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CREATING JUSTICE FOR
THE POOR IN THE NEW METROPOLIS

MARGARET WEIR

POVERTY, IN THE PUBLIC IMAGINATION and the academic literature alike, has long fixated on the system of “urban containment” that trapped the minority poor in low-income urban neighborhoods. The face of poverty that became anchored in the American public mind was African-American, urban, and nonworking. The most vulnerable public debates singled out individual behavior as the cause of poverty. Transforming welfare into a temporary, work-oriented program became the cure. A less visible set of arguments did not blame the poor but rather the environment of the poor as the cause of poverty. Animated by concerns of fairness and equal opportunity, this perspective pointed to the concentration of poverty and the racially driven sociopolitical segregation of metropolitan areas as the prime causes for entrenched poverty. This alternative approach embraced policy solutions that ranged from reorganizing metropolitan area governments to deconcentrating poor people throughout the region.

It is now apparent that the economic, political, and demographic forces that made containment an apt metaphor during the last century have since shifted in complex ways. Assistance to the poor has been transformed by new time limits and work requirements and the social and political geography of poverty has shifted. Urban gentrification, the demolition of public housing under HOPE VI, and large-scale immigration have all combined to increase the racial and economic diversity of the suburbs. Poverty, never the sole province of the inner city, has spread beyond urban boundaries so that by 2005, 53 percent of the poor in large metropolitan areas lived in the suburbs, not the central city (Berube and Kneebone 2006, 4; Frey et al. 2009). Among this diverse group are African-Americans pushed out of the city by gentrification and public-housing
reforms; immigrants seeking to settle near employment centers and searching for affordable housing; and white suburban residents buffered by economic change. To be sure, concentrations of racially and ethnically identified urban poverty persist in cities across the country, but the challenges confronting the urban poor have also shifted as cash assistance becomes ever more rare and ongoing economic change moves jobs further from centers of urban poverty.

The new geography of need, together with policies that make the well-being of the poor contingent on market income, poses fundamental questions about justice. Is the more complex political geography of poverty creating new kinds of place-based inequalities? And if so, then how should they be understood? As poverty has taken on a more complex spatial configuration, what have we learned about the efficacy of the last decade’s progressive solutions—regionalism and deconcentrating the poor—as antipoverty strategies? What are the implications for devising new approaches that build toward a more just metropolis? This chapter addresses these questions. It begins by examining the disappointing outcomes of efforts to promote regionalism and deconcentration of the poor. It then presents a typology for characterizing the economic and sociopolitical context that confronts the poor in different parts of metropolitan areas. I highlight in particular the dangers of “extrusion,” a demographic-political pattern that leaves low-income communities with an even weaker social safety net and less access to opportunity than in the past. In so doing, I show how this array of public and private institutions violates basic principles of distributive justice. The final section of the chapter considers the political strategies and policy orientations that can help chart a path toward a more just metropolis.

The Disappointments of Metropolitan Reform

Since the rediscovery of regionalism in the early 1990s, advocates have touted its virtues as a solution to a diverse menu of urban, suburban, and national ills, ranging from economic competitiveness to global warming to growing economic inequality. One reason for regionalism’s popularity was that it meant so many different things to different people. For some of its supporters, regionalism entailed new forms of collaboration among business elites; for others, it meant state regulations, such as tax-base sharing that links the economic fate of the region’s localities together; for still others, regionalism evoked the image of authoritative institutions that can devise and implement plans for rational patterns of metropolitan growth and development.

For those concerned with urban poverty, metropolitan reform promised a way to challenge the twin pillars of urban containment: political boundaries and racial-economic segregation. Since the incorporation of the first suburbs, affluent communities have used political boundaries to protect themselves from the costs and inconvenience of lower-income residents. During the postwar era, the defensive localism of the suburbs not only constituted the flip side of urban containment but also began to establish an economically distinctive patchwork among suburban areas. Political boundaries meant that critical public goods, such as schooling and basic services, varied widely by jurisdiction. Boundaries also served as institutional bulwarks designed to produce homogeneous populations (Lowrey 2000; Bickford 2000; Weiher 1991; Weir 1994). Earlier waves of regionalism had sought to erase those boundaries through governmental consolidation, but by the 1990s, most regional reformers dismissed this approach as politically unrealistic. Instead, they sought to promote policies and build regional connections designed to make existing boundaries less significant. One of the most important policies they embraced to reduce the economic significance of political boundaries was tax-base sharing that aimed to distribute the benefits of prosperity across the region (Orfield 2002).

To challenge the second pillar of containment, racial and economic segregation, a second set of policies, including inclusionary zoning and public-housing reform would help mix up populations that had been sorted by income and by spatial location (Rusk 1993; Turner, Popkin, and Rawlings 2008; Goetz 2003). Local control of zoning had long served as a powerful tool for carving metropolitan areas up into jurisdictions with distinct income profiles. The combination of urban renewal and segregated public housing had played a major role in creating “the second ghetto” of concentrated poverty in the postwar era (Hirsch 1983). Together, reforms requiring that affordable housing be built throughout the metropolitan area and that distressed public housing be replaced with mixed-income developments would break the pattern of poor black cities—wealthy white suburbs that characterized many metropolitan areas. By tackling the twin pillars of containment, this new cluster of reforms would begin to correct the policy biases that had long forced low-income communities to swim against the tide of policies that sent
people and investment out of cities; instead, metropolitan reforms would help create new connections and fresh opportunities (O’Connor 1999).

Yet more than fifteen years after ideas about regionalism reappeared in policy debates, the achievements are disappointing. They are especially unsatisfactory when it comes to the protection of the interests of low-income residents and low-income communities. Indeed, many of the regional reform ideas that have been put into place in recent years either have been indifferent to low-income communities or have actually harmed them.

Efforts to reduce the economic significance of political boundaries have run into major political roadblocks. Only four metropolitan regions have adopted some form of tax-base sharing and only in Minnesota’s Twin Cities does the policy redistribute significant revenue. Despite the considerable interest these ideas provoked around the country during the 1990s, no metropolitan area adopted the broad tax-base sharing scheme put into place forty years ago in the Twin Cities.

Instead, business groups seeking to promote economic competitiveness became the most ardent backers of regionalism (Peirce, Johnson, and Hall 1993; Dodge 1996). Their central goal in reducing the significance of metropolitan boundaries, however, was not to promote redistribution but rather to decrease competition among jurisdictions in order to market the region as a single entity. On the whole, this type of regionalism has been indifferent to the issues facing low-income communities. At worst, it has directed resources away from projects that would benefit low-income groups toward those that advantage businesses and upper-income residents. Recent developments in Pittsburgh provide an example of how regionalism can harm low-income communities. As the city moved toward bankruptcy in 2004, efforts at regional revitalization, overseen by the state-initiated Intergovernmental Cooperation Authority, focused on the development of regional assets, not the city and its neighborhoods. In the words of one critic, “Resident tax money goes to large regional projects like baseball and football stadiums, convention centers . . . [while] neighborhood assets like parks and recreation and senior centers are squeezed to the point where now they are threatened with total elimination” (McCollester 2005). A secondary impact of such regional revitalization is gentrification. New regional assets located in the central city may indeed help ailing central cities. But this approach may revitalize cities at the expense of low-income residents who find themselves displaced to new urban—or, increasingly, suburban—settings.

Efforts to dismantle the second pillar of urban containment—racial and income segregation—have confronted similar obstacles. Inclusionary zoning, the most far-reaching policy lever for mixing up populations by income and, by extension, race has been adopted in only a handful of settings, accounting for just 5 percent of the population by one count (Rusk 2005). A second set of policies that sought to “deconcentrate the poor” has achieved mixed results (Goetz 2003; Turner, Popkin, Rawlings 2009). Influenced by arguments about the dangers of concentrated poverty, the HOPE VI program promised to demolish the most “severely distressed” public housing and replace it with mixed-income units (Hirsch 1983; National Housing Law Project 2002; Turner, Popkin, and Rawlings 2009). In practice, however, the program’s successes have often occurred at the expense of the poorest residents (Popkin et al. 2004). Cities, with the blessing of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, have also used the program to demolish nondistressed housing in areas attractive to private investors (National Housing Law Project 2002). The failure to construct enough replacement housing for low-income residents and the restrictions attached to the new mixed-income developments have made HOPE VI a significant factor in reducing the supply of deeply subsidized housing and displacing the poor in some metropolitan areas (Popkin et al. 2004).

In many metropolitan areas, ideas about regionalism have seeped into the domain of civic debate and sparked conversation about the region. But because these ideas are so diffuse and rarely attract a powerful constituency, they have had little impact on the public regulations and policies that have turned metropolitan areas into a patchwork of separate and unequal jurisdictions. Indeed, in some cases, policy shifts related to the aspirations of regionalism have exacerbated regional inequalities.

Conceptualizing the New Metropolitan Patchwork

Although ideas about regionalism and the policies associated with it have had limited impact, during the past two decades, dramatic demographic and economic shifts have altered metropolitan areas in ways that make the old picture of white suburbs—poor black city far too simple. Three forces that are remaking metropolitan areas include immigration, “demographic inversion,” and “job sprawl.” As the classic postwar city—suburb antimony becomes less meaningful in many metropolitan areas,
new ways of conceptualizing regional inequality and access to opportunity become imperative.

The growing immigrant presence in the suburbs has begun to attract wide attention (DeParle 2009; Dawkins 2009). By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the majority of immigrants lived in suburbs, not cities (Singer, Hardwick, and Brettell 2008). Many of these immigrants were new arrivals who had broken the pattern of a century earlier by bypassing the city. Instead, they migrated directly to the suburbs, following job growth. Yet greater proximity to jobs does not by itself guarantee an escape from poverty. Given their lower education levels and greater presence among the working poor, the influx of immigrants has been a significant factor in the growth of suburban poverty. In 2009, 41 percent of poor immigrants lived in suburbs, not cities; 16 percent of the suburban poor were foreign born (U.S. Census Bureau 2009).5

The second force remaking metropolitan areas is what Alan Ehrenhalt has called “demographic inversion” (Ehrenhalt 2006). In his view, the influx of high-income whites back into cities and the movement of low-income African-American residents to suburbs is reconfiguring the basic demographic pattern that has characterized metropolitan areas during the postwar era. The movement of upper-income residents into the city reverses a more basic pattern established in American and British cities during the dawn of the industrial age (Fishman 1989). Among the drivers of this change are rising traffic congestion, which reduces the quality of life in suburbs; high energy costs, which made suburban life more expensive; and a heavily marketed cultural shift that has given “downtown living” an attractive, sophisticated patina (Leinberger 2007). For low-income African-Americans and some Latinos, these trends have caused displacement, one of the central causes for moving to the suburbs. The shift is a real, but as Ehrenhalt notes, it is an emerging trend that has only begun to alter the older demographic pattern.

The third factor reshaping metropolitan areas is ongoing “job sprawl” (Kneebone 2009). The exodus of jobs to suburban areas began in earnest during the 1970s. Since that time, analysts have studied the impact of “spatial mismatch” on the job prospects of African-Americans stuck in cities as jobs moved outward (Kain 1968; Stoll 2005). In subsequent decades, that pattern has become even more pronounced and more complex as more jobs have relocated to higher-income suburbs and more lower-income people have moved to suburbs in response (Holzer and Stoll 2007). In a study of metropolitan labor markets, Harry Holzer and Michael Stoll found that a majority of residents in lower-income suburbs commuted to higher-income suburbs or to the central city for work. Those residing in higher-income suburbs were more likely to work in the higher-income suburbs or in the central city, while central-city residents were overwhelmingly likely to work in the central city (Holzer and Stoll 2007, 5–6). The significance of these patterns greatly varies by metropolitan area. In some regions, such as Chicago, Atlanta, and Denver, the higher-income suburbs with job growth are located at the opposite end of the metropolitan area from the suburbs that are home to lower-income residents (Holzer and Stoll 2007). This pattern greatly exacerbates the problem of spatial mismatch by making employment opportunities even less accessible. In other metropolitan areas, such as Baltimore and Boston, the upper-income suburbs experiencing job growth are nearly contiguous to the lower-income suburbs. In such settings, the movement of jobs to upper-income suburbs is less likely to exacerbate spatial mismatch and may even help mitigate it.

As these three forces reshape economic and demographic patterns, they are rendering obsolete the older lens through which the challenges associated with poverty in metropolitan America have been interpreted. Established assumptions about the characteristics of particular places, such as cities and suburbs, no longer hold. Yet the older models are not easily replaced by new labels, since the relationship among places is central in shaping access to opportunity. Moreover, because the characteristics of place interact with the resources and connections of the people in them and because they vary in light of their history, places that are similar in some respects may, in fact, operate very differently when it comes to connecting residents to opportunity or providing safety nets to them.

These considerations suggest a two-dimensional model by which to characterize subsections of metropolitan areas. As Table 10.1 indicates, the first dimension measures the locational advantage of particular places. The vast literature on spatial mismatch has highlighted the

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<th>Organizational-political endowment</th>
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Table 10.1. Two-dimensional characterization model for metropolitan areas

Creating Justice for the Poor
economic importance of proximity to jobs for low-income workers. Recent work demonstrates that greater job decentralization particularly disadvantages black residents (Stoll 2005).

The second dimension, which has received much less attention, characterizes the organizational–political endowment of particular places. The organizational endowment encompasses such factors as the fiscal capacity of political jurisdictions, the presence of public services such as clinics and hospitals, and the array and capacity of nonprofit organizations, which deliver many key social-welfare services (Allard 2009). After decades of devolution and contracting out of government services, it is this often jumbled and arbitrary set of institutions that serves as a social safety net and springboard to opportunity for people in low-income communities. The political endowment refers to the capacity and will within the area to articulate the interests of low-income residents and the ability to effectively represent those interests in the arenas where their concerns can be addressed.

The distribution of such organizational and political endowments across political jurisdictions is a crucial component of a just metropolis. Analyses of justice in the metropolis have touched on this issue in highlighting the uneven distribution of educational opportunities across political jurisdictions. For example, Stephen Macedo’s chapter in this volume shows how reliance on the property tax to fund education creates sharp differences in educational quality across the metropolis, etching deep-seated inequalities into a foundational public program. Unequal access to education leads to fundamental injustices in life chances, especially in a nation where free public education has long served to justify a limited social-welfare state (Flora and Heidenheimer 1981; Steffes 2007).

But the significance of local organizational and political endowments for justice extends well beyond the institutions of public education. For low-income individuals and families, access to social services, provided by both public and nonprofit organizations, constitutes an essential aspect of the safety net that promotes more equal life chances. This role has become especially significant since 1996, when new provisions in welfare legislation sharply reduced access to cash assistance for families with children, put time limits on the number of years a recipient would be eligible to receive welfare, and made work the central goal of the welfare system. These reforms made the basic well-being of the poor more dependent on markets in a context where the jobs open to unskilled workers provide limited income and few of the “fringe benefits” associated with higher-wage jobs (Hacker 2006). But even to participate in those markets, many low-income people must rely (to varying degrees) on support from a range of publicly provided services, including transportation, health care, child care, food assistance, job training, and housing assistance. The location of these services matters. If food banks or child-care centers are located far from the residences of low-income people, then they will be of limited use to those in need. Those without access to such services are severely handicapped in their efforts to enter the workforce and remain in it, which is now a requirement for receiving benefits.

The density of organizations in a particular location matters as well. Mario Small’s research on organizational networks shows how ties among organizations can play a critical role in providing needed services to low-income people (Small 2009). In places with a cluster of service organizations, clients are more likely find help in connecting to other needed services. Information sharing across service organizations lowers the barrier to securing services when clients need to access multiple bureaucracies. Places with more service organizations and a longer history of such organizations are more likely to have developed the ties that facilitate such information sharing. For this reason, low-income people living in a suburban location—even a prosperous suburban area—with few social services may be at a disadvantage when compared to their inner-city counterparts.

The political endowments of place are also a critical component of a just metropolis. The availability of public services that create the foundation of fairness for low-income people depends on the supply of resources to fund them. These services are funded by a complex set of public dollars from federal, state, local, county, and township governments. In some places, simple lack of fiscal capacity limits the availability of services for the poor. In other places, however, it is the willingness and ability of political leaders to address the needs of low-income residents that determines the supply of services. The calculations of politicians about whether to address the needs of poor residents depends on the structure of the local political system, the incentives of different types of political leaders, and on the mobilization of the poor.

Political analysts have long noted the ways that the characteristic elements of Progressive urban reform—at-large systems of political representation, appointed officials, and council–manager forms of urban government—disadvantage low-income residents. Voter turnout in such systems is notoriously low, and the basic institutional mechanisms of
the ward system for boosting voter turnout are missing (Self 2003). To be sure, machine-style politics is no guarantee that a city will engage in broad voter mobilization, since both machine- and reform-style politics can work to suppress votes, as Jessica Trounstine has shown (2008). Even so, the structural features of politics in reform-style political systems make it more difficult to mount political campaigns that mobilize low-income voters.

Differently situated political leaders may also react differently to the needs of low-income constituents. As the political scientist Paul E. Peterson suggested over thirty years ago, city political leaders, responsible for managing the fiscal well-being of their city, may have more incentive to ignore the poor who are costly and contribute little to the city’s coffers (Peterson 1981). This may be especially true in places that house residents with diverse incomes. Higher-income residents are more likely to have the political skills and connections to make their issues most politically relevant. But even in places with sizeable numbers of low-income residents, city leaders are often more interested in using scarce resources to lure higher-income residents to their localities. The incentives for ward-based city-council members, state legislative representatives, and members of Congress are different. In each case, these politicians may be more receptive to securing resources for low-income residents where they form a sizeable part of their electoral base.

The political mobilization of the poor is the third element of political endowment relevant to securing benefits for low-income residents. The poor are rarely poised to exercise power directly in urban politics; they can, however, benefit from the advocacy of experienced organizations dedicated to serving low-income residents. In many places, these service organizations function as the main voice for the poor. In some cases, nonprofits or public agencies directly advocate for the poor in city and state governments. In other cases, they forge ties with politicians in a machine-like system of political patronage. These “machine-community-based organizations can deliver substantial resources to poor neighborhoods (Marwell 2007). For example, Nicole Marwell’s study of community politics in Brooklyn shows how one community-based organization was able to secure millions of dollars through its connection with powerful state and congressional representatives (2007). Another study of a CBO in Newark shows how the network of relations between a nonprofit and a politician built since the 1960s created a multifaceted, multimillion-dollar service organization (Casciano 2009). These relationships have drawbacks: they may take a long time to develop, and they restrict the scope of political voice as the machine politicians set the political agenda.

The distinctive cross-cutting of locational advantages and organizational-political endowments creates different kinds of places within metropolitan areas for low-income residents. For much of the period after the 1960s, low-income people in metropolitan areas were concentrated in inner cities, where the war on poverty and the political mobilization of the minority poor created a hodgepodge of organizations designed to serve the poor. The capabilities of these organizations varied greatly across cities, and in many places, they deteriorated over time as resources dried up and political pressure to address the needs of the poor waned. As the pattern of metropolitan settlement has grown more complex with the settlement of low-income people across the metropolitan area, it has become essential to understand how the new combinations of location and organizational-political advantage affect the life chances of the poor. It is especially urgent given the transformation of social-welfare policy into a system that makes assistance conditional on work and leaves much of the provision of supportive services to state and local governments, who in turn contract much of them out to community-based organizations.

The Historical Legacy of Place and the Unjust Metropolis

A closer look at the development of distinct metropolitan places, illustrated with examples from the Chicago metropolitan area, suggests how and why these locational advantages and organizational-political endowments vary across subregions within metropolitan areas. The Chicago case also illuminates how difficult the task of creating new institutions in new places can be.

Whether suburban residence translates into opportunity for low-income people depends heavily on the locational advantage of the suburban area. This may vary sharply by race and ethnicity. For example, in Chicago, Latinos—who are disproportionately likely to be poor—have moved in the general direction of job growth over the past four decades, while African-Americans—also more likely to be poor—have moved in the opposite direction. 6 Growing numbers of poor African-Americans are moving to very poor suburban towns on the far south side of the city, far from the centers of job growth. Latinos, by contrast,
have migrated closer to the centers of job growth in the north and west of the city. For low-income African-Americans and Latinos who remain in the city, the locational disadvantages are less extreme than for those in the poor southern suburbs, but the ongoing movement of jobs further north and west has increased the challenge they face in connecting to opportunity.

African-Americans in the poor south suburbs of Chicago are very likely to settle in areas with high levels of poverty and in political jurisdictions with extremely low fiscal capacity. For those who do, the disadvantages of location are extreme. They not only are far from jobs but also suffer from the attendant ills of concentrated poverty with meager local public resources available for remedying their situation. For immigrants, the story is more complex. Although they are more likely to live closer to job centers, many low-income immigrants are clustered in declining industrial cities (e.g., Waukegan, Elgin, Aurora, and Joliet) that have been engulfed by the expansion of the Chicago metropolitan area. Their locational advantage is thus tempered by the dangers of creating new concentrations of poverty and by the limited fiscal capacity of these suburban jurisdictions. When low-income residents are concentrated in separate suburban jurisdictions, meager local fiscal resources make it impossible to reproduce one of the key economic ladders available in affluent suburbs: good schools.

The organizational-political endowments of places may help compensate for or they may exacerbate locational advantages and disadvantages. Organizational and political endowments are historically developed characteristics of place that do not shift easily. In Chicago, as in many cities, earlier waves of European immigration and the more recent innovations of the war on poverty in the 1960s left an extremely varied legacy of organizations dedicated to serving the poor. Indeed many vital institutions that serve low-income communities, such as social-service agencies, hospitals, clinics, parks, and recreation centers, were the hard-won fruit of community struggles of the 1960s. These institutions—both public and nonprofit—have long played a vital role in providing services and opportunities for the poor. Recent research on New York City shows how second-generation immigrants can use these institutions to obtain a foothold on the economic ladder (Kasinitz et al. 2008). The organizational endowment of these places is strengthened by the presence of local philanthropy. Cities also were (and in many cases remain) the sites of enormous wealth creation, reflected today in the presence of community and national foundations that have invested in the social infrastructure for the poor.

In most suburbs, created as places of private middle-class and working-class life, access to services and community institutions is more difficult for low-income residents. Suburbs have no comparable history of immigrant settlement and the upheaval of the war on poverty that bequeathed to cities a set of institutions designed to serve low-income residents. As a result, the network of nonprofit organizations that has developed in cities since the 1960s has no counterpart in most suburbs. This means that these organizations have to be created from scratch. In many suburban areas, this is a daunting task. Even when region-wide institutions, such as the United Way, try to expand their reach into the suburbs, they often can find no counterparts with which to connect (Reckhow and Weir forthcoming). Compounding the difficulties of creating new services is the fact that suburbs do not have the philanthropic infrastructure to help support organizations that provide services to the poor. Moreover, the suburban public sector—apart from schools—is generally weak. In the Chicago metropolitan area, for example, this is evident in the absence of a public hospital in the suburban counties and a generally weak system of suburban transportation.

A similar contrast is evident when it comes to political voice for the poor. Public bureaucracies, for which service to the poor is a central mission, may also serve as influential advocates for the poor. For example, in Chicago, Stroger Hospital, the main public hospital, and its employees have offered significant muscle to support institutions that provide health care to the poor. The challenge of building new clinics to serve uninsured residents of the suburbs has proven much more difficult. The weak organizational infrastructure of the suburbs makes it much more difficult to advocate on behalf of low-income residents. Lacking the residue of machine politics, the Chicago suburbs typically offer few handholds for mobilizing new voters. Mayors and other politicians in very poor towns may be attentive to the needs of their residents but have little power to address them. In some northern suburbs, politicians have devoted more effort to discouraging the poor from settling there than to addressing their needs (Kotlowitz 2007b). Local officials are particularly prone to react this way when the low-income residents are immigrants, many of them undocumented. The tactics that local officials have used to discourage low-income residents are many, ranging from restrictions on the number of residents who can live in a single-family home, to English-only
rules, to requirements that landlords check legal status before renting (Dawkins 2009). The private and nonprofit institutions that do provide services in the suburbs, such as health care, are geared to more-affluent clients and may be poorly equipped to serve those with less income.7

I have presented these differences in organizational and political endowments as features that distinguish cities and suburbs, but it is important to note that not all cities share these characteristics. Many cities, particularly the sunbelt cities that grew dramatically in the second half of the twentieth century, such as Houston and Phoenix, have no organizational legacy comparable to that of cities in the Northeast and Midwest. With distinct histories and political systems, these cities were late to develop a nonprofit sector and often lack a strong philanthropic community. And as Amy Bridges (1997) has pointed out, the political systems of these cities are more akin to those of reform suburbs, where rule by a narrow set of elites was the norm and political institutions were designed to discourage political participation.

In the development of postwar Chicago, as in many other metropolitan areas, the majority of suburban areas functioned as the bedroom community for the growing middle class. Some suburbs, particularly south of the city, were also home to workers and the industrial manufacturing sector, notably steel and autos, that employed them. But as immigrants and low-income residents have moved to these places and as economic transformation has left some suburbs without jobs or public resources, the quest to create a more just metropolis must put the challenges of these new places front and center.

The Dangers of Extrusion

The two-dimensional model creates four distinct patterns of locational advantages and organizational–political endowment. The first is the model of inclusion that has inspired reformers since the earliest efforts to open the suburbs to minority and lower-income residents. The next two are variants of containment. One is the familiar model of “urban containment,” where low-income communities are stuck in cities, where access to employment is difficult, and where concentrated poverty exacerbates the problems of the poor. In this model, a relatively developed system of social services helps to mitigate poverty, but in many cities, that system has deteriorated under the strain of increased demand and restricted resources. The second pattern is “segmented inclusion.” In this model, which describes the situation of many immigrants and some African-Americans in the suburbs, the crucial locational advantage is proximity to employment and a lower likelihood of residing in a community of concentrated poverty. But with a weak system of social services, few institutions to promote economic mobility, and low political influence, low-income residents in such settings find economic security and mobility difficult to obtain. For them, suburban residence does not convey the opportunities commonly associated with it.

The model also introduces a new pattern: “extrusion.” This pattern occurs when immigration, job sprawl, and demographic inversion (or some combination of the three) interact to produce extreme disconnection from the rest of society. In this pattern, characteristic of some African-American and immigrant suburban settlements, as well as some sunbelt cities, low-income residents live far from employment centers; they are likely to reside in communities of concentrated poverty and in jurisdictions with low fiscal capacity. In contrast to the older model of urban containment, places of extrusion have weak organizational and political endowments to assist residents in coping with or remedying the social and economic problems they confront.

The potential for extrusion has been amplified by two additional factors affecting African-Americans and immigrants. For African-Americans in particular, the dramatic growth in the prison population, the sharply restricted employment opportunities for those released from prison, and the legal limits on their political engagement greatly exacerbate locational disadvantages. Given their handicap in the job market, those with felony records are especially likely to need social and employment services to reintegrate into the community. Immigrants face a different issue that exacerbates extrusion: the fact that an estimated one-third of all immigrants are unauthorized. This legal status undermines locational advantages for those that have them and intensifies the challenge for those in disadvantaged locations.

As these considerations suggest, the elements of this new metropolitan typology do not represent pure models but rather a continuum of possibilities, with extrusion at the extreme pole. Many features of extrusion may also exist in the two containment models. The movement of jobs further from cities exacerbates spatial mismatch; gentrification can begin to erode the nonprofit infrastructure of cities (or, in the case of hospitals, reduce their willingness to serve low-income clienteles); and inadequate resources can overburden public institutions, such as
hospitals and clinics. Immigrants in suburban areas may locate closer to jobs but live in communities of concentrated poverty and low fiscal capacity, magnifying obstacles to economic security or upward mobility.

As the typology suggests, the demographic and economic changes of the past two decades have not tempered the inequalities of the older political–spatial system: in important respects, they have exacerbated those problems. And in numerous ways, they have altered the nature of the problems associated with inequalities and, as such, call for new kinds of solutions.

**Conclusion: Institution Building for a Just Metropolis**

The new geography of poverty and opportunity suggests the need to rethink key aspects of the way we approach metropolitan inequalities. Three elements of a new approach include a focus on institutions as well as individuals, renewed attention to the way the federal policy sets the rules of the game for how metropolitan areas operate, and recognizing how federal policy can strengthen the voice of low-income Americans.

During the 1990s, the debate about the problems associated with concentrated poverty led to support for its opposite: the solution to concentrated poverty was to deconcentrate it. Yet as suburban poverty has grown (as a result of both policy and individual migration choices), it has become clear that deconcentration focused too much on individuals and not enough on institutional infrastructures. The language of self-sufficiency that has permeated policy debates since the 1990s helped to obscure the ongoing need for a range of services even for the working poor. It also concealed the antipoor bias already built into the infrastructure of American metropolitan areas from the organization of transportation to the location of work. Strategies to promote inclusion require attention to the location, capacity, and purposes of institutions and the fit of each with the needs of low-income residents.

Second, it is striking how much of the debate about regional inequality in the past two decades focused on local policies, such as zoning. Local decisions are, without a doubt, critical in shaping the structure of opportunity throughout metropolitan areas. But it is important to remember that the federal government was central in creating the policies that underpinned urban containment in the postwar era (Hirsch 2000). Because federal policy plays such a key role in setting the rules of the game for local decisions, it is essential to understand how federal rules magnify the disadvantages of the poor and how they could instead mitigate those disadvantages. For example, the geographer Mark Hughes has argued that the federal government has amplified the obstacles that local boundaries create with the “administrative geography” it sets up for key programs such as workforce training (Hughes 2000). Alternative organization of federal programs can facilitate access to resources throughout the metropolitan area rather than making it more difficult.

Finally, the obstacles and needs of low-income residents vary so much within and across metropolitan areas that amplifying the voice of low-income people themselves is crucial to designing appropriate policies (Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka 2009). The federal government can play a role here as well. Provisions in federal laws may open doors for the participation of groups that would otherwise have little power in decisions. Recent efforts in the domain of transportation provide some evidence of the difficulties and possibilities for building “vertical power” that allows advocates for low-income interests to enter policy arenas that had been closed to them (Swanstrom and Banks 2009; Weir, Rongerude, and Ansell 2009).

The postwar metropolitan form of middle-class, white suburbs and poor, minority cities has been shifting for several decades. As it does so, it presents new dangers of an even more divided metropolis, where “extrusion” of the poor renders poverty more even intractable and less visible than in the past. Even for those who live closer to work opportunities, suburban residence is no guarantee of economic security or upward mobility. Recognition of these facts is a first step in designing policies and institutions that promote inclusion.

**Notes**

1. Arnold Hirsch uses the term “containment” to describe the impact of federal and local policies on African-Americans in postwar Chicago (see Hirsch 2000).
3. The aspirations of the Chicago Metropolis 2020 effort, a business-linked group, have been especially attentive to issues related to low-income groups, but their achievements in this regard have been limited.
4. A major Urban Institute study of HOPE VI has found that some residents used housing vouchers to move to urban neighborhoods with less-concentrated poverty.
5. Thanks to Ryan Hunter for for providing this data.


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