then, in an irreversibly disadvantaged position because of their shorter history. Indeed, in addition to their more developed techniques, they had another solid weapon against the protection-oriented associations: their links to the state. Especially some of the major organizations in group D had tight links with the central government and its institutions. For example, they regularly used the government's databases and funding; they were engaged in knowledge exchange with the government; and some of their cadres also came from a governmental background, even though this was denied in rhetoric. Organizations in group C also had links with the military (e.g. family links; retired generals on their boards; etc.). Especially the businessmen in both C and D had personal links and even friendships with some ministers. They had more structural and entrenched links too, such as food donation programs with the Ministry of Tourism. It is also telling that whenever I brought this topic up through questions, respondents denied any link with the state (even database use). I got the information only when they brought the topic up

themselves. Civil society organizations wanted to picture themselves as independent from the state, to the extent possible.

These patterns suggest that the more neoliberal organizations are more closely linked to the state, in defiance of pro-free market expectations. In an ideal free market world, aid organizations would liberate society from state tutelage and guidance, fulfilling the neoliberal hope of reducing state intervention in people's lives. However, in the world I have observed, a more thorough market-orientation was possible only via more engagement with the state.

This deep state involvement in the so-called "non-governmental" realm is restricted neither to Egypt nor to Islamic benevolence. One of the world's major Christian-turned-secular philanthropic organizations, Save the Children, has ex-generals on its team of top managers. Many other global players also incorporate such figures, since links with states procure funds and other advantages (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003, 90). Moreover, Wolch (1990) has shown that, in the United States, the more the lines between government and NGOs are blurred, the more "entrepreneurial" the activities of the NGO become. In other words, the cards seem to be stacked against communitarian tendencies within the realm of benevolence, partially due to the merger of beneficence with the neoliberal state—not only in Egypt, but throughout the globe as well. This balance of forces has significant implications for a possible "embedding" of the market.

Conclusion

Can we see the signs of a full-fledged Polanyian "double movement" in Egypt? Are pious Islamic circles among the leaders of counter-movements against the marketization of society? Building on existing literature (Atia 2008; Roy 2010), this paper dispels any myths that Islamic mobilization as a whole might be a barrier against the havoc wrought by unfettered capitalism. Islamic circles have displayed neoliberal as well as non-liberal tendencies. There might be signs of an Islamic counter-movement in Egypt, but we have to dig deep into the differences between religious actors to trace the tracks of the double movement's "second leg." While the persistence and redefinition of communitarian charity might indeed lay a basis of the second leg of the double movement, it is too early to call this a clearly counter-market *movement* yet; it is at best a tendency.

What will really determine the meaning of less marketized forms of benevolence is their articulation to emergent welfare regimes: Will the communitarian organizations be reduced to props of neoliberal entrenchment if the Brotherhood assumes a more complete control of the Egyptian state, as happened in Turkey's experiment with Islamic politics (Buğra and Candas 2011)? Will their investment in orphans (and other "deserving poor") become an excuse for disinvestment in the working poor if the Brotherhood manages the Egyptian economy? The market-oriented tendencies within Brotherhood charity activities have been covered above. So far, these have been subordinate to other tendencies and activities, but the aftermath of the 2011 revolt might lead to thorough changes.

The conservative leadership of the Brotherhood first tried to prevent its members from joining this revolt; then, after its young members pulled the organization into the process, the leadership still condemned labor action. Young Brotherhood members converged, in the spring of 2011, with other pro-labor revolutionaries in demanding the establishment of a social justice-based democracy. The Brotherhood leadership purged these members as a response. Ironically, what started out as a social justice revolt all over Egypt ended up strengthening the pro-business elements in the Brotherhood. It is still an open question

whether the new Brotherhood's more pronounced pro-business macro-policy tendencies will also be translated into a more market-oriented overhaul of its day to day operations, such as its charity activities.

Preliminary fieldwork by the author in the summer of 2012 suggests that Egyptian benevolent activities are in a state of flux. As economic activity has stalled after the events of 2011, poverty has exploded. The funding of benevolent organizations has not kept pace with this explosion. It is too early to gauge how these developments will transform the overall pro- and anti-market orientations discussed here. But if the leadership of the new Brotherhood actively promotes a market mentality within the domain of Islamic charity, the communitarian charity organizations in Egypt might come to resemble the neoliberal philanthropic associations. The end of the Brotherhood's illegality too (with the possible result of the registration of its charity activities) might allow it to be absorbed fully into the neoliberal regulatory apparatus. Hence, the merger of the Brotherhood with the state could definitively seal the fate of communitarian giving.

Such fragility of communitarian benevolence highlights the power of political factors that mold the ethics of giving. This paper therefore calls scholars to focus more thoroughly on the political determinants of associational activity. The tight (and increasing) interdependence between associations on the one hand and the state and political movements on the other thoroughly shapes benevolence, especially in the age of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism deploys intense state involvement, not only in issues of security, but also in "managing" liberalization (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Jones and Ward 2002; Peck and Tickell 2002, 394–395). In the case of Egypt, this involvement is manifested in the state's participation in boards of benevolent organizations (which are imagined to be the antidotes to an interventionist government). Benevolence has become a site of active social engineering, whereby businesses and pro-business officials seek to promote an entrepreneurial culture throughout society.

Critical approaches to Polanyi have so far focused on macro-institutional dynamics (e.g. the weight of finance) that make a re-embedding of the market in the neoliberal age quite difficult (Dale 2012; Wade 2009). This paper draws attention to a micro factor that might also block a full-fledged double movement: the merger of associational activity (more specifically, benevolent activity) with businesses and the state, which has fostered a mutation in the ethics of benevolence. A persistent nurturing of market ethics, not only through the activities of businesses, but also through those of civil society and the state, casts a doubt on the Polanyian belief (Birchfield 1999, 38) that the first leg of the double movement (marketization) is inevitably followed by a second leg (the self-protection of society). Benevolent activity, if revamped, might counter-intuitively become the hand that prevents the second leg from taking a step forward.

Acknowledgments I would like to thank Michael Burawoy, Ann Swidler and three anonymous Qualitative Sociology reviewers for their detailed comments on the text and Momen el-Husseiny for his assistance with research in Egypt. This research was funded by the Hellman Family Faculty Fund, University of California at Berkeley.

References

Abdelrahman, Maha. 2004. *Civil society exposed: The politics of NGOs in Egypt*. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press.

Allahyari, Rebecca Anne. 2000. *Visions of charity: Volunteer workers and moral community*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Annette, John. 2011. Faith communities, communitarianism, social capital and youth civic engagement. *Ethnicities* 11(3): 383–397.

Atia, Mona. 2008. *Building a house in heaven: Islamic charity in neoliberal Egypt*. Unpublished dissertation, University of Washington, Seattle.
Atia, Mona. 2012. "A way to paradise": Pious neoliberalism, Islam, and faith-based development. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 102(X): 1–20.
Bartkowski, John P., and Helen A. Regis. 2003. *Charitable choices: Religion, race, and poverty in the post-welfare era*. New York: New York University Press.
Bayat, Asef. 1997. *Street politics: Poor people's movements in Iran*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Bayat, Asef. 2002. Activism and social development in the Middle East. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 34: 1–28.
Bayat, Asef. 2007. *Making Islam democratic: Social movements and the post-Islamist turn*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Baylouny, Anne Marie. 2010. *Privatizing welfare in the Middle East: Kin mutual aid associations in Jordan and Lebanon*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Bellah, Robert N. 2011. *Religion in human evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Bellah, Robert N., Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton. 1985. *Habits of the heart: Individualism and commitment in American life*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Benthall, Jonathan, and Jérôme Bellion-Jourdan. 2003. *The charitable crescent: Politics of aid in the Muslim world*. London: I.B. Tauris.
Birchfield, Vicki. 1999. Contesting the hegemony of market ideology: Gramsci's "good sense" and Polanyi's "double movement". *Review of International Political Economy* 6(1): 27–54.
Block, Fred. 2003. Karl Polanyi and the writing of the Great Transformation. *Theory and Society* 32(3): 275–306.
Borgonovi, Francesca. 2008. Divided we stand, united we fall: Religious pluralism, giving, and volunteering. *American Sociological Review* 73(1): 105–128.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990 [1980]. *The logic of practice*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Brenner, Neil, and Nik Theodore. 2002. Cities and Geographies of "Actually Existing Neoliberalism". In *Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring in North America and Western Europe*, ed. Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore, 2–32. Malden and Oxford: Blackwell.
Brown, Wendy. 2005. *Edgework: Critical essays on knowledge and politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Burawoy, Michael. 2003. For a sociological Marxism: The complementary convergence of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi. *Politics and Society* 31(2): 193–261.
Buğra, Ayse, and Aysen Candas. 2011. Change and continuity under an eclectic social security regime: The case of Turkey. *Middle Eastern Studies* 47(3): 515–528.
Bumiller, Kristin. 2008. *In an abusive state: How neoliberalism appropriated the feminist movement against sexual violence*. Durham: Duke University Press.
Burchell, Graham. 1993. Liberal government and techniques of self. *Economy and Society* 22(3): 267–282.
Casanova, José. 1994. *Public religions in the modern world*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Clark, Janine A. 2004. *Islam, charity, and activism: Middle-class networks and social welfare in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Dale, Gareth. 2012. Double movement and pendular forces: Polanyian perspectives on the neoliberal age. *Current Sociology* 60(1): 3–27.
Davis, Nancy J., and Robert V. Robertson. 1999. Their brothers' keepers? Orthodox religionists, modernists and economic justice in Europe. *American Journal of Sociology* 104(6): 1631–65.
Davis, Nancy J., and Robert V. Robertson. 2012. *Claiming society for god: Religious movements and social welfare in Egypt, Israel, Italy, and the United States*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Evans, Peter. 2008. Is an alternative globalization possible? *Politics & Society* 36(2): 271–305.
Foster, Benjamin R. 1970. Agoranomos and muhtasib. *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 13(2): 128–144.
Foucault, Michel. 1975/1977. *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison*. London: Penguin.
Foucault, Michel. 2008 [2004]. *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979*. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.
Ghaanim, Ibraahim al-Bayyuumi. 2010. *Maqasid al-'amal al-khayri wa al-usul al-Islamiyya lil-musharaka al-ijtima'iyya*. Cairo: Shorouk.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1981/1985. *The theory of communicative action, vol. 2: Lifeworld and system: A critique of functionalist reason*. Boston: Beacon Press.
Hann, Chris. 2007. A new double movement? Anthropological perspectives on property in the age of neoliberalism. *Socio-Economic Review* 5(2): 287–318.
Harb, Mona. 2010. *Le Hezbollah à Beyrouth, 1985–2005: de la banlieue à la ville*. Paris: Karthala.
Ibrahim, Barbara L. 2008. Introduction: Arab philanthropy in transition. In *From charity to social change*, 1–21.

Ibrahim, Mohammed A. 2004. The political economy of poverty in Egypt (1975–2000): A sociological perspective. *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 15(4): 469–495.
Jones, Martin and Kevin Ward. 2002. Excavating the logic of British urban policy: Neoliberalism as the "crisis of crisis management". In *Spaces of neoliberalism*, 126–147.
Kandil, Amani. 1998. The nonprofit sector in Egypt. In *The nonprofit sector in the developing world: A comparative analysis*, ed. Helmut K. Anheier and Lester M. Salamon, 122–157. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
Karim, Wazir Jahan. 2010. The economic crisis, capitalism and Islam: The making of a new economic order? *Globalizations* 7(1–2): 105–125.
Kienle, Eberhard. 1998. More than a response to Islamism: The political deliberalization of Egypt in the 1990s. *Middle East Journal* 52(2): 219–35.
Mahmood, Saba. 2005. *Politics of piety: the Islamic revival and the feminist subject*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Mauss, Marcel. 1923–24/1990. *The gift: The form and reason for exchange in archaic societies*. New York: W.W. Norton.
Munck, Ronaldo. 2006. Globalization and contestation: A Polanyian problematic. *Globalizations* 3(2): 175–186.
Ong, Aihwa. 2011. Translating gender justice in Southeast Asia: Situated ethics, NGOs, and bio-welfare. *Journal of Women of the Middle East and the Islamic World* 9(1–2): 26–48.
Peck, Jamie, and Adam Tickell. 2002. Neoliberalizing space. *Antipode* 34(3): 380–404.
Polanyi, Karl. 1944. *The great transformation*. New York, Toronto: Farrar & Rinehart.
Raddon, Mary-Beth. 2008. Neoliberal legacies: Planned giving and the new philanthropy. *Studies in Political Economy* 81: 27–48.
Riain, Seán Ó. 2006. Timespace intensification: Karl Polanyi, the double movement, and global informational capitalism. *Theory and Society* 35(5–6): 507–528.
Richards, Alan, and John Waterbury. 2007. *A political economy of the Middle East*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Roy, Ananya. 2010. *Poverty capital: Micro-finance and the making of development*. New York: Routledge.
Salevurakis, John William, and Sahar Mohamed Abdel-Haleim. 2008. Bread subsidies in Egypt: Choosing social stability or fiscal responsibility. *Review of Radical Political Economics* 40(1): 35–49.
Sandbrook, Richard. 2011. Polanyi and post-neoliberalism in the global south: Dilemmas of re-embedding the economy. *New Political Economy* 16(4): 415–443.
Schild, Veronica. 2007. "Empowering consumer citizens or governing poor female subjects? The institutionalization of "self-development" in the chilean social policy field." *Journal of Consumer Culture* 7(2): 179-203.
Singer, Amy. 2008. *Charity in islamic societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Somers, Margaret. 1993. Citizenship and the place of the public sphere: Law, community, and political culture in the transition to democracy. *American Sociological Review* 58(5): 587–620.
Somers, Margaret. 2008. *Genealogies of citizenship: Markets, statelessness, and the right to have rights*. New York and London: Cambridge University Press.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2002. *Globalization and its discontents*. Norton & Company: W. W.
Sullivan, Denis J. 1994. *Private voluntary organizations in Egypt: Islamic development, private initiative, and state control*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
Swidler, Ann, and Susan Watkins. 2009. 'Teach a man to fish': The sustainability doctrine and its social consequences. *World Development* 37(7): 1182–1196.
Tadros, M. 2010. Between the elusive and the illusionary: Donors empowerment agendas in the Middle East in perspective. *Journal of Comparative Studies of Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 30(2): 224–237.
Titmuss, Richard M. 1997 [1970]. *The gift relationship: From human blood to social policy*. New York: New Press.
Tuğal, Cihan. 2009. *Passive revolution: Absorbing the Islamic challenge to capitalism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Wade, Robert. 2009. Is the globalization consensus dead? *Antipode* 41(1): 142–165.
Wilson, John, and Marc Musick. 1997. Who cares? Toward an integrated theory of volunteer work. *American Sociological Review* 62(5): 694–713.
Wolch, Jennifer R. 1990. *The shadow state: Government and voluntary sector in transition*. New York: The Foundation Center.
Wuthnow, Robert. 1995. *Learning to care: Elementary kindness in an age of indifference*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Zubaida, Sami. 1989. *Islam, the people and the state: Political ideas and movements in the Middle East*. London and New York: Routledge.

Cihan Tuğal teaches at the University of California, Berkeley. His book *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism* was published by Stanford University Press in 2009.