While research shows that penal state interventions facilitate a wide range of detrimental consequences, theoretical accounts rarely specify the role of micro-level agency. To address this gap, I advance the concept of Collateral Decision-Making: the process by which individuals, embedded in a criminal-legal institution, make decisions that carry adverse consequences in another institutional domain. To mitigate negative experiences generated by a criminal-legal institution, individuals reframe how they navigate another institution. To illustrate this process, this article analyzes in-depth interviews with 65 pretrial detainees simultaneously embedded in two distinct state institutions— jails and criminal courts. The findings expose why and how the disadvantage of pretrial detention recalibrates decision-making and translates into unfavorable outcomes, as detainees adopt plea agreements to escape violence, the misery of court holding tanks, poor jail conditions, and caretaker obligation frustration—even while maintaining innocence. Notably, the analysis also reveals that detainees sometimes forgo the benefit of legal counsel, offering a compelling account of how this decision appears reasonable within the structural constraints of jail detention, yet ultimately reproduces institutional disadvantage. The findings illustrate the propensity of the penal state to shape individual behavior across institutions and underscore the salience of multiple institutional embeddedness for understanding social disparities.
